State v. Chavis
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-52
JudgeJudge Chris Dillon
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA26-52
Filed 18 November 2026
Durham County, No. 21CR000196-310
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
REGINALD LEMONT CHAVIS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 16 April 2025 by Judge
Josephine Kerr-Davis in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 16 September 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Rachel G.
Posey, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Wyatt
Orsbon for defendant-appellant.
DILLON, Chief Judge.
Defendant Reginald Lamont Chavis appeals the final judgments entered
consistent with the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of one count of second-degree
kidnapping, one count of assault on a female, and one count of communicating
threats, all arising from an incident involving Defendant and his former girlfriend.
STATE V. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error during his trial by not
letting his attorney withdraw. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Defendant
received a fair trial, free from reversible error.
I. Background
On 15 February 2021, Defendant was indicted on one count of second-degree
kidnapping, one count of assault on a female, and one count of communicating
threats. The State’s evidence tended to show Defendant ambushed his former
girlfriend, believing she had a new boyfriend. When the victim arrived at her home,
Defendant was waiting for her inside. Once the victim was inside, Defendant struck
her several times, threatened her with a knife, dragged her to her bedroom, and
sexually assaulted her.
Sometime prior to trial, the State came to believe Defendant had made
threatening contact with the victim about her testifying against him in violation of a
pre-trial order. As a result, on 7 April 2025, a week before Defendant’s trial,
Defendant was indicted on new charges, specifically on one count of interfering with
a witness, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count of violation of a court
order.
The next day, Defendant’s attorney filed a motion to continue, stating he could
not represent Defendant on the new charges. However, his motion was denied. On
10 April 2025, counsel renewed his motion to continue and filed a motion to withdraw.
The motion to withdraw again referenced the new charges and asserted counsel could
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STATE V. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
not represent Defendant on those charges due to an unwaivable conflict. Counsel
further asserted he could not “provide legal advice to Defendant regarding the new
charges, including advice on the possibility of joining the cases for trial or other key
legal issues.”
Defendant’s case came on for trial 14 April 2025. During pre-trial motions,
counsel raised both the motion to withdraw and the motion to continue, asserting he
was not able to represent Defendant on the new charges for reasons that were
confidential, and that he was unable to give the trial court further information
regarding why. Counsel again asserted he was unable to advise Defendant on the
issue of joinder, indicating Defendant would rather have one attorney represent him
on all charges. The trial court inquired into the reason for counsel’s inability to
represent Defendant on the new charges and, following a bench conference, denied
both motions. Subsequently, the jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree
kidnapping, assault on a female, and communicating threats. Defendant appeals.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal after the jury returned its verdict but
prior to the entry of the trial court’s judgments. Our Appellate Rules provide a
defendant in a criminal action may take appeal “within fourteen days after entry of
the judgment[.]” N.C. R. App. P. 4(a) (emphasis added).
We have construed Rule 4(a)’s “at trial” language to mean notice of appeal
given after entry of final judgment and that oral notice of appeal given “before entry
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STATE V. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
of the final judgment” is “premature[]” and ineffective. See State v. Lopez, 264 N.C.
App. 496, 503 (2019); State v. Robinson, 236 N.C. App. 446, 448 (2014) (emphasis
added).
Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari acknowledging the prematurity
of his notice of appeal. The State responded, it does not contend it has suffered any
prejudice because of the premature notice, nor do we discern any.
We grant Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and proceed to review the
merits of Defendant’s appeal. N.C.G.S. § 7A-32.
III. Analysis
Defendant asserts that his constitutional right to conflict-free representation
was violated and that he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.
“Whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo.” State v. Clark, 380 N.C. 204, 215 (2022).
Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial based upon a conflict his attorney
had in this case. Defendant does not argue his attorney had any conflict regarding
the charges involved in this matter relating to his initial charges. Rather,
Defendant’s attorney’s conflict relates to the secondary charges involving his alleged
conduct intimidating the victim not to testify. Defendant contends this conflict
prevented his attorney from advising him on seeking joinder of the new charges with
the charges for which he was tried in this matter.
Defendant argues we should analyze the prejudice analysis under the more
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STATE V. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
defendant-friendly standard established by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) and like cases rather than the prejudice
standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Our Supreme
Court has held the “Sullivan analysis” is more appropriately used in situations where
an attorney’s conflict in representing a defendant involves the attorney also
representing co-defendants in the same or successive trials. State v. Phillips, 365
N.C. 103, 118 (2011). Phillips involved a defendant contending he did not receive
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to withdraw and testify as
a witness for the defendant, depriving him of conflict-free counsel. Id. at 116–17.
Since the conflict did not involve the attorney’s multiple representations of co-
defendants who may have conflicting interests, our Supreme Court held that the
Defendant’s appeal was more appropriately evaluated under Strickland. Id. at 121.
Strickland employs a two-part test that looks both at counsel’s performance
and the prejudice stemming from that performance. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553,
562 (1985). Here, Defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced in this matter by
the jury not hearing about his subsequent threatening conduct towards the victim.
Defendant has not shown how the results regarding the charges for which he was
tried in this matter would have been different had they been joined with the newer
charges.
We note Defendant’s reliance on State v. Reese, wherein our Court held a
defense counsel’s performance was adversely affected because, due to a conflict of
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STATE V. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
interest, counsel was unable to provide “independent advice” to a defendant prior to
trial on whether to object to joinder. No. COA06-1098, 2007 WL 4233684, at *3–4
(N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2007). However, this case is inapplicable here as Reese involved
an attorney, who was actively representing two co-defendants, and whose charges
had been joined. The conflict there was obvious: defense counsel “faced an actual
conflict when one of his clients could benefit from inculpating another of his clients.”
Id. at *4. Here there is only one client.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude Defendant received a fair trial, free from reversible error.
NO ERROR.
Judges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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