Logan Thomas Williams v. State of Alabama

Rel: November 6, 2026 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2026-2027 _________________________ CR-2026-0133 _________________________ Logan Thomas Williams v. State of Alabama Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court (CC-23-1096) KELLUM, Judge. The appellant, Logan Thomas Williams, was convicted of one count of rape in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-61(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; two counts of sodomy in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; and one count of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 CR-2026-0133 years old, a violation of § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment for the rape and sodomy convictions and to 20 years' imprisonment for the sexual-abuse conviction. The circuit court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.1 The evidence presented at trial established that in 2019 P.H.,2 who was born in December 2010, and her two younger brothers were living 1Because Williams was convicted of first-degree rape and first- degree sodomy of a child less than 12 years old, both Class A-felony sex offenses involving a child, see § 15-20A-4(27), Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced to life imprisonment for each conviction, Williams is not eligible for parole on those sentences, see § 15-22-27.3, Ala. Code 1975. Thus, his sentences of life imprisonment for those convictions are, in effect, sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See generally Frost v. State, 76 So. 3d 862, 868-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that, because a sex offense involving a child is ineligible for parole under § 15-22-27.3, a "life" sentence is, in reality, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole). And, although § 13A-5- 6(c), Ala. Code 1975, requires "an additional penalty of not less than 10 years of post-release supervision" on a conviction for a Class A-felony sex offense involving a child, the circuit court was not required to impose 10 years of postrelease supervision for Williams's first-degree-rape and first- degree sodomy convictions because his life sentence for each of those convictions is not eligible for parole. See Colburn v. State, 395 So. 3d 117, 125 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023) ("Because the circuit court sentenced Colburn to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree- rape convictions, however, Colburn will not be released from prison. Thus, the requirement of an 'additional penalty' under § 13A-5-6(c) does not apply."). 2Initials are used to protect the anonymity of the victim. See Rule 52, Ala. R. App. P. 2 CR-2026-0133 with their grandmother. At that time, P.H.'s grandmother had an abusive boyfriend, so P.H. and her two brothers were sent to live with their aunt, T.H., and her fiancé, Williams, who was approximately 23 years old at the time. P.H. was nine years old when she moved in with T.H. and Williams, who had recently purchased a house together. The house did not have much furniture at the time, so P.H. and her brothers slept on an air mattress in the living room. P.H., who was 14 years old at the time of trial, testified that, on the day before Thanksgiving in 2019, she was watching a movie and lying on the air mattress beside Williams. P.H. complained to Williams about her stomach aching, and Williams began to rub P.H.'s stomach on the outside of her clothes. P.H. testified that Williams rubbed lower on her stomach before moving his hand inside of P.H.'s pants and rubbing P.H.'s vagina with his hand. While touching P.H.'s vagina, Williams kissed and sucked P.H.'s neck, leaving a bruise. Williams told P.H. to hide the bruise with concealer. P.H. testified that Williams became "very touchy and affectionate" with her after he first sexually abused her. (R. 306.) According to P.H., Williams gave her special treatment, purchased her food and other items she requested, and took her driving. Williams 3 CR-2026-0133 frequently sent text messages to P.H., giving her a nickname and expressing how much he loved her. A month later, Williams told P.H. that he wanted to go into his bedroom and watch a movie and cuddle with her while her brothers played outside. P.H. testified that they cuddled for a little while before Williams locked the door and began to take off her clothes and his clothes. Williams placed two pillows under P.H.'s lower back, raised her legs, and inserted his penis inside P.H.'s vagina. P.H. "begged him to stop," but Williams said that "he was about to cum." (R. 313.) P.H. testified that it "hurt." (R. 314.) After Williams stopped, he made P.H. sit on the toilet to "make sure it all came out." (R. 314.) P.H. testified that she "felt embarrassed" after it happened. (R. 315.) A week later, Williams and P.H. were alone again, and Williams put his hands inside of P.H. and had sexual intercourse with P.H. P.H. testified that Williams continued to sexually abuse her and rape her almost daily for two years. According to P.H., she remained silent because she was "scared." (R. 317.) In addition to intercourse, Williams forced P.H. to give him a "hand job" and to "give him oral sex" and used his tongue on her vagina. (R. 317-18.) P.H. testified that the 4 CR-2026-0133 abuse occurred in Williams's bedroom, in his car, in P.H.'s bedroom, and in the garage. When P.H. was 11 years old, she had her first menstrual cycle. After P.H. started having her period, Williams no longer made P.H. sit on the toilet after sexual intercourse. P.H. testified that Williams had a "box full of condoms and pills," along with "different types of toys, lube and throat spray," that Williams kept in the top of his closet. (R. 331.) According to P.H., Williams would use the condoms and lube during sex with her and applied throat spray to "numb the back of [her] throat" before oral sex. (R. 332.) P.H. testified that, from what she understood, the pills were "probably Plan B pills" that Williams told her to take. (R. 333.) P.H. took a pill at least once a week "after [they] did stuff." (R. 333.) Williams used the condoms when P.H. was having her menstrual cycle. Shortly before P.H. turned 12 years old, P.H. told Williams that she was "tired" of the abuse and that she "did not want to do any of [the] stuff [they] were doing anymore." (R. 335.) According to P.H., Williams was mad and they argued. Williams stopped having sexual intercourse with 5 CR-2026-0133 P.H. at that time but continued to put his hands inside P.H. and have P.H. "masturbat[e] him." (R. 336.) In June 2023, Williams took P.H. to the movie theater to meet some friends. Williams discovered that one of the friends P.H. met was a boy whom she was interested in, and Williams and P.H. argued once they returned home from the theater. T.H. saw them arguing and asked P.H. why she was not acting her age. P.H. told T.H. to ask Williams because he knew, and P.H. subsequently disclosed that Williams had been raping her. T.H. yelled at Williams to get out and he left. Following her disclosure, P.H. was interviewed at the Barrie Center, a nonprofit child-advocacy center in Etowah County. P.H. also underwent a physical examination following her disclosure. Dr. Kara Huls, a physician at UAB and Children's Hospital of Alabama, testified as an expert in the field of child-sexual-abuse examination and conducted a "non-acute evaluation" of P.H. for sexual abuse. (R. 472.) According to Dr. Huls, it is very rare to find evidence of sexual abuse during an examination. Dr. Huls explained that this is so because "we know from very large volume studies that about 95 percent of children who experience sexual abuse, even the most severe forms …, have normal 6 CR-2026-0133 examinations at the time of their exam." (R. 479.) Dr. Huls testified that P.H. "had a normal examination" but that the result did not necessarily mean that P.H. had not been sexually abused. (R. 481.) Dr. Huls stated that the purpose of the examination was to ensure that P.H. had not received any sexually transmitted infections and that P.H. was not in need of further medical intervention. Dr. Huls surmised that there were no findings inconsistent with the report of sexual abuse but could not say, based on her examination, that P.H. had been sexually abused. Sergeant Jarrod Pell, a detective with the Rainbow City Police Department, was contacted on June 14, 2023, by patrol officers about a possible sexual assault of a juvenile. Sergeant Pell met with T.H. at the police department to gather details for his initial investigation. Sergeant Pell then went with the Department of Human Resources caseworker TyKesha Stephens to P.H.'s grandmother's residence to conduct a home visit and arranged for P.H. to be interviewed at the Barrie Center. Following P.H.'s interview, Sgt. Pell obtained search warrants for Williams's residence and his mother's residence. Law-enforcement officers found the box of sex toys and condoms that P.H. described in the top of the master closet. Inside the box, Sgt. Pell found "multiple sex toys, 7 CR-2026-0133 lube, condoms, [and] a throat spray [P.H.] described in her interview in detail." (R. 514.) On August 22, 2023, and August 26, 2023, Sgt. Pell obtained Williams's and P.H.'s cellular telephones. After he obtained search warrants, both cellular telephones were sent to "RFCFL in Huntsville"3 for cellular extractions. (R. 545.) Sergeant Pell testified that he later received another cellular telephone from P.H. that he personally performed the cellular extractions on in 2024. Sergeant Pell explained that Rainbow City maintains software to perform cellular extractions and that he had been trained to extract cellular data using that software. On redirect examination, Sgt. Pell testified that three cellular- telephone extractions were performed in this case and provided to the defense -- one on Williams's cellular telephone and one each on two cellular telephones collected from P.H. Sergeant Pell explained that the extractions were provided in the form of a "Cellebrite reader copy" that Sgt. Pell was able to access to look at the data. (R. 650.) The data 3The "RFCFL" is a laboratory for digital forensics associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The record does not indicate the full name of the laboratory. 8 CR-2026-0133 included text messages, photographs, location history, and website browser/search history. Sergeant Pell found "thousands" of text messages between Williams and P.H. (R. 652.) When looking at the internet history on Williams's cellular telephone, Sgt. Pell testified that certain "search terms" came to his attention. (R. 653.) Williams visited multiple pornography websites and used search terms to include "niece and uncle and incest." (R. 655.) From May 9, 2023, to June 13, 2023, the terms "niece and uncle" appeared on 18 pornography webpages that Williams searched. (R. 655.) Between April 19, 2023, and May 9, 2023, the term "incest" appeared on 37 pornography webpages that Williams searched. (R. 657.) Williams called T.H. as a witness to testify in his defense. T.H., P.H.'s aunt and Williams's former fiancée, testified that she and Williams had been in a relationship for almost two years when P.H. moved in with them in October 2020. In October 2022, T.H. started working the third shift at a local hospital, leaving for work at 7:00 p.m. and arriving home after work at 7:00 a.m. Williams took care of P.H. and the other children while T.H. slept. According to T.H., in 2022 she and Williams began to have problems in their relationship that revolved around finances, 9 CR-2026-0133 communication, and sex. T.H. became aware that Williams and P.H. had been spending too much time together and texting too much. T.H. blocked Williams's number on P.H.'s cellular telephone, and, according to T.H., Williams became irate. T.H. testified that she confronted Williams and questioned whether he had an appropriate relationship with P.H. and that Williams assured T.H. that "[i]t was fine." (R. 737.) T.H. testified that on one occasion she came home from work and found Williams and P.H. lying on her bed but under separate covers. On another occasion, T.H. observed the two sitting too closely on the couch and described P.H. lying on top of Williams. T.H. explained that she asked Williams "several times if he would stop putting himself in compromising positions" with P.H. (R. 769.) On cross-examination, T.H. testified that she had a latex allergy, so she and Williams never used condoms, and that she never had a pregnancy scare and thus had no need for a Plan B pill. Williams, who was 28 years old at the time of trial, testified that when P.H. and her brother moved in with him and T.H. it was a drastic change to this life. P.H. was the first of the children to warm up to Williams, and Williams described P.H. as his shadow as their 10 CR-2026-0133 relationship progressed. Williams denied having a sexual relationship with P.H. Williams denied that he touched P.H.'s stomach or vagina on the air mattress and testified that it was physically impossible for him to engage in sexual intercourse in his vehicle based on his size. According to Williams, the argument the night of June 14, 2023, when P.H. disclosed the sexual abuse, stemmed from P.H.'s being upset that T.H. had confiscated P.H.'s cellular telephone. Williams admitted that he actively viewed pornography but testified that his actions were due to his nonexistent sexual relationship with T.H. On cross-examination, Williams denied touching P.H. in a sexual manner, requiring P.H. to touch him in a sexual manner, putting his mouth on P.H.'s vagina, ordering P.H. to put her mouth on his penis, or engaging in sexual intercourse with P.H. According to Williams, P.H. made up the allegations. Williams did not know what motive P.H. had for making up the allegations. After both sides rested and the circuit court instructed the jury on the applicable principles of law, the jury found Williams guilty of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse in the first degree. Williams filed a motion for 11 CR-2026-0133 a new trial. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion, and the motion was denied by operation of law. This appeal followed. I. Williams contends that the circuit court erred when it allowed Sgt. Pell to testify as a lay witness regarding "Cellebrite technology and the use of data from a cell phone extraction." (Williams's brief, p. 21.) Specifically, Williams argues that Sgt. Pell's testimony constituted expert testimony because it was based on expert principles. The State argues that, as a matter of first impression, the Cellebrite extraction did not require specialized or technical knowledge that required the testimony of an expert. Alabama has not yet addressed whether expert testimony is necessary to authenticate information retrieved from a cellular telephone using Cellebrite technology. Recently, however, in United States v. Williams, 83 F.4th 994, 995 (5th Cir. 2023), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that expert testimony is not needed to authenticate information retrieved using Cellebrite technology. In Williams, police used Cellebrite technology to copy information from the defendant's cellular telephone. The investigator plugged the phone into 12 CR-2026-0133 a Cellebrite device and ran the program. "The program pulled out the user data … and provided it to the police in an accessible, easily- navigable, and readable format." 83 F.4th at 995. At trial, the investigator disavowed any knowledge of Cellebrite's technology or of any malware that may have affected data extraction. Id. at 996. The defendant objected and argued that it was reversible error for the court to admit the Cellebrite data without an expert witness because, he said, "Cellebrite is a complex technology, ergo, the operation of Cellebrite requires specialized knowledge, and the introduction of a Cellebrite report demands qualification of a witness as an expert." Id. The Court explained: "Every circuit that has addressed this question -- whether evidence obtained with Cellebrite technology requires expert testimony for admission -- has answered it in the negative. In United States v. Chavez-Lopez, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the sponsoring witness offered only fact testimony, such as 'the actions he took to extract the data -- hooking the phones up to a computer, following a few prompts, and saving data onto an external drive.' 767 F. App'x 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2019). 'At most, [the witness] offered the opinion that Cellebrite copies data from a cellphone, which he derived from his personal experience using the software.' Id. That testimony 'didn't require a technical understanding of Cellebrite, and he made no claims about the program's effectiveness or reliability.' Id. 13 CR-2026-0133 "Similarly, in United States v. Marsh, the witness merely described his training, explained how he used the software, and 'confirmed the results by checking the [text] messages on the phone itself.' 568 F. App'x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2014). And in United States v. Ovies, the Ninth Circuit reached the same result. 783 F. App'x 704, 707 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1155, 140 S. Ct. 820, 205 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2020). Reasoning similarly to the Fourth Circuit in Chavez-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit found that the witness's testimony was not based on technical or specialized knowledge, as he 'testified only about the steps he took using the Cellebrite program' and 'did not opine as to the reliability' of Cellebrite. Id." Id at 997. The Court in Williams found as follows: "We join our sister circuits. All the investigator testified to was how he downloaded the information from the phones using Cellebrite technology. At no point did he speak to the reliability of the software, except that he double-checked some of the report by looking directly at the source material in the phones themselves. To that end, he did not state any information on how Cellebrite operated in a technical sense, nor information that was beyond the knowledge of an average cell phone user. The investigator did not 'implicitly vouch for the accuracy or reliability of Cellebrite's software,' as [the defendant] claims. Rather, the investigator acknowledged his lack of knowledge about the software and stated that he was merely an operator. Notably, the cross-examination of the investigator did not probe the reliability of Cellebrite technology. "Without a showing of specialized knowledge, the mere use and understanding of a Cellebrite extract at trial is insufficient to require an expert. Operating a Cellebrite device and understanding its report require knowledge in the 14 CR-2026-0133 realm of a reasonably tech-savvy lay person, regardless of the investigator's testimony that he was a 'certified' operator and analyzer." Id. at 997-98 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that, "[w]hen law enforcement uses Cellebrite to pull information from a phone and a lay juror would require no additional interpretation to understand that information, the party does not need to introduce the evidence through an expert." Id. at 995. Citing Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also held that Cellebrite evidence can be admitted by lay testimony. In United States v. Blair, 174 F.4th 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2026), government agents extracted data using a "plug-and-play extraction tool called Cellebrite." 174 F.4th at 1315. The defendant argued on appeal that the government needed to provide an expert witness to explain the extraction process. The Court in Blair disagreed, finding that Cellebrite was a "plug-and-play technology that requires no special skill or knowledge to operate" and that "no specialized knowledge is needed to run that tool or interpret its output." 174 F.4th at 1317-18. We agree with the conclusion reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Williams and the United States Court 15 CR-2026-0133 of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Blair that information retrieved from a cellular telephone using Cellebrite technology does not require authentication by an expert. We hold that, under Alabama law, when law enforcement uses Cellebrite technology to extract information from a cellular telephone and a lay juror would require no additional interpretation to understand that information, a party is not required to introduce the evidence through an expert. See Williams, supra. In this case, the record indicates that Sgt. Pell testified on direct examination that he had obtained search warrants for Williams's and P.H.'s cellular telephones. On direct examination, Sgt. Pell testified: "Q. Okay. All right. And those [cell phones] were both sent off for extraction; is that correct? "A. Yes. The RFCFL in Huntsville. "…. "Q. Do you -- do you have the capability to do phone extraction? "A. Yes, I do. "Q. But you did not for those phones. "A. I did not for those two phones. "Q. Was there a reason for that? 16 CR-2026-0133 "A. Just to have another third party do it. "Q. Okay. But you do have training in doing that; is that correct? "A. I do. Yes. "Q. And Rainbow City maintains software to be able to do that, as well? "A. Correct. Yes. "Q. All right. At some point, did you obtain any other cell phone? "A. Yes. Later on into the investigation, I did obtain a cell phone from [P.H.]. "Q. And who -- what did you do with that cell phone once you had it? "A. When I -- I performed the extraction on that, that cell phone? "Q. Here in Rainbow City? "A. Yes." (R. 545-46.) On cross-examination, Sgt. Pell was again asked about extraction and testified that he was familiar with how to look through the data collected from an extraction. Before Sgt. Pell testified on redirect, the State notified the court that it intended to question Sgt. Pell "some more 17 CR-2026-0133 about the cell phone extractions and some of the contents of the cell phone extractions." (R. 615.) The State informed the court that defense counsel had been provided with a hard drive with the contents of the extractions. Williams objected and argued, as he does here, that Sgt. Pell had to be qualified as an expert to testify regarding the Cellebrite extractions. After considering arguments by both parties, the circuit court overruled Williams's objection, finding that Sgt. Pell could testify regarding the Cellebrite extraction report and the results he reviewed from the extractions without being designated as an expert at trial. On redirect examination, Sgt. Pell testified that "the RFCFL [had] provided [him] with a master copy … called a Cellebrite reader copy" and that he was able to access and look at the data. (R. 650.) From the Cellebrite reader copy, Sgt. Pell searched the web history using terms including niece, uncle, and incest and found multiple pornography websites. As was the case in Williams and Blair, Cellebrite technology was used to extract data from the defendant's cellular telephone. Although Williams's cellular telephone was accessed by a third part, not by Sgt. Pell, the record indicates that Cellebrite technology was used to extract the data from Williams's cellular telephone and a Cellebrite reader copy 18 CR-2026-0133 was provided to the State and defense counsel before trial. Sergeant Pell reviewed the Cellebrite reader copy on behalf of the State. He was also capable of extracting data using Cellebrite and, in fact, did so on the third cellular telephone recovered in this case. Based on the foregoing, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Cellebrite evidence to be admitted by lay testimony.4 II. Williams also contends that he was prejudiced by the failure of the State to disclose a report created by Sgt. Pell based on the data extracted from Williams's cellular telephone. Specifically, Williams argues that, as a technical expert based on his knowledge of the Cellebrite system and his ability to extract information using Cellebrite software, Sgt. Pell's report should have been disclosed to Williams pursuant to Rule 16.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. Williams references a motion in limine he filed before trial in which he requested the disclosure of all witnesses the State intended 4To the extent that Williams argues that the error in the admission of the Cellebrite evidence could not be harmless, we need not address that issue because we find no error. 19 CR-2026-0133 to call to give expert testimony and/or opinion in the case pursuant to Rule 702, Ala. R. Evid.5 In this case, Sgt. Pell was not qualified as an expert in Cellebrite extraction and was not offered as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 702. As discussed in Part I, Sgt. Pell testified as a lay witness that he used Cellebrite software to download the contents of one of the three cellular telephones while an outside agency provided the Cellebrite extraction for the other two cellular telephones. Sergeant Pell reviewed the Cellebrite reader copies and created a specific report based on data from those extractions. The report was not admitted as evidence at trial. Because Sgt. Pell was not qualified as an expert or called as an expert witness, his report did not have to be disclosed pursuant to Rule 16.1 in this case. Moreover, Williams has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the failure of the State to disclose Sgt. Pell's report. At a hearing held outside the presence of the jury and before Sgt. Pell testified on redirect, 5Rule 702(a), Ala. R. Evid., states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 20 CR-2026-0133 the State informed the circuit court that the "entire extraction" had been provided to defense counsel before trial but that a copy of the specific report created by Sgt. Pell had not been provided to defense counsel. (R. 617.) " 'Prosecutors have no duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), to disclose evidence available to the defense from another source.' Hurst v. State, 469 So. 2d 720, 723 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). See also Brown v. State, 982 So. 2d 565 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); McGowan v. State, 990 So. 2d 931 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Gardner v. State, 530 So. 2d 250 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)." Vanpelt v. State, 74 So. 3d 32, 69-71 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Because defense counsel had been provided with the Cellebrite reader copies before trial, the data contained in those copies was available to defense counsel and could have been analyzed in advance of trial. Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Windom, P.J., and Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur. 21