State v. Moran
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1194
JudgeJudge Allegra Collins
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1194
Filed 18 November 2026
McDowell County, No. 24CR201746-580
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TIFFANY NICOLE MORAN
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 17 July 2024 by Judge J. Thomas
Davis in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17
September 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Jayla L. Cole, for
the State-Appellee.
Iqra Razzaq for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant Tiffany Nicole Moran appeals from judgments entered following a
jury’s guilty verdicts of possession of fentanyl and knowingly keeping a vehicle which
is used for the keeping of controlled substances. Defendant argues that the trial court
erred by denying her motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence the charge of
knowingly and intentionally keeping a vehicle which is used for the keeping of
controlled substances. We find no error.
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Defendant was indicted on 1 April 2024 for felony possession of a schedule II
controlled substance; possession with intent to sell or deliver a schedule II controlled
substance; and knowingly and intentionally keeping and maintaining a vehicle that
was used for using, keeping, or selling a controlled substance, fentanyl. The State
voluntarily dismissed the charge of felony possession of a schedule II controlled
substance during pretrial motions. The evidence presented at trial tended to show
the following:
Three probation officers arrived at Defendant’s home on 3 January 2024 to
search her person, home, and vehicle. At the time, Defendant was on supervised
probation and subject to warrantless searches. The officers were able to get
Defendant to come to the door. After searching Defendant’s person and home, the
officers searched her car parked in the driveway. In the driver’s-side door
compartment of the car, officers recovered a scale with white powder residue on it, a
container with two bags of white chalky powder, and a folded piece of notebook paper
with white powder. When questioned about these items, Defendant said that one of
the bags with a white chalky powder contained sugar and the other contained
fentanyl. The substances recovered from the vehicle and other items recovered from
the house were tested. The substance in the notebook paper weighed 0.21 grams and
tested positive for fentanyl.
At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges
-2-
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
for insufficient evidence. The State indicated that it was only arguing that Defendant
“kept” the vehicle, as opposed to “maintained” the vehicle. The trial court otherwise
denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges at the close of
all the evidence. The trial court denied the motion.
At the charge conference, the State indicated that it did not intend to argue
that Defendant kept the vehicle for the purpose of selling drugs. In its closing
argument, the State indicated that it was “going under the theory of keeping,” not
using or selling. The trial court ultimately instructed the jury on “intentionally
keeping a vehicle which is used for the keeping of controlled substances” and
“knowingly keeping a vehicle, which is used for the keeping of controlled substances.”
The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses of possession
of fentanyl and knowingly keeping a vehicle which is used for the keeping of
controlled substances. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six to seventeen
months’ imprisonment for fentanyl possession, suspended for thirty-six months’
supervised probation, and to an additional thirty days in custody for knowingly
keeping a vehicle for keeping controlled substances. Defendant gave proper oral
notice of appeal in open court.
II. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss
the charge of knowingly and intentionally keeping a vehicle which is used for the
keeping of a controlled substance.
-3-
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable
inferences. State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301 (2002). “The trial court must determine
whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime.” State
v. Smith, 294 N.C. App. 724, 726 (2024) (cleaned up). “Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a
conclusion.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 597 (2002) (citation omitted). “If there is
substantial evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or both—to support a finding
that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it,
the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.” State v. Locklear,
322 N.C. 349, 358 (1988) (citation omitted).
We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Stroud, 252 N.C.
App. 200, 208 (2017). Under de novo review, this Court considers the matter anew
and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower court. State v. Williams,
362 N.C. 628, 632-33 (2008).
Defendant was convicted of knowingly keeping a vehicle which is used for the
keeping of a controlled substance, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-108(a)(7). To
survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present sufficient evidence of four
elements: defendant “(1) knowingly (2) kept . . . (3) a vehicle (4) which was used for
the keeping . . . (5) of controlled substances.” State v. Garmon, 390 N.C. 116, 125-26
(2026) (quoting State v. Rogers, 371 N.C. 397, 401 (2018) (cleaned up)); see also N.C.
-4-
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
Gen. Stat. § 90-108(a)(7) (2025).
At issue in this case is the fourth element.
The word “keep” in section 90-108(a)(7) “has different definitions under
elements two and four.” Garmon, 390 N.C. at 126. “Under element two, it may be
defined as ‘possessing something for at least a short period of time–or intending to
retain possession of something in the future–for a certain use.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“However, as applied to element four, keeping controlled substances, when someone
‘keeps’ an object in his car, that word does not refer to possessing something for a
designated use; it refers to storing that object in his car.” Id. at 126 (cleaned up).
“The defendant does not need to store drugs for a minimum time period, but it is also
not sufficient for him to ‘merely have drugs in a car.’” Id. (quoting Rogers, 371 N.C.
at 406). “[T]he key question is, under the totality of the circumstances, ‘whether the
defendant was using that vehicle . . . for the storing of drugs.’” Id.
In Rogers, officers found two bags of crack cocaine hidden behind the door to
the vehicle’s gas-cap compartment. 371 N.C. at 399. The compartment was accessible
only through a switch inside the vehicle. Id. Officers saw the defendant leave the
vehicle and remain in a hotel for approximately forty-five minutes without accessing
the drugs, suggesting the vehicle’s purpose extended beyond mere transportation of
the drugs. Id. at 403-04. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence
supported a reasonable inference that the defendant was using the vehicle to store
drugs. Id. at 404.
-5-
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
In State v. Mitchell, officers found a marijuana cigarette in the defendant’s car,
knew that he had possessed two bags of marijuana while in the car, and subsequently
found drug paraphernalia in his home. 336 N.C. 22, 26 (1994). While the evidence
supported an inference that the defendant possessed marijuana while in the car, it
was insufficient to support a reasonable inference that he used the vehicle as a place
to store drugs. Id. at 33.
In Garmon, during a traffic stop of the defendant’s car, officers found a bookbag
on the passenger-side floorboard containing fentanyl, heroin, marijuana, a digital
scale, plastic bags, and other drug paraphernalia. 390 N.C. at 119. The bookbag was
located in the passenger compartment, within easy reach, and functioned as a self-
contained container designed for transportation. Id. at 128. These circumstances
showed possession of drugs in the vehicle, but not that the defendant used the vehicle
as a place to store them. Id. Accordingly, the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that the vehicle was used for keeping controlled substances. Id.
Here, Defendant was inside her home when officers arrived. Officers first
searched her person and home and then searched her vehicle. In the driver’s-side
door compartment of the car, they found a scale containing white powder residue, two
plastic bags containing white powder, and a folded piece of notebook paper containing
fentanyl. Defendant later admitted that one of the bags contained fentanyl and
another contained sugar. Defendant further told officers that no one else had driven
the vehicle during the preceding two or three weeks.
-6-
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
Unlike in Mitchell, the evidence here does not show that Defendant merely
possessed fentanyl while she was in the car. See 336 N.C. at 33. And, unlike in
Garmon, the evidence here does not show that the contraband was in the car when
Defendant exited the car or that the contraband was found in a self-contained
container designed for transportation. See 390 N.C. at 128.
This case is more similar to Rogers. Here, the only plausible inference is that
the fentanyl had been placed in the driver’s-side door compartment before the officers
arrived. Thus, the fentanyl had been stored in the car for at least some period of time
before it was discovered. And it is apparent from the fact that Defendant went inside
the home while the drugs stayed in the car that Defendant was not using the car only
to transport drugs from one place to another. Furthermore, although the driver’s-
side door compartment is not as effective a hiding place as the gas-cap compartment
in Rogers, an inference can still be drawn that Defendant chose to store the fentanyl
in a hidden place. After all, “a defendant who wants to store contraband will, all
other things equal, want to store it in a hidden place . . . .” Rogers, 371 N.C. at 404.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that Defendant’s vehicle was used for the keeping of controlled
substances, within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-108(a)(7). Accordingly, the
trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of
knowingly and intentionally keeping a vehicle which is used for the keeping of
controlled substances.
-7-
STATE V. MORAN
Opinion of the Court
III. Conclusion
The State presented sufficient evidence to support the charge of knowingly and
intentionally keeping a vehicle which is used for the keeping of controlled substances.
The trial court thus did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge.
NO ERROR.
Judges STADING and MURRY concur.
-8-