Full Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Darrell Nordland, : Appellant : : v. : No. 1656 C.D. 2024 : Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : Department of Transportation, : Bureau of Driver Licensing : Submitted: March 3, 2026 BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE WOLF FILED: October 26, 2026 Darrell Nordland (Licensee) appeals from the October 31, 2024 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court). The trial court denied Licensee’s appeal from the 18-month suspension of his operating privilege under Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law. On appeal, Licensee challenges whether the investigating officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that Licensee had operated his vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, i.e., oxycodone,1 in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802. Upon review of 1 Oxycodone is a Schedule II controlled substance. See Section 4(2)(i)(1) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-104(2)(i)(1). the record, we discern no error in the trial court’s finding that reasonable grounds existed for Licensee’s arrest and request for chemical testing. Thus, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND On July 26, 2023, the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) issued Licensee a notice of suspension of his operating privileges, effective August 30, 2023, citing Licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing, pursuant to Section 1547 of the Implied Consent Law, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, on May 25, 2023. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 65a. Licensee appealed the suspension to the trial court on August 23, 2023. Id. at 1a. The trial court held a de novo license suspension appeal hearing on October 29, 2024. At the hearing, Officer Michael Coughlin of the Abington Township Police Department testified. Officer Coughlin stated that he responded to the scene of an accident involving a pickup truck and a motorcycle at Jenkintown Road and Tennis Avenue at 5:47 p.m. on May 25, 2023, arriving “approximately ten minute[s] after[] the call was received.” R.R. at 7a-8a. Officer Coughlin testified that he was not the first officer to arrive on scene, but as part of the crash investigation unit, he took over the crash investigation when he arrived. Id. at 8a. He explained that “[t]he investigation led me to conclude that Mr. Nordland in his black Chevrolet pickup truck had turned left - - was attempting to turn left on to Tennis Avenue and failed to yield the right-of-way to an oncoming motorcycle.” Id. Officer Coughlin also identified the DL-26 form that another officer, Officer Adrian DeAngelo, read to Licensee, and testified that Licensee refused chemical testing of his blood following the reading of the form. Id. at 9a-10a, 69a. Officer DeAngelo, also a police officer for Abington Township, testified second. Officer DeAngelo identified Licensee as the operator of the pickup 2 truck involved in the collision. R.R. at 13a. Officer DeAngelo explained that he asked Licensee to submit to standardized field sobriety testing (SFST), and Licensee agreed. Id. Officer DeAngelo testified that the SFST he performed consisted of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, nine-step walk and turn, and one-leg stand tests. Id. Officer DeAngelo testified that he observed signs of impairment during the SFST, and further that Licensee “did admit he takes Oxy[C]ontin once in the morning and once at night for pain management.” Id. at 14a. Officer DeAngelo further indicated that a portable breath test was administered to licensee, which indicated that Licensee did not have alcohol in his system. Id. at 24a. Officer DeAngelo noted that the portable breath test was used to determine if he was arresting Licensee for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol and a controlled substance, or just a controlled substance. Id. at 25a. Following the portable breath test, Officer DeAngelo arrested Licensee for suspected DUI. Id. at 24a. Officer DeAngelo subsequently went through the DL-26 form with Licensee, with Licensee initially consenting to the blood draw. Id. at 28a-29a. The affidavit regarding Licensee’s subsequent refusal was signed by Officer Coughlin, as the refusal occurred following a shift change. Id. at 29a-31a, 69a. A third Abington Township officer, Officer Andrew Stahl, testified that he was also at the accident scene as a backup officer, and was subsequently present at the hospital when Licensee refused to permit the completion of a blood draw. R.R. at 34a-35a. Licensee testified next. He testified that he complied with Officer DeAngelo’s request to perform SFST, and informed Officer DeAngelo that he has “bone loss in [his] hip, and [he] can’t stand on one foot like that.” R.R. at 41a. He further testified as to the underlying medical conditions which contributed to his 3 difficulty in performing the SFST. Id. at 42a. Licensee also testified that he informed Officer DeAngelo that he had taken a Percocet that morning. Id. at 43a. He testified: “I refused to test, because, you know I wasn’t drunk. I wasn’t inebriated. I wasn’t on drugs. Why should I allow them to put a needle in my arm?” Id. at 44a. II. ISSUES On appeal2 to this Court, Licensee argues that Officer DeAngelo lacked reasonable grounds to arrest Licensee on suspicion of DUI and request that he submit to chemical testing. In support, Licensee contends that his involvement in a motor vehicle collision, admission to prescription medication use, and SFST performance (resulting from physical limitations) were insufficient for the trial court to find that reasonable grounds existed for his DUI arrest and request for chemical testing. Licensee further argues that a number of other usual signs of impairment, mainly related to alcohol use, were not noted by Officer DeAngelo at the time of the arrest. The Department responds that the testimony before the trial court sufficiently established that Officer DeAngelo had reasonable grounds to arrest Licensee on suspicion of DUI and request chemical testing. In particular, the Department argues that the totality of the circumstances, as known to Officer DeAngelo at the time of Licensee’s arrest, such as Licensee’s admission of Schedule II prescription drug use, as well as the indicia of impairment exhibited by Licensee during the SFSTs, were sufficient for the trial court to find that Officer DeAngelo had reasonable grounds. The Department further argues that Licensee downplays 2 Our standard of review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by competent evidence of record, whether the court committed an error of law, or whether the court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Danforth, 608 A.2d 1044, 1045 (Pa. 1992). 4 the significance of these facts, while overemphasizing the lack of signs of impairment usually indicative of alcohol use, despite that alcohol use was not the basis for Licensee’s DUI arrest. III. DISCUSSION Section 1547(a) of the Vehicle Code states in relevant part: (a) General rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in violation of section 1543(b)(1.1) (relating to driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or 3808(a)(2) (relating to illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock). 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a). In turn, Section 3802(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code provides: (d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances: *** (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual's ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). To sustain a suspension of a licensee’s driving privileges, the Department must establish: 5 that the licensee: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was warned that the refusal would result in a license suspension. Farnack v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 29 A.3d 44, 48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Here, Licensee maintains that the Department did not establish that the police had reasonable grounds to request submission for a chemical blood test. This Court reviews the question of whether an officer had reasonable grounds on a case-by-case basis. Marone v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 990 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Walkden v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The test in determining whether reasonable grounds existed for an officer to believe that a licensee operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated is not demanding and requires less proof than that necessary to establish probable cause in the context of a criminal prosecution. Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Helt v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 856 A.2d 263, 266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In determining whether the Department has met its burden in showing that the officer had reasonable grounds, “we consider the totality of the circumstances and determine, as a matter of law, whether a person in the position of the arresting officer could have reasonably reached this conclusion.” Helt, 856 A.2d at 266. An officer’s belief that a licensee was operating a vehicle while intoxicated need not be correct, and a later discovery that the officer’s belief was erroneous does not void the existence of reasonable grounds. Hasson, 866 A.2d at 6 1185. It is further not necessary that an officer observe a licensee operating a vehicle in order to arrest the licensee for DUI. Walkden, 103 A.3d at 437. An officer’s reasonable belief will justify a request for chemical testing so long as “one reasonable interpretation of the circumstances” as they appear to the officer supports the officer’s reasonable belief that the licensee operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Marnik v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 145 A.3d 208, 212-13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); Helt, 856 A.2d at 266. Generally, courts defer to officers’ experience and observations when it comes to determining whether an individual is intoxicated. See Hasson, 866 A.2d at 1186 (noting that “a police officer may rely upon his experience and personal observations to render an opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated”). Turning to the instant case, Licensee informed Officer DeAngelo that he takes Percocet3 and that he had taken it at 8 a.m. on the day of his arrest. As the trial court opined: The key fact here is Norland’s admission of ingesting a controlled substance. The arresting officer is not a pharmacist or toxicologist and is not expected to know whether an operator is supposed to refrain from driving for a period of time after ingestion of prescribed medications or whether the operator took the correct amount of the narcotic medication. From the officer’s perspective, [Licensee] likely violated the [Vehicle Code] and caused 3 We note that Licensee testified that he takes Percocet, a name brand drug, and Officer DeAngelo testified that Licensee stated he takes OxyContin, a different name brand drug. Compare R.R. at 43a (Licensee’s testimony that he told Officer DeAngelo that he had taken Percocet the morning of his arrest) and R.R. at 14a (Officer DeAngelo’s testimony that Licensee admitted to taking OxyContin). This brand name distinction is immaterial for purposes of this appeal, as both Percocet and OxyContin contain oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance. See Drug Enforcement Administration Oxycodone Fact Sheet, September 2025, accessed at https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/oxycodone.pdf (last accessed October 6, 2026); see also supra note 1. 7 an accident, admitted taking a controlled substance earlier that day and failed the field sobriety testing. The combination of these circumstances establishes that Officer DeAngelo had reasonable grounds to arrest [Licensee] and request him to submit to chemical testing. Rule 1925(a) Opinion at 5. We agree with the trial court’s analysis. While Licensee attempts to downplay the significance of his statement regarding his medication and SFST performance, we do not find that argument persuasive. Even if Licensee’s SFST performance is attributable to physical limitations, this alternate explanation does not discount Officer DeAngelo’s interpretation. Rather, as noted above, “we consider the totality of the circumstances and determine, as a matter of law, whether a person in the position of the arresting officer could have reasonably reached this conclusion.” Helt, 856 A.2d at 266 (emphasis added). Here, the evidence is overwhelming. Licensee exhibited multiple signs of impairment during the SFST, admitted to prescription use of a controlled substance, and had operated his motor vehicle in a manner that caused or contributed to a serious motor vehicle collision. Under such circumstances, it was more than reasonable for Officer DeAngelo to conclude that Licensee had operated his vehicle while impaired. Accordingly, Officer DeAngelo had reasonable grounds to arrest Licensee on suspicion of DUI and request a blood draw. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court. _____________________________________ MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge 8 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Darrell Nordland, : Appellant : : v. : No. 1656 C.D. 2024 : Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : Department of Transportation, : Bureau of Driver Licensing : ORDER AND NOW, this 26th day of October 2026, the October 31, 2024 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED. _____________________________________ MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge