United States v. MCNEAL

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition. Before HARRELL, ZIMMERMANN, and STAMPFLI Appellate Military Judges _________________________ UNITED STATES Appellee v. Sean A. MCNEAL Sergeant (E-5), U. S. Marine Corps Appellant No. 202500174 _________________________ Decided: 30 October 2026 Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary Military Judges: David C. Segraves (arraignment and motions) John L. Ferriter (motions and trial) Sentence adjudged 20 December 2024 by a special court-martial tried at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of a panel of officer and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment (EOJ): reduction to E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. For Appellant: Major Theodore H. Massey III, USMC For Appellee: Major Mary Claire Finnen, USMC Lieutenant Erin H. Bourneuf, JAGC, USN Judge ZIMMERMANN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior Judge HARRELL and Judge STAMPFLI joined.  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court _________________________ This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2. _________________________ ZIMMERMANN, Judge: A panel of enlisted and officer members sitting as a special court-martial convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of extortion and four specifications of assault consummated by a battery, in violation of Articles 127 and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).1 The members acquitted Appellant of five specifications of assault consummated by a battery. The members sentenced Appellant to reduction to E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. Appellant asserts several assignments of error (AOE), which we restate and renumber as follows: I. Whether a fatal variance occurred when the military judge allowed the members to make exceptions and substitutions changing the location of the offense. II. Whether the evidence is factually sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for assault consummated by a battery against Corporal Romeo and Corporal Bravo.2 III. Whether the evidence is factually sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for extortion. IV. Whether the findings of guilt for assault consummated by a battery against Corporal Romeo and Corporal Bravo are ambiguous, precluding this Court’s factual sufficiency review. We find no prejudicial error and affirm the findings and the sentence. 1 10 U.S.C. §§ 927, 928. 2 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel, are pseudonyms. 2  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court I. BACKGROUND A. Underlying Facts—Article 128, UCMJ (Assault) Appellant and eight other Marines, the alleged victims in assault allegations in this case, were assigned to the airframes shop in Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA)-3673 at Camp Pendleton during the 2022- 2023 timeframe. For approximately eight months in 2022, the Marines deployed with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit to Okinawa and aboard the USS New Orleans (LPD 18). Each alleged victim testified that Appellant touched him without consent. These instances happened on several occasions in the workplace at Camp Pendleton and during the deployment. Specification 2 of the Charge alleged that Appellant, on divers occasions, unlawfully touched Cpl Romeo on the groin with his hand. Cpl Romeo testified that Appellant “cupped” his groin area one time with his hand. The members found Appellant guilty of the specification but excepted the words, “divers occasions.” Specification 5 of the Additional Charge alleged that Appellant unlawfully touched Cpl Bravo on divers occasions, including touching him on the buttocks with a broomstick handle, on the ear, on the arms, and on the eye. Cpl Bravo testified about the various occasions during which Appellant touched him, but he testified that Appellant touched his buttocks with a broomstick only one time. The members found Appellant guilty only of touching Cpl Bravo on the buttocks with a broomstick handle by excepting the language, “on divers occasions,” and all language regarding the other touches. Specification 2 of the Additional Charge alleged that Appellant, on divers occasions, assaulted Cpl Yankee “at or near San Diego, California.” However, Cpl Yankee testified the assaults took place in Okinawa or on the ship during the deployment, not at Camp Pendleton. Over Defense objection, the military judge allowed the members to find Appellant guilty by exceptions and substitutions as to the location.4 Appellant’s defense to each assault allegation was mistake of fact as to consent based on his perception that the culture in the unit involved mutual “horseplay” and “locker room” behavior among the Marines. Trial defense counsel cross-examined each alleged victim about whether they participated in or observed actions similar to the charged conduct in the workplace. Appellant testified, admitting to touching each of the alleged victims on the 3 Initially the unit was HMLA-469, but it transitioned to HMLA-367 in December 2022. 4 The military judge also denied the Defense motion for a finding of not guilty under R.C.M. 917 based on the discrepancy between the specification and the testimony as to the location. 3  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court body part alleged in the specifications; however, he insisted the unit’s culture led him to believe such contact was consensual. Contrary to the testimony of the alleged victims, Appellant testified he never “cupped” the genitals of any of the alleged victims, but rather, “flicked” them with the back of his hand, and that the touching of the buttocks and groins was “mutual.” B. Underlying Facts—Article 127, UCMJ (Extortion) Appellant and Cpl Kilo met on an online dating application and communicated via text and other electronic applications. Cpl Kilo sent Appellant a selfie, which was not sexually explicit, in which a bottle of vodka was visible in the background. Cpl Kilo was under the age of 21 at the time, and Appellant commented on the alcohol he saw in the photo. They discussed sexual topics, including the sexual conduct in which each was willing to engage, and Cpl Kilo hinted that she would send explicit photos to Appellant in response to his request. In their initial texts, Cpl Kilo also expressed an interest in engaging in sexual intercourse with Appellant. The military judge admitted Prosecution Exhibit 5, which depicted screenshots of text messages between the two Marines. After a few days of communicating with Appellant, Cpl Kilo changed her mind and decided she did not want to have any further contact with him. She blocked Appellant, preventing his calls and messages from reaching her phone. However, Cpl Kilo was able to see two of his texts on her Apple Watch after she blocked Appellant. One of the messages asked, “What did I do?” and the other stated Appellant intended to report her to her command for underage drinking. She immediately unblocked Appellant’s number and began texting him, begging him not to make such a report. In that context, Cpl Kilo sent explicit photos and an explicit video to Appellant. She also invited Appellant to her barracks room, ostensibly to engage in sexual conduct. Once he arrived, however, they discussed the alcohol situation, and Appellant promised Cpl Kilo he would not report her to her command for underage drinking. She then told Appellant she had changed her mind, and she did not want to “hook up,” or in other words, have sex with him. Although he was upset at that development, Appellant left. About a week later, Appellant resent an explicit photo Cpl Kilo had previously texted to him, and told her, “I want more.” Once Cpl Kilo told Appellant she did not want to send any more explicit photos, and, “I don’t want to do anything,” Appellant answered, “And that is your FINAL decision?” Once Cpl Kilo responded, “yes,” Appellant’s next texts stated, “Ok. Well then I’ll be doing the right thing then. Good luck. . . . But I have to inform them of your drinking. Sorry.” Appellant also later sent Cpl Kilo a photo of her Marine On Line profile, noting her work phone number was displayed. 4  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court Appellant testified he never asked for explicit photos or a sexual relationship with Cpl Kilo in exchange for his silence about her underage drinking. His position at trial and on appeal is that he made the threat as an emotional response to her rejection, and not with the intent to obtain an advantage (explicit photos and a sexual relationship). He asserts Cpl Kilo offered the images and sexual activity on her own. II. DISCUSSION A. Variance 1. Standard of Review. We review de novo whether a fatal variance occurred.5 2. Variance Generally. “A variance between pleadings and proof exists when evidence at trial establishes the commission of a criminal offense by the accused, but the proof does not conform strictly with the offense alleged in the charge.”6 The Manual for Courts-Martial contemplates such discrepancies and provides for findings by exceptions and substitutions, as long as those changes do not violate an accused’s due process right to be given notice of what to defend against at trial.7 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has held, “it is well established that in order to prevail on a fatal variance claim, an appellant must show both that the variance was material and that he was substantially prejudiced thereby.”8 A variance is material if it “substantially changes the nature of the offense, increases the seriousness of the offense, or increases the punishment of the offense.”9 Further, “A variance is material if it involves ‘an integral part of an element of the offense.’”10 An appellant may be prejudiced if he is “at risk of another prosecution for the same conduct”; is misled and therefore “has been 5 United States v. Taylor, 82 M.J. 614, 625 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting United States v. Treat, 73 M.J. 331, 335 (C.A.A.F. 2014)). 6 United States v. Teffeau, 58 M.J. 62, 66 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 7 Treat, 73 M.J. at 335 (citing what is now R.C.M. 918(a)(1)(C)); see also Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 67 (discussing due process). 8 Treat, 73 M.J. at 335–36 (quoting United States v. Marshall, 67 M.J. 418, 420 (C.A.A.F.2009)). 9 Id. at 336 (citing Marshall, 67 M.J. at 420). Note R.C.M. 918(a)(1)(C) is consistent with these principles, stating, “Exceptions and substitutions may not be used to substantially change the nature of the offense or to increase the seriousness of the offense or the maximum punishment for it.” 10 Taylor, 82 M.J. at 625 (citing Treat, 73 M.J. at 336). 5  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court unable adequately to prepare for trial”; or has been denied “the opportunity to defend against the charge.”11 3. There Was No Fatal Variance. Clearly, there was a variance with respect to Specification 2 of the Additional Charge—the charge sheet alleged the relevant assault occurred in San Diego, and the evidence indicated it occurred in Okinawa. However, for the reasons below, we find this variance was not material. Even if the variance were material, we find Appellant was not prejudiced. Thus, the variance was not fatal. As to materiality, the first question is whether location is an integral part of an element of the charged offense.12 Under the facts of the instant case, the answer is no. The CAAF has characterized location to be a “minor variance” that may “not necessarily change the nature of the offense.”13 More recently, the CAAF directly used a hypothetical with facts almost identical to those in this case—where the Government charged an assault to have taken place in one location, but the evidence at trial proved the assault occurred in a different location.14 The Court noted the offense of assault consummated by a battery “requires the government to prove just three elements: (a) That the accused did bodily harm to a certain person; (b) That the bodily harm was done unlawfully; and (c) That the bodily harm was done with force or violence.”15 Therefore, the CCA could find, “the location of the incident was not an integral part of one of the elements of the offense.”16 Similarly, there is nothing about the relevant specification in this case that makes San Diego an integral part of an element of the offense. Considering all of the alleged victims and Appellant were serving together in the same unit in both locations during the 11 Id. (quoting Marshall, 67 M.J. at 420). 12 Taylor, 82 M.J. at 625 (citing Treat, 73 M.J. at 336); see also United States v. Kershaw, 87 M.J. 16 (C.A.A.F. 2026) (finding a Court of Criminal Appeals had authority under the previous version of Article 66, UCMJ, to find factual insufficiency or conduct a variance analysis on appeal if the fact at issue is not an integral part of an element). 13 Teffeau, 58 M.J. at 66; see also United States v. Finch, 64 M.J. 118, 122 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (“Location usually is not a substantial part of the offense of conspiracy.”). 14 Kershaw, 87 M.J. 16, 22 (C.A.A.F. 2026) (discussing a hypothetical charge of assault in Arlington, Virginia, when the evidence indicated it took place in Alexandria, Virginia). 15 Id. (quoting MCM pt. IV, para. 77.b.(2)). 16 Id. (while the CAAF’s holding in Kershaw addresses the CCA’s authority to conduct a variance analysis under the prior version of Article 66, UCMJ, the discussion is persuasive on this point). 6  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court charged timeframe, the substitution of Okinawa for San Diego did not “substantially change[] the nature of the offense, increase[] the seriousness of the offense, or increase[] the punishment of the offense.”17 The variance was not material. Appellant suffered no prejudice from the finding that he committed the charged assault of Cpl Yankee in Okinawa rather than in San Diego. He was on notice of each alleged victim he was accused of assaulting, how such assaults occurred, and the fact that each assault took place in the workplace. Appellant was not misled or confused about what he had to defend against.18 In fact, Appellant admitted to each touching alleged, but argued he had an honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to consent at the time of each and every charged incident, including the assault alleged in the relevant specification. This is unlike an accused, for example, who is not on notice of a Government theory until trial and thus cannot prepare a defense to that theory.19 The alleged victims and Appellant worked together at Camp Pendleton (which is near San Diego, California) and were deployed together in Okinawa and aboard the New Orleans. There was no evidence that any other witnesses would have been pertinent to Okinawa but not San Diego.20 Significantly, Appellant testified the mutual “locker room activities” with Cpl Yankee took place both at Camp Pendleton and on ship or in Okinawa, and again, his defense—mistake of fact—was the same to all of the alleged assaults, regardless of location. We find Appellant is not at risk of another prosecution for the same conduct, was not misled and therefore was able to adequately 17 Treat, 73 M.J. at 336 (citing Marshall, 67 M.J. at 420). 18 There is no indication in the record Appellant asked for a bill of particulars. 19 See, e.g., Marshall, 67 M.J. at 421 (“Had he known that he would be called upon to refute an agency theory or to defend against a charge that he escaped from SSG Fleming, Appellant is unlikely to have focused his defense and his closing argument on the lack of evidence that CPT Kreitman placed him in custody or that he escaped from the custody of CPT Kreitman” when the identity of the custodian was an element of the offense). 20 Appellant argues his “investigation, trial preparation, strategy, and examination of witnesses at trial focused on San Diego” without identifying specifically how his actions would have differed had the charge sheet alleged the assault took place in Okinawa rather than San Diego. Additionally, he had a full opportunity to cross-examine Cpl Yankee after the testimony that the assaults occurred in Okinawa, to include asking about the location of the offense. He did not ask for Cpl Yankee to be recalled, for a continuance, or for any other relief due to the claimed surprise. 7  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court prepare for trial, and has not been denied the opportunity to defend against the charge.21 In sum, Appellant was charged with committing assault consummated by a battery by doing bodily harm to Cpl Yankee (unlawfully touching him on the buttocks and groin with his hand), and Appellant stands convicted of the offense of assault consummated by a battery by doing bodily harm to Cpl Yankee (unlawfully touching him on the buttocks and groin with his hand). “There is nothing fundamentally unfair here.”22 There was no fatal variance. B. Sufficiency of Evidence 1. Standard of Review. This Court reviews the factual sufficiency of a specification only when an appellant asserts an assignment of error raising the issue and makes a specific showing of a deficiency in proof.23 The CAAF has explained that in order to “invoke a factual sufficiency review,” an appellant must raise “a specific, reasonable, nonfrivolous statement of error as to a particular finding.”24 Once the appellant satisfies this threshold, we “may weigh the evidence and determine controverted questions of fact subject to . . . appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence.”25 The level of deference that is appropriate depends on the nature of the evidence in the record.26 If we are clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence, we may dismiss, set aside, or modify the findings, or affirm a lesser finding.27 In order to conclude the finding of guilty was against the weight of the evidence, we must decide the evidence 21 Taylor, 82 M.J. at 625 (citing Treat, 73 M.J. at 336). 22 Kershaw, 87 M.J. at 15. 23 United States v. Harvey, 85 M.J. 127, 130 (C.A.A.F. 2024); 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B). 24 United States v. Hunt, M.J. , No. 25-0257, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 661, at *7 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 6, 2026). 25 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). 26 Harvey, 85 M.J. at 130. 27 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B)(iii). 8  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court “does not prove that the appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” and we “must be clearly convinced of the correctness of this decision.”28 2. The Convictions for Assault Consummated by a Battery Against Cpl Romeo and Cpl Bravo are Factually Sufficient. Appellant raised factual sufficiency as to the assaults alleged in Specification 2 of the Charge and Specification 5 of the Additional Charge, and argued the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of unlawfulness with respect to both specifications. Specifically, he argued he had an honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to consent. He has made the threshold showings, and we will review these specifications for factual sufficiency. Upon review of the record, we find the evidence factually sufficient. All eight alleged victims, including Cpl Romeo and Cpl Bravo, testified Appellant touched them without their consent. Appellant admitted to all of the instances of touching but testified the culture of the unit and mutual “horseplay” among the Marines led him to believe the touching was consensual. The members had the opportunity to hear and observe each witness’s testimony and observe their demeanor. Thus, they were in a better position to assess witness credibility than this Court and we afford a great deal of deference to them as to the impact of witness testimony. Appellant offered photos and a video contradicting the testimony of some of the alleged victims, and we are able to weigh the evidentiary value of that evidence without deference to the members.29 The findings reflect that the members found the testimony of Cpl Romeo and Cpl Bravo to be more credible than that of Appellant regarding the unlawfulness of the touches and whether Appellant was reasonably mistaken as to consent. Upon review of the record, subject to great deference to the members in that regard, we are not clearly convinced that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touches were unlawful and that Appellant did not have a reasonable mistake of fact as to consent. After weighing the evidence subject to appropriate deference to the fact that the members saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence, we are not clearly convinced that the findings of guilty were against the weight of the evidence. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient. 3. The Conviction for Extortion is Factually Sufficient. Appellant also raised factual sufficiency as to the extortion alleged in the Specification of Additional Charge II, and argued the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of intent. Specifically, he argued he did not intend to 28 Harvey, 85 M.J. at 132. 29 Id. at 130. 9  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court obtain an advantage when he threatened to report Cpl Kilo’s underage drinking to her command. He has made the threshold showings, and we will review that specification for factual sufficiency. Upon review of the record, we find the evidence factually sufficient. While it may not have been explicitly stated (“I will report you if you do not comply with your earlier agreement to send explicit photos or engage in a sexual relationship”), the timing and content of the text messages clearly illustrate Appellant communicated two such threats with the requisite intent. The first threat to report Cpl Kilo to her command occurred on 20 April 2024 immediately after and in response to Cpl Kilo indicating she wanted no further contact with Appellant and blocking his number. Her words and actions communicated she no longer intended to send him explicit photos or engage in a sexual relationship with him. At that point, when the threat was made with the requisite intent, the offense was complete.30 That threat resulted in a flurry of texts Cpl Kilo sent to Appellant begging him not to make the report. Appellant asked whether she was going to send the explicit photos they had earlier discussed and suggested they make a video together, to which Cpl Kilo acquiesced. She sent him explicit images and a video and invited him to her barracks room, implying she would make a sexually explicit video with him in an effort to placate him and keep him from carrying out his threat. Appellant did go to Cpl Kilo’s barracks, but they did not engage in any sexual activity. Later that evening, Appellant texted Cpl Kilo and requested “something a little more explicit.” Cpl Kilo responded she was tired and asked to send it later. The next morning, Cpl Kilo texted Appellant. She plainly stated she did not want to send any additional photos to him or “hook up,” in other words, engage in a sexual relationship, with him. The two did not communicate again until about a week later. On 27 April 2024, Appellant restarted the conversation and resent an explicit photo Cpl Kilo had previously texted to him. When Cpl Kilo asked him why he did that, he answered, “I want more.” After Cpl Kilo responded with her decision not to send photos or to “hook up,” and that that was her “FINAL decision,” Appellant made the second threat to report her to her command. Appellant testified his threats to report Cpl Kilo for underage drinking were to ensure she got help for what he perceived was an alcohol problem and not to obtain explicit photos or a sexual relationship. None of the text messages mentioned any alcohol issues or that he was concerned for her welfare, and we find this claim not credible. The members saw and heard the testimony of both Cpl Kilo and Appellant. They also had screenshots of the text messages between the two. The findings indicate the members found Appellant made the 30 MCM para 76.c.(1). 10  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court threats with the requisite intent. The evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant threatened Cpl Kilo on two occasions with the intent to obtain an advantage, specifically, explicit images and a sexual relationship. After weighing the evidence subject to appropriate deference to the fact that the members saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence, we are not clearly convinced that the findings of guilty were against the weight of the evidence. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient. C. Ambiguous Findings as to Assaults of Cpl Romeo and Cpl Bravo 1. Standard of Review. Whether a verdict is ambiguous, precluding our factual sufficiency review, is a question of law we review de novo.31 2. A Verdict Must Indicate the Conduct Forming the Basis of the Conviction. “A clear record as to the occasion for which an accused is found guilty is necessary when the words ‘on divers occasions’ are excepted from findings.”32 This Court cannot conduct a factual sufficiency review of a conviction if “the findings of guilty and not guilty do not disclose the conduct upon which each of them was based.”33 This is because, “When the phrase ‘on divers occasions’ is removed, the effect is that ‘the accused has been found guilty of misconduct on a single occasion and not guilty of the remaining occasions.’”34 Ambiguity about what conduct forms the basis of the conviction, combined with double jeopardy principles, precludes our review if the record is not clear.35 Controlling authority establishes that requiring clarification of the findings when “on divers occasions” is excepted only applies in situations in which the Government presents evidence that an accused committed an offense on more than one occasion.36 If the evidence only indicates an offense occurred one time, 31 United States v. Ross, 68 M.J. 415, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 32 Id. at 416. 33 United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391, 397 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 34 Ross, 68 M.J. at 417 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 67 M.J. 423, 428 (C.A.A.F.2009)). 35 Id. 36 See, e.g., United States v. Trew, 68 M.J. 364, 369 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (“The Government charged Trew with indecent acts on ‘divers occasions,’ introduced evidence of more than one occasion, and argued in both opening and closing statements that at least two incidents had occurred.”); Ross, 68 M.J. at 418 (evidence legally sufficient to prove appellant possessed child pornography on two hard drives); United States v. Wilson, 67 M.J. 423, 429 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (Government presented evidence of two incidents of rape); United States v. Augspurger, 61 M.J. 189, 190 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (Government presented evidence of three uses of controlled substance); United States v. Seider, 60 11  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Opinion of the Court a finding excepting the words “on divers occasions” is not ambiguous. 3. The Findings were Not Ambiguous. The Government did not offer evidence and thus did not prove assaults on Cpl Romeo and Cpl Bravo happened on more than one occasion. Cpl Romeo testified Appellant’s touching of his groin “was a one time thing,” and Cpl Bravo testified Appellant touched his buttocks with a broomstick only one time. The military judge instructed the members that if they had a reasonable doubt about whether the offenses occurred on more than one occasion, but were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred one time, they could except the words “on divers occasions”—but only if they agreed on which occasion occurred.37 Consistent with that instruction and the evidence, the guilty findings properly reflect the members’ findings that Appellant assaulted Cpl Romeo one time by touching his groin and assaulted Cpl Bravo one time by touching him on his buttocks with a broomstick. Since there is evidence of only one instance of each, there is no ambiguity in the verdicts. III. CONCLUSION After careful consideration of the record and the parties’ briefs, we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred.38 However, we note that the EOJ incorrectly lists the findings with respect to the Charge and the Additional Charge. Although we find no prejudice, Appellant is entitled to have court-martial records that correctly reflect the content of his proceeding.39 In accordance with R.C.M. 1111(c)(2), we therefore modify the EOJ and direct that it be included in the record. The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: MARK K. JAMISON Clerk of Court M.J. 36, 38 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (Government presented evidence of drug use on two occasions). 37 R. at 1023–24. 38 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ. 39 United States v. Crumpley, 49 M.J. 538, 539 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 12 UNITED STATES NMCCA NO. 202500174 v. ENTRY OF Sean A. MCNEAL JUDGMENT Sergeant (E-5) U.S. Marine Corps As Modified on Appeal Accused 30 October 2026 On 20 December 2024, the Accused was tried at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, by a special court-martial consisting of officer and enlisted members. Military Judge John Ferriter presided over the trial and completed the Entry of Judgment. FINDINGS The following are the Accused’s pleas and the Court’s findings to all offenses referred to trial: Charge I: Violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty. Specification 1: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 1 January 2022 and on or about 28 February 2023, at or near San Diego, CA, unlawfully touch Sergeant T.D.D., Jr. on the groin with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty. Specification 2: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 15 November 2022 and on or about 15 February 2023, at or near San Diego, CA, unlawfully touch Corporal J.T.R. on the groin with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty.  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Modified Entry of Judgment Finding: Guilty, except for the words “on divers occasions.” Of the excepted words, Not Guilty. Of the Specification as excepted, Guilty. Specification 3: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, between on or about 1 November 2022 and 14 June 2023, at or near San Diego, CA, unlawfully touch Sergeant C.J.N., Jr. by sitting on his knee with the said Sergeant’s buttocks. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty. Specification 4: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 1 January 2023 and on or about 31 March 2023, at or near San Diego, CA, unlawfully touch Sergeant J.A.P. by: - touching Sergeant J.A.P.’s buttocks with his hand; and - touching Sergeant J.A.P.’s groin with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty. Additional Charge: Violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty. Specification 1: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 1 August 2022 and on or about 31 October 2022, aboard USS GREENBAY, unlawfully touch Corporal D.J.L. on the buttocks with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty. Specification 2: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 14 June 2021 and on or about 14 June 2023, at or near San Diego, California, unlawfully touch Corporal Y.Z.D. by: i. touching Corporal Y.Z.D. on the buttocks with his hand; and 2  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Modified Entry of Judgment ii. touching Corporal Y.Z.D. on the groin with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty, except for the words “San Diego, California,” substituting therefor the words “Okinawa, Japan.” Of the excepted words, Not Guilty. Of the Specification as excepted and substituted, Guilty. Specification 3: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 1 September 2022 and on or about 30 November 2022, aboard USS GREENBAY, unlawfully touch Corporal S.D.R. by: i. touching Corporal S.D.R. on the buttocks with his hand; and ii. touching Corporal S.D.R. on the groin with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty. Specification 4: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 1 January 2023 and on or about 28 February 2023, at or near San Diego, California, unlawfully touch Corporal S.D.R. on the groin with his hand. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Not Guilty. Specification 5: (Assault Consummated by a Battery): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions, between on or about 1 January 2023 and on or about 14 June 2023, at or near San Diego, California, unlawfully touch Corporal D.R.B. by: i. touching Corporal D.R.B. on the buttocks with a broomstick handle; ii. touching Corporal D.R.B. on the ear with his tongue. iii. restraining Corporal D.R.B.’s arms with his arms; and iv. licking Corporal D.R.B.’s eye with his tongue. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty, except for the words “on divers occasions,” and “ii. touching Cpl D.R.B. on the ear with his tongue; iii. restraining Cpl D.R.B.’s arms with his arms; 3  United States v. McNeal, NMCCA No. 202500174 Modified Entry of Judgment and iv. licking Cpl D.R.B.’s eyes with his tongue.” Of the excepted words, Not Guilty. Of the Specification as excepted, Guilty. Additional Charge II: Violation of Article 127, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 927. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty. Specification: (Extortion): In that Sergeant Sean A. McNeal, did, on divers occasions between on or about 20 April 2024 and on or about 28 April 2024, communicate a threat to Lance Corporal S.K., to wit: reporting her underage drinking to her command, with intent to unlawfully obtain an advantage, to wit: i. explicit images of Lance Corporal S.K.; and ii. a sexual relationship with Lance Corporal S.K. Plea: Not Guilty. Finding: Guilty. SENTENCE On 20 December 2024, members sentenced the Accused to the following: Reduction to E-1; and A bad-conduct discharge. FOR THE COURT: MARK K. JAMISON Clerk of Court 4