Billy London Hughes v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket07-25-00338-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00338-CR
BILLY LONDON HUGHES, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 31st District Court
Gray County, Texas
Trial Court No. 12774, Honorable Steven R. Emmert, Presiding
November 18, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant Billy London Hughes appeals his conviction for the third-degree felony
offense of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, one gram or more
but less than four grams, 1 and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. 2 By two issues,
he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress
1 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(c).
2 The jury found two enhancement allegations true and sentenced Appellant to life in prison. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 12.42(d).
because the deputy (1) conducted a Terry 3 frisk without having a reasonable suspicion
that Appellant was armed and (2) exceeded the scope of a valid Terry frisk when he
seized an object in Appellant’s sock without first detecting a weapon-like object or the
object being immediately apparent to be contraband. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On the night of November 24, 2024, Deputy Demontray Sibley of the Gray County
Sheriff’s Office observed an automobile being driven without a front license plate. He
initiated a traffic stop when the vehicle pulled into a nearby Allsup’s convenience store.
Deputy Sibley approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and explained the reason for
the stop. The vehicle contained five occupants including Appellant who was seated in
the front passenger seat. After advising the occupants that the vehicle smelled like
marijuana, Sibley said, “I’m about to pull all of you out” starting with the driver. While
Sibley was speaking to the driver, Appellant inquired whether he could go into Allsup’s to
“get something to eat.” Sibley deemed this request “weird” and “suspicious.” He told
Appellant he could not leave because Sibley was waiting for backup units, and remarked,
“I don’t want y’all to try and jump me.” After his backup arrived, Sibley informed Appellant
he needed to exit the vehicle so he could conduct a pat-down of Appellant. Appellant
stepped out of the car as requested. After Sibley asked Appellant whether he had any
paraphernalia or weapons, Appellant disclosed that he “ha[d] some knives.” During the
pat-down, Sibley removed several knives from Appellant’s person. Then, while “patting
down [Appellant’s] lower half down by his sock,” Sibley “felt something” he described as
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 889 (1968).
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“little bitty rocks inside [Appellant’s] sock,” or a “bulge of rocks.” Sibley “knew it was
probably paraphernalia or something illegal.” Sibley asked Appellant what the item was
and Appellant responded, “c’mon man.” Sibley removed the item, a small plastic bag of
methamphetamine, and placed Appellant under arrest.
Appellant moved to suppress the methamphetamine seized from him during the
traffic stop both before and during trial. The jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced
him to confinement for life in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence using a bifurcated
standard. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing
the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State,
800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc.). The trial judge is the sole trier
of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give
almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and
application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn
on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on
those questions de novo. Id.
When, as here, there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested
findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that
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would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s rulings, supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236,
241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court’s
legal ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also
dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
When, as here, the parties relitigate the suppression issue during the trial on the merits,
we review all the evidence presented during the pretrial hearing and at trial. Gutierrez v.
State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 U.S.
CONST. AMEND. IV. A “stop” and “frisk” by a law enforcement officer implicates the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95
S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31. An officer is
constitutionally justified in frisking an individual he has lawfully detained if a reasonably
prudent person would be warranted in the belief that the individual was armed and that
“[the officer’s] safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Lerma v.
State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The officer “need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed”; he need only possess specific and articulable facts
which, together with reasonable inferences from those facts, in light of the officer’s
experience, reasonably lead him to conclude that the detained individual might possess
4 Appellant mentioned both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, § 9, of
the Texas Constitution in his issues, but his argument addressed only the Fourth Amendment. We limit our
analysis to the Fourth Amendment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993).
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a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–27; Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 191. “Whether a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the
officer’s actual [subjective] state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.”
O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
An officer may not conduct a pat-down search as a matter of routine. Lerma, 543
S.W.3d at 192. However, objective facts can justify a pat-down search even if the officer
conducts a pat-down search as a part of a stated routine. O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 554. The
relevant inquiry is whether a reasonably prudent person in the officer’s situation would be
justified in fearing for his safety to the point that a pat-down search for weapons is
necessary to assure the officer’s safety. Id. Contraband detected through the sense of
touch during a pat-down search of a suspect may be admissible. See Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373–74, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). There has
been no invasion of privacy if an officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and
feels an object with a contour or mass that makes its identity immediately apparent. Id.
at 375.
REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONSIDER APPELLANT ARMED AND DANGEROUS
In his first issue, Appellant contends that Sibley’s categorical policy of frisking all
vehicle occupants without individualized reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed
and dangerous violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches. The State, in
turn, responds that objective facts were present that justified a pat-down regardless of
any evidence establishing a routine. We agree with the State.
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Although Sibley testified that it was his custom to conduct a pat-down search of an
individual for weapons when he pulled them out of a vehicle, he also provided other
objective facts upon which a reasonably prudent person could base a belief that his safety
or the safety of others was in danger. O’Hara, 27 S.W.3d at 554. Sibley provided three
objective facts that gave him reasonable suspicion to pat down Appellant for weapons:
(1) he initiated the traffic stop alone and was “outnumbered” by the presence of five
individuals, (2) he deemed Appellant’s request to leave during the traffic stop to “get
something to eat” as “weird” and “suspicious,” and (3) Appellant voluntarily disclosed that
he was armed with knives.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that an officer’s solitude
during a traffic stop may contribute to an objectively reasonable concern for the officer’s
safety. Id. at 553. Here, it is undisputed that Sibley was patrolling alone and, after
realizing that he was outnumbered, Sibley immediately radioed for backup. Appellant’s
behavior in asking if he could leave before backup arrived to “get something to eat” was
another specific and articulable suspicious circumstance. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555
U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009) (“[A] traffic stop of a car
communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the
encounter with the police and move about at will.”); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,
258, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007) (it is reasonable for passengers to expect
officer conducting traffic stop will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize
officer’s safety). Finally, before he began the pat-down, Sibley inquired of Appellant
whether he had any guns on him, and Appellant replied, “I’ve got knives on me.” Appellant
did not specify how many knives he had or where they were located. See Lerma, 543
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S.W.3d at 192 (disclosure of pocketknife prior to pat-down did not alleviate potential threat
of additional weapons). It would be unreasonable to deny Sibley the right to neutralize
the threat of physical harm presented by Appellant’s admission that he was armed with
knives. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201
(1983); Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 192.
Evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the
evidence supports a finding that Sibley was concerned for his safety when he conducted
the frisk. Multiple objective factors support the trial court’s conclusion that an officer in
Sibley’s position could have reasonably believed Appellant was armed and the officer’s
safety was in danger. The trial court did not err in concluding that Sibley was objectively
justified in patting down Appellant for weapons. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
SCOPE OF FRISK
In his second issue, Appellant maintains that Sibley exceeded the permissible
scope of a Terry frisk by searching Appellant’s sock without first (1) detecting a weapon-
like object was present or (2) determining the incriminating nature of the object seized
was immediately apparent. The State responds that (1) an officer may seize a non-
weapon during a lawful pat-down for weapons when it is immediately apparent that what
the officer is feeling is contraband; and (2) during the lawful pat-down of Appellant’s sock,
it was immediately apparent to Sibley that the object was contraband. We again agree
with the State.
While conducting a lawful frisk, Sibley removed several knives from Appellant’s
person. Notably, Appellant did not say how many knives he had, and additional knives
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could have been concealed in his socks. As Sibley was patting down Appellant’s lower
leg, Sibley squeezed Appellant’s ankle and “felt something” he described as “little bitty
rocks inside [Appellant’s] sock” or a “bulge of rocks.” Sibley “knew it was probably
paraphernalia or something illegal.” He suspected he was feeling methamphetamine. He
asked Appellant what the item was, and Appellant responded, “c’mon man.” Sibley
testified that it was good to ask Appellant what the item was “to hear what he had to say.”
According to Sibley, “from [his] training and experience, just previous encounters feeling
methamphetamine. Just that unique feeling,” he believed it to be methamphetamine.
Appellant’s claim that Sibley exceeded the scope of the Terry frisk is unavailing
because the “plain feel” doctrine allows for the lawful seizure of an object “whose contour
or mass makes its identity immediately apparent” and is incriminating in nature, so long
as the officer does not manipulate the item to determine its identity as contraband.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375–76; Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 & n.14 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). Here, Sibley did not manipulate the sock or “bulge” in concluding that
Appellant had contraband in his sock; he only squeezed Appellant’s ankle. Sibley was
unequivocal in testifying that he knew immediately that what he felt was “something
illegal” based on his training and experience. See Young v. State, 563 S.W.3d 325, 332
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (“[A]n officer’s training and experience
might help him identify, based on plain feel, certain objects like a crack pipe or a cocaine
rock.”). Appellant also contends that Sibley was uncertain about what he felt or that he
needed further investigation because he asked Appellant what the item in the sock was
before he seized it. We conclude the question from Sibley was rhetorical rather than
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investigatory because Sibley did not need further investigation to determine that the bulge
was contraband.
Given the trial court’s implied fact findings and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to its ruling, the record supports a conclusion that the incriminating nature
of the contraband became immediately apparent through Sibley’s lawful touch.
Accordingly, Sibley’s search was proper within the “plain feel” doctrine and did not exceed
its scope. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having considered both issues raised by Appellant, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
Judy C. Parker
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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