Full Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION BARNES, P. J., MCFADDEN, P. J., and MERCIER, P. J. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules October 26, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1327. VEGA-RENTERIA v. THE STATE. MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge. Eraclio Vega-Renteria was indicted for two counts of rape, one count of aggravated sodomy, and three counts of child molestation against his middle daughter, S. v., and a single count of child molestation against his eldest daughter, L. v. The trial court granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the single count of child molestation against L. V., and the jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining counts. After the denial of his motion for new trial, Vega-Renteria filed this appeal. He argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the recording of S. V.’s forensic interview and that the trial court erred by denying his bolstering objection to certain testimony of L. V. We hold that Vega-Renteria has not shown reversible error. So we affirm. 1. Trial evidence “Because [Vega-Renteria] does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to his convictions, and because we resolve ... a claim of plain trial court error in ways that implicate the strength of the [s]tate’s case, we present the evidence as a reasonable juror would have viewed it instead of in the light most favorable to the verdicts.” Johnson v. State, 321 Ga. 511, 512 n.2 (915 SE2d 636) (2025). So viewed, the evidence presented at trial may be summarized as follows. Id. at 512. S. v., who was 15 years old at the time of trial, is Vega-Renteria’s middle daughter. S. V. testified at trial that on two occasions, she awoke to her father having intercourse with her and that on other occasions she awoke to him touching her or standing over her and masturbating. In 2022, S. V. told her older sister, L. v., that their father was touching her at night. S. V. testified at trial that she made the disclosure to L. V. because she heard what she thought was her father sexually abusing their younger sister. S. V. testified 2 that one night, Vega-Renteria came home and was sleeping with her younger sister on the couch. She testified: And then, I kept hearing, like, the couch move, and that’s when I knew he was probably touching my little sister. I don’t exactly know if it was [a cousin, who was sleeping over,] or my little sister. But that’s when, like, I had enough. Like, this, like, needed to stop now, because, like maybe if I never told my sister, this would have escalated to the point where — yeah, you know. And that’s when I told my sister, like, my older sister, everything. After S. V.’s disclosure, L. V. called their mother, who was at work, and then 911. The responding officers interviewed S. V., L. V., and their mother, and asked L. V. and the girls’ mother to accompany them to the police station. While there, L. V. made her own disclosure to law enforcement officers. She informed them that when she was in middle school, Vega-Renteria had gotten into bed with her, put his hand under her shirt, and unstrapped her bra. She failed to report the incident at the time, she testified, because she assumed Vega-Renteria had mistaken her for her mother. When the prosecuting attorney asked L. V. why she disclosed the incident to law enforcement officers after S. V.’s outcry, when she had not disclosed it at the time 3 years before, she responded, “Because I believe ... .” Before she completed her sentence, defense counsel objected on the ground that the testimony was bolstering. The trial court overruled the objection, and L. V. then testified, “I believed my sister.” S. V. underwent a forensic interview that was recorded. A recording of the interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. 2. Admission of video recording of forensic interview Vega-Renteria enumerates that the trial court plainly erred by admitting evidence that he may have sexually abused his youngest daughter. He focuses his argument on a portion of the video recording of S. V.’s forensic interview. Similar to her testimony at trial describing another incident involving her younger sister (which Vega-Renteria does not challenge on appeal), in the forensic interview S. V. described hearing what she believed was her father sexually abusing her younger sister. We hold that Vega-Renteria is not entitled to a reversal of his convictions for this alleged error, because he introduced this evidence himself through cross-examination of S. V. and he affirmatively stated that he had no objection when the state sought to introduce the video recording into evidence. 4 Where, as here, no objection is made to the admission of evidence, we may review a claim only for plain error. Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 864(2) (849 SE2d 191)(2020). See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). To show plain error, an appellant must meet each prong of a four-prong test: First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Samuels v. State, 323 Ga. 629, 638-39(4)(a) (926 SE2d 648) (2026). This “is a difficult standard to satisfy.” Id. at 639(4)(a) (quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the second prong of the test (a demonstration that there was clear and obvious error) Vega-Renteria argues that the admission of the video recording violated OCGA §§ 24-4-413 and 24-4-414, which permit, under certain circumstances, the admission of evidence of other offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases. Vega-Renteria argues that S. V.’s statements were not admissible under those statutes 5 because her statements regarding the alleged prior offense were too vague and indefinite to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any prior crime had occurred. The prosecutor did not question S. V. during direct examination about the statements she made to the forensic interviewer regarding a prior incident involving her younger sister. But on cross-examination — before the recording of the forensic interview had even been played for the jury — defense counsel questioned S. V. about those statements. A defendant generally cannot complain on appeal about the admission of evidence that he introduced himself[.] Although we may take notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights even when an error is not brought to the attention of the trial court, where invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing. “When the [s]tate did not introduce evidence of the statement during [S. V.’s] direct testimony, [Vega-Renteria] had the option to not do so either. ... Instead, he elected to present that evidence himself. He cannot complain now that the jury heard that evidence.” Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153, 156(2) (800 SE2d 341) (2017) (citation modified). 6 Vega-Renteria is not entitled to reversal for another reason: he affirmatively waived any error in the admission of the evidence. The forensic interviewer testified later in the trial, and during her testimony, the prosecutor introduced and played for the jury the recording of the forensic interview. Prior to the admission of the video recording, defense counsel informed the court, “I’m not objecting to this exhibit[,]” and the court “admitted [it] without objection from the defendant.” Vega-Renteria affirmatively waived any claim of error by stating that he had no objection to the admission of the recording, so there was no plain error. Adams v. State, 306 Ga. 1, 3(1) (829 SE2d 126) (2019); McAllister v. State, 351 Ga. App. 76, 88(3) (830 SE2d 443) (2019). 3. Bolstering Vega-Renteria argues that the trial court erred by denying his bolstering objection to L. V.’s testimony that she believed S. V. We disagree. “OCGA § 24-6-620 says that the credibility of a witness shall be a matter to be determined by the trier of fact. Under this rule, a witness can never bolster the credibility of another witness as to whether the witness is telling the truth.” Clifton v. State, __ Ga. __(7)(a) (__ SE2d __), S26A0716, S26A0795, slip op. at 12-13 (Ga. 7 Aug. 13, 2026) (punctuation and quotation marks omitted). However, “where, as here, testimony is admissible for the purpose of showing the effect on the victim or to explain the victim’s conduct, the testimony does not constitute improper bolstering.” Alford v. State, 320 Ga. App. 523, 528(2)(c) (738 SE2d 124) (2013). Accord Futch v. State, 326 Ga. App. 394, 398 (2) (756 SE2d 629) (2014), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686 (820 SE2d 640) (2018), and White v. State, 305 Ga. 111 (823 SE2d 794) (2019). As detailed above, L. V. made the statement that Vega-Renteria challenges in response to a question about why she disclosed her own alleged abuse years after it had occurred. In other words, the testimony of L. V., the alleged victim in one count of the indictment, was introduced to explain her own conduct, not to vouch for the credibility of victim S. V. The trial court did not err by denying Vega-Renteria’s objection. Judgment affirmed. P. J. Barnes and P. J. Mercier concur. 8