Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-25-00338-CR BILLY LONDON HUGHES, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 31st District Court Gray County, Texas Trial Court No. 12774, Honorable Steven R. Emmert, Presiding November 18, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. Appellant Billy London Hughes appeals his conviction for the third-degree felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, one gram or more but less than four grams, 1 and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. 2 By two issues, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress 1 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(c). 2 The jury found two enhancement allegations true and sentenced Appellant to life in prison. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(d). because the deputy (1) conducted a Terry 3 frisk without having a reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and (2) exceeded the scope of a valid Terry frisk when he seized an object in Appellant’s sock without first detecting a weapon-like object or the object being immediately apparent to be contraband. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND On the night of November 24, 2024, Deputy Demontray Sibley of the Gray County Sheriff’s Office observed an automobile being driven without a front license plate. He initiated a traffic stop when the vehicle pulled into a nearby Allsup’s convenience store. Deputy Sibley approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and explained the reason for the stop. The vehicle contained five occupants including Appellant who was seated in the front passenger seat. After advising the occupants that the vehicle smelled like marijuana, Sibley said, “I’m about to pull all of you out” starting with the driver. While Sibley was speaking to the driver, Appellant inquired whether he could go into Allsup’s to “get something to eat.” Sibley deemed this request “weird” and “suspicious.” He told Appellant he could not leave because Sibley was waiting for backup units, and remarked, “I don’t want y’all to try and jump me.” After his backup arrived, Sibley informed Appellant he needed to exit the vehicle so he could conduct a pat-down of Appellant. Appellant stepped out of the car as requested. After Sibley asked Appellant whether he had any paraphernalia or weapons, Appellant disclosed that he “ha[d] some knives.” During the pat-down, Sibley removed several knives from Appellant’s person. Then, while “patting down [Appellant’s] lower half down by his sock,” Sibley “felt something” he described as 3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 889 (1968). 2 “little bitty rocks inside [Appellant’s] sock,” or a “bulge of rocks.” Sibley “knew it was probably paraphernalia or something illegal.” Sibley asked Appellant what the item was and Appellant responded, “c’mon man.” Sibley removed the item, a small plastic bag of methamphetamine, and placed Appellant under arrest. Appellant moved to suppress the methamphetamine seized from him during the traffic stop both before and during trial. The jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence using a bifurcated standard. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Id. When, as here, there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that 3 would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When, as here, the parties relitigate the suppression issue during the trial on the merits, we review all the evidence presented during the pretrial hearing and at trial. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. A “stop” and “frisk” by a law enforcement officer implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31. An officer is constitutionally justified in frisking an individual he has lawfully detained if a reasonably prudent person would be warranted in the belief that the individual was armed and that “[the officer’s] safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The officer “need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed”; he need only possess specific and articulable facts which, together with reasonable inferences from those facts, in light of the officer’s experience, reasonably lead him to conclude that the detained individual might possess 4 Appellant mentioned both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 9, of the Texas Constitution in his issues, but his argument addressed only the Fourth Amendment. We limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 4 a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–27; Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191. “Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual [subjective] state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer may not conduct a pat-down search as a matter of routine. Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 192. However, objective facts can justify a pat-down search even if the officer conducts a pat-down search as a part of a stated routine. O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 554. The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonably prudent person in the officer’s situation would be justified in fearing for his safety to the point that a pat-down search for weapons is necessary to assure the officer’s safety. Id. Contraband detected through the sense of touch during a pat-down search of a suspect may be admissible. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373–74, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). There has been no invasion of privacy if an officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object with a contour or mass that makes its identity immediately apparent. Id. at 375. REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONSIDER APPELLANT ARMED AND DANGEROUS In his first issue, Appellant contends that Sibley’s categorical policy of frisking all vehicle occupants without individualized reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and dangerous violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches. The State, in turn, responds that objective facts were present that justified a pat-down regardless of any evidence establishing a routine. We agree with the State. 5 Although Sibley testified that it was his custom to conduct a pat-down search of an individual for weapons when he pulled them out of a vehicle, he also provided other objective facts upon which a reasonably prudent person could base a belief that his safety or the safety of others was in danger. O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 554. Sibley provided three objective facts that gave him reasonable suspicion to pat down Appellant for weapons: (1) he initiated the traffic stop alone and was “outnumbered” by the presence of five individuals, (2) he deemed Appellant’s request to leave during the traffic stop to “get something to eat” as “weird” and “suspicious,” and (3) Appellant voluntarily disclosed that he was armed with knives. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that an officer’s solitude during a traffic stop may contribute to an objectively reasonable concern for the officer’s safety. Id. at 553. Here, it is undisputed that Sibley was patrolling alone and, after realizing that he was outnumbered, Sibley immediately radioed for backup. Appellant’s behavior in asking if he could leave before backup arrived to “get something to eat” was another specific and articulable suspicious circumstance. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009) (“[A] traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.”); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007) (it is reasonable for passengers to expect officer conducting traffic stop will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize officer’s safety). Finally, before he began the pat-down, Sibley inquired of Appellant whether he had any guns on him, and Appellant replied, “I’ve got knives on me.” Appellant did not specify how many knives he had or where they were located. See Lerma, 543 6 S.W.3d at 192 (disclosure of pocketknife prior to pat-down did not alleviate potential threat of additional weapons). It would be unreasonable to deny Sibley the right to neutralize the threat of physical harm presented by Appellant’s admission that he was armed with knives. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983); Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 192. Evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence supports a finding that Sibley was concerned for his safety when he conducted the frisk. Multiple objective factors support the trial court’s conclusion that an officer in Sibley’s position could have reasonably believed Appellant was armed and the officer’s safety was in danger. The trial court did not err in concluding that Sibley was objectively justified in patting down Appellant for weapons. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. SCOPE OF FRISK In his second issue, Appellant maintains that Sibley exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk by searching Appellant’s sock without first (1) detecting a weapon- like object was present or (2) determining the incriminating nature of the object seized was immediately apparent. The State responds that (1) an officer may seize a non- weapon during a lawful pat-down for weapons when it is immediately apparent that what the officer is feeling is contraband; and (2) during the lawful pat-down of Appellant’s sock, it was immediately apparent to Sibley that the object was contraband. We again agree with the State. While conducting a lawful frisk, Sibley removed several knives from Appellant’s person. Notably, Appellant did not say how many knives he had, and additional knives 7 could have been concealed in his socks. As Sibley was patting down Appellant’s lower leg, Sibley squeezed Appellant’s ankle and “felt something” he described as “little bitty rocks inside [Appellant’s] sock” or a “bulge of rocks.” Sibley “knew it was probably paraphernalia or something illegal.” He suspected he was feeling methamphetamine. He asked Appellant what the item was, and Appellant responded, “c’mon man.” Sibley testified that it was good to ask Appellant what the item was “to hear what he had to say.” According to Sibley, “from [his] training and experience, just previous encounters feeling methamphetamine. Just that unique feeling,” he believed it to be methamphetamine. Appellant’s claim that Sibley exceeded the scope of the Terry frisk is unavailing because the “plain feel” doctrine allows for the lawful seizure of an object “whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent” and is incriminating in nature, so long as the officer does not manipulate the item to determine its identity as contraband. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375–76; Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 & n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Here, Sibley did not manipulate the sock or “bulge” in concluding that Appellant had contraband in his sock; he only squeezed Appellant’s ankle. Sibley was unequivocal in testifying that he knew immediately that what he felt was “something illegal” based on his training and experience. See Young v. State, 563 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (“[A]n officer’s training and experience might help him identify, based on plain feel, certain objects like a crack pipe or a cocaine rock.”). Appellant also contends that Sibley was uncertain about what he felt or that he needed further investigation because he asked Appellant what the item in the sock was before he seized it. We conclude the question from Sibley was rhetorical rather than 8 investigatory because Sibley did not need further investigation to determine that the bulge was contraband. Given the trial court’s implied fact findings and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling, the record supports a conclusion that the incriminating nature of the contraband became immediately apparent through Sibley’s lawful touch. Accordingly, Sibley’s search was proper within the “plain feel” doctrine and did not exceed its scope. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. CONCLUSION Having considered both issues raised by Appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judy C. Parker Chief Justice Do not publish. 9