State v. Robert Allen Henderson, Jr.
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2024-001211
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Robert Allen Henderson, Jr., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2024-001211
Appeal From Pickens County
Patrick Cleburne Fant, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-490
Submitted October 2, 2026 โ Filed November 18, 2026
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, of Columbia,
for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds
Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Cynthia Smith
Crick, of Greenville, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Robert Allen Henderson, Jr. appeals his conviction for simple
possession of methamphetamine and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment
suspended upon the service of four years' imprisonment and three years of
probation. On appeal, Henderson argues the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress drug evidence found during a warrantless search of his person
in violation of the Fourth Amendment because no exception applied and his will
was overborne such that his consent was not voluntarily given. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
We hold the trial court did not err in denying Henderson's motion to suppress the
drug evidence discovered on his person because the law enforcement officer had
reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and did not measurably extend its
duration and Henderson voluntarily gave law enforcement consent to search his
vehicle and person. See State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633-34, 879 S.E.2d 762,
766 (2022) (explaining an appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings
regarding a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment for any
evidentiary support but "the ultimate legal conclusion . . . is a question of law
subject to de novo review"). First, we find the law enforcement officer had
reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because the officer testified
Henderson's tag lights were not working as required by South Carolina law. See
State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 108, 747 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013) ("Violation of
motor vehicle codes provides an officer reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic
stop."); S.C. Code Ann. ยง 56-5-4530 (2018) ("Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp
shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear
registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the
rear. Any tail lamp or tail lamps, together with any separate lamp for illuminating
the rear registration plate, shall be so wired as to be lighted whenever the head
lamps or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted.").
Second, we find the law enforcement officer did not measurably extend the
duration of the traffic stop because the purpose of the traffic stop had not yet been
completed when he asked Henderson for consent to search the vehicle and his
person. See Provet, 405 S.C. at 108, 747 S.E.2d at 457 ("A traffic stop supported
by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation remains valid until the purpose of the
traffic stop has been completed."). Specifically, Henderson had not yet provided
proof of insurance, and the law enforcement officer was still awaiting a response
from dispatch regarding Henderson's identification and had not issued a traffic
citation. See id. ("The officer may not extend the duration of a traffic stop in order
to question the motorist on unrelated matters unless he possesses reasonable
suspicion that warrants an additional seizure of the motorist."); id. at 108-09, 747
S.E.2d at 457 ("Notwithstanding that an officer may not lawfully extend the
duration of a traffic stop in order to engage in off-topic questioning, this rule does
not limit the scope of the officer's questions to the motorist during the traffic
stop."); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as the inquiries do
not measurably extend the stop's duration."). In addition, the officer testified "[n]o
more than a couple minutes" had passed from the time he pulled over Henderson to
the time that he located the methamphetamine on Henderson's person, and the
footage from law enforcement's body-worn camera indicated that the officer asked
for consent to search Henderson's person just over two minutes after the beginning
of the traffic stop. See Provet, 405 S.C. at 111, 747 S.E.2d at 458 ("[T]he proper
inquiry is not whether an officer 'unreasonably' extended the duration of the traffic
stop with his off-topic questions but whether he 'measurably' extended it."); id.
("This is a temporal inquiry, not a reasonableness inquiry.").
Third, we find Henderson voluntarily consented to the law enforcement officer's
search of his vehicle and person. See Frasier, 437 S.C. at 638, 879 S.E.2d at 769
("Warrantless searches are generally considered per se unreasonable unless they
fall within a recognized exception under the Fourth Amendment."); id. ("Police
may search an individual if that person consents, but the burden is on the State to
demonstrate consent."). The officer testified Henderson gave him consent to
search his vehicle and his person, and the officer's body-worn camera footage
corroborated his testimony that Henderson consented to each search. Moreover,
we hold that under the totality of the circumstances, even if Henderson did not
voluntarily consent to the search of his vehicle and person, the officer had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Henderson's person for safety
purposes. See Milledge v. State, 422 S.C. 366, 376, 811 S.E.2d 796, 801 (2018)
("In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to perform an investigative
stop and frisk without infringing upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights,
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances."). Henderson was wearing a
large jacket concealing his waistband, appeared to be extremely nervous with
shaking hands, and failed to provide the correct documentation, and the stop
occurred at night in a high-crime area. See id. at 375, 811 S.E.2d at 801 ("In
conjunction with a valid automobile stop for a traffic violation, an officer may
conduct a Terry frisk for his own safety after forming a reasonable conclusion 'that
the person whom he ha[s] legitimately stopped might be armed and presently
dangerous.'" (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977)); id. at
377, 811 S.E.2d at 802 ("A person's presence in a known high-crime area is one
relevant consideration in analyzing reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry
frisk."); id. ("[O]fficers may also draw inferences and conclusions from the
'extreme nervousness' of motorists during traffic stops, particularly where, in the
officers' experience, the nervousness is excessive when compared to other
motorists who are not engaged in criminal activity.").
AFFIRMED.1
WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.