Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4027-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PAUL J. RITTER and ROBERT F. RUDDY, Defendants-Appellants. __________________________ Argued September 28, 2026 – Decided October 20, 2026 Before Judges Sabatino, Perez Friscia and Torregrossa- O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Municipal Appeal Nos. 25-009 and 25-010. Amanda Felice Wolf argued the cause for appellants (Wolf Law, PC, attorneys; Randolph H. Wolf and Amanda Felice Wolf, on the briefs). Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Monica do Outeiro, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendants Paul J. Ritter and Robert F. Ruddy appeal from their July 8, 2025 convictions for the prohibited taking of clams, N.J.S.A. 58:24-3. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, we affirm. I. We derive the following facts from the record. In 2024, the Borough of Atlantic Highlands Municipal Court presided over a two-day trial. The State presented the testimony of New Jersey State Fish and Wildlife Conservation Police Officer Dane Bahrle. Bahrle testified that he worked in the Marine Division and was responsible for monitoring recreational and commercial fishermen "on the water." At the time of trial, he had worked in the position for about four-and-a-half years. On January 8, 2024, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Bahrle was on patrol and responded to the Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor based on a complaint that "two individuals . . . were . . . clamming inside prohibited waters." He explained that after arriving at the harbor he used his "spotting scope" equipment, which had a range of approximately "a quarter mile." While standing on the pier, he observed "two vessels . . . clamming" "along the A-4027-24 2 seawall" about 300 yards from the shoreline. He "identified" defendants' individual vessels by "the yellow placards on their vessels," which included their "names and numbers." Specifically, he watched both vessels "go on three separate drifts," meaning that "[t]hey each went up[,]" "would start to drift west along the seawall[,]" and would be "just east due to the wind, clamming the whole time." After defendants would pull up their clam racks, they would "head back for another drift." Bahrle was certain he observed defendants inside the seawall. He took photographs that he testified showed the vessels clamming within the prohibited waters that went "from that seawall to the shoreline." He then observed Ritter's vessel approximately thirty yards from the seawall and Ruddy's vessel within twenty yards of the seawall "[b]ecause his [vessel] was smaller." Bahrle watched defendants for approximately one hour while they "actively clamm[ed] the whole entire time within the seawall." In describing the seawall, Bahrle explained that Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor has a rock wall that "keeps everything contained per se for the marina and . . . protects" "the mooring boats, the harbor, [and] everything inside of it." He detailed that the "wall actually is the divi[di]ng line [between] where prohibited waters and restricted waters" are located. He stated A-4027-24 3 "depurators [were] allowed to clam" in the "restricted waters" but not in the prohibited waters. Specifically, he relayed that the Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor is a prohibited area where an individual "cannot harvest shellfish." He identified and testified about an aerial photograph depicting "the Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor . . . basin itself and what the [c]ourt refers to as the breakwater wall, which encloses moored sailboats and such." According to Bahrle, clamming is prohibited in the harbor because of "[p]ublic health concern[s]" regarding gas and the fact that "bioaccumulation occurs inside these clams," causing the "build up [of] all these contaminants." Bahrle attested that when clams are "brought to the plant, the plant[ is] only specified to take the clams from restricted waters" and is "only capable of purifying those clams and not ones that are prohibited." Bahrle explained the clams from a prohibited area should not be purified because of "[p]ossible . . . cross[-]contamination," which would result in all the "clams in the plant" being "deemed inedible at that point." As clams are tracked, he maintained "the [Food and Drug Administration]" could "figure out where they came from and . . . possibly shut down the whole entire plant." After watching defendants, Bahrle went to "Sandy Hook, across from the JT White Shellfish Plant," and "could see when [defendants'] vessels were A-4027-24 4 returning to offload" the prohibited clams. He watched Ritter come into the depuration plant, met and gave Ritter Miranda1 warnings, and "[a]dvised him that all the clams would have to go back in the boat and be offloaded back into the water." Bahrle recalled that Ritter admitted he had been clamming in the area "for five years." A short time later, Bahrle met Ruddy after his vessel arrived at the plant. Bahrle instructed both defendants to dump the clams by the "mouth of [the] Shrewsbury" River where the water is deeper, so there was no risk they would be harvested. On January 12, 2024, Bahrle issued Ritter two summonses for the prohibited taking of clams from the Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor and for doing so in an area "participating in a hard clam depuration project." Ruddy was issued summonses for the same violations the following day. On cross-examination, Bahrle conceded there was no "designation in the water that you[ are] entering a prohibited zone" in the harbor. However, Bahrle explained that the statute "[i]ndicates that clamming in those waters is prohibited." Bahrle identified the body worn camera footage from the day of the incident, which was played for the municipal court. He also described that "[w]ater monitoring" "posts a whole entire chart that . . . [has] marked out in 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). A-4027-24 5 color . . . where you can and cannot be." He identified the prohibited harbor area on maps permit applicants receive with licensure. On the second day of trial, Bahrle testified regarding his location at the time he took the photographs of defendants on January 8, 2024. He explained that certain photographs were taken from different locations. On January 14, 2025, the municipal court found each defendant guilty of a single count of the prohibited taking of clams, N.J.S.A. 58:24-3, from the waters of Sandy Hook Bay in Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor. The municipal court found Bahrle's testimony was "unrebutted and uncontroverted." Specifically, the municipal court reasoned "it [wa]s clear from the photographic evidence submitted and the . . . testimony . . . that both defendants were engaged in the taking of clams from a prohibited area." It was unpersuaded by defendants' arguments that the State failed to prove defendants' locations, finding the photographs and Bahrle's testimony established defendants were clamming on the "eastern most point of the seawall which existed directly behind the vessels in the photo[graphs]." The municipal court also found the "[c]ode section could not be more descriptive" as it "outlines the prohibited area with accuracy that rivals a surveyor's description." It highlighted that "[t]he eastern boundary line is not floating on the surface of the harbor, it lies on the A-4027-24 6 sea floor" and "[i]t is not subject to tide, wave, wake nor hurricane," but "constantly remains where it is." In February 2025, before sentencing, defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on jurisdiction. On February 25, 2025, the court rejected defendants' motion argument that "jurisdiction lies totally and solely within the [municipalities'] geographic borders[,] which end at the mean high watermark of the banks of the Raritan Bay." The municipal court found jurisdiction, citing N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a), which provides "[a] municipal court of a single municipality shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within the territory of that municipality" and N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17(d), which gives "municipal courts jurisdiction over . . . violations of fish and game laws." The municipal court sentenced Ritter the same day on the disorderly persons offense of taking clams from prohibited waters as he had a prior conviction for the same offense from May 1993. It imposed a fine of $507, $33 in court costs, a $50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board ("VCCB") penalty, and a $75 Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund ("SNSF") assessment. The municipal court sentenced Ruddy on the petty disorderly persons offense of taking clams from prohibited waters and imposed a slightly lower fine of $257, $33 in court costs, a $50 VCCB penalty, and a $75 SNSF penalty. A-4027-24 7 Defendant appealed to the Law Division. On July 7, 2025, the trial court heard the matter de novo and the parties addressed the issue of jurisdiction and whether the State proved defendants' violations beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendants argued the proceedings before the municipal court "were voided" and "the complaint must be dismissed." The State argued that New Jersey State Fish and Wildlife Conservation was an agency that "has statewide jurisdiction" but agreed "that Atlantic Highlands lacked jurisdiction." The State posited that that the matter should be remanded to the Borough of Highlands Municipal Court because that was "where [defendants] were apprehended" and jurisdiction was proper. On July 8, 2025, the trial court issued an order accompanied by a thorough and cogent written decision, which denied defendants' municipal appeal. The court was unpersuaded by defendants' argument that dismissal was mandated because "jurisdiction is limited under N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16 to 'cases arising within the territory of that municipality.'" The court also found de novo that the credible evidence proved defendants had committed the violations beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal before us, defendants contend reversal is warranted because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: the alleged offenses A-4027-24 8 occurred within the jurisdiction of the Borough of Atlantic Highlands Municipal Court and as a result, the summonses issued are void; the map provided to defendants as part of their licensure, which depicted the harbor, clearly demarcated the boundaries of prohibited versus restricted waters and provided reasonable notice; and defendants were illegally clamming within the boundaries of prohibited waters. II. "[A]ppellate review of a municipal appeal to the Law Division is limited to 'the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court.'" State v. L.S., 444 N.J. Super. 241, 247 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014)). The Law Division judge must decide the matter de novo on the record. State v. Monaco, 444 N.J. Super. 539, 549 (App. Div. 2016) (citing R. 3:23-8(a)(2)). "The [Law Division] judge[] [is] obliged to make independent findings of fact" rather than engage in a review of the sufficient credible evidence. State v. Heine, 424 N.J. Super. 48, 58 (App. Div. 2012); see also State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964). Our "review is limited to 'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. '" State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 382-83 (2015) (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). A-4027-24 9 In making findings about witness credibility, "the Law Division judge must give 'due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the [municipal judge]'" to make credibility determinations. State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 157). Where both the municipal judge and the Law Division judge have found a witness credible, we owe particularly strong deference to the Law Division judge's credibility findings. State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017). "We owe no deference, however, to the 'trial court's interpretation of the law . . . and the consequences that flow from established facts[,]' which we review de novo." L.S., 444 N.J. Super. at 248 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)). N.J.S.A. 58:24-3 prohibits the taking of certain shellfish from condemned beds as follows: The department shall prohibit the taking of oysters, clams or other shellfish from a place which has been condemned by the department pursuant to this act, and shall also prohibit the distribution, sale, offering for sale or having in possession of any such shellfish so taken, without a permit so to take, distribute, sell, offer to sell, or have in possession, first obtained from the department, under such rules and regulations as it shall adopt. A fee of $25.00 shall be charged for any permit so issued. A-4027-24 10 Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 58:24-9, a person that violates N.J.S.A. 58:24-3 "is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense and a person convicted of a subsequent offense is guilty of a disorderly persons offense." III. A. Defendants first contend their convictions must be reversed and summonses dismissed as void because the Atlantic Highlands Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction. While they concede that the municipal court had jurisdiction to hear "[v]iolations of fish and game laws" under N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17, they assert there was no "territorial jurisdiction" under N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a). They contend the municipal court lacked territorial jurisdiction because "a single municipality shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within the territory of the municipality" and "[t]he territory of a municipality includes any premises or property located partly in and partly outside the municipality." N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a). After reviewing the record and applicable law, we are unpersuaded. The trial court determined Bahrle's testimony was credible and uncontroverted. Relevantly, Bahrle's testimony, which was deemed credible, was that he observed defendants' vessels for approximately an hour, the vessels "drift[ed] west to east" multiple times, Ritter's vessel was "[a]pproximately A-4027-24 11 [fifty] yards from [the] shoreline" and Ruddy was "in that area," the shoreline was in Atlantic Highlands, and the vessels were in the Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor. Bahrle also explained that after observing the violations in the waters near the Atlantic Highlands shoreline, he then drove to the depuration plant in Highlands where he met defendants off-loading their vessels. As the trial court correctly recognized, N.J.S.A. 23:10-2 grants the Superior Court and municipal court jurisdiction "to try and punish any person violating any provision of" the Fish and Game, Wild Birds, and Animals Code ("Code"), N.J.S.A. 23:1-1 to -23:13-6, "either in the county or municipality where the offense is committed or where the offender is first apprehended or where he may reside." Further, N.J.S.A. 23:10-3 states that "proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any provision of [the Code], any provision of any law supplementary thereto, or any provision of the State Fish and Game Code shall be brought in the name of the State, by a duly commissioned . . . police officer." In the present case, defendants' violations occurred "within a few hundred feet of the Atlantic Highlands shoreline." The court found defendants were harvesting clams from the prohibited area that "beg[an] at the shoreline and extend[ed] for only a few hundred yards to the seawall," which is a "legitimate A-4027-24 12 zone of concern of the Fish and Wildlife officers entrusted with the protection of the public." Defendants' vessels thereafter traveled to Highlands for depuration. It is well established that "[w]hen [an offense is] 'commenced in one municipality and ended in another,' [defendants] can be prosecuted in either municipality." State v. Sylvia, 424 N.J. Super. 151, 156 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting State v. Potts, 186 N.J. Super. 616, 620 (Law Div. 1982)). For these reasons, we discern no error in the court's determination that the municipal court had jurisdiction because defendants' "violation[s] began in the waters off Atlantic Highlands." We are also unpersuaded by defendants' argument that N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16 "explicitly limit[s] the territorial boundaries of the municipality." Regarding jurisdiction, subsection (a) states that "[t]he territory of a municipality includes any premises or property located partly in and partly outside of the municipality." N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16 (emphasis added). Defendants' narrow reading of jurisdiction to only include land boundaries is unsupported. The court's findings regarding jurisdiction are supported by the record and the law. Thus, defendants' related arguments that summonses are void and the complaints should be dismissed are without merit. A-4027-24 13 B. Defendants next contend the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the map defendants were provided with their licensure demarked the boundaries of prohibited versus restricted waters. The record demonstrates the map clearly depicts the prohibited Atlantic Highlands Municipal Harbor area and delineates the seawall boundary within which defendants were taking clams. Bahrle testified on cross-examination about the map and showed that the prohibited area is well delineated on the map, which was uncontroverted. The court's findings that the map "clearly identifies the prohibited and restricted areas[,] and there is no evidence that either defendant was unaware that they were clamming in the prohibited area" are sufficiently supported by the evidence. C. Finally, for the reasons already stated, we reject defendants' assertions that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants were within the boundaries of the restricted waters. Bahrle's unrefuted credible testimony was corroborated by his photographs and the map he identified. Notably, he testified to using his spotting scope to identify defendants' vessels, watching them drift multiple times in the harbor while harvesting clams, and recorded the A-4027-24 14 names and numbers from the vessels' yellow placards. The record amply supports the court's determination that the State demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that both defendants had taken clams from the prohibited area. To the extent that we have not addressed defendants' remaining contentions, it is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed. A-4027-24 15