Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Robert Allen Henderson, Jr., Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-001211 Appeal From Pickens County Patrick Cleburne Fant, III, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-490 Submitted October 2, 2026 โ€“ Filed November 18, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellate Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Cynthia Smith Crick, of Greenville, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Robert Allen Henderson, Jr. appeals his conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of four years' imprisonment and three years of probation. On appeal, Henderson argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress drug evidence found during a warrantless search of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment because no exception applied and his will was overborne such that his consent was not voluntarily given. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Henderson's motion to suppress the drug evidence discovered on his person because the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and did not measurably extend its duration and Henderson voluntarily gave law enforcement consent to search his vehicle and person. See State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633-34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022) (explaining an appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings regarding a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment for any evidentiary support but "the ultimate legal conclusion . . . is a question of law subject to de novo review"). First, we find the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because the officer testified Henderson's tag lights were not working as required by South Carolina law. See State v. Provet, 405 S.C. 101, 108, 747 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2013) ("Violation of motor vehicle codes provides an officer reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop."); S.C. Code Ann. ยง 56-5-4530 (2018) ("Either a tail lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. Any tail lamp or tail lamps, together with any separate lamp for illuminating the rear registration plate, shall be so wired as to be lighted whenever the head lamps or auxiliary driving lamps are lighted."). Second, we find the law enforcement officer did not measurably extend the duration of the traffic stop because the purpose of the traffic stop had not yet been completed when he asked Henderson for consent to search the vehicle and his person. See Provet, 405 S.C. at 108, 747 S.E.2d at 457 ("A traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation remains valid until the purpose of the traffic stop has been completed."). Specifically, Henderson had not yet provided proof of insurance, and the law enforcement officer was still awaiting a response from dispatch regarding Henderson's identification and had not issued a traffic citation. See id. ("The officer may not extend the duration of a traffic stop in order to question the motorist on unrelated matters unless he possesses reasonable suspicion that warrants an additional seizure of the motorist."); id. at 108-09, 747 S.E.2d at 457 ("Notwithstanding that an officer may not lawfully extend the duration of a traffic stop in order to engage in off-topic questioning, this rule does not limit the scope of the officer's questions to the motorist during the traffic stop."); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as the inquiries do not measurably extend the stop's duration."). In addition, the officer testified "[n]o more than a couple minutes" had passed from the time he pulled over Henderson to the time that he located the methamphetamine on Henderson's person, and the footage from law enforcement's body-worn camera indicated that the officer asked for consent to search Henderson's person just over two minutes after the beginning of the traffic stop. See Provet, 405 S.C. at 111, 747 S.E.2d at 458 ("[T]he proper inquiry is not whether an officer 'unreasonably' extended the duration of the traffic stop with his off-topic questions but whether he 'measurably' extended it."); id. ("This is a temporal inquiry, not a reasonableness inquiry."). Third, we find Henderson voluntarily consented to the law enforcement officer's search of his vehicle and person. See Frasier, 437 S.C. at 638, 879 S.E.2d at 769 ("Warrantless searches are generally considered per se unreasonable unless they fall within a recognized exception under the Fourth Amendment."); id. ("Police may search an individual if that person consents, but the burden is on the State to demonstrate consent."). The officer testified Henderson gave him consent to search his vehicle and his person, and the officer's body-worn camera footage corroborated his testimony that Henderson consented to each search. Moreover, we hold that under the totality of the circumstances, even if Henderson did not voluntarily consent to the search of his vehicle and person, the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Henderson's person for safety purposes. See Milledge v. State, 422 S.C. 366, 376, 811 S.E.2d 796, 801 (2018) ("In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to perform an investigative stop and frisk without infringing upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances."). Henderson was wearing a large jacket concealing his waistband, appeared to be extremely nervous with shaking hands, and failed to provide the correct documentation, and the stop occurred at night in a high-crime area. See id. at 375, 811 S.E.2d at 801 ("In conjunction with a valid automobile stop for a traffic violation, an officer may conduct a Terry frisk for his own safety after forming a reasonable conclusion 'that the person whom he ha[s] legitimately stopped might be armed and presently dangerous.'" (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977)); id. at 377, 811 S.E.2d at 802 ("A person's presence in a known high-crime area is one relevant consideration in analyzing reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk."); id. ("[O]fficers may also draw inferences and conclusions from the 'extreme nervousness' of motorists during traffic stops, particularly where, in the officers' experience, the nervousness is excessive when compared to other motorists who are not engaged in criminal activity."). AFFIRMED.1 WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.