Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 88060-8-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION HAAKON H. GOEDEL, Appellant. SMITH, J. — The State charged Haakon Goedel with second degree burglary. After voir dire, the State moved to strike juror no. 6, a 73-year-old Asian American woman, claiming she lacked the ability to follow the court’s instructions and fully understand English. The trial court denied the State’s for-cause strike but immediately after, granted the State’s motion to exercise a peremptory strike against juror no. 6. The jury found Goedel guilty of second degree burglary. Goedel appeals, contending the trial court erroneously granted the State’s peremptory challenge. Under the totality of the circumstances, we do not find race or ethnicity could be a factor in the State’s peremptory challenge. We affirm. FACTS In May 2024, the State charged Goedel with burglary in the second degree. The case proceeded to trial, and the court conducted jury selection via Zoom.1 1 Zoom is an online video conferencing software app. No. 88060-8-I/2 Juror No. 6 The court began by speaking with several jurors individually who requested one-on-one questioning, including juror no. 6, a 73-year-old self- identified Asian female who noted a health concern. During questioning, juror no. 6 stated she had been in a car accident and could not stand or sit for long periods of time and needed to walk around or lie down intermittently. When asked by the State if she had concerns about her ability to pay attention during trial given her condition, juror no. 6 said, “Not really. As long as the question[]s are simple and I can answer it right away.” The State followed up with juror no. 6, noting she had indicated English was her second language and asking her whether she had any concerns in court, “for example, if someone were speaking quickly, does that sometimes affect your ability to understand?” Juror no. 6 responded, “Yes,” but indicated she could understand if people spoke slowly. Juror no. 6 confirmed she had no problem understanding the instructions the court had previously given. Goedel asked juror no. 6 if her experience with the car accident would impact her ability to be a juror in the present case. Juror no. 6 replied, “Oh, I don’t have any idea if it will affect.” She said her accident would be on her mind during trial, but it would not be difficult for her to set it aside because her case was different from the current case. When asked by Goedel if she had any concerns whether her accident would impact her decision making in the present case, juror no. 6 replied, “Well, I don’t really know.” Goedel clarified and asked, “Do you think you can say, ‘Yes, this will not affect me’?” Juror no. 6 replied, 2 No. 88060-8-I/3 “Yeah, I can say that.” Juror no. 6’s questioning ended with the following exchange with the court: The Court: Okay. Juror 6, . . . . [i]f I’m not able to allow you to walk great distances, I can set it up so that you could walk a few paces back and forth if you’re feeling uncomfortable. ... [I]s that going to be enough for you, or if you need to fully lie down on a regular basis, I’m concerned that we may not be able to do that. [Juror No. 6]: No, no, no. I just have to stand up and walk around. And, you know, stand up a little bit. During general questioning with the full jury panel, the State asked the panel if they were comfortable with the concepts of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and “proof beyond all possible doubt.” The State noted that several juror questionnaires indicated they were “avid fans” of crime shows and asked, “Does anyone here feel that the type of evidence that would convince you to render or vote a guilty verdict would mean that you want to see all of these types of evidence [blood DNA and fingerprinting] in any given trial?” Juror no. 6 responded, “Yes.” The State asked juror no. 6 a hypothetical question about her accident, inquiring whether a person who had seen the accident would be “good evidence” of the accident. Juror no. 6 responded, “Yeah, it could be.” The State and juror no. 6 then had the following exchange: [State]: And would you find that if there had been no fingerprints or blood that was found that was the driver’s on your vehicle at the time that this crash occurred, would you feel that you needed to have that blood, that fingerprint in order to say that individual was the driver of the vehicle that hit and run on yours?” 3 No. 88060-8-I/4 [Juror No. 6]: Probably. Because if it will be in the car which he was driving, so that means like if he was really the one, then fingerprints will be indicated in the vehicle. Juror no. 6 went on to say that, even if the driver of the vehicle that hit her called her to say it was them driving, other evidence, like DNA and fingerprints, would still be necessary because “maybe [they are] like covering for somebody else.” Toward the end of the State’s first round of voir dire, the State asked, “Anybody else who would perhaps prefer . . . to discuss any other concerns you might have about being a fair juror in this trial?” Juror no. 6 replied, “Yeah. You can see now I’m standing because I’ve been sitting for so long. . . . I have to lie down because my hip is hurting.” The State asked, “[J]ust to make sure, do you feel comfortable being a fair juror in this case and listening to all the evidence?” The following exchange ensued: [Juror No. 6]: I could be. I cannot say yes. It depends on what’s going on with the case. [State]: Okay. What do you mean by depending on what goes on with the case? [Juror No. 6]: Well, it depends on the evidence and it depends on a circumstantial or non-circumstantial evidence. [State]: And can I just ask whether you would be able to follow the jury instructions that the Court gives you about how to weigh those direct and circumstantial evidence? [Juror No. 6]: Yes. Statements of Other Potential Jurors When discussing direct versus circumstantial evidence with the jury panel, the court described the difference between the two types of evidence and asked the jury panel whether anybody felt uncertain about giving both types of evidence equal weight. Juror no. 8, a self-identified White female, indicated that they felt 4 No. 88060-8-I/5 “direct evidence should be verifiable, observable and reproducible, whereas circumstantial evidence can be—or could be impacted by a lot of unknown factors.” Juror no. 8 agreed when the State asked if corroborating circumstantial evidence with witness testimony would be helpful. Juror no. 31, a self-identified White female, also agreed that “it would take maybe extra corroboration for circumstantial [evidence].” Juror no. 22, a self-identified White male, stated that the evidentiary process was like the scientific method: “Keep proving, reproving until it becomes fact or becomes the new truth as you know it right now.” The State responded, “I appreciate you mentioning . . . the scientific method. I know that given our geography here, a lot of us may be in the STEM[2] field.” The State asked juror no. 22 whether they were “comfortable . . . deliberating on a case in which the standard to prove a charge is proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not all possible doubt[,]” because in the scientific community, beyond all possible doubt is more familiar. Juror no. 22 answered yes and confirmed he knew the distinction between the two but noted, “It’s tough when you’re wired one way.” Juror no. 28, a self-identified White male, who had previously raised his hand when the State asked jurors whether they would feel comfortable deliberating on a case in which the standard to prove a charge is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, stated his thoughts on circumstantial versus direct evidence: I guess what I’m hearing here is the trial process is going to present evidence. Some of that’s going to be direct, some of that’s going to be indirect. And the legal professionals here will decide what gets 2 STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics, 5 No. 88060-8-I/6 admitted to the record, what evidence we can consider. And whatever’s left out of the end of that, which is going to be direct and indirect evidence is what we are going to be asked to consider in the case. Juror no. 32 asked whether direct evidence and circumstantial evidence have the same weight, noting that his intuition was that direct evidence should be given more weight. The State clarified that under the law both types of evidence should be given equal weight and asked juror no. 32 whether they would be able to follow the instructions of the court and give equal weight to both types of evidence, to which juror no. 32 replied, “Yes.” For Cause Challenges At the conclusion of the first round of voir dire, the court asked the parties about their for-cause challenges. The State moved to dismiss juror no. 6 for cause: [I]n light of the last voir dire round before defense’s, which was juror number 6 had gotten up sometime during the voir dire session—let me make sure. Yes. And this individual indicated she was a having some hip pains and needed to be up and stretching. I was a bit concerned that either, A, her physical capacity would somewhat limit her ability to pay full attention as the trial goes on, and B, even if she does, how capable she would be of following instructions. So perhaps if the Court wanted to ask further questions, I wanted to pose that at this time. Goedel objected to the State’s motion to dismiss juror no. 6 but noted he was not opposed to the court inquiring further with the juror about her ability to serve considering her physical limitations. The court noted that “obviously, I can’t have her wandering around the courtroom,” but it could make accommodations for her to walk around within a small area. The court stated it would have the bailiff follow up with juror no. 6 via e-mail. 6 No. 88060-8-I/7 The next morning, the State inquired with the Court whether it had heard from juror no. 6. The court noted it had not, and the State re-raised its for-cause challenge. The State cited to concerns of juror no. 6’s “ability to follow instructions, but . . . also perhaps fully understand English as I believe she noted this was not her first language.” Goedel objected, asserting juror no. 6 provided lengthy and elaborate responses to all questions and, even though she got up and walked around, “we [don’t] have enough here to find that this juror wouldn’t be able to follow instructions in the courtroom.” The court agreed with Goedel that juror no. 6 did not appear to have any trouble keeping up with instructions and understanding questions, but the court noted she appeared uncomfortable and wanted to move around. Ultimately, the court articulated that it understood the State’s concerns, but there was not enough for a challenge for cause. Peremptory Strikes Immediately after the State’s for-cause challenge to juror no. 6, the court asked the State for its first peremptory strike, and the State asked to excuse juror no. 6. Goedel objected under GR 37. The court asked the State to articulate a nonracial reason for the strike. The State replied: Frankly, State had some concerns based upon the voir dire questioning of this juror and some confusion as to her understanding of what State had posed as questioning, direct versus circumstantial evidence. Although she did give a quite lengthy description in the summary of her own incident at the time, it was not evidently clear that she had a firm understanding of the evidentiary burdens. Goedel replied: So GR 37, section (h)(7) has not being a native English speaker as a presumptively invalid reason. The State did note that 7 No. 88060-8-I/8 basis during their for-cause challenge, but did not bring that up now when arguing for the peremptory strike, and I would note the State’s concerns about her views on evidence and the burden of proof, she was asked if she would follow the instructions and she did say yes. So my concern is that a reason that’s on the presumptively invalid list was provided a couple minutes ago but now is not being mentioned again, and the same juror is being—the State’s attempting to strike the same person. The court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances, “a neutral observer would not determine that this [challenge] is premised on race or ethnicity.” The court noted that “a little bit of a push-pull” exists because even though GR 37 states not being a native English speaker is a presumptively invalid basis for a strike, RCW 2.36.070(4) requires jurors to be able to communicate in the English language. Ultimately, the court considered juror no. 6’s general responses to questions concerning direct versus circumstantial evidence and her ability to stay on screen and noted these concerns do not “fall under a GR 37 analysis.” The court removed juror no. 6. The State also used peremptory challenges for juror nos. 8, 14, and 28; Goedel did not object. Goedel used peremptory challenges for juror nos. 9, 11, 12, 22, 38, 34, and 13. The final jury consisted of nine White individuals, two Latinas, two Asians, and one who identified as “some other race, ethnicity, or origin.” The jury found Goedel guilty as charged. Goedel appeals. ANALYSIS Goedel contends the trial court erred when it denied his GR 37 challenge for juror no. 6 because being a non-native English speaker is a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge. Because the State articulated a 8 No. 88060-8-I/9 nonracial-based reason for the challenge and an objective observer could not view race as a factor in the State’s use of its peremptory challenge, we disagree. We review GR 37 challenges de novo. State v. Tesfasilasye, 200 Wn.2d 345, 355-56, 518 P.3d 193 (2022). Both the federal constitution and the Washington State Constitution require a fair and impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. “When a trial court grants a peremptory challenge in violation of GR 37, the remedy is reversal of the convictions and remand for a new trial.” State v. Walton, 29 Wn. App. 2d 789, 803, 542 P.3d 1041, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1025 (2024). GR 37 is a court-adopted rule created to “eliminate the unfair exclusion of potential jurors based on race or ethnicity.” GR 37(a). The rule applies in all jury trials, and a party may object to the use of a peremptory challenge by simply citing to the rule. GR 37(b), (c). Once a GR 37 objection is made, the party exercising the peremptory challenge must provide the reasons why the peremptory challenge was exercised. GR 37(d). The court then evaluates these reasons “in light of the totality of circumstances.” GR 37(e). The court must determine whether “an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” GR 37(e). “The rule was designed to be overinclusive in order to be effective.” State v. Bell, 5 Wn.3d 54, 66, 571 P.3d 272 (2025). In Bell, the Washinton Supreme Court underscored the difficulty in determining when racial bias influences a justification and stated, “trial courts must be especially prudent in denying peremptory 9 No. 88060-8-I/10 challenges in light of GR 37 objections to fulfill the rule’s purpose and avoid reversal on appeal.” 5 Wn.3d at 67. The “could view” standard requires a judge to deny a peremptory challenge when “the effect is discriminatory regardless of whether there was discriminatory purpose.” Tesfasilasye, 200 Wn.2d at 357. For purposes of GR 37, an objective observer is someone who “is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.” GR 37(f). “If the court determines that an objective observer could view race as a factor,” the court shall deny the peremptory challenge.3 GR 37(e) (emphasis added). But the dictionary definition of “could” means both “ ‘made possible or probable by circumstances,’ ” and that for purposes of the objective observer test, it “cannot mean always.” Simbulan v. Nw. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 32 Wn. App. 2d 164, 176, 555 P.3d 455 (2024), (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 323 (2002)), review denied, 578 P.3d 778 (2025). 3 The trial court incorrectly stated the GR 37 standard during its ruling: “I’m going to find based on the totality of the circumstances that a neutral observer would not determine that this is premised on race or ethnicity given the totally of everything that was observed.” (Emphasis added.) The court previously stated the correct “could” standard, indicating the error was likely a slip of the tongue and not a misunderstanding of the correct standard that needed to be applied. Either way, the mistake is inconsequential on appeal because we review the record de novo. 10 No. 88060-8-I/11 GR 37(g) In determining whether an objective observer could view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, the court should consider, at a minimum, the following circumstances: (i) the number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, which may include consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the alleged concern or the types of questions asked about it; (ii) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked significantly more questions or different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to other jurors; (iii) whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party; (iv) whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a race or ethnicity; and (v) whether the party has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity, in the present case or in past cases. GR 37(g). 1. GR 37(g)(i) Under the GR 37 analysis, we first consider “the number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, which may include consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the alleged concern or the types of questions asked about it.” GR 37(g)(i). Here, the State questioned juror no. 6 several times, including questions about her ability to focus on and understand what was 11 No. 88060-8-I/12 happening in court, what types of evidence she would need to see to convict (direct versus circumstantial), and whether she could be a fair and impartial juror. The questions concerning juror no. 6’s ability to focus in court and understand English occurred during individual questioning of juror no. 6. In that session, she noted that she had suffered from an injury that affected her ability to sit still, but she did not think it would affect her ability to pay attention “as long as the question[]s are simple and I can answer it right away.” Based on that response, the State asked juror no. 6 whether she had concerns about her ability to understand questioning if, for example, someone was speaking quickly because English was her second language. Next, both the State and Goedel’s counsel questioned juror no. 6 concerning her car accident. All other questions asked of juror no. 6 during voir dire were in response to her raising her hand to a question posed by counsel. Most of the questions from the State related to its concern that juror no. 6 had some confusion concerning direct versus circumstantial evidence and the evidentiary burden in the case. Viewed objectively, GR 37(i) does not show juror no. 6’s race or ethnicity was a factor in the State’s use of a peremptory challenge. 2. GR 37(g)(ii) Next, under GR 37(g)(ii), we consider whether the State “asked significantly more questions or different questions” of juror no. 6 compared to other jurors. The record does not demonstrate that the State asked more or different questions of juror no. 6 than other potential jurors. 12 No. 88060-8-I/13 The State asked similar questions to all jurors as it did of juror no. 6. The State checked in with other jurors who mentioned in their questionnaire that English was their second language to confirm whether they had concerns about being able to understand the proceedings. The State also asked other jurors about their views on direct versus circumstantial evidence and whether they could be fair jurors. The State did not ask significantly more questions or different questions of these other jurors than it did with juror no. 6. 3. GR 37(g)(iii) The court also must consider whether other jurors provided similar answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge. While some of the jurors questioned the weight given to direct versus circumstantial evidence, none of these jurors expressed as strong of viewpoints as juror no. 6. Goedel contends juror nos. 31, 32, and 22, all White, provided similar answers to juror no. 6 but the State did not use peremptory challenges against them. Juror no. 31 did note that they “think it would take maybe extra corroboration for circumstantial [evidence],” but this was in response to the State’s question about whether having additional evidence to corroborate a story would give more credibility to what the person was saying. Later, when Goedel moved to strike juror no. 31 for cause, the State noted that juror no. 31 “indicate[d] that [they] would find Mr. Goedel not guilty when faced with insufficient evidence to meet the burden, as well as in addition to expressing or exercising his right to remain silent, which is all great. [They] can follow the law.” 13 No. 88060-8-I/14 The court agreed, noting juror no. 31 “indicated that [they] can weigh the evidence presented before [them].” Juror nos. 22 and 32 expressed familiarity with the scientific method, which the State noted has a higher burden of proof than in a criminal case (beyond possible doubt versus beyond reasonable doubt). Despite noting “[i]t’s tough when you’re wired one way,” juror no. 22 stated they knew the distinction between the two burdens of proof. Similarly, juror no. 32 mentioned their intuition was that direct evidence should have more weight, but they would be able to follow the instructions and give the evidence the proper weight. Unlike these three jurors, juror no. 6’s statements indicated she would have trouble applying the correct burden of proof. Despite saying that she could follow the court’s instructions, she stated that DNA or fingerprint evidence “would be necessary” even in a case where there was a confession because the person might be “covering for somebody else.” Also, at the end of the first day, after all the discussion about direct and circumstantial evidence, when asked if she could be a fair juror and listen to all the evidence, juror no. 6 replied, “I could be. I cannot say yes. It depends on what’s going on with the case. . . . [I]t depends on the evidence and it depends on a circumstantial or noncircumstantial evidence.” Juror no. 6’s responses to questions about circumstantial versus direct evidence were different from other jurors who expressed a familiarity with evidentiary burdens and stated their ability to comply with the court’s directions. Accordingly, the record does not support a finding that the State failed to use peremptory challenges against jurors who provided similar answers to juror no. 6. 14 No. 88060-8-I/15 4. GR 37(g)(iv) Under GR 37(g)(iv), the court considers “whether a reason might be disproportionally associated with a race or ethnicity.” Goedel contends that the State’s reference to STEM indicates racial stereotyping may have influenced its decision to strike juror no. 6. During voir dire, a juror mentioned the scientific method and the State replied, “I appreciate you mentioning I think the scientific method. I know that given our geography here, a lot of us may be in the STEM field and that is a very, I think, real thing when you come in here to be members of the jury.” The State went on to discuss the differences in standards of proof between the scientific method and criminal cases. Goedel relies on State v. Lahman, 17 Wn. App. 2d 925, 937, 488 P.3d 881 (2021), to support his contention that racial stereotyping may have influenced the State’s peremptory challenge of juror no. 6. In Lahman, the State used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror with an Asian surname. The State claimed they struck the juror “based on his young age and lack of experience with domestic violence and limited life experience.” 17 Wn. App. 2d at 936. When analyzing GR 37(g)(iv), the court noted “a common stereotype of Asian Americans is that they are strong in academics, to the detriment of interpersonal skills.” Id. at 937. The court concluded that the State possibly relied on this stereotype in deciding the juror lacked the frame of mind to side with the State. Id. at 937. 15 No. 88060-8-I/16 Here, Goedel contends an objective observer could view this stereotype to be a factor in the State’s decision to strike juror no. 6, because “the State suggested [juror no. 6] might overemphasize a lack of direct evidence and claimed that she showed confusion or an inability to follow instructions in her courtroom conduct.” No evidence exists in the record to support a finding that the State’s concerns about juror no. 6 were based on stereotypes and, in any event, the circumstances here differ from Lahman. In Lahman, the State asked the juror few questions, the juror’s answers were not markedly different from other jurors, and the State focused on the juror’s youth and lack of experience. 17 Wn. Ap. 2d at 937-38. As discussed supra, the GR 37(g)(i), (ii), and (iii) do not weigh in favor of a finding that race was a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. Without other evidence in the record, we cannot conclude a peremptory challenge of an Asian juror is influenced by stereotypes that Asians are strong in academics to the detriment of interpersonal skills. 5. GR 37(g)(v) Finally, the court must consider whether the party exercising the challenge “has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity.” GR 37(g)(v). The State used three peremptory challenges and only juror no. 6 was Asian; the other two jurors were White. The final jury contained two Asian individuals. The record does not support a conclusion that the State used its peremptory challenges disproportionally against a given race. 16 No. 88060-8-I/17 Taken together, the circumstances considered under GR 37(g) do not support a finding that race or ethnicity was a factor in the State’s decision to use a peremptory strike for juror no. 6. GR 37(h) - Reasons Presumptively Invalid Goedel asserts the State relied on a presumptively invalid reason—being a non-native English speaker—to strike juror no. 6. Because the State’s peremptory challenge was not based on juror no. 6 not being a native English speaker, we disagree. GR 37(h) identifies several justifications for a peremptory challenge that have historically “been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection” and are presumptively invalid, including a juror not being a native English speaker. GR 37(h)(vii)(i). Goedel contends the State’s peremptory strike of juror no. 6 rested on the presumptively invalid reason that she was not a native English speaker, but the reason for the State’s peremptory strike had nothing to do with juror no. 6’s ability to understand English. The State’s reasoning for its peremptory challenge of juror no. 6 was its concerns about her understanding of the evidentiary burdens: “State had some concerns based upon the voir dire questioning of [Juror No. 6] and some confusion as to her understanding of what State had posed as questioning, direct versus circumstantial evidence. . . . [I]t was not evidently clear that she had a firm understanding of the evidentiary burdens.” While the State’s previous for-cause challenge addressed juror no. 6’s ability to follow directions and fully understand the proceedings, it provided a 17 No. 88060-8-I/18 nonracial-based reason for its peremptory challenge. Goedel contends the fact that the State provided a different reason for its peremptory challenge does not overcome the presumption of invalidity. To support this contention, Goedel cites to State v. Harrison, 26 Wn. App. 2d 575, 583, 528 P.3d 849 (2023), but that case is distinguishable. In Harrison, the State asked questions to the jury panel about race and identity, noting it “did not believe Harrison’s case involved race, racism, or identity, but it felt obligated to ask about those issues ‘because of what’s happened in the news in the last year.’ ”4 26 Wn. App. 2d at 577 (quoting record). Later, the State attempted to use a peremptory challenge on juror no. 28, and Harrison objected under GR 37. Id. The State responded that it brought the peremptory challenge because it was not sure juror no. 28 could be fair because the juror was “mindful of current events related to the Black Lives Matter Movement, and was mindful of and potentially susceptible to news media influences regarding racial justice and fairness issues.” Id. at 579. The trial court concluded race or ethnicity was not a factor for the State’s peremptory challenge. Id. at 581. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s order, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, an objective observer could have viewed race as a factor in the State’s peremptory challenge. Id. at 583. We noted that the State used peremptory challenges on all jurors who expressed an awareness of 4 Voir dire took place almost exactly one year after Minneapolis law enforcement officers killed George Floyd, a Black man, sparking widespread protests regarding racial justice and law enforcement. Harrison, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 577, n.1. 18 No. 88060-8-I/19 racial justice issues. Id. at 583. The court concluded that even though the State’s proffered reason for excluding the juror did not explicitly reference race, race was “nevertheless implicated” and the challenge was presumptively invalid under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 583. Unlike in Harrison, the totality of the circumstances here do not support the conclusion that the State’s peremptory challenge was invalid simply because it previously moved to strike juror no. 6 for cause. First, as the court noted, it cannot seat someone on the jury if they are not able to communicate in English; therefore, English proficiency “is a concern that the State has to raise in terms of a challenge for cause.” And a challenge for cause must come before a peremptory challenge. See RCW 4.44.220. A party is not denied the ability to use a peremptory challenge on a juror just because they previously sought to remove the juror for cause. See Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, 107 Wn.2d 524, 534, 730 P.2d 1299 (1987). Additionally, unlike Harrison, where the State used peremptory challenges on all jurors who responded similarly to a question about race, the State did not move to strike all jurors of Asian descent. In fact, the only other jurors the State used peremptory challenges on were White. The State’s reasoning for its peremptory challenge of juror no. 6 was distinct from its for- cause challenge, and it did not implicate a presumptively invalid reason under GR 37(h). GR 37(i) - Reliance on Conduct Goedel claims the State’s reason for its peremptory strike of juror no. 6 is invalid under GR 37(i). GR 37(i) recognizes reasons have been proffered for 19 No. 88060-8-I/20 peremptory challenges that “have historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection.” These reasons include allegations that the juror “provided unintelligent or confused answers.” GR 37(i). Because of their historical association with discrimination, if a party intends to offer one of the reasons recognized under GR 37(i) as a justification for their peremptory challenge, “that party must provide reasonable notice to the court and the other parties so the behavior can be verified and addressed in a timely manner.” GR 37(i). Either the court or opposing counsel must corroborate the behavior to validate the reason given for the peremptory challenge. GR 37(i). Here, Goedel maintains the State’s concerns about juror no. 6’s understanding of the evidentiary burden is conduct historically associated with improper discrimination because it is based on juror no. 6 “provid[ing] unintelligent or confused answers.” But juror no. 6’s answers were not “confused” or “unintelligent” under the meaning of GR 37(i), nor does the State contend as much. The State’s reasoning for its peremptory strike was that it “had some concerns based upon the voir dire questioning of [juror no. 6] and some confusion as to her understanding of what State had posed as questioning, direct versus circumstantial evidence.” RP at 421-22. The State was not contending juror no. 6’s answers were unintelligent or confused; it was concerned about her understanding of the evidentiary burden. GR 37(i) addresses conduct, not content. See e.g., State v. Hogan, 6 Wn.3d 675, 695, 591 P.3d 335 (2026) (“The State’s justifications that juror 40 struggled to articulate their thoughts and seemed uncomfortable are just the sort of ‘demeanor,’ ‘body language,’ and 20 No. 88060-8-I/21 supposedly ‘unintelligent or confused answers’ that GR 37(i) treats as ‘[c]onduct’ subject to its strict verification procedures.”). The State’s justification for its peremptory strike does implicate GR 37(i); therefore, we do not need to analyze the factor further. Based on the totality of the circumstances, an objective observer could not view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State’s decision to strike juror no. 6. We affirm. WE CONCUR: 21