Full Opinion

- IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87962-6-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION MORRIS BETTIS QUIROLGICO, Appellant. FELDMAN, J. — Morris Bettis Quirolgico appeals from a conviction after a jury trial for second degree assault and a hate crime under RCW 9A.36.080(1). Quirolgico claims (a) there is insufficient evidence to support the hate crime conviction and to disprove self-defense and (b) the trial court erred in giving a first aggressor instruction. Finding no error, we affirm. I Quirolgico’s conviction arises from an altercation with Jalal Javadi Arabani that occurred at a supermarket in Lynnwood. According to Quirolgico, Javadi Arabani cut in front of him at the checkout line. A physical altercation then ensued, during which Quirolgico punched Javadi Arabani in the face, causing him to fall to the ground, lose a tooth, experience headaches, and bleed from his mouth and lip. The State charged Quirolgico with second degree assault and a hate crime under No. 87962-6-I RCW 9A.36.080(1), and a jury convicted Quirolgico as charged. This timely appeal followed. Additional facts relevant to the issues on appeal are set forth in the analysis below. II A. Sufficiency of the Evidence When analyzing whether evidence is sufficient to uphold a jury’s verdict, this court applies a deferential standard of review. In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wn.2d 354, 364, 256 P.3d 277 (2011). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). Further, a defendant claiming insufficiency “admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We defer to the jury on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75. 1. Hate Crime Conviction To convict Quirolgico of a hate crime offense, the relevant portion of the unchallenged jury instructions required the jury to find that Quirolgico caused physical injury to Javadi Arabani “because of his perception of the race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin of Jalal Javadi Arabani.” 1 (Emphasis added.) 1 As no party objected to this instruction, it is “law of the case” and is “‘treated as the properly applicable law for purposes of appeal.’” State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 755, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) (quoting Roberson v. Perez, 156 Wn.2d 33, 41, 123 P.3d 844 (2005)). -2- No. 87962-6-I “Proof that the accused committed a prohibited act ‘because of’ the victim’s membership in a protected category is characterized as the element of ‘victim selection.’” State v. Johnson, 115 Wn. App. 890, 896, 64 P.3d 88 (2003) (quoting State v. Pollard, 80 Wn. App. 60, 64-65, 906 P.2d 976 (1995)). Addressing this element, Quirolgico argues the evidence was insufficient to show he committed a hate crime because “there was no indication of victim selection because of race or national origin.” Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence supports Quirolgico’s hate crime conviction. Quirolgico spoke with a police officer minutes after the physical altercation at issue here. In doing so, he described Javadi Arabani as “some old foreigner dude” who “didn’t speak English.” In contrast to his description of Javadi Arabani, Quirolgico described himself as an “American national” with “more rights” than “any of these citizens in here.” There is also evidence that Quirolgico told Javadi Arabani, “I don’t know where the fuck you come from. What country Biden dragged you in from. But you’re getting behind me.” Additionally, when the police officer asked if perhaps Javadi Arabani did not understand what Quirolgico had said, Quirolgico retorted, “No, I don’t think so and it’s not my fault if he doesn’t. He shouldn’t be here if he doesn’t understand what’s going on.” Quirolgico also disparaged what he perceived to be Javadi Arabani’s religion and national origin, stating: Is that some kind of Muslim . . . what is that? Is he, he’s bringing terrorists in, isn’t he? Yeah. So, let’s find out who this guy is and find out, let’s find out his visa status, let’s find out this guy’s green card status. Yes? Let’s find out if he is an illegal alien. -3- No. 87962-6-I The foregoing evidence is sufficient to show that Quirolgico selected his victim based on his perception of the victim’s race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. Despite this, Quirolgico contends “there was no evidence [he] uttered any racial or ethnic slur against Javadi Arabani during their confrontation” and “there was no evidence he chose to punch Javadi Arabani because of his race rather than because of the dispute over line-cutting and Javadi Arabani’s own aggressive conduct.” This argument fails at the outset because neither RCW 9A.36.080 nor the trial court’s unchallenged jury instructions require the uttering of racial slurs during a confrontation to satisfy the victim selection element. Additionally, the evidence discussed above, especially when viewed in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the State, shows that Quirolgico confronted Javadi Arabani in line—and escalated the confrontation— based on Javadi Arabani’s race, perceived inability to understand English, religion, and nationality. Nor does the conviction penalize constitutionally protected speech or thought, as Quirolgico also contends. In State v. Read, which Quirolgico cites in support of this argument, the court stated, “The intent of the malicious harassment statute is not to punish bigoted speech or thought, ‘but rather the act of victim selection.’” 163 Wn. App. 853, 864, 261 P.3d 207 (2011) (quoting State v. Talley, 122 Wn.2d 192, 206, 858 P.2d 217 (1993)). Accordingly, the court’s sufficiency analysis focused on Read’s repeated use of “racial slurs to attack Zewdu while continuing to advance toward her.” Id. at 873. The court reasoned that Read -4- No. 87962-6-I thereby made a “true threat,” which was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment. Id. Citing Read, Quirolgico broadly argues, “Hate crimes involve the potential for penalizing constitutionally protected speech or thought.” Quirolgico’s reliance on Read is misplaced. Read involved a conviction for malicious harassment under RCW 9A.36.080(1)(c), which applies where the defendant “[t]hreatens a specific person or group of persons.” Here, in contrast, Quirolgico was charged and convicted of a hate crime offense under RCW 9A.36.080(1)(a), which applies where the defendant “[a]ssaults another person.” Because the conviction here is predicated on a physical assault (which Quirolgico does not contest), the “true threat” analysis in Read is inapposite. But even if we apply that analysis, the result is the same: like the virulent racial epithets described in Read, which the court held were not entitled to protection under the First Amendment (163 Wn. App. at 873), there is evidence that Quirolgico escalated the confrontation and aggressively told Javadi Arabani, “I don’t know where the fuck you come from. What country Biden dragged you in from. But you’re getting behind me.” Viewed favorably to the prosecution, sufficient evidence supports the hate crime conviction. 2 2. Self-Defense Quirolgico also argues “the evidence was insufficient to disprove that [he] acted in self-defense.” It is well-settled that the use of force is lawful where the 2 Quirolgico’s reliance on our unpublished opinion in State v. Wagner, No. 86044-5-I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2025), is also misplaced. Although Wagner singled out one person based on her race and directed racial slurs toward her during a confrontation, slip op. at 2-4, the opinion does not hold that sufficient evidence to support a hate crime conviction must always include statements made by a defendant during the altercation. In any event, the record here (viewed favorably to the prosecution) includes evidence of such statements. -5- No. 87962-6-I defendant subjectively and reasonably believes they are in imminent danger from the victim. State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 266, 458 P.3d 750 (2020). Evidence of self-defense is evaluated “from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person standing in the shoes of the defendant.” State v. Riley, 137 Wn.2d 904, 909, 976 P.2d 624 (1999). However, self-defense cannot be invoked if the defendant was the first aggressor or provoked the altercation. Id. “If the defendant meets the ‘initial burden of producing some evidence that [their] actions occurred in circumstances amounting to self-defense,’ then the State has the burden to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Grott, 195 Wn.2d at 266 (quoting Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 909). Sufficient evidence disproves Quirolgico acted in self-defense. The State’s evidence establishes that Javadi Arabani “just stood there and stared” when Quirolgico asked him to get behind him in the checkout line. Despite Javadi Arabani’s passivity, the evidence at trial shows that Quirolgico kicked Javadi Arabani’s shopping cart, stepped in close and loomed over him, yelled and cursed at him while Javadi Arabani appeared “[g]uarded,” and “[v]iolently” shoved Javadi Arabani’s cart away from him. Additionally, the evidence at trial also establishes that Quirolgico was substantially taller than Javadi Arabani. Viewing the evidence favorably to the State and taking all reasonable inferences in its favor, a reasonable juror could conclude that a person in Quirolgico’s shoes would not have believed they were in imminent danger. Despite the foregoing evidence, Quirolgico claims the evidence was insufficient to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] lost the right to act in -6- No. 87962-6-I self-defense due to being the first aggressor.” But as established above and discussed further in section II.B below (regarding the evidentiary basis for the trial court’s first aggressor instruction), the State’s evidence shows that Quirolgico instigated the altercation by being physically aggressive in the checkout line. Although Quirolgico claimed later that Javadi Arabani initiated the conflict by “enter[ing] [his] personal space,” we cannot conclude, based on the evidence at trial, that no rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Quirolgico was the first aggressor and therefore could not claim self-defense. Quirolgico’s assertion that the State “did not disprove [his] claim that he feared imminent attack and took limited action” is also misguided. Contrary to Quirolgico’s argument, the evidence at trial indicates he was not fearful, but rather angry, that “some old foreigner dude . . . butted in front of [him].” Additionally, a witness testified that Javadi Arabani was turning away from Quirolgico when Quirolgico punched him, so Quirolgico could not have anticipated “imminent attack.” Quirolgico’s testimony at trial also suggests he was offended rather than fearful: Q (Counsel Swenson): And you punched him out at that point, correct, when he got in your face? A (Quirolgico): No. After he cursed my parents is when I did it. That was the bottom line. Taking all inferences in favor of the State and deferring to the jury on credibility issues, a rational juror could find that Quirolgico did not subjectively or reasonably fear imminent attack. Thus, sufficient evidence disproves that Quirolgico acted in self-defense. -7- No. 87962-6-I B. First Aggressor Instruction At the State’s request, and over Quirolgico’s objection, the trial court gave a first aggressor instruction which stated that self-defense was not available if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Quirolgico was the first aggressor and provoked the fight. Quirolgico argues the court erred in giving this instruction because “there was no supporting evidence” that Quirolgico “engaged in aggressive conduct, likely to provoke a belligerent response, triggering the alleged victim’s need to act in self-defense.” “To satisfy the constitutional demands of a fair trial, the jury instructions, when read as a whole, must correctly tell the jury of the applicable law, not be misleading, and permit the defendant to present his theory of the case.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 105, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). While “courts should use care in giving an aggressor instruction,” an aggressor instruction is appropriate “[w]here there is credible evidence from which a jury can reasonably determine that the defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense.” Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 909, 910 n.2. A defendant provokes the need for self-defense by engaging in “‘an intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response’ by the victim.” Grott, 195 Wn.2d at 272 (quoting 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 16.04, at 256 (4th ed. 2016)). Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to warrant a first aggressor instruction is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Sanchez, 29 Wn. App. 2d 382, 391, 546 P.3d 436, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1007, 551 P.3d 438 (2024). In our review, we “view the -8- No. 87962-6-I supporting evidence in the light most favorable to the party that requested the instruction.” State v. Wingate, 155 Wn.2d 817, 823 n.1, 122 P.3d 908 (2005). Applying these principles here, the trial court did not err in giving the first aggressor instruction. The State presented surveillance video footage and witness testimony showing that Quirolgico instigated the altercation in the checkout line by kicking Javadi Arabani’s shopping cart, throwing an item from his cart, and shoving his cart. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State (the party that requested the instruction), we conclude a jury could reasonably find that Quirolgico provoked any need for him to use force against Javadi Arabani. Thus, the trial court did not err in giving the first aggressor instruction. Quirolgico’s contrary arguments lack merit. First, he cites Grott to argue the aggressor instruction was unwarranted “because the evidence shows [he] engaged in a single aggressive act,” which was punching Javadi Arabani. But Grott holds an aggressor instruction is unwarranted for a single aggressive act only “where the defendant undisputedly engaged in a single aggressive act and that act was the sole basis for the charged offense.” 195 Wn.2d at 272 (emphasis added). This is because “[o]ne cannot simultaneously engage in an act of first aggression and an act of lawful self-defense.” Id. If, on the other hand, the defendant “engaged in a course of aggressive conduct” toward the victim, an aggressor instruction is proper. Id. at 272-73. Here, Quirolgico kicked Javadi Arabani’s shopping cart, threw a bottle of juice from his cart, and shoved his cart down the aisle before punching him. From this evidence, a rational juror could find that -9- No. 87962-6-I Quirolgico engaged in “a course of aggressive conduct” that provoked his need to punch Javadi Arabani. Grott does not aid Quirolgico. Lastly, Quirolgico claims the aggressor instruction was improper “because any arguably aggressive conduct by Quirolgico prior to the punch was not directed at Javadi Arabani’s person.” But Quirolgico cites no case law holding that the conduct supporting a first aggressor instruction cannot be directed toward something the person is holding, like a shopping cart. The proper standard is instead whether the defendant “create[d] a necessity for acting in self-defense” by engaging in “any intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response.” Grott, 195 Wn.2d at 272. And here, Quirolgico engaged in numerous such acts, as set forth in the preceding paragraph, that would provoke a belligerent response from a reasonable person. The aggressor instruction was therefore warranted. Affirmed. WE CONCUR: - 10 -