Full Opinion

Filed 11/20/26 P. v. Mendoza CA5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, F090454 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. VCF452891A) v. JOSE ELIAS MENDOZA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda Myrle Reed, Judge. Matthew J. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Justin Pedroso, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- Defendant and Appellant Jose Elias Mendoza (appellant) pled no contest to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c)).1 The trial court granted appellant’s request to represent himself at the sentencing hearing. Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant was sentenced to two years of felony probation and 364 days in custody. Appellant thereafter sought to revoke the waiver of his right to counsel and requested modification of his probation terms the day before he was scheduled to go into custody. The court denied appellant’s request to reappoint counsel. Appellant argues on appeal that the court erred in denying his request for counsel. We affirm. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 28, 2024, the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office filed a felony complaint charging appellant with one count of sodomy of a person under 18 years old (§ 286, subd. (b)(1); count 1). The complaint further alleged as to count 1 that appellant committed the offense with knowledge he had an acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and knowledge that he carried antibodies to the human immunodeficiency virus (§ 12022.85), the victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3))2, appellant occupied a position of leadership, dominance, and induced others to participate in the commission of the crime (Rule 4.421(a)(4)), and appellant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (Rule 4.421(b)(1)).3 On May 21, 2024, appellant requested his appointed attorney be discharged and a new attorney substituted pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The trial court denied appellant’s motion. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 3 The complaint also charged appellant’s co-defendant with crimes, which we do not address because they are not the subject of this appeal. 2. On August 2, 2024, appellant’s attorney declared a conflict, and he was appointed a new attorney. On November 15, 2024, appellant filed another Marsden motion. Appellant asked for his current counsel to be relieved and new counsel appointed. The trial court denied appellant’s request. On January 23, 2025, appellant filed a third Marsden motion that the trial court denied and held appellant to answer to the charges in the criminal complaint at the preliminary hearing. On February 5, 2025, the Tulare County District Attorney’s Office filed an information charging appellant with the same allegations as the felony complaint. On May 27, 2025, at a pretrial hearing, appellant, who was represented by counsel, entered a plea agreement with the People. Appellant pled no contest to unlawful intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) in exchange for two years of felony probation and a 364-day lid. On June 25, 2025, appellant’s counsel declared a conflict, and a new attorney was appointed. On July 1, 2025, appellant relinquished his right to counsel and requested to represent himself. After executing a valid waiver, the trial court granted appellant’s request. On the same day, the court sentenced appellant pursuant to the plea agreement as follows: two years of felony probation and 364 days in custody. The court suspended execution of his sentence for 30 days to allow appellant time to contact the sheriff’s office to determine if he was eligible for a program other than serving 364 days in custody. On July 31, 2025, the day before appellant was scheduled to go into custody, he appeared before the trial court as a walk-in without a scheduled hearing and requested the court reappoint counsel. Appellant also asked the court to modify the terms and conditions of his probation. The court denied appellant’s request. 3. DISCUSSION4 I. Request to Withdraw Pro Per Status and Reappoint Counsel Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing his request to withdraw his pro per status and to have counsel reappointed. The People respond that appellant was not entitled to counsel because he was not at a critical stage of the proceedings. The People further maintain that even if appellant had been entitled to counsel, there was no error, and any presumed error was harmless. We conclude appellant was not in a critical stage of the proceedings. However, assuming appellant was in a critical stage and entitled to counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s untimely request to revoke his waiver of his right to counsel, and any presumed error is harmless. A. Additional Background Appellant reached an agreement with the prosecution and pled no contest to unlawful intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) in exchange for two years felony probation and a lid of 364 days in custody. Appellant was represented by counsel at the time he executed the plea agreement who discussed the charges, appellant’s rights, defenses, and the consequences of his plea. Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to the terms of the plea. Appellant does not contest on appeal the validity of the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, appellant requested to represent himself. The trial court informed appellant that he had a right to counsel, and that it is “almost always wise not to represent yourself when you are dealing with criminal proceedings because a lawyer can do and say things for you that you may not have knowledge of, and a lawyer may receive benefits for you that you are unable to receive because you are unaware of them.” 4 Because this appeal raises no issues concerning the facts of the underlying offenses, we omit a statement of facts. (See People v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914, 916, fn. 2.) 4. Appellant confirmed he understood and requested to be sentenced without counsel. The court granted appellant’s request to proceed without counsel. Appellant made arguments that appeared to be for a lesser sentence, however, the trial court sentenced appellant pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. The court provided appellant 30 days to determine if he was eligible to apply for an alternative program other than serving time in custody. The day before appellant was scheduled to go into custody, he appeared in the trial court without a scheduled hearing and requested reappointment of counsel. Appellant also sought modification of his probation conditions, claiming he did not agree to the plea. He further stated that his mother was ill and requested a lighter sentence so he could care for her. Appellant informed the court that he was denied alternative programming that would substitute for time in custody. The trial court reminded appellant that he entered a plea agreement and was previously sentenced. The court denied appellant’s request to reappoint counsel as untimely. The court stated, “You requested that you proceed on your own, and I [am] not inclined to now grant [reappointment of counsel]. This matter had been terminated by way of pronouncement of judgment. You are here as a walk-in … request[ing] … modification of [probation] restrictions.” B. Right to Counsel “The federal constitutional right to counsel ‘applies at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake.’ ” (People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155; see Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128, 134.) “[A] critical stage is one ‘in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake’ [citation], and ‘the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 465.) Plea negotiations and sentencing are critical stages to which the constitutional right to counsel attaches. (Gardner v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2019) 6 Cal.5th 998, 5. 1005.) This applies even when “sentencing is deferred and a hearing is not conducted until after probation is revoked.” (People v. Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126, 134; see also People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155.) A probation revocation hearing requires appointed counsel because a probationer faces a significant loss of liberty when probation is revoked. (See People v. Bauer, at p. 156, fn. 2 [“the right to counsel at probation revocation hearings is consistent with the principle that the due process clause imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation”].) The People argue appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel because he was not in a critical stage in the proceedings citing People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858. There, the Second District found there was “no federal constitutional right to counsel in connection with a postconviction habeas corpus petition attacking the validity of a judgment.” (Id. at p. 865.) The court reasoned that the Secretary’s request for recall and resentencing is only an invitation for the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction; it did not provide any statutory entitlement to relief. (Ibid.) However, once the defendant’s sentence was recalled, the resentencing hearing was a critical stage at which the defendant enjoyed the right to due process and counsel. (Id. at p. 866.) Our case does not involve a postconviction request for the trial court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. Appellant requested the trial court modify the terms of his probation because he did not qualify for programming, was faced with 364 days in custody, and his mother was ill. Thus, our case presents a different issue that Frazier does not address. In appellant’s reply, he contends the hearing was in a critical stage because it was adversarial in nature, relying on authority that states a trial court generally has the power to modify terms and conditions of probation. (People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095 [“A change in circumstances is required before a court has jurisdiction to extend or otherwise modify probation”].) Appellant ends the inquiry there. While the court has the 6. power to modify the terms and conditions of probation, this does not necessitate entitlement to counsel at the hearing. The court in United States v. Silver (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 289, held that a hearing extending probation does not result in “a liberty interest [being] so infringed as to require [the] court to call for additional protections as per the Due Process Clause.” (Id. at p. 292.) The Third District followed the Ninth Circuit and held that “the procedural due process protections applied by the Supreme Court … to parole and probation revocation proceedings do not apply to probation extension proceedings.” (People v. Minor (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1, 17.) The Minor court reasoned, “[n]ot only is the liberty issue at stake in an extension proceeding different in degree from that involved in revocation of probation, the nature of the factual inquiry also differs.” (Id. at p. 16.) In a probation revocation hearing, the probationer can contest the violation allegation, however, in a modification hearing, the trial court is given greater discretion, and the court need not find that a violation occurred. (Ibid.) Like Minor, the significant liberty interest implicated in a critical stage, such as at sentencing or a parole revocation hearing, is not at issue in this case. Appellant entered a plea agreement and was sentenced. He then requested leniency regarding the terms of his probation. The court refused to modify the terms. We also find noteworthy the reason appellant made the modification request was because he was denied programming the court offered and was faced with serving a period in custody. The denial of appellant’s request to have counsel present at the hearing on his request to modify probation did not violate the Sixth Amendment; this was not a critical stage in the proceedings since there was minimal risk that his counsel’s absence might infringe upon a liberty interest protected by due process. However, even assuming appellant was in a critical stage, the court did not err. 7. C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion A criminal defendant has the right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to waive the right to counsel and to represent himself. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819.) “When a criminal defendant who has waived his right to counsel and elected to represent himself under Faretta … seeks, during trial, to revoke that waiver and have counsel appointed, the trial court must exercise its discretion under the totality of the circumstances, considering factors including the defendant’s reasons for seeking to revoke the waiver, and the delay or disruption revocation is likely to cause the court, the jury, and other parties.” (People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 188 (Lawrence).) The following factors may be considered when the trial court exercises its discretion to grant a defendant’s request for self-representation: “(1) defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set forth for the request, (3) the length and stage of the trial proceedings, (4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the granting of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney.” (People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 993–994.) “[U]ltimately the trial court’s discretion is to be exercised on the totality of the circumstances, not strictly on the listed factors.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 192.) “The standard is whether the court’s decision was an abuse of its discretion under the totality of the circumstances [citation], not whether the court correctly listed factors or whether any one factor should have been weighed more heavily in the balance.” (Id. at p. 196; see also People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1006 [“a trial court’s denial of a Faretta revocation request is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].) In Lawrence, the defendant’s request for revocation of his Faretta waiver, who was being tried jointly with a codefendant, was not heard until after the jury had been 8. selected and sworn and after testimony from the prosecution’s first witness began. (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 188.) Our Supreme Court held, “considering all the circumstances, especially [the] defendant’s failure to articulate a compelling reason for revoking his Faretta waiver and the likely delay and disruption that continuing a joint trial after the jury was empaneled would cause, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the revocation request.” (Ibid.) The Lawrence court reasoned that because the defendant was properly told and confirmed his understanding of “the risks and disadvantages of self-representation before he waived counsel” this showed that he did not suddenly learn he would be at a disadvantage at trial but that he “had simply reweighed the pros and cons of self-representation and changed his mind as to the best course.” (Id. at p. 195.) The court further found that the defendant had “no compelling reason” to revoke his in propria persona status, and granting his request would cause “serious disruption to the administration of justice….” which strongly supported the trial court’s denial of his request. (Id. at p. 196.) After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant appellant’s request for reappointment of counsel. Significantly, appellant showed no compelling reason to revoke his in pro per status. (See, Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 195 [there was a “lack of either definiteness or urgency” in the defendant’s reason for requesting representation].) Appellant vaguely asserted he wished to revoke his right to self-representation, stating that he “did [not] agree to the plea….” Appellant then asked the court to reconsider his probation restrictions and consider a lighter sentence because of his mother’s “gravely ill” condition and the fact that he is her “sole caregiver.” Appellant failed to explain the reason he needed representation, essentially only asking for appointment of counsel so that he could seek a modification of the probation terms and conditions that he previously agreed to while he was represented. Appellant did not demonstrate that any aspect of the proceedings proved to be harder to manage than he expected or “that he had suddenly 9. learned he would be at a disadvantage in the trial.” (Ibid.; Cf. People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 760–762 [the defendant’s request to revoke self-representation was made before jury selection and trial began, there was no showing of disruption or delay, and the trial court’s errors in addressing the defendant’s prior requests for substitution of counsel and self-representation led to error in denying his request to revoke his counsel waiver].) It appears that appellant, after receiving his sentence and preparing to turn himself into custody, “had simply reweighed the pros and cons of self-representation and changed his mind as to the best course.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 195.) It is also notable that appellant’s request to revoke his waiver of his right to counsel was untimely. Appellant’s request occurred after the plea agreement and sentencing occurred, without a scheduled hearing, only one day before he was due to be taken into custody. Appellant’s calculated delay in making his request weighed against granting it. (See People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 164 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s midtrial request for appointment of counsel, where the “request came late in the guilt phase trial, after a substantial part of the prosecution case had been presented, and after [he] had a chance to perceive that things were not proceeding as smoothly as he had envisioned”]; see also People v. Gonzalez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 724, 743 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to reappoint counsel, where his ability to defend against the charges was not implicated, as he had been represented by appointed counsel throughout his trial, and he made the request the day after the court denied his request for a continuance and the victim’s family was present at the sentencing hearing].) Appellant’s prior history of substituting counsel weighed against granting his request. Appellant made numerous Marsden motions and declarations concerning his conflict with his court-appointed counsel. The trial court appointed new attorneys to represent appellant on two different occasions. Moreover, as the court pointed out, appellant had requested self-representation. Appellant was fully apprised of the 10. difficulties associated with representing oneself. He was told that self-representation is not advised, and that counsel may receive benefits that he may not be able to obtain on his own because he is not aware of them. Appellant chose to waive his right to counsel and represent himself anyway. This history militates against appellant’s request to represent himself. (See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 196 [“a defendant’s proclivity to seek changes in counsel status will generally weigh against finding an abuse of discretion”]; see also People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 150 [a defendant’s history of substituting counsel supported the trial court’s ruling denying his request for representation by counsel].) The risk of delay to the proceedings did not weigh in appellant’s favor. The trial court stayed the execution of appellant’s sentence for 30 days after he voluntarily relinquished his right to counsel and was sentenced. Appellant’s untimely request on the day before he was scheduled to turn himself into custody would only result in further unnecessary delay. Finally, to the extent appellant argues he would be a “poor substitute” for appointed counsel and could not effectively represent himself, we reject the contention. As we discussed, appellant was amply warned by the trial court before his Faretta waiver. “Because defendant had been fully advised before he chose self-representation, his later change of mind properly bore less weight in the trial court’s discretionary decision on the revocation request.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 195–196.) Moreover, a “defendant’s asserted ineffectiveness at self-representation does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. [The] [d]efendant was untrained in the law and may not have been especially experienced in court procedures, but the same could be said of many, if not most, in propria persona criminal defendants. That [the] defendant’s defense would have been more effectively presented (or a better sentence obtained through a negotiated plea) had he been represented is likely. But if that fact were determinative, virtually all self-representing defendants would have the right to revoke their counsel 11. waivers at any time during trial. That is not the law.” (Id. at p. 196.) Here, appellant was represented by counsel when he negotiated his plea agreement. Appellant fails to recognize that at the time he requested reappointment of counsel, he had already been sentenced. There was no portion of the proceedings remaining for him to effectively represent himself. Appellant contends the trial court failed to establish a record based on the relevant factors and therefore did not comply with its duty. However, as the Supreme Court stated, no one factor “is necessarily determinative.” (Lawrence, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 196; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 743 [“the trial court need not review on the record each factor….”].) Rather, the standard “is whether the court’s decision was an abuse of its discretion under the totality of the circumstances.” (Lawrence, at p. 196.) While no one factor is determinative, the record amply supports the conclusion that each factor weighed against appellant obtaining counsel. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for a change from self-representation to that of counsel-representation. D. Even Assuming Error, There Was No Prejudice Appellant argues that the trial court would have granted his request to modify the terms of his probation and imposed a shorter sentence had counsel been reappointed. We disagree. The issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s request to reinstate counsel is reviewed under the state law harmless error standard set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Sampson (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1409, 1418; see also People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 998 [an abuse of discretion error on behalf of the court in not permitting a defendant to retract a Faretta waiver is not of constitutional dimension].) Appellant voluntarily requested that he represent himself at sentencing, ignoring the trial court’s encouragement that he remain represented by 12. counsel. At the last possible moment before appellant was scheduled to turn himself into custody, he appeared before the court without a scheduled hearing to request a modification of the terms and conditions of his probation because he claimed that he did not agree to the restrictions and his mother was ill. However, the record reflects appellant was sentenced pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement that he executed and agreed to while represented by counsel. Appellant argues that reappointed counsel would have more clearly set forth the basis for his modification request. But this does not show that a result more favorable to appellant was reasonably probable if the trial court had reappointed counsel. (See People v. Ngaue (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1126–1127.) Thus, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached had the trial court granted appellant’s request to reappoint counsel. Any presumed error was harmless. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed. SANDHU, J. WE CONCUR: HILL, P. J. DESANTOS, J. 13.