Full Opinion

25-773-cr United States v. Udeokoro UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., DENNIS JACOBS, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. 25-773-cr (L); 25-786-cr (CON) IKECHUKWU UDEOKORO, AYODEJI FASONU, AKA AYODEJI FASONU- ADEGBOYEJO, Defendants-Appellants. _____________________________________ FOR APPELLEE: JAVIER A. SINHA, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal Division (A. Tysen Duva, Assistant Attorney General, Josh A. Goldfoot, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Campbell, Attorney, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, on the brief), U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, District of Columbia. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: RONALD W. CHAPMAN, II, The Chapman Firm, Detroit, Michigan (John Joseph Dowling, III, Dowling Defense Group LLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, on the brief). Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ann M. Donnelly, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgments of the district court, entered on March 27, 2025, are AFFIRMED. Defendants-Appellants Ikechukwu Udeokoro and Ayodeji Fasonu appeal from the district court’s judgments of conviction, after a jury trial, on one count of health care fraud for each defendant, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The defendants’ convictions arose from their involvement in a scheme to sell motorized recliner chairs to patients, while billing insurers for much more expensive devices designed to lift bedridden patients. The district court sentenced each defendant to time served, followed by two years’ supervised release, and ordered them to pay restitution and forfeiture. On appeal, the defendants contend that the district court improperly precluded (1) testimony that third-party billing intermediaries did not correct inaccurate codes submitted by the defendants, and (2) argument during summations that the intermediaries’ failure to do so suggested that the defendants acted in good faith. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 2 BACKGROUND The defendants owned and operated Meik Medical Equipment and Supply, LLC (“Meik”), which supplied medical equipment to patients insured through Medicare and Medicaid. Udeokoro was Meik’s president, and Fasonu was its business manager. In general, when patients ordered equipment from Meik, Udeokoro selected the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (“HCPCS”) codes used to seek reimbursement from insurers for the orders, and Fasonu entered those codes and other billing information into electronic platforms to submit the insurance claims. Specifically, Meik supplied patients with motorized seat-lift chairs, which resemble conventional recliner chairs with a mechanism to help users stand up. Meik purchased one such chair for approximately $384. The appropriate HCPCS code for the seat-lift mechanisms in these chairs was “E0627,” which authorized reimbursement for approximately $250 to $325. However, Udeokoro and Fasonu caused Meik to bill insurers for codes “E0636” or “E0637,” which corresponded with much more expensive and sophisticated equipment: respectively, a multi-positional patient-support system with an integrated lift, and a combined sit-to-stand frame and table system. Individual claims for code E0637, for example, resulted in Meik receiving more than $3,000 in purported reimbursement per chair. Between December 2010 and February 2014, Meik submitted approximately $3.8 million in claims under the two incorrect codes, and received approximately $2.36 million in payments. Meik submitted certain claims directly to insurers, but used third-party intermediaries—i.e., independent practice associations (“IPAs”)— to submit other claims. The IPAs, in exchange for a percentage of insurance payments, provided electronic platforms for Meik to submit insurance claims. As relevant here, the defendants jointly moved in limine to introduce evidence that 3 Meik’s billing practices had relied on information it received from insurance companies and the IPAs. Specifically, they sought to introduce evidence that “employees of the insurance companies” had instructed Meik to bill “seat lifts” and “lift chairs” under codes E0636 or E0637—i.e., those authorizing reimbursement for more expensive equipment. App’x at 49; see also id. at 127 (Fasonu’s counsel during pretrial conference: “[T]he evidence I believe will show [that an insurer] and the IPAs told [the defendants] which code to use.”). The district court ruled that “to the extent [] insurance companies informed the defendants that [certain] codes were appropriate,” those communications were admissible. Id. at 150; see also id. (noting that the government did not dispute the admissibility of that evidence). However, it stated that it would preclude evidence (as yet unspecified by the defense) that insurers or IPAs “failed to discover” the defendants’ alleged misconduct, because such evidence would advance an impermissible “blame-the-victim theory.” Id. At trial, an employee of Integra Partners (“Integra”), an IPA used by Meik, testified that Integra typically did not verify the accuracy of information submitted by providers like Meik, modify their HCPCS codes, or instruct them on how to bill insurers. On cross-examination, Fasonu’s counsel asked: “Integra is not going to submit a claim unless Integra believes it’s appropriate, right?” Supp. App’x at 267. The district court barred the employee from answering the question on two grounds: (1) the employee’s testimony indicated that she did not appear to have personal knowledge on that point, and (2) defense counsel’s question ran afoul of the court’s in limine ruling because it did not address whether the IPA had affirmatively communicated anything to Meik, but instead sought to elicit testimony concerning Integra’s ostensible failure to uncover the fraud. After the government rested, it stated that it understood that the defense intended to call 4 another Integra employee, Victoria Thornton, to testify that “Integra had zero tolerance for fraud, generally,” and that, during Thornton’s former employment with an insurer outside the relevant time period, she had audited billing codes to determine whether they were appropriate. Supp. App’x at 433. The district court noted that such testimony would be impermissible under its earlier rulings. Fasonu’s counsel then stated that it did not intend to call Thornton. However, consistent with the in limine ruling, defense counsel elicited testimony during the trial from former Meik employees that insurers and IPAs had sometimes instructed them with respect to billing codes. See, e.g., Supp. App’x at 167–69 (insurer’s case worker told Meik employee that if certain equipment were not covered by the insurer, Meik should change the billing code to correspond with equipment that was covered), 468 (same), 501–03 (representatives from IPAs and insurer told Meik employee to change the billing code from “like a 72” to “E0636”), 557–58 (insurers’ employees told Meik employee that a certain code was “not covered” but that the insurers could “approve a different code”). Moreover, in summation, counsel for each defendant argued that the defendants had acted in good faith based on such billing instructions. See, e.g., id. at 613–15 (Udeokoro’s counsel: “[T]he directive from the insurance company was . . . if you’re billing Medicare bill the easier [code,] E0636.”), 652–54 (Fasonu’s counsel: “Many [Meik] employees” testified that insurers instructed them to “change the code from [E0]637 . . . to [E0]636”). The jury convicted both defendants. The district court subsequently denied the defendants’ joint motions for judgments of acquittal or a new trial, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33, respectively. The district court sentenced both defendants to time served, followed by two years’ supervised release. It ordered Udeokoro and Fasonu to pay $2,342,716 in restitution jointly, and $894,570 and $946,770 in forfeiture, respectively. The 5 defendants appealed. DISCUSSION Udeokoro and Fasonu argue that the district court denied them their constitutional right to present a complete defense by precluding (1) testimony that third-party billing intermediaries did not correct the codes submitted by the defendants, and (2) argument that the intermediaries’ ostensible failure to do so showed the defendants’ good faith. We disagree. We review evidentiary rulings, including a district court’s decision to limit the scope of testimony, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 308 (2d Cir. 2018). We find abuse of discretion only if the decision (1) “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,” (2) “rests on a clearly erroneous factual finding,” or (3) “rests on an error of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we review interpretations of law de novo, including whether an evidentiary ruling violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2015). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment afford criminal defendants a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). However, defendants do not have “an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible” under the rules of evidence. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); see United States v. Cho, 713 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 2013). A district court may thus “exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326–27 (2006) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 6 339, 345 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the district court has “wide discretion to exclude proffered evidence that is collateral, rather than material, to the issues in the case”). Whether the exclusion of testimony violates defendants’ right to present a complete defense “depends upon whether the omitted evidence[,] evaluated in the context of the entire record[,] creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.” Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice v. Hoke, 90 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)), as amended (Nov. 16, 2000). “Even erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely result in depriving a defendant of the fundamental constitutional right to present a meaningful defense.” Cho, 713 F.3d at 721. Here, the district court did not err in precluding either testimony that the third-party IPAs failed to correct the billing codes submitted by the defendants, or argument that such failure vitiated the defendants’ fraudulent intent. As the district court correctly stated, “[w]hether the IPAs caught the [defendants’] misrepresentations, or even tacitly approved of them, is not relevant to what the defendants knew or intended in making those misrepresentations.” Special App’x at 14. Meik—not the IPAs—selected the billing codes for the claims that the IPAs submitted on Meik’s behalf. An Integra representative testified that Integra typically did not modify the codes submitted by providers like Meik, instruct providers how to bill, adjudicate claims, or investigate whether the equipment for which a claim was submitted had been delivered. Likewise, the written agreement between Meik and another IPA required Meik to comply with insurers’ billing policies and procedures, and did not impose any affirmative obligation on the IPA to verify whether the codes selected by Meik accurately described the supplied equipment. In short, the evidence established that IPAs generally functioned as passive conduits: they relayed to insurers the information (and misinformation) provided by the 7 defendants. Any testimony or argument to the effect that the IPAs did not themselves uncover the defendants’ misrepresentations thus has no bearing on whether the defendants had fraudulent intent. 1 The defendants counter that the district court improperly applied the bar on “blame-the- victim” evidence, as formulated in United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2004). In that case, we held that testimony concerning a fraud victim’s gullibility and imprudence would be irrelevant to whether the defendant had intended to defraud, and was thus properly excluded. Id. at 242–44. Udeokoro and Fasonu argue that Thomas is inapt because, in their view, the IPAs (unlike the insurers) were not victims. However, that distinction does not dictate a different result here. The animating principle in Thomas was that a party’s failure to detect a fraud— especially due to reliance on a defendant’s misrepresentations—does not bear on whether the defendant had fraudulent intent. See id. at 243 (emphasizing that the analysis for criminal fraud liability “focuses on the violator”); accord United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 780 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming “the district court’s holding that the ‘reasonable victim’ defense does not apply to allegations of mail fraud under [18 U.S.C.] § 1341”); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A]n individual (with the necessary intent) may be held liable if he is a cause in fact of the criminal violation, even though the result which the court condemns is achieved through the actions of innocent intermediaries.” (internal quotation marks and citation 1 The government also argues on appeal that the admission of any such evidence would be unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. However, the government’s motion in limine did not seek such exclusion based on that rule, and the district court did not conduct a Rule 403 analysis. We thus decline to affirm the district court’s evidentiary ruling based on Rule 403. See United States v. Roldan, 167 F.4th 569, 578 n.7 (2d Cir. 2026) (“Because we review a Rule 403 decision for abuse of discretion, and since the district court did not exercise its discretion on this basis or engage in a balancing process that we can review, we have no occasion to decide whether the evidence was properly excluded under the Rule.” (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2008))). 8 omitted)). For the reasons stated above, that principle applies with force here. Importantly, the district court did not preclude the defendants from offering testimony or argument that insurance companies and IPAs had instructed Meik employees as to the billing codes that they should use. Pursuant to that ruling, as noted above, defense counsel elicited such testimony from former Meik employees and argued, in summation, that the defendants had acted in good faith based on such billing instructions. Thus, the district court’s ruling allowed the defendants to present a complete defense of good faith based on the relevant evidence under the applicable law. In sum, because the district court did not err in precluding testimony and argument concerning the IPAs’ ostensible silence as to the accuracy of Meik’s billing codes, the defendants’ constitutional right to present a complete defense was not abridged. See Cho, 713 F.3d at 721–22. * * * We have considered the defendants’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 9