Full Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 0851-25-1 RICARDO CARLOS PILOLA v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Malveaux and Causey Argued at Williamsburg, Virginia Opinion Issued November 17, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH Stephen C. Mahan, Judge Taite A. Westendorf (Westendorf & Khalaf, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant. Allison M. Mentch, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION BY CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER Ricardo Carlos Pilola appeals his conviction for sexual battery in violation of Code § 18.2-67.4. He argues that the trial court erred by refusing to strike certain jurors for cause. Pilola also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the touching was accomplished by force or intimidation. For the reasons explained below, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. BACKGROUND2 Pilola’s conviction is based on his criminal behavior toward his niece I.I.3 In October and November of 2021, I.I. and her immediate family lived in a three-bedroom apartment with Pilola, his wife, and their child. Pilola was married to the sister of I.I.’s mother. At the time, sixteen-year-old I.I. had a “close” relationship with Pilola, who was thirty. She considered him a confidant and talked to him about “everything,” especially when she “did[ not] really want to talk to [her] parents.” One evening, I.I. asked Pilola to talk because she and a boy had “ended up doing something.” After everyone else in the apartment was asleep, Pilola and I.I. went into the kitchen to have the discussion. Once in the kitchen, Pilola approached I.I. from behind and placed one hand on her hip and the other on her groin. He began rubbing his fingers on her vaginal area over her pants. While he did so, Pilola asked I.I. if she “knew what [she] liked.” He placed his hand inside I.I.’s pants and continued using his fingers to rub her vagina over her underwear. I.I. squirmed as Pilola touched her. Pilola removed his hand from inside her pants but continued rubbing her vagina from outside her clothing before stopping altogether. At first, I.I. told no one what had happened because she was scared and concerned about “how people would take it” since the family all lived together. A few weeks later, however, she told her pastor’s wife. The pastor’s wife told her husband, who then informed I.I.’s mother. 2 On appeal of the refusal to strike a juror for cause and the sufficiency of the evidence, “appellate court[s] must ‘review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party’” below. Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 304 Va. 92, 100 (2025) (quoting Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024)); see Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 664, 675 (2025). In doing so, appellate courts “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences” in the Commonwealth’s favor. Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018) (per curiam)); accord Rodriguez, 85 Va. App. at 675. 3 We refer to the victim by her initials to protect her privacy. -2- After learning what happened, I.I.’s parents immediately moved their family out of the apartment to live with their pastor. They also reported the incident to law enforcement, and Pilola was charged with misdemeanor sexual battery. During voir dire at the resulting jury trial, several prospective jurors answered affirmatively to questions aimed at identifying possible biases. When the panel members were asked if they or any family members had ever worked in law enforcement, Juror 1025 said that she worked as a deputy chief with the Department of Corrections. Juror 1085 stated that he previously worked as a police officer with the Chesapeake Police Department. The prospective jurors were also asked whether a family member or loved one ever had been the victim of a sexual assault, and Juror 1167 answered affirmatively. Colloquies with each of these individuals followed. Defense counsel made motions to strike these prospective jurors for cause, but the trial court denied the motions.4 In doing so, the court relied on the prospective jurors’ assertions that they could hear the case fairly and impartially. At trial, I.I. testified, describing Pilola’s actions toward her. She said that he did not necessarily use physical force to accomplish the unwanted touching but that she nonetheless felt “distanced” and could not move away from him. When asked about the specifics of Pilola’s touching of her hip, I.I. stated, “There was no force. . . . [I]t didn’t hurt or anything.” After the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief and again after the close of all the evidence, Pilola made a motion to strike, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of force, threat, or intimidation. Concluding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of both force and intimidation to allow the issue to go to the jury, the trial court denied the motions. 4 In total, the trial court struck six of the prospective jurors for cause. -3- The jury convicted Pilola of the charged offense. He made a motion to set aside the verdict on the same grounds stated in the motions to strike. After taking the motion under advisement, the trial court denied it. Pilola was sentenced to twelve months of incarceration with five months suspended. ANALYSIS Pilola challenges his conviction based on the trial court’s refusal to strike certain venire members for cause and its ruling that the evidence was sufficient to prove that he accomplished the offense using force, threat, or intimidation. We address these issues in turn. I. Refusal to Strike Specific Jurors for Cause Pilola contends that the trial court erred by refusing to strike Jurors 1025, 1085, and 1167 for cause. An abundance of law guides our analysis of these rulings. We begin with the bedrock principle that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be tried “by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; Va. Const. art. I, § 8. To safeguard this fundamental right, “persons accused of violating criminal laws must be provided with ‘an impartial jury drawn from [“]a panel . . . free from exceptions.[”]’” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 22 (2012) (quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300 (1976)); see Code § 8.01-358; Rule 3A:14. A juror who “does not stand indifferent in the cause” must be struck from the jury. Brown v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 746, 784 (2018) (quoting Code § 8.01-358). And if any “reasonable doubt as to a juror’s qualifications” exists, that issue “must be resolved in favor of the accused” and result in the exclusion of the juror. Northcraft v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 563, 587 (2023) (quoting Breeden, 217 Va. at 298). “These principles must be strictly applied” by the courts, so “a prospective juror [who] equivocates about whether he or she has formed a fixed opinion . . . should be stricken by the trial court.” Taylor, 61 Va. App. at 23. -4- For a juror’s opinion to disqualify that person, however, it must be one of such “fixed character [that it] repels the presumption of innocence in a criminal case” and leads that juror to believe “the accused stands condemned already.” Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 125, 141 (2019) (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976 (1980)). But if a juror can pass “the test of impartiality,” “lay aside . . . preconceived views[,] and render a verdict based solely on the law and evidence presented at trial,” that juror is not disqualified. Brown, 68 Va. App. at 784-85 (quoting Cressell v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 744, 761 (2000)). In light of these principles, a “trial court’s refusal to strike a juror for cause will not be disturbed on appeal unless that decision constitutes ‘manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion.’” Goodwin, 71 Va. App. at 136 (quoting Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 55, 61 (2011)). See generally Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 94 (2023) (explaining that the abuse-of-discretion standard is a “bell-shaped curve of reasonability” and “rests on the venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest is the judge best able to discern where the equities lie” (quoting Sauder v. Ferguson, 289 Va. 449, 459 (2015))). “A manifest error occurs when the record shows that a prospective juror cannot or will not lay aside his or her preconceived opinion” and a motion to strike that juror for cause is denied. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 448, 456 (2017). In conducting our analysis, we are keenly mindful that the trial court—not the appellate court—has the opportunity to “see[] and hear[]” each prospective juror respond to questions posed during voir dire. Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 256 (2010); accord Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 475 (1994). As the trial court listens to voir dire, it can observe the “tenor, tone, and general demeanor” of the juror, putting it “in a better position” to determine whether the juror is qualified to serve. Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 589 (quoting Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 475 (2007)). -5- As a result, a “trial court’s determination on the subject [of impartiality] is ‘entitled to great deference on appeal’ unless ‘plainly wrong or unsupported by the record.’” Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436, 454 (2023) (quoting Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 92, 121, 127 (2014)). And, significantly, the “question of juror impartiality is one of fact,” and in reviewing the trial court’s decision, we “consider the juror’s ‘entire voir dire, not just isolated portions.’” Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 588 (quoting Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 401 (2006)). Taking into account this legal framework, we consider the particular jurors at issue here. A. Jurors 1025 and 1085 – Employment During voir dire, Juror 1025 stated that she worked for the Department of Corrections, and Juror 1085 informed counsel that he was previously employed with the Chesapeake Police Department. Juror 1025 disclosed that she was actively employed as a deputy chief probation officer and worked there for twenty-five years. She explained that her unit “supervise[d] . . . sexually[ ]violent predators.” Juror 1085 told the court that he previously worked as a sexual assault detective for thirteen years. When asked by the trial court if that employment background “would interfere with [their] ability” to be “fair and impartial to both sides,” both Jurors 1025 and 1085 answered, “No, sir.” Defense counsel asked Juror 1025 if she thought she could “sit fair[ly] and impartially and judge this case without being influenced with [her] experience.” In response, Juror 1025 definitively said, “Yes, I do.” The trial court asked Juror 1085, “Is there anything about your prior employment . . . that you think would interfere in any way [with your ability] to decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in court and the law that is applicable to this case as I explain it to you?” Juror 1085 responded, “I don’t believe so[,] no.” When the court asked if -6- anyone would automatically give greater or lesser weight to the testimony of witnesses in law enforcement, neither juror responded affirmatively. The responses to questions that Jurors 1025 and 1085 gave during voir dire simply did not reflect any bias. At no point did either juror equivocate or express an inability to be impartial. The trial court was in the best position to assess the prospective jurors. Based on the record, this Court cannot and will not second-guess the trial court’s findings that Jurors 1025 and 1085 would be fair and impartial. See Taylor, 67 Va. App. at 455-56. To the extent that Pilola asks this Court to rule that Jurors 1025 and 1085 should have been disqualified as a matter of law due to their professions, which “placed them in prolonged, direct contact with the very type[] of offense[] at issue in this case,” there is no per se disqualification to apply based on their professional backgrounds. “The rationale of a per se disqualification is that the prospective juror’s status alone renders that juror incapable of being fair and impartial.” Bay v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 532 (2012) (listing categories of per se disqualification). Virginia “‘disfavor[s]’” rules that automatically disqualify prospective jurors “based on ‘a presumption of . . . bias or prejudice.’” Id. at 531 (quoting McGann v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 448, 454 (1992)). Relevant here, the Virginia Supreme Court has held “[a] person is not automatically excluded from a jury because of an association with law enforcement personnel, provided he [or she] demonstrates that he [or she] can be impartial.” Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 338 (1987) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to strike for cause a venire member who was a former police officer); see Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 492 (1991) (holding that a former probation and parole officer was not automatically disqualified from serving as a juror). Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, this Court has also rejected a per-se-disqualification rule “that a person affiliated with women and gender studies in a university setting can never -7- fairly sit as a juror in a sexual assault case in which the defendant is a male.” Vay v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 262 (2017). Similarly, this Court declined to establish a per se rule disqualifying a correctional officer as a jury member in a trial for the crime of assaulting a correctional officer. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 616, 619 (1996) (en banc). Here, too, consistent with Virginia precedent, we do not adopt a per se rule excluding Jurors 1025 and 1085 from service in a sexual offense case based on their employment as a probation officer supervising sexually violent predators or as a prior sexual assault detective. Finally, Pilola suggests that the trial court erred “by failing to meaningfully probe the jurors’ specialized experience.” But the onus is not on the trial court to ask “prob[ing]” questions of the venire panel. See Lovos-Rivas, 58 Va. App. at 65 (“Because defense counsel did not ask any further questions of the venire as a whole or seek to question the prospective jurors individually, we cannot determine whether any of these prospective jurors indicated a ‘casual impression’ or held a[n] . . . ‘abiding conviction.’” (first emphasis added) (quoting Hopson v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 144, 152 (2008))). Indeed, a trial court must be careful to avoid asking suggestive questions or questions for the purpose of rehabilitation. See, e.g., Burton v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 408, 426 (2025); Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 45-46 (2020). The record simply does not establish manifest error reflecting an abuse of discretion by the trial court with regard to its decisions to not strike Jurors 1025 and 1085 for cause based on their employment. For these reasons, we uphold the court’s rulings. B. Juror 1167 – Relation to a Victim of a Crime Defense counsel asked the venire panel if anyone “kn[ew] someone, whether it be . . . a family member or close[ ]loved one, to be the victim of a sexual assault.” Juror 1167 responded affirmatively. When asked whether that fact could “influence how [she] would view this trial,” -8- Juror 1167 said, “I would say yes.” She clarified, “Only because the victim never pressed charge[s].” When counsel followed up, Juror 1167 confirmed that she said she believed that experience “would impact [her] ability to remain fair and impartial.” She also explained that she thought “it would ultimately . . . have some sort of . . . impact on [her] decision.” But then the voir dire continued. The prosecutor explained that jurors are permitted to draw on their life experiences and then elaborated, “[T]he question is[ w]hether or not [that] experience would make you unable to . . . be fair to both sides in this case.” After receiving this explanation and a rephrasing of the question, Juror 1167 stated, “I think I can be fair ultimately.” She also agreed that she believed that she “could listen to the evidence and the law to be applied in th[e] case and . . . fairly and impartially evaluate that for both the [d]efense and the prosecution.” Juror 1167 explained further that she answered yes to the question at first “only because . . . all o[f people’s] experiences . . . . shape [their] decision[-]making, so [she] was just being honest.” Defense counsel asked her whether she could “definitively say, yes, that [she could] remain fair and impartial and put aside any personal experience.” Juror 1167 answered, “Yes.” Here, the trial court found that Juror 1167 could be impartial. That factual finding is entitled to deference on appeal unless plainly wrong. See Huguely, 63 Va. App. at 127. The trial court, as the finder of fact on issues of juror impartiality, was responsible for “determin[ing] what significance to give” Juror 1167’s statements. See Harvey, 76 Va. App. at 455. Although she initially expressed her belief that her loved one’s experience as a victim of a sexual assault would impact her ability to serve as an unbiased juror, Juror 1167 later expressed her belief that she could put aside that experience. She conveyed that she could fairly and impartially evaluate the law and the evidence as well as “be fair ultimately.” Juror 1167’s combined responses indicate that she did not hold a fixed bias based on the experience of her loved one. The trial -9- court’s finding of impartiality is entirely supported by the record. See Webb v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 220, 221, 223 (1990) (in a rape case, affirming the denial of a motion to strike for cause a juror who had been raped). Pilola argues that Juror 1167’s answer to a yes or no question did not sufficiently demonstrate that she could serve impartially and without bias on the jury. “[P]roof of a prospective juror’s impartiality ‘should come from h[er] and not be based on h[er] mere assent to persuasive suggestions.’” Scott v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 265, 273 (2011) (quoting McGill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 237, 242 (1990)). And “[r]ehabilitation of a juror who has demonstrated bias requires more than just an assertion by the juror that [s]he can be impartial.” Pereira v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. App. 431, 452 (2025) (quoting Scott, 58 Va. App. at 272 (emphasis added)). “‘Proper rehabilitation’ requires first ‘instructing the potential juror on the correct principle of the law[.’ T]hen, ‘[o]nce the potential juror acknowledges that [s]he can apply this principle of law, the juror must then be allowed to reconcile it with h[er] previous views.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Scott, 58 Va. App. 272-73). Here, after initially expressing possible bias, Juror 1167 did more than simply assert that she could be impartial or merely assent to a leading question. After the prosecutor explained that jurors were allowed to draw on their life experiences as long as they could remain fair to both sides, Juror 1167 clarified her response “in her own words.” See Northcraft, 78 Va. App. at 591. She explained that, at first, she answered yes to the question based on her general belief that “all our experiences are going to shape our decision[-]making.” When asked again, though, she agreed that she could “remain fair and impartial and put aside any personal experience.” Jurors “cannot be expected invariably to express themselves carefully or even consistently.” Garcia v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 262, 270 (2012) (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 (1984)). The trial court implicitly ruled that Juror 1167 did not hold an - 10 - opinion of such “fixed character” that it stood in opposition to the principle that Pilola was presumed innocent. See Goodwin, 71 Va. App. at 141 (quoting Justus, 220 Va. at 976). A reasonable jurist could conclude based on Juror 1167’s statements that, although she had been affected by her loved one’s experience, she would remain impartial and decide the case on the evidence presented. Consequently, the court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to strike Juror 1167 for cause was not error. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Pilola argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for sexual battery. In “review[ing] the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction,” appellate courts have a limited role. Commonwealth v. Mahoney, ___ Va. ___, ___ (June 11, 2026). This role is “determining ‘whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Cuffee v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Apr. 16, 2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024)). Accordingly, an appellate court should start with the presumption that “[t]he judgment of the trial court is . . . correct and will not be disturbed [on appeal] unless . . . ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Mahoney, ___ Va. at ___ (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294, Va. 502, 512 (2017)). On appellate review, we consider the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to . . . the prevailing party in the trial court,” which in this case was the Commonwealth. Barney, 302 Va. at 96 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). And we “may neither find facts nor draw inferences that favor the losing party that the factfinder did not.” Commonwealth v. Richerson, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Apr. 23, 2026) (quoting Garrick, 303 Va. at 182). Under this standard of review, the appellate court “‘discard[s] the evidence of the accused in conflict with - 11 - that of the Commonwealth[] and regard[s] as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn’ from” that evidence. Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380 (2002) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)). “[T]hese principles [are applied] to a jury’s verdict,” and “a factfinder must base its decision on evidence presented rather than mere surmise or conjecture.” Cuffee, ___ Va. at ___ (quoting Wynnycky v. Kozel, 71 Va. App. 177, 203 (2019)). But “factfinders, whether jurors or trial judges, do not abandon their common sense or experience in performing their [factfinding] function.” Id. at ___ (alteration in original) (quoting Wynnycky, 71 Va. App. at 203). Pilola was convicted by a jury of sexual battery under Code § 18.2-67.4. At trial, the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pilola “sexually abuse[d] . . . the complaining witness against [her] will . . . by force, threat, intimidation, or ruse.” Code § 18.2-67.4(A)(i). Pilola’s contention on appeal is that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he used force or intimidation to accomplish the “touching.”5 “Whether the act was accomplished by ‘force, threat, or intimidation’ is ordinarily a question for the fact[]finder.” Wactor, 38 Va. App. at 380. Intimidation is “putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such domination and control of her as to overcome her mind and overbear her will.” Bondi v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 79, 90 (2019) (quoting Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 663 (1985)). It “may be caused by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.” Id. (quoting Sutton, 228 Va. at 663); see Clark v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1163, 1165-66 (1991). In addition, “[i]ntimidation may occur 5 Pilola does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence on the other elements needed to prove a sexual battery. - 12 - without threats.” Bondi, 70 Va. App. at 90 (quoting Sutton, 228 Va. at 663). Further, “[t]he ‘fear of bodily harm’ need not be separate and apart from the fear of the possibility of bodily injury inherent in the sexual assault itself.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bower, 264 Va. 41, 45-46 (2002)). As it relates to intimidation, another important aspect of the analysis requires determining that the “fear of bodily harm . . . come[s] from the actions of the defendant, not from the victim’s ‘temperamental timidity.’” Bower, 264 Va. at 46. Factors that are not indicative of the victim’s “temperamental timidity” and are therefore appropriate for consideration include “the victim’s age, the relative size of the defendant and victim, the familial relationship between the defendant and victim, and the vulnerable position of the victim.” Id. In this case, the jury received an accurate definition of intimidation from the trial court.6 And a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Pilola used intimidation to commit sexual battery against I.I. Several circumstances supported a finding that he exercised psychological pressure over her sufficient to constitute intimidation. I.I. was only sixteen, young in comparison to thirty-year-old Pilola. See Bower, 264 Va. at 46 (listing the victim’s age as a factor). Pilola was I.I.’s uncle. They had a close family relationship, and I.I. considered Pilola a confidant—to such a degree that I.I. would consult him in lieu of her parents on certain matters. See Bondi, 70 Va. App. at 91 (finding relevant that even though the victim was not related to the appellant, she considered him a “mentor and father figure”). Finally, the family’s living situation further complicated the dynamic between Pilola and I.I., since I.I., her parents, and her brothers lived in an apartment with Pilola, his wife, and their child. 6 The jury was instructed that “[i]ntimidation means putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such domination and control of her as to overcome her mind and overbear her will” and “may be caused by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who, under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.” - 13 - I.I.’s reaction during the sexual assault also supports the jury’s verdict. According to her testimony, when Pilola put his hand on her groin and rubbed her vagina, she felt “distanced” and could not bring herself to physically move away. When asked whether she could “freely . . . move,” I.I. responded, “I’m pretty sure I could have. I just . . . couldn’t.” See Bondi, 70 Va. App. at 91 (describing the victim as “completely frozen and in shock” during the attack and considering this as a factor supporting a finding that the appellant accomplished the sexual offense through intimidation). In light of her testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that I.I.’s inability to move stemmed from psychological pressure exerted over her. Based on all of these factors, it was entirely reasonable for the jury to find “that [Pilola] exercised emotional dominance over [I.I.] through his actions” and that I.I. “was susceptible to psychological pressure as a result of her relationship with [Pilola].” 7 See id. The facts of this case support the conclusion that Pilola accomplished the sexual abuse through intimidation.8 7 Pilola’s reliance on Clark, 12 Va. App. at 1166, is unavailing. In that case, the Court held “that the defendant’s role as a teacher supervising the victim who was his student [wa]s not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute intimidation used to sexually abuse her.” Id. at 1164. In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted the lack of evidence outside of the nature of their relationship establishing that the defendant “served to dominate or control her so as to ‘overcome her mind and overbear her will.’” Id. at 1166. Here, as detailed in the analysis, evidence in addition to the family relationship between Pilola and I.I. supported a finding of intimidation. 8 In light of this conclusion, we do not address whether the evidence also supported a finding that Pilola used force. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 31, 34 (2006) (noting that “both actual and constructive force” can satisfy the force element in sexual offenses). See generally Fergeson v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Apr. 23, 2026) (order) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases on the best and narrowest grounds available.” (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017))). - 14 - CONCLUSION The trial court did not err by refusing to strike Jurors 1025, 1085, or 1167 for cause. Additionally, the evidence was sufficient to prove sexual battery in violation of Code § 18.2-67.4. Consequently, we affirm the conviction. Affirmed. - 15 - Causey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s analysis in Part II and join it in full. However, I disagree as to Part I. Ricardo Pilola was not granted a panel of jurors free from bias9 before exercising all his peremptory strikes. The right to a fair and impartial jury is among the most sacred constitutional guarantees in our criminal legal system.10 Because I believe that right has not been adequately protected here, I respectfully dissent. The majority’s analysis reverses the convention that any reasonable doubt about a prospective juror’s impartiality must be resolved in the accused’s favor. See Burton v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 408, 424 (2025); Castillo v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 394, 423 (2019). This resolution stems from the principle that “nothing should be left to inference or doubt.” Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 125, 135 (2019); see also Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298 (1976) (noting veniremen “must ‘stand indifferent in the cause’”). Here, Ricardo Pilola was charged with sexual battery of his 16-year-old niece. Because Jurors 1025 and 1085 were specialized professionals with expertise in policing, supervising, and treating individuals involved in sexual violence cases, and Juror 1167 equivocated as to whether she could decide the case impartially, Pilola was denied a cross-sectional jury of his peers. See DeLeon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 409, 412 (2002) (A criminal defendant “is entitled to a 9 Throughout this dissent, “bias” and “prejudice” refer to the longstanding definitions used by legal scholars and social scientists. See Jim M. Perdue, A Practical Approach to Jury Bias, 54 Tex. B.J. 936, 936 (1991) (defining “[b]ias” as “an inclination toward ‘one side of an issue rather than the other one’” and “[p]rejudice” as a “‘preconceived judgment or opinion,’” and noting that the term prejudice “‘embraces’” the term bias (first quoting State v. Burke, 434 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); and then quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1788 (1976))). 10 Justice Thurgood Marshall described discrimination in jury selection as “perhaps the greatest embarrassment in the administration of our criminal justice system.” Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). - 16 - panel of jurors free from exceptions before exercising peremptory challenges.” (emphasis added) (quoting Breeden, 217 Va. at 298)); Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329 (2005) (“It is prejudicial error for the trial court to force a defendant to use peremptory strikes to exclude a venireman from the jury panel if that person is not free from exception.”); Harvey v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 403, 417 (2019) (“The core of due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal.”).11 I. Jurors 1025 and 1085 During voir dire, Juror 1025 advised that she had been actively employed as a deputy chief probation officer with the Virginia Department of Corrections, in charge of a unit supervising sexually violent predators for the past 25 years. Juror 1085 advised that he had been a sexual assault detective with the Chesapeake Police Department for 13 years. The trial court asked only one question to both prospective jurors: if their prior employment would interfere with their ability to be fair and impartial. Both responded negatively.12 Virginia courts have recognized that an individual’s career in law enforcement career, on its own, is not sufficient to disqualify a prospective juror from service. See, e.g., Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 338-39 (1987) (holding that a juror’s former career as a police officer was not enough to disqualify him); Holloman v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 147, 164-66 (2015) (holding that the trial court did not err in declining to strike a retired police 11 This rule is widely adopted. See, e.g., Grant v. State, 287 S.E.2d 681, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (“If the defendant in a felony trial has to exhaust his peremptory strikes to excuse a juror who should have been excused for cause, the error is harmful.”); Commonwealth v. McBee, 405 A.2d 1297, 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (“Because appellant was thereby forced to use one of his peremptory challenges to excuse [biased juror] and exhausted all of such challenges prior to the seating of the jury, the lower court’s error was not harmless.”); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981) (“This Court has consistently ruled that the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus to compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror was prejudicial.”). 12 Defense counsel also asked if they could be impartial; both again said they could. - 17 - detective). However, no Virginia appellate court has ever decided a case where the law enforcement officer in question had specialized, expert knowledge in the field specific to the hyper-sensitive crime of sexual assault. For a combined thirty-eight years, Jurors 1025 and 1085 investigated, assisted in the prosecution, and monitored, assessed and managed risk, and facilitated the rehabilitation of those charged and convicted of sex offenses. Juror 1025 was a deputy chief, having risen in the ranks during her 25-year employment. These jurors’ extensive professional training and experiences placed them in prolonged, direct contact with the very types of offenses at issue in this case.13 “[I]t is not only important that justice should be impartially administered, but it should also flow through channels as free from suspicion as possible.” Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976 (1980) (emphasis added). While appellate courts rightfully refrain from bright-line rules disqualifying individuals based on professional experience, the record here reflects specialized work on sexual offenses creating an appearance of impartiality. Their very presence in the jury pool risked the public’s confidence in the judicial system.14 See Brooks v. 13 As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the requirement that a jury’s verdict be based solely upon the evidence from trial “goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.” Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965). “Expert jurors—that is, jurors with relevant personal expertise—pose a distinct risk of introducing extraneous information given the wealth of knowledge they already possess that other jurors would be prohibited from seeking out.” Kristin A. Liska, Experts in the Jury Room: When Personal Experience Is Extraneous Information, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 911, 913 (2017). “Extraneous information that comes before the jury has not passed through the processes of trial that serve to protect litigants: rules of evidence intended to weed out misleading or confusing information, procedural rules that protect privileged information, and rules governing expert witnesses that ensure faulty science is not considered.” Id. at 921. “Moreover, a party is not given the chance to respond to any information first presented in the jury room.” Id. All of these imperative Sixth Amendment requirements are jeopardized when experts come into the jury room. 14 A juror ordinarily brings some life experience into the jury room. That is inevitable. But there is a critical distinction between day-to-day life experiences and specialized professional knowledge concerning the very subject of the prosecution. Jurors 1025 and 1085 had professional experience involving sexual violence and sexual offenders. Their professional - 18 - Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 454, 462 (2003) (“[T]he question of public confidence is inherent in the jury selection process and is necessarily implicated when a juror’s retention is purportedly improper.”). Neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth followed up once the jurors revealed that their experience was specifically in the investigation and supervision of sexual offenders. The only question asked was a single, generalized inquiry about whether their professional backgrounds would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. Both jurors responded with the predictable assurance, “I can be fair.” But rote assurances of fairness cannot cure clear indicia of bias. See Burton, 85 Va. App. at 422-24 (“[W]hen asked by the court, a suggestive question produces an even more unreliable response” because a juror naturally wishes to “‘say the right thing’” (quoting Bradbury v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 176, 181 (2003))). Sexual assault cases present challenges in securing an unbiased venire.15 Placing veteran sexual assault inv