United States v. Ronald Smith, Jr.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
Docket25-14413
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-14413
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALD DEWAYNE SMITH, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:25-cr-00106-PGB-RMN-3
____________________
Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Smith, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, challenging the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-14413
search of a car he occupied. Smith asserts, for the first time on ap-
peal, that because of recent changes to Florida’s marijuana laws,
the odor of marijuana alone cannot establish probable cause to
search a car under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement. After review, we affirm Smith’s con-
viction.
Any theories supporting a motion to suppress that were not
raised in the district court will be reviewed by this Court for plain
error. United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003)
“Plain error occurs if (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that seriously af-
fected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings.” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks omitted).
Before the district court, Smith argued that the officers
lacked probable cause to search the car because the officers’ testi-
mony that they smelled marijuana was not credible and the smell
of marijuana “was not strong enough based on what [the officers]
knew at the time.” Smith does not appeal the district court’s find-
ing that officers were credible when they testified they smelled the
odor of marijuana coming from the car. Because Smith does not
appeal this finding, we accept it.
Smith did not assert the issue, as he does here, that the plain
smell of marijuana alone could not provide officers with probable
cause for a search, rather, he argued that the officers were not cred-
ible when they claimed to smell marijuana. This is a different issue
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25-14413 Opinion of the Court 3
than that raised in the district court, not merely an alternative ar-
gument on the same issue. See United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275,
1298 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[W]hile an issue can be waived, alternative
arguments on an issue cannot.”).
The district court did not plainly err in denying Smith’s mo-
tion to suppress. The officers had sufficient probable cause under
our prior precedent to search the car because they smelled the odor
of marijuana emanating from the car prior to the search. In United
States v. Tobin, we held the smell of marijuana emitting from a
home established probable cause for a warrantless search. See
United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (1991) (en banc) (“There
is no doubt that the agent’s suspicions rose to the level of probable
cause when, as the door stood open, he detected what he knew
from his law enforcement experience to be the odor of mariju-
ana.”). In United States v. Harden, we held “[t]he smell of marijuana
alone . . . provide[s] probable cause” for a search. United States v.
Harden, 104 F.4th 830, 839 n.5 (11th Cir. 2024).
Under the prior panel precedent rule, this Court’s holding
that the smell of marijuana alone provides probable cause remains
binding until the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc over-
rules the holding or undermines it to the point of abrogation. See
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (explain-
ing under our prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding
is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled
or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court
or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc” (italics omitted)); United States v.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-14413
Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The prior panel prece-
dent rule applies regardless of whether the later panel believes the
prior panel’s opinion to be correct, and there is no exception to the
rule where the prior panel failed to consider arguments raised be-
fore a later panel.”). Accordingly, Smith’s argument that probable
cause did not exist because the Florida District Courts of Appeal
have recently concluded that the smell of marijuana alone does not
clearly indicate the presence of contraband fails, as Smith does not
cite any binding authority overruling or abrogating this Court’s
holdings in Harden and Tobin that the smell of marijuana establishes
probable cause. See Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. Thus, Smith cannot
show plain error, and we affirm the district court’s denial of Smith’s
motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.