United States v. Udeokoro
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-773
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
25-773-cr
United States v. Udeokoro
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 16th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DENNIS JACOBS,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. 25-773-cr (L);
25-786-cr (CON)
IKECHUKWU UDEOKORO, AYODEJI
FASONU, AKA AYODEJI FASONU-
ADEGBOYEJO,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLEE: JAVIER A. SINHA, Attorney, Appellate Section,
Criminal Division (A. Tysen Duva, Assistant
Attorney General, Josh A. Goldfoot, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J.
Campbell, Attorney, Fraud Section, Criminal
Division, on the brief), U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, District of Columbia.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: RONALD W. CHAPMAN, II, The Chapman Firm,
Detroit, Michigan (John Joseph Dowling, III,
Dowling Defense Group LLC, Charlotte,
North Carolina, on the brief).
Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Ann M. Donnelly, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgments of the district court, entered on March 27, 2025, are
AFFIRMED.
Defendants-Appellants Ikechukwu Udeokoro and Ayodeji Fasonu appeal from the
district court’s judgments of conviction, after a jury trial, on one count of health care fraud for
each defendant, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The defendants’ convictions arose from their
involvement in a scheme to sell motorized recliner chairs to patients, while billing insurers for
much more expensive devices designed to lift bedridden patients. The district court sentenced
each defendant to time served, followed by two years’ supervised release, and ordered them to
pay restitution and forfeiture. On appeal, the defendants contend that the district court
improperly precluded (1) testimony that third-party billing intermediaries did not correct
inaccurate codes submitted by the defendants, and (2) argument during summations that the
intermediaries’ failure to do so suggested that the defendants acted in good faith. We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to
which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
2
BACKGROUND
The defendants owned and operated Meik Medical Equipment and Supply, LLC
(“Meik”), which supplied medical equipment to patients insured through Medicare and
Medicaid. Udeokoro was Meik’s president, and Fasonu was its business manager. In general,
when patients ordered equipment from Meik, Udeokoro selected the Healthcare Common
Procedure Coding System (“HCPCS”) codes used to seek reimbursement from insurers for the
orders, and Fasonu entered those codes and other billing information into electronic platforms to
submit the insurance claims.
Specifically, Meik supplied patients with motorized seat-lift chairs, which resemble
conventional recliner chairs with a mechanism to help users stand up. Meik purchased one such
chair for approximately $384. The appropriate HCPCS code for the seat-lift mechanisms in
these chairs was “E0627,” which authorized reimbursement for approximately $250 to $325.
However, Udeokoro and Fasonu caused Meik to bill insurers for codes “E0636” or “E0637,”
which corresponded with much more expensive and sophisticated equipment: respectively, a
multi-positional patient-support system with an integrated lift, and a combined sit-to-stand frame
and table system. Individual claims for code E0637, for example, resulted in Meik receiving
more than $3,000 in purported reimbursement per chair. Between December 2010 and February
2014, Meik submitted approximately $3.8 million in claims under the two incorrect codes, and
received approximately $2.36 million in payments. Meik submitted certain claims directly to
insurers, but used third-party intermediaries—i.e., independent practice associations (“IPAs”)—
to submit other claims. The IPAs, in exchange for a percentage of insurance payments,
provided electronic platforms for Meik to submit insurance claims.
As relevant here, the defendants jointly moved in limine to introduce evidence that
3
Meik’s billing practices had relied on information it received from insurance companies and the
IPAs. Specifically, they sought to introduce evidence that “employees of the insurance
companies” had instructed Meik to bill “seat lifts” and “lift chairs” under codes E0636 or
E0637—i.e., those authorizing reimbursement for more expensive equipment. App’x at 49; see
also id. at 127 (Fasonu’s counsel during pretrial conference: “[T]he evidence I believe will
show [that an insurer] and the IPAs told [the defendants] which code to use.”). The district
court ruled that “to the extent [] insurance companies informed the defendants that [certain]
codes were appropriate,” those communications were admissible. Id. at 150; see also id. (noting
that the government did not dispute the admissibility of that evidence). However, it stated that
it would preclude evidence (as yet unspecified by the defense) that insurers or IPAs “failed to
discover” the defendants’ alleged misconduct, because such evidence would advance an
impermissible “blame-the-victim theory.” Id.
At trial, an employee of Integra Partners (“Integra”), an IPA used by Meik, testified that
Integra typically did not verify the accuracy of information submitted by providers like Meik,
modify their HCPCS codes, or instruct them on how to bill insurers. On cross-examination,
Fasonu’s counsel asked: “Integra is not going to submit a claim unless Integra believes it’s
appropriate, right?” Supp. App’x at 267. The district court barred the employee from
answering the question on two grounds: (1) the employee’s testimony indicated that she did not
appear to have personal knowledge on that point, and (2) defense counsel’s question ran afoul
of the court’s in limine ruling because it did not address whether the IPA had affirmatively
communicated anything to Meik, but instead sought to elicit testimony concerning Integra’s
ostensible failure to uncover the fraud.
After the government rested, it stated that it understood that the defense intended to call
4
another Integra employee, Victoria Thornton, to testify that “Integra had zero tolerance for fraud,
generally,” and that, during Thornton’s former employment with an insurer outside the relevant
time period, she had audited billing codes to determine whether they were appropriate. Supp.
App’x at 433. The district court noted that such testimony would be impermissible under its
earlier rulings. Fasonu’s counsel then stated that it did not intend to call Thornton.
However, consistent with the in limine ruling, defense counsel elicited testimony during
the trial from former Meik employees that insurers and IPAs had sometimes instructed them with
respect to billing codes. See, e.g., Supp. App’x at 167–69 (insurer’s case worker told Meik
employee that if certain equipment were not covered by the insurer, Meik should change the
billing code to correspond with equipment that was covered), 468 (same), 501–03
(representatives from IPAs and insurer told Meik employee to change the billing code from “like
a 72” to “E0636”), 557–58 (insurers’ employees told Meik employee that a certain code was
“not covered” but that the insurers could “approve a different code”). Moreover, in summation,
counsel for each defendant argued that the defendants had acted in good faith based on such
billing instructions. See, e.g., id. at 613–15 (Udeokoro’s counsel: “[T]he directive from the
insurance company was . . . if you’re billing Medicare bill the easier [code,] E0636.”), 652–54
(Fasonu’s counsel: “Many [Meik] employees” testified that insurers instructed them to “change
the code from [E0]637 . . . to [E0]636”).
The jury convicted both defendants. The district court subsequently denied the
defendants’ joint motions for judgments of acquittal or a new trial, under Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 29 and 33, respectively. The district court sentenced both defendants to
time served, followed by two years’ supervised release. It ordered Udeokoro and Fasonu to pay
$2,342,716 in restitution jointly, and $894,570 and $946,770 in forfeiture, respectively. The
5
defendants appealed.
DISCUSSION
Udeokoro and Fasonu argue that the district court denied them their constitutional right
to present a complete defense by precluding (1) testimony that third-party billing intermediaries
did not correct the codes submitted by the defendants, and (2) argument that the intermediaries’
ostensible failure to do so showed the defendants’ good faith. We disagree.
We review evidentiary rulings, including a district court’s decision to limit the scope of
testimony, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 308 (2d Cir.
2018). We find abuse of discretion only if the decision (1) “cannot be located within the range
of permissible decisions,” (2) “rests on a clearly erroneous factual finding,” or (3) “rests on an
error of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we review
interpretations of law de novo, including whether an evidentiary ruling violates a defendant’s
constitutional rights. United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2015).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment afford
criminal defendants a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). However, defendants do not have “an
unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible”
under the rules of evidence. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); see United States v.
Cho, 713 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 2013). A district court may thus “exclude evidence that is
repetitive, only marginally relevant, or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or
confusion of the issues.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326–27 (2006) (alterations
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d
6
339, 345 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the district court has “wide discretion to exclude
proffered evidence that is collateral, rather than material, to the issues in the case”). Whether
the exclusion of testimony violates defendants’ right to present a complete defense “depends
upon whether the omitted evidence[,] evaluated in the context of the entire record[,] creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.” Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir.
2000) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice v. Hoke, 90 F.3d 43, 47
(2d Cir. 1996)), as amended (Nov. 16, 2000). “Even erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely result
in depriving a defendant of the fundamental constitutional right to present a meaningful defense.”
Cho, 713 F.3d at 721.
Here, the district court did not err in precluding either testimony that the third-party IPAs
failed to correct the billing codes submitted by the defendants, or argument that such failure
vitiated the defendants’ fraudulent intent. As the district court correctly stated, “[w]hether the
IPAs caught the [defendants’] misrepresentations, or even tacitly approved of them, is not
relevant to what the defendants knew or intended in making those misrepresentations.” Special
App’x at 14. Meik—not the IPAs—selected the billing codes for the claims that the IPAs
submitted on Meik’s behalf. An Integra representative testified that Integra typically did not
modify the codes submitted by providers like Meik, instruct providers how to bill, adjudicate
claims, or investigate whether the equipment for which a claim was submitted had been
delivered. Likewise, the written agreement between Meik and another IPA required Meik to
comply with insurers’ billing policies and procedures, and did not impose any affirmative
obligation on the IPA to verify whether the codes selected by Meik accurately described the
supplied equipment. In short, the evidence established that IPAs generally functioned as
passive conduits: they relayed to insurers the information (and misinformation) provided by the
7
defendants. Any testimony or argument to the effect that the IPAs did not themselves uncover
the defendants’ misrepresentations thus has no bearing on whether the defendants had fraudulent
intent. 1
The defendants counter that the district court improperly applied the bar on “blame-the-
victim” evidence, as formulated in United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2004). In
that case, we held that testimony concerning a fraud victim’s gullibility and imprudence would
be irrelevant to whether the defendant had intended to defraud, and was thus properly excluded.
Id. at 242–44. Udeokoro and Fasonu argue that Thomas is inapt because, in their view, the IPAs
(unlike the insurers) were not victims. However, that distinction does not dictate a different
result here. The animating principle in Thomas was that a party’s failure to detect a fraud—
especially due to reliance on a defendant’s misrepresentations—does not bear on whether the
defendant had fraudulent intent. See id. at 243 (emphasizing that the analysis for criminal fraud
liability “focuses on the violator”); accord United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 780 (2d Cir.
2007) (affirming “the district court’s holding that the ‘reasonable victim’ defense does not apply
to allegations of mail fraud under [18 U.S.C.] § 1341”); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408,
412 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[A]n individual (with the necessary intent) may be held liable if he is a
cause in fact of the criminal violation, even though the result which the court condemns is
achieved through the actions of innocent intermediaries.” (internal quotation marks and citation
1
The government also argues on appeal that the admission of any such evidence would be unduly
prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. However, the government’s motion in limine did not
seek such exclusion based on that rule, and the district court did not conduct a Rule 403 analysis. We
thus decline to affirm the district court’s evidentiary ruling based on Rule 403. See United States v.
Roldan, 167 F.4th 569, 578 n.7 (2d Cir. 2026) (“Because we review a Rule 403 decision for abuse of
discretion, and since the district court did not exercise its discretion on this basis or engage in a balancing
process that we can review, we have no occasion to decide whether the evidence was properly excluded
under the Rule.” (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2008))).
8
omitted)). For the reasons stated above, that principle applies with force here.
Importantly, the district court did not preclude the defendants from offering testimony or
argument that insurance companies and IPAs had instructed Meik employees as to the billing
codes that they should use. Pursuant to that ruling, as noted above, defense counsel elicited
such testimony from former Meik employees and argued, in summation, that the defendants had
acted in good faith based on such billing instructions. Thus, the district court’s ruling allowed
the defendants to present a complete defense of good faith based on the relevant evidence under
the applicable law.
In sum, because the district court did not err in precluding testimony and argument
concerning the IPAs’ ostensible silence as to the accuracy of Meik’s billing codes, the
defendants’ constitutional right to present a complete defense was not abridged. See Cho, 713
F.3d at 721–22.
* * *
We have considered the defendants’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
9