Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction KADAFIE FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 48465) Suarez, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder as a result of a shooting incident, appealed following the habeas court’s granting in part of his petition for certification to appeal from the court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that his criminal trial counsel, M, did not provide ineffective assistance. Held: The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner’s claim that M rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately challenge or test on cross- examination certain factors concerning the memory of two state’s witnesses who had identified the petitioner as the shooter, as M’s approach in cross- examining those witnesses was reasonably competent and constituted sound trial strategy, the factors at issue had not yet been identified as important by our Supreme Court at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial, and, because resolution of the petitioner’s claim did not involve an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason or that a court could reasonably have resolved differently, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal with respect to his claim. The habeas court correctly concluded that M did not render deficient perfor- mance by not consulting with or presenting the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert, as the law at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial generally disfavored the admission of such testimony, M competently attacked the state’s identification evidence, even in the absence of a consulta- tion with such an expert, and the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal as to that issue on the ground that presenting such an expert could have backfired by impacting the jury’s assessment of the testimony of a witness for the petitioner, who M believed was an “absolute perfect eyewitness.” The petitioner did not prove his claim that M rendered deficient performance by failing to file motions to preclude or to suppress the identifications of the petitioner that were made by two of the state’s witnesses, as one of those witnesses had testified that she knew the petitioner, which increased the accuracy of her identification, a prior motion to preclude the other witness’ identification already had been denied, and, even if the criminal court had found that the police photographic arrays from which the witnesses had identified the petitioner were unduly suggestive, that court still reasonably could have found that the identifications were reliable under the totality of the circumstances and denied any motion to suppress. The habeas court properly determined that M did not perform deficiently by failing to request comprehensive jury instructions on the issue of eyewitness  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction identification, as the court correctly noted that the law at the time of the petitioner’s criminal trial was that juries did not need the kind of guidance that was later established by our Supreme Court in cases such as State v. Guilbert (306 Conn. 218), the instructions the criminal court did give mir- rored the then existing model identification instructions on the Judicial Branch website, which left M with no sound legal basis on which to request more specific instructions, and, as this court did not believe that the issue deserved encouragement to proceed further, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal with respect to his claim. Argued September 17—officially released November 10, 2026 Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Streeto, J.; thereafter, the petition was withdrawn in part; judgment denying the petition; subsequently, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for certification to appeal, and the peti- tioner appealed to this court. Affirmed in part; appeal dismissed in part. Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Christopher A. Alexy, senior assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney, Cornelius P. Kelly, senior assistant state’s attorney, and Jonathan Formichella, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion SUAREZ, J. The petitioner, Kadafie Fernandez, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court (1) abused 1 The habeas court granted in part and denied in part the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court. All of the grounds listed by the petitioner in his petition for certification to appeal related to his ineffective assistance claim. The petitioner asserts that the court’s granting of several “broad claims” listed as grounds to appeal “cover the claims that were denied” and,  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction its discretion in denying in part his petition for certifica- tion to appeal and (2) improperly rejected his claim that his criminal trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We dismiss the appeal as to the petitioner’s first claim. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court as it relates to the petitioner’s second claim. This court previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural history pertaining to the petitioner’s convic- tion. See State v. Fernandez, 139 Conn. App. 341, 55 A.3d 613 (2012), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 954, 58 A.3d therefore, that the court abused its discretion in denying the petition with respect to those claims that it denied. We acknowledge that the habeas court granted certification on the broad issue of whether the court had improperly determined that the petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of counsel was not violated. We further note that it is “unsettled whether a habeas petitioner is lim- ited in the claims he or she may pursue on appeal when a habeas court expressly grants permission to appeal as to certain specific claims and denies certification to appeal as to others.” Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 214 Conn. App. 199, 202 n.1, 280 A.3d 526, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 967, 285 A.3d 736 (2022). The petitioner, however, has not provided any case citations or analysis in support of his argument and has not further briefed this issue other than to assert in conclusory fashion that his “broad” claims are encompassed by the narrower claims that he had asserted. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Commissioner of Correction, 240 Conn. App. 856, 889 n.20, A.3d (2026) (“[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandon- ing an issue by failure to brief the issue properly” (internal quotation marks omitted)), petition for cert. filed (Conn. September 3, 2026) (No. 260153). To the extent the petitioner intended to raise the propriety of the certification order as a separate claim, we conclude that it is not adequately briefed and decline to consider it. We therefore leave the issue of the propriety of the habeas court’s certification order for another day and address the petitioner’s claims in turn. See, e.g., Hil- ton v. Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn. App. 309, 311 n.1, 315 A.3d 1135 (2024), aff’d, 354 Conn. 825, 358 A.3d 983 (2026); Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 202 n.1. We note, however, that habeas courts should consider a petition for certification to appeal as a whole and in light of our jurisprudence that, following the granting of a petition for certification to appeal, “at least in the absence of demonstrable prejudice, the legislature did not intend the terms of the habeas court’s grant of certification to be a limitation on the specific issues subject to appellate review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 214 Conn. App. 202 n.1.  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction 974 (2013). The victim, Blake Moore, was shot at approxi- mately 3:10 a.m. on January 1, 2008, on Pembroke Street in the city of Bridgeport. Id., 343. “Between 10 and 10:30 p.m. on December 31, 2007, Rogsbert King was walking south on Pembroke Street near its intersection with Ogden Street. At that time, she saw the [petitioner], who was carrying a shotgun, exit a convenience store on the opposite side of Pembroke Street. “Between 9 and 10 p.m. that evening, Moore and his girlfriend, Thea Robinson, arrived at the apartment of Jonalee Lacend, who lived at the corner of Pembroke and Shelton Streets. Moore, Robinson and Lacend left together to attend a New Year’s Eve party in Stratford and returned together at approximately 1 a.m. on Janu- ary 1, 2008. Thereafter, the three of them and others congregated on the corner of Pembroke and Shelton Streets until approximately 2:30 a.m. when they went into Lacend’s apartment. During the time they were on the corner, two men walked by and one of them bumped into Robinson. Robinson and the man exchanged unpleas- ant words. “At approximately 3 a.m., Moore and Robinson prepared to leave Lacend’s apartment. Moore exited Lacend’s apartment and crossed Shelton Street where Robinson’s car was parked. Robinson was standing on Shelton Street when two men walked past her. When they were approximately ten feet away, the men stopped and turned toward Robinson. One of the men took a shotgun from under the long coat he was wearing and fired two shots into the air in Moore’s direction. Robinson heard a pumping action between the shots, indicating to her that it was a pump action shotgun. Moore ran from the scene and turned south on Pembroke Street toward Jane Street. The man who had produced and fired the shotgun handed it to the other man and stated ‘get him, get him.’ The man took the shotgun and pursued Moore. Later, at the police station, Robinson identified the [petitioner] as the man who took the shotgun and pursued Moore onto Pembroke Street.  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction “Marlboro Court is a public housing complex on the west side of Pembroke Street between Shelton and Jane Streets. For a number of hours on the night in question, Elizabeth Campos had been sitting near the interior stairwell of Marlboro Court smoking crack cocaine. When Campos heard a gunshot, she opened the stairwell door and saw Moore running south on Pembroke Street toward Jane Street. She also saw the [petitioner], whom she knew from the neighborhood and who was facing her, carrying a shotgun and running on the sidewalk behind Moore. More than once, she saw the [petitioner] ‘click it back,’ referring to the shotgun, and shoot Moore.2 Moore collapsed on the ground, and the [petitioner] turned and headed east on Jane Street. Campos went to a pay telephone and called 911. “Carmelo Rivera was a high school student living with his family on the third floor of Marlboro Court. He spent New Year’s Eve and the early hours of New Year’s Day in his brother’s bedroom talking on a portable telephone to his friend. He was smoking cigarettes near an open window that faced Jane Street. Rivera had seen a man walking on Jane and Pembroke Streets thirty to sixty minutes prior to the shooting. The man, later identified as the [petitioner], was carrying something big under his white hoodie. While he was looking out the window, Rivera saw the man, then in the company of another man, turn from Jane Street on to Pembroke Street, as well as Moore walking south in the middle of Pembroke Street. One of the men took out a shotgun and fired three shots at Moore. In his statement to [the] police, Rivera stated that Moore was first shot in the leg. The two men then stood over Moore and shot him twice more. Rivera dialed 911 to report the shooting. 2 “Campos did not report what she saw to the police immediately. Fulgencio Rodriguez, with whom Campos had been smoking crack, told Detective Heitor Teixeira that Campos witnessed the shooting. After Campos had been arrested on an unrelated matter on January 25, 2008, Heitor Teixeira questioned her about the Moore shooting. Campos provided a written statement regarding what she saw and selected the [petitioner’s] photograph from a photographic array, identifying him as the shooter.” State v. Fernandez, supra, 139 Conn. App. 344 n.3.  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction “Detective Paul Ortiz secured the crime scene to col- lect evidence. He recovered three spent shotgun shells on the sidewalk on the east side of Pembroke Street close to its intersection with Jane Street. Moore’s body was found in the roadway on Pembroke Street, on the side of the street close to the walkway where the shells were recovered. “On January 11, 2008, Detective Heitor Teixeira went to the home of Sandi Teixeira.3 The [petitioner], who was then incarcerated on an unrelated conviction, had informed [D]epartment of [C]orrection personnel that Sandi Teixeira was his contact person. Sandi Teixeira told the detectives that she had been romantically involved with the [petitioner] on and off for several years, but that she had not seen the [petitioner] on New Year’s Eve. At 4:40 a.m. on January 1, 2008, the [petitioner], who was standing in Sandi Teixeira’s backyard, called her from a cellular telephone she had lent him. Sandi Teixeira and the [petitioner] went to a hotel in Milford where they remained until approximately noon, when Sandi Teixeira then took the [petitioner] to his grandmother’s house on Pembroke Street. That evening, Sandi Teixeira and the [petitioner] checked into a hotel in Fairfield, where they remained for several days. “When Heitor Teixeira first met with Sandi Teixeira, she produced a cellular telephone from which the detec- tive downloaded a photograph of the [petitioner] that had been taken on January 1, 2008. Sandi Teixeira met with Heitor Teixeira again on January 20, 2008, and identified a 551 number that appeared frequently on her cellular telephone as the number of the cellular telephone she had lent to the [petitioner] (551 phone). The United States marshal’s office utilized the records of the 551 phone to plot its location throughout the evening of December 31, 2007, and into the morning of January 1, 2008. The records disclosed that the 551 phone was used during those hours in Trumbull at approximately 10:46 3 “Heitor Teixeira and Sandi Teixeira are not related to one another.” State v. Fernandez, supra, 139 Conn. App. 345 n.6.  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction p.m. and in New Haven one and one-half hours later. The records further revealed that the 551 phone was used sequentially in West Haven, Milford and Bridgeport, where it was used at 2:56 a.m.” (Footnotes in original; footnotes omitted.) Id., 343–46. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with murder. Before his criminal trial commenced, the petitioner filed a motion in limine on November 3, 2009, seeking to preclude the state from eliciting an in-court identification of him from several witnesses, including Robinson (2009 motion in limine), which the court later denied.4 Following a jury trial that proceeded in Decem- ber 2009, the petitioner was convicted of murder in vio- lation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and sentenced to sixty years of incarceration. State v. Fernandez, supra, 139 Conn. App. 342–43 and n.1. The petitioner’s convic- tion was affirmed on direct appeal. Id., 343. In 2013, the petitioner commenced this habeas action. The operative second amended petition was filed on March 22, 2024, and contained three counts. Count one alleged that the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel, Gary Mas- tronardi, provided ineffective assistance by, inter alia,5 failing (1) to adequately investigate the petitioner’s case, (2) to adequately research legal issues, (3) to adequately cross-examine or otherwise challenge the testimony pro- vided by Robinson and Campos, (4) to adequately consult 4 It is not disputed on appeal that the trial court denied the motion in limine, although the record and underlying trial transcripts before us do not reveal when the court ruled on this motion. At the habeas trial, Mastronardi testified as follows with respect to the 2009 motion in limine: “I think that . . . when [the court] denied the motion [in limine], he said, but I’m going to allow you, you know, to question the police, and that’s what I did.” 5 The petitioner alleged various other instances of ineffective assis- tance by Mastronardi. In counts two and three of the operative petition, the petitioner also alleged freestanding claims that his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial was violated by the prosecutor’s (1) failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence and (2) knowing presentation of false and/or misleading testimony. The petitioner withdrew these claims before the habeas trial, and, thus, they are not relevant to this appeal.  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction with or present the testimony of an expert in eyewitness identification, (5) to move to suppress Campos’ in-court identification, (6) to object to or preserve for appeal the issue of Campos’ and Robinson’s in-court and out-of- court identifications of the petitioner, (7) to adequately investigate and/or file a motion to suppress Campos’ and Robinson’s out-of-court identifications of the petitioner, (8) to adequately request jury instructions relating to eyewitness identification, and (9) to adequately object to or respond to the trial court’s jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification. The respondent, the Commis- sioner of Correction, filed a return leaving the petitioner to his proof. During the habeas trial on November 26, 2024, the peti- tioner presented testimony from Mastronardi; Charles A. Goodsell, an eyewitness identification expert; and Brian Carlow, a legal expert. In addition, the petitioner offered documentary evidence, including the transcripts from his criminal trial, a certified copy of his criminal file, copies of the photographic arrays shown to the eyewit- nesses during the criminal trial, and the 2009 motion in limine. The respondent did not call any witnesses. After the conclusion of the petitioner’s habeas trial, the habeas court, Streeto, J., issued a memorandum of decision on December 13, 2024, denying the operative habeas petition. The court rejected the petitioner’s claim that Mastronardi had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or that he had been prejudiced by Mastronardi’s representation. The habeas court first concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that Mastronardi was ineffective in failing to adequately cross-examine Robinson and Campos. The court noted that, with respect to Robinson, Mastronardi had asked “numerous questions designed to impeach her credibility regarding her identification of the petitioner as the shooter . . . .” As to Campos, the court stated that “even . . . Carlow acknowledged that  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction Mastronardi did a good job of exposing the unreliability of her identification and impeaching her credibility.” The habeas court also determined that Mastronardi was not ineffective in failing to consult with or present the testimony of an expert in eyewitness identification. The court stated that Mastronardi did not consult an expert in eyewitness identification because of the “utter unreliability” of the state’s witnesses as opposed to the “sterling credibility” of his own eyewitness, Rivera. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court further concluded that, at the time of the petitioner’s trial, “the area of eyewitness identification had not yet evolved to the point at which it now stands, and, therefore, Mas- tronardi effectively used cross-examination, closing argument, and his own eyewitness to instill reasonable doubt about identity. Moreover, if Mastronardi had brought forth an expert witness at trial in an attempt to undermine Robinson’s and Campos’ identifications of the petitioner, it might have backfired by causing the jury to question the reliability of his own eyewitness, a situation that would have hurt, rather than helped, his defense.” Next, the habeas court determined that the petitioner’s claim that Mastronardi was ineffective in his handling of Robinson’s and Campos’ in-court and out-of-court identifications of the petitioner was unavailing. The court noted that Mastronardi had believed that the best way to present the defense of mistaken identity was to “move to preclude Robinson’s in-court identification of the petitioner, to challenge the reliability and accuracy of . . . Campos’ and Robinson’s out-of-court identifica- tions, to highlight the trustworthiness of Rivera’s out- of-court identification, and to focus on the shoddy and incomplete police investigation,” and concluded that these were reasonable strategic decisions. The court noted that, even though Carlow had opined that he would have filed a motion to suppress the identification evi- dence, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moreover, the court reasoned that, at the time  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction of the petitioner’s criminal trial, cases such as State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218, 49 A.3d 705 (2012), “were still years away from being decided, and, thus, Mastronardi was left to make strategic decisions about how best to defend a case revolving around eyewitness identification under the law at the time. . . . The decisions Mastronardi made were reasonable under all the circumstances and given the law regarding the admissibility of eyewitness identifications at the time of the trial.” (Citation omit- ted; emphasis omitted.) Finally, the habeas court concluded that Mastronardi did not render ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request jury instructions pertaining to eyewitness identification and in failing to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on that issue. The habeas court iterated that “the law at the time of the petitioner’s 2009 trial regarding eyewitness identification was in flux and evolv- ing. Generally, however, the rule was that the jury was capable of deciding the reliability of, and weight to give, eyewitness identification, and that the jury did not need the kind of guidance that was later established in cases like Guilbert. Given this state of the law, Mastronardi was not deficient for failing to request a different or specific jury instruction on eyewitness identification.” With respect to each of the petitioner’s claims, the habeas court also held that the petitioner did not prove prejudice. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal wherein he stated fourteen grounds on which he proposed to appeal.6 Thereafter, on December 24, 2024, the habeas 6 Specifically, he asserted the following grounds: (1) the habeas court improperly determined that his right to the effective assistance of trial counsel was not violated; (2) the habeas court made clearly erroneous factual findings; (3) the habeas court improperly found that Mastronardi conducted effective cross-examinations of Robinson and Campos; (4) the habeas court improperly found that Mastronardi’s failure to consult with or present expert testimony on eyewitness identification was reasonable “because he effectively used cross-examination, closing argument, and his own eyewitnesses to instill reasonable doubt about the identity of the shooter”; (5) the habeas court improperly found that the petitioner had failed to prove that the trial court would have admitted the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert; (6) the habeas court improperly  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction court issued an order on the petition for certification to appeal in which it granted the petition in part and denied it in part. See footnote 1 of this opinion. This appeal followed. Our analysis of the petitioner’s claims on appeal is guided by the following principles. “Faced with the found that the possibility that presenting an expert in eyewitness identification could have backfired justified Mastronardi’s not having consulted such an expert; (7) the habeas court improperly found that Mastronardi’s decision not to consult or present an expert in eyewitness identification was reasonable under all the circumstances; (8) the habeas court improperly found that Mastronardi’s failure to adequately move to suppress the identifications of the petitioner was a reasonable strate- gic decision; (9) the habeas court improperly found that the petitioner presented no evidence that the trial court would have suppressed the identifications, and, as a result, he was unable to establish prejudice; (10) the habeas court improperly found vis-à-vis the petitioner’s claim that Mastronardi failed to preserve various eyewitness identification issues for appeal, he was unable to show that he was prejudiced because “there [was] no evidence that the petitioner would have had a reason- able probability of appellate success if any of those claims had been raised on appeal”; (11) the habeas court improperly found that the petitioner had put forth no evidence showing that, even if Mastronardi had preserved eyewitness identification issues for appeal, the result of the appeal would have been different under the applicable legal stan- dard; (12) the habeas court improperly found that Mastronardi was not deficient for failing to request a different or specific jury instruction on eyewitness identification; (13) the habeas court improperly found that the petitioner had failed to establish both deficient performance and prejudice with respect to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims; and (14) “[c]laims involving any other evidentiary, factual, or legal improprieties that become apparent after the petitioner has the opportunity to receive and review the habeas trial transcript, and to compare the transcript to the habeas court’s decision.” We further note that the petition for certification to appeal lists fifteen grounds for appeal; however, the petitioner twice alleged an identical ground, namely, that the habeas court had improperly found that the possibility that presenting an expert in eyewitness identifica- tion could have backfired justified Mastronardi’s not having consulted such an expert. This appears to have been a scrivener’s error. As noted previously; see footnote 1 of this opinion; habeas courts should review a petition for certification as a whole. We further note, however, that, in the present case, the petitioner’s inclusion of fourteen grounds in his petition for certification to appeal, which included a broad claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as well as several narrower arguments in support of that claim, may have invited confusion on the part of the habeas court in ruling on the petition for certification.  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction habeas court’s denial of certification to appeal, a peti- tioner’s first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. . . . If the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits. . . . “A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason . . . [a] court could resolve the issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . . the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . In deter- mining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. . . . In other words, we review the petition- er’s substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria . . . for determining the propriety of the habeas court’s denial of the petition for certification. . . . [S]ee also Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994) (adopting as state law criteria identified by United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), as appropriate standard for determining whether habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. App. 241, 248–49, A.3d (2026). We next set forth the well settled standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. “In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly errone- ous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary. . . .  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction “In Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], the United States Supreme Court established that for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of [the] conviction . . . . That requires the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. . . . Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. . . . Because both prongs . . . must be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a petitioner’s claim if he [or she] fails to meet either prong. . . . “To prove deficient performance, the petitioner must prove that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed [to him] by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. [Id.] The petitioner is tasked with demonstrat[ing] that his [or her] attorney’s repre- sentation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . Additionally, [a] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes- sional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the chal- lenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nealy v. Commissioner of Correction, 235 Conn. App. 872, 882–84, 346 A.3d 551, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 939, 347 A.3d 879 (2025). With these principles in mind, we address the petitioner’s claims in turn.7 I The petitioner first claims that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that Mastronardi rendered 7 Because we agree with the habeas court that the petitioner failed to meet his burden under the performance prong of Strickland with respect to each of his specific claims, we need not address the petitioner’s  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately cross-examine Robinson and Campos. The petitioner also claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal from the court’s denial of his claim. We disagree. The following legal principles are relevant to the peti- tioner’s claim. “It is well settled that [o]nce an attorney makes an informed, strategic decision regarding how to cross-examine a witness, that decision is virtually unchal- lengeable. . . . An attorney’s line of questioning on exami- nation of a witness clearly is tactical in nature. [As such, this] court will not, in hindsight, second-guess counsel’s trial strategy. . . . The fact that counsel arguably could have inquired more deeply into certain areas, or failed to inquire at all into areas of claimed importance, falls short of establishing deficient performance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Balbuena v. Commissioner of Correction, 231 Conn. App. 289, 338, 332 A.3d 1008, cert. denied, 352 Conn. 905, 335 A.3d 845 (2025). In rejecting the petitioner’s claim in the present case, the habeas court reasoned that “[t]he trial transcripts demonstrate that Mastronardi conducted effective cross-examinations of both witnesses. With regard to Robinson, he asked numerous questions designed to impeach her credibility regarding her identification of the petitioner as the shooter, including homing in on why she was shown the same photo[graphic] array twice but initially stated [that] she could not identify the shooter in that array. He skillfully suggested via cross-examination that [Detective] Teixeira had improperly coached her to identify the petitioner as the shooter. As to . . . Campos, even . . . Carlow acknowledged that Mastronardi did a good job of exposing the unreliability of her identifica- tion and impeaching her credibility.” Accordingly, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis arguments as to the prejudice prong. See, e.g., Godfrey-Hill v. Com- missioner of Correction, 221 Conn. App. 526, 538 n.6, 302 A.3d 923, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 929, 304 A.3d 861 (2023).  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction of Mastronardi’s alleged failure to adequately cross- examine Robinson and Campos. On appeal, the petitioner relies on Carlow’s testimony in arguing that Mastronardi’s cross-examination of Rob- inson and Campos did not “go far enough” or cover the relevant issues. He specifically asserts that certain fac- tors affecting memory, which were discussed by Goodsell at the habeas trial,8 were not adequately “challenged or tested on cross-examination,” and would have impeached the identification evidence offered by Robinson and Cam- pos.9 He also argues that Mastronardi “failed to question Campos and Robinson about whether the case had been discussed with others and whether they had heard any- thing about the case.” We are not persuaded. With respect to Robinson, Mastronardi vigorously cross-examined her concerning her identification of the petitioner. Moreover, as the petitioner concedes, Carlow himself testified at the habeas trial that Mastronardi highlighted the stress Robinson was under when she made her identification.10 As the respondent notes in her brief to this court, Mastronardi testified at the habeas trial that Robinson “was not an eyewitness to the [shooting] and she saw nothing.” Indeed, at the petitioner’s criminal trial, Mastronardi elicited the following testimony from 8 As the petitioner noted in his principal appellate brief, Goodsell testi- fied concerning several factors, including the passage of time, lighting, distance, obstructions, distraction, the presence of a weapon, and the suggestive nature of a photographic array, all of which may impact a witness’ memory and false identification. 9 In support of this claim, the petitioner also asserts that Mastronardi should have consulted an expert, which could have better prepared his cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. We conclude that this argument fails for the reasons stated in part II of this opinion, which we need not repeat here. 10 Carlow testified at the habeas trial that “[s]ome of it was in there, and [it] certainly was brought out that it was stressful . . . .” At the petitioner’s criminal trial, Mastronardi cross-examined Robinson at length about her inability to identify the petitioner initially in a police photographic array shown to her at approximately 8 a.m. on the morning after the shooting. During that line of questioning, Robinson testified that, at that time, she had been “hurt and just crying and hysterical, and [she] was trying to get over the trauma [she had] just went through.”  Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction Robinson on cross-examination: “I didn’t see him fire the gun. I [saw] him chase [the victim] with the gun.” As to Campos, Carlow testified at the habeas trial that Mastronardi impeached her credibility on cross-exami- nation by highlighting her drug use.11 Mastronardi also cross-examined her concerning her observation of the shooting and a prior inconsistent statement that she gave to the police.12 Furthermore, Mastronardi cross- examined Campos concerning the fact that she did not report the shooting to the police and gave a statement only after being arrested on an unrelated matter. Campos acknowledged on cross-examination that the police had spoken to her at the time she identified the peti- tioner and “[told her] stuff about other people calling [an] ambulance and that they seen stuff . . . .” Mastronardi also elicited testimony from Campos that the police had played recordings of 911 calls made by other individuals during their meeting with her. This line of questioning was consistent with Mastronardi’s principal defense theories, namely, his attack on the police investigation and the reliability of the eyewitnesses’ identifications of the petitioner. Mastronardi explained at the habeas trial that his strategy with respect to the eyewitness testimony offered by the state was to contrast the testimony of Robinson and Campos with that of Rivera, who did not identify the petitioner. Mastronardi stated that Rivera was not 11 Carlow testified at the habeas trial that Mastronardi “[c]ertainly . . . did spend some time on the cocaine . . . use an