Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 88744-1-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JOSHUA ALAN ROHRS, Appellant. BIRK, J. — A jury convicted Joshua Rohrs of felony driving under the influence (with priors) under RCW 46.61.502(1)(6). On appeal, he argues he was unlawfully seized because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, therefore, evidence from his arrest must be suppressed. Additionally, Rohrs argues his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because the State did not provide sufficient evidence to support at least one of the alternative means of a driving under the influence conviction. We affirm the trial court. I A At the CrR 3.6 and Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (2023) motion hearing, Tacoma Police Officer Ramel Clasablanca testified that he heard a female screaming and excessive honking of a car horn coming from a Jack in the Box restaurant located in downtown Tacoma on November 18, 2023, at approximately 12:30 a.m. He determined the honking came from a dark-colored No. 88744-1-I/2 sport utility vehicle (SUV) parked in the drive-through lane. The screaming, some of which was profanity, came from a woman adjacent to the dark car. She stood approximately 10 feet away from the car. Officer Clasablanca drove up directly behind the dark car and immediately noticed it did not have a rear license plate. He noticed a second car in the parking lot. Officer Clasablanca was not sure if the business was still open when he drove into the parking lot. He testified that he could see “the situation was escalating.” Officer Clasablanca activated the overhead lights on his patrol car for the purpose of detaining the woman and the driver of the car. After Officer Clasablanca activated his lights and started to exit his vehicle, the dark SUV began to drive away slowly onto Pacific Avenue. Without speaking to the woman, Officer Clasablanca followed the dark car with his lights activated and observed the car driving no faster than 10 miles per hour. The dark car pulled over, and the driver immediately exited the vehicle without Officer Clasablanca asking. Officer Clasablanca asked the driver why he was at the Jack in the Box and why he drove away when Officer Clasablanca had activated his lights. The driver explained he was at Jack in the Box because he was trying to order food. Officer Clasablanca asked for the driver’s license and registration, neither of which the driver had with him. The driver explained he had recently purchased the car from “Offer Up.” At this point, the driver identified himself as Rohrs. Officer Clasablanca initially believed Rohrs was driving under the influence, but he asked Rohrs questions about the car. During this encounter, Officer 2 No. 88744-1-I/3 Clasablanca observed Rohrs to be unsteady on his feet, leaning against the SUV, and having difficulty maintaining his train of thought while answering questions. Additionally, he observed slurred speech, droopy eyes, flushed face, and the smell of alcohol emanating from Rohrs. Officer Clasablanca read Rohrs warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and asked Rohrs to perform a field sobriety test, which Rohrs declined, and a preliminary breath test, which Rohrs initially agreed to but then declined. Another officer performed a search and discovered Rohrs’s driver’s license required him to have an interlock device on his vehicle. “The ignition interlock device . . . is designed to prevent a vehicle from starting if the driver has consumed alcohol.” Ignition Interlock, WASH. ST. PATROL, https://wsp.wa.gov/interlock [https://perma.cc/R24Y-X8WD]. The SUV that Rohrs was driving was not equipped with an ignition interlock device. Officer Clasablanca arrested Rohrs for driving under the influence and failure to have an interlock system in the vehicle, and transported Rohrs to the Tacoma Police Department, where Officer Clasablanca advised Rohrs of his constitutional warnings and implied consent warnings. Officer Clasablanca testified that because Rohrs declined to provide a breath sample several times, he sought and was granted a search warrant to obtain Rohrs’s blood. Officer Clasablanca observed a certified phlebotomist draw blood from Rohrs into two “ ‘Vacutainer’ glass vials” that he provided her. The phlebotomist filled one vial with eight milliliters of blood and the other vial contained seven milliliters of blood. Rohrs was then transported to the Pierce County Jail for 3 No. 88744-1-I/4 booking and processing. The vials were received by the Washington State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory (“WSPTL”) on November 21, 2023. B The State presented testimony from Darlene Valencia, a forensic scientist who is a certified blood analyst with training and experience related to the testing of alcohol concentration in blood. She testified the vials used for Rohrs had an expiration date of November 30, 2023. Valencia tested Rohrs’s blood on July 17, 2024 and July 19, 2024. Thus, the blood draw occurred approximately 12 days before the vials’ expiration date, and the testing occurred nearly eight months after the expiration date. Valencia testified that the expiration date noted on the vial referred to the vacuum seal of the vial and not the solutions contained within. She testified that if there was blood in the tube, she had no concern for the vacuum seal. Valencia testified the vacuum seal either worked or it did not, meaning the vial vacuum seal was sufficient to draw blood into the vial, or it was insufficient to draw blood and no blood would be drawn into the vial. Valencia observed that Rohrs’s blood collected in the vials was not coagulated, which suggested to her that the preservatives were functioning properly. Based on her experience, she believed that if the concentration of alcohol were to change due to prolonged storage in vials, the alcohol concentration would decrease very slightly, if anything. The trial court found that the scientific studies Valencia referenced stood for the proposition that the expiration of the vial has a minimal impact on the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of the tested blood contained within. 4 No. 88744-1-I/5 Valencia testified she was not aware of any regulation or statute that prohibited the testing of blood contained in expired vials or whether Washington State Patrol quality protocols mention the testing of sample stored in expired vials. With regard to the volume of blood drawn for Rohrs, Valencia testified she was not concerned because she believed if the tube contained blood, the vacuum seal was not compromised. C Rohrs presented testimony of Janine Arvizu, a chemist and certified quality auditor of laboratory work. She has been auditing forensic toxicology work for more than 25 years, including data quality audits of alcohol toxicology results. Arvizu testified that normally, the laboratory would respect the expiration date of an evacuated vial noted by the manufacturer and not test any substance beyond the vial’s expiration date. She disagreed with Valencia’s contention that the expiration date primarily affected the vacuum seal of the tubes. She explained that the efficacy of a vacuum seal is one consideration for the manufacturers in regard to the expiration date, in addition, they consider the “sterility, efficacy and concentration of the preservatives over time under the conditions that the device will be used for collection, storage, and testing of a blood specimen.” She testified a laboratory would need to do further testing of a particular device or substance to determine if its conditions of use remain acceptable. WSPTL did not conduct additional testing. Arvizu explained that any collection, storage or testing of a sample after the vial has expired runs the risk that ethanol concentration in the vial at the time it is 5 No. 88744-1-I/6 tested is materially different than at the time the specimen was collected. The trial court was not provided any studies or testimony from the manufacturer that the testing of blood samples contained in an expired evacuated vial will not produce reliable results as to alcohol concentration. Arvizu testified the results in this case were obtained employing generally accepted forensic toxicology procedures and were appropriate. However, she opined the results obtained in this case cannot be viewed as reliable and accurate to a degree of certainty. II In this case, Rohrs argued, and the State agreed, Officer Clasablanca seized Rohrs when he turned on his overhead lights in the Jack in the Box parking lot. Rohrs agues the trial court erred in concluding the seizure was a valid investigative detention “because the ‘loud disturbance’ does not support a reasonable suspicion that Rohrs was involved in criminal activity.” We disagree. A We review challenges to a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. State v. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d 222, 237, 573 P.3d 1191 (2025). The constitutionality of a warrantless stop is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 539, 182 P.3d 426 (2008). Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an officer generally may not seize a person without a warrant, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Weyand, 188 Wn.2d 804, 811, 399 P.3d 530 (2017). The State bears the 6 No. 88744-1-I/7 burden to show that a warrantless search or seizure falls into one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. Id. An investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Weyand, 188 Wn.2d at 811. The Terry exception allows an officer to briefly detain a person for questioning, without a warrant, if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Id. An officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the inception of the stop. State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 158, 352 P.3d 152 (2015). In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion, we look at the totality of the circumstances known to the officer. Id. The totality of the circumstances includes the officer’s training and experience, the location of the stop, the conduct of the person detained, the purpose of the stop, and the amount of physical intrusion on the suspect’s liberty. Id. “Warrantless traffic stops are constitutional under article I, section 7 as investigative stops, but only if based upon at least a reasonable articulable suspicion of either criminal activity or a traffic infraction, and only if reasonably limited in scope.” State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292-93, 290 P.3d 983 (2012). Pretextual traffic stops are unconstitutional under article I, section 7. Id. at 294. A pretextual traffic stop occurs when a police officer relies on some legal authorization as a mere pretext to dispense with a warrant when the true reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement. Id. A mixed-motive traffic stop is not pretextual if, despite other motivations or reasons for the stop, 7 No. 88744-1-I/8 the officer actually and consciously makes an appropriate and independent determination that addressing the suspected traffic infraction (or multiple suspected infractions) is reasonably necessary in furtherance of traffic safety and the general welfare. Id. at 297-98. B A person is “seized” only if, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wn. App. 452, 455, 711 P.2d 1096 (1985) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)). In this case, the State agreed with Rohrs’s argument that a seizure began when Officer Clasablanca turned on the lights to his patrol car. In Gatewood, the court analyzed only the facts known to the officer up to the point of the seizure. 163 Wn.2d at 540. Similarly here, we analyze only the facts known to the Officer Clasablanca up to the point when the seizure occurred: (1) Officer Clasablanca heard excessive honking from an SUV in the drive-through lane of Jack-in-the-Box; (2) he heard a woman screaming at the someone in the SUV, from 10 feet away; (3) the SUV did not have a license plate; (4) there was a second vehicle in the parking lot; and (5) he was unsure if Jack in the Box was closed when he pulled into the parking lot of the business. Based on those facts, Officer Clasablanca turned on “his overhead lights for the stated purposes of detaining both individuals as he believed he was observing a potential domestic violence situation.” Officer Clasablanca testified that he did not rely on the lack of a rear license plate to initiate the stop. Although the State argued in the trial court 8 No. 88744-1-I/9 that the stop could be justified under the community caretaking exception, the State does not advance this theory on appeal. At oral argument, the State clarified that the criminal activity it asserts Officer Clasablanca could reasonably suspect was domestic violence assault. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., State v. Rohrs, No. 88744-1-I (Sep. 22, 2026), at 14 min., 36 sec. to 15 min., 20 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division- 1-court-of-appeals-2026091220/?eventID=2026091220. Rohrs argues that the “loud disturbance” does not support a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity. We disagree. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Clasablanca had reasonable articulable suspicion of a potential assault. Officer Clasablanca observed this incident at approximately 12:30 a.m. in a Jack in the Box drive-through lane in downtown Tacoma. With a woman screaming profanity in an escalating manner at a car, and the car excessively honking in the drive-through lane, the officer was presented with individuals apparently interacting with each other in an elevated manner. Officer Clasablanca’s perception of Rohrs’s excessive use of his horn in that situation supports an inference that Rohrs was responding to the woman’s screaming. Officer Clasablanca could have reasonably believed a fight was about to occur based on the conduct of the woman and Rohrs. In State v. Madrigal, this court held the officer’s detention was justified after he observed a man and a woman in a heated argument. 65 Wn. App. 279, 283, 827 P.2d 1105 (1992). The officer could hear the couple yelling more than half a block away. Id. at 280. Additionally, the officer observed the man’s body language 9 No. 88744-1-I/10 overpowering the woman. Id. Believing an assault was about to occur or had occurred or that a domestic quarrel was ensuing, the officer approached the couple and noticed the woman crying. Id. We held this was sufficient under Terry. Id. at 282. The present case lacks the precisely analogous fact observed in Madrigal that the man’s body language was “overpowering” the woman. But the participants here displayed escalated conduct giving rise to the same kind of suspicion of imminent disturbance. And, in State v. Schultz, the court recognized that an officer may be justified in entering someone’s home if the circumstances are volatile and could likely escalate into domestic violence. 170 Wn.2d 746, 761, 248 P.3d 484 (2011). Here, taken together, the time of night, the participants being apparently the only people present at the relatively deserted location, the woman’s apparent distress, the proximity of the SUV approximately 10 feet from her, and the participants’ mutual escalation all support a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person in the vehicle was about to commit an assault. As a result, evidence resulting from the lawful stop is admissible. III Rohrs argues the test for his BAC was not reliable. We disagree. In Washington, expert testimony must satisfy both the Frye test and ER 702. State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 798, 453 P.3d 696 (2019). While Frye concerns the use of novel scientific methodology and guards against the admission of new techniques until a “ ‘scientific consensus decides the methodology is reliable,’ ” ER 702 concerns the use of existing scientific methodology and excludes testimony “ ‘where the expert fails to adhere to that reliable methodology.” Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 10 No. 88744-1-I/11 at 798 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909, 918-19, 296 P.3d 860 (2013)). Admissibility decisions under ER 702 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 798. “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.’ ” Id. at 799 (quoting State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007)). If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. ER 702. ER 703 provides, The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. B Both the State’s expert and the defense’s expert testified to the reliability of the blood sample tested after the tube in which the sample was collected expired. However, in at least one case, the Supreme Court held that challenges to reliability of the evidence based on the laboratory error rate goes to the weight of the evidence, which is a determination for the jury. State v. Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 270, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). Rohrs’s challenge based on the viability of the blood 11 No. 88744-1-I/12 sample after the expiration date of the vial is similar. The State presented evidence that this circumstance did not undermine the test validity. RCW 46.61.506(5)(c) provides, Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent the subject of the test from challenging the reliability or accuracy of the test, the reliability or functioning of the instrument, or any maintenance procedures. Such challenges, however, shall not preclude the admissibility of the test once the prosecution or department has made a prima facie showing of the requirements contained in (a) of this subsection. Instead, such challenges may be considered by the trier of fact in determining what weight to give to the test result. Based on the State’s evidence, the jury could infer reliability of the blood tests. Rohrs’s blood was present in the test tubes, and as Valencia, the expert for the State, testified, blood cannot get into the tube without a functioning vacuum seal. The presence of blood in the test tube indicates the tube was functioning as intended and the vacuum seal was still intact. Arvizu, Rohrs’s expert, contended that the proper functionality of the vacuum seal was not an “all-or-nothing situation,” as described by Valencia. The jury could also infer reliability of the blood tests because there was no evidence of coagulation. Valencia testified that the blood was in liquid form when she received the blood samples. Because the State presented evidence that supported a reliable application of a methodology that was not novel, the weight of the evidence was for the jury to decide. The court acted within its discretion in finding adequate foundation for the blood tests under ER 702 and ER 703. 12 No. 88744-1-I/13 IV Rohrs argues his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because the State did not provide sufficient evidence to support at least one of the alternative means of a driving under the influence conviction. We disagree. A Questions of law are reviewed de novo. See Roberts, 5 Wn.3d at 237. In claiming insufficient evidence, the defendant admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. Id. Inferences are drawn in the State’s favor. Id. The conviction will be upheld if any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Our state constitution protects a criminal defendant’s right to be convicted only by a unanimous jury. State v. Aguilar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 905, 917, 534 P.3d 360 (2023). The constitutional right to jury unanimity functions uniquely in the alternative means context. Id. at 918. When more than one means of elevating the degree of a crime is present, the State may instruct the jury on each of the means that is potentially available. Id. So long as each means is supported by sufficient evidence, the jury does not need to be unanimous as to which means it relies on to elevate the crime to a higher degree. Id. Under the Washington constitution, if even a single one of the alternative means on which the jury is instructed is unsupported by sufficient evidence, the conviction will not be affirmed. Id. 13 No. 88744-1-I/14 Jury instruction 12, which mirrored the language of former RCW 46.61.502 (2022), which provided, To convict the defendant of the crime of driving under the influence, each of the following three elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about November 18, 2023, the defendant drove a motor vehicle in the State of Washington; (2) That the defendant at the time of driving a motor vehicle (a) was under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or (b) had sufficient alcohol in his body to have an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher within two hours after driving as shown by accurate and reliable test of the defendant’s blood; and (3) That the defendant (a) has been previously convicted under RCW 46.61.522 or (b) the person has been previously convicted under RCW 46.61.502(6) B Driving under the influence is an alternative means crime. State v. Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d 726, 733, 364 P.3d 87 (2015). We therefore consider the evidence supporting each alternative means submitted to the jury. 1 Sufficient evidence supports the alternative means that Rohrs was under the influence or affected by intoxicating liquor. Officer Clasablanca testified to his observations of Rohrs after Rohrs exited his vehicle. Officer Clasablanca observed Rohrs struggling to maintain his balance after he exited his vehicle, 14 No. 88744-1-I/15 appearing disordered, and having noticeable odor of intoxicants. He also observed Rohrs’s slurred speech and watery eyes. This is combined with the fact that Rohrs was going 10 to 15 miles per hour in an area where the posted speed limit was 25 miles per hour. Based on Officer Clasablanca’s training in detecting drivers under the influence, he testified that people driving under the influence may drive too fast or too slow. 2 Sufficient evidence supports alternative means of Rohrs having a BAC of 0.08 or higher. Rohrs states, “[T]here is arguably substantial evidence to prove alternative means (b), that Rohrs had a BAC of 0.08 or higher” but he argues the tests are not reliable because the test tubes expired by the time the blood sample was tested, and his expert witness testified to that point. He points to his blood test result showing his BAC was 0.23. We disagree with Rohrs’s contention. The State presented testimony from Valencia who discussed the toxicology lab’s procedure for testing blood samples. She testified that her lab received samples of Rohrs’s blood and placed them in a refrigerator. She observed Rohrs’s blood samples in gray top Vacutainer tubes. She testified that the color of the cap indicates the type of additives contained in the tubes, which are present to keep the blood in its liquid form and stop any processes that could create additional ethanol in the sample. Valencia testified she uses headspace gas chromatography to perform blood alcohol testing, and this technology is a procedure approved by the state toxicologist. She tests the blood sample in duplicate by running a second test using a different instrument with different separation properties. For the 15 No. 88744-1-I/16 toxicology report she prepared on Rohrs, the result shows a BAC level of 0.23 plus or minus 0.02 grams per 100 milliliters. Valencia testified to the purpose of retrograde extrapolation to estimate one’s blood alcohol concentration at a prior time after a certain number of hours of ceasing alcohol intake. She testified that in order for the calculation to work, she had to assume that the person had ceased alcohol intake for at least two hours. Using retrograde extrapolation, Valencia estimates someone with a BAC of 0.23 would have had a BAC of 0.28 to 0.355 five hours before the blood sample was tested. Rohrs had a BAC of 0.23 approximately five hours after his initial seizure. Sufficient evidence supports alternative means of Rohrs having a BAC of 0.08 or higher within two hours after driving. Affirmed. WE CONCUR: 16