State v. Clements
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-228
JudgeJudge Julee Flood
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA26-228
Filed 18 November 2026
Onslow County, No. 24CR225994-660
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CHRISTOPHER MARK CLEMENTS, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 February 2025 by Judge Henry
L. Stevens IV in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14
October 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Yvonne B.
Walker, for the State.
Emehel Law PLLC, by Johneric C. Emehel, for defendant-appellant.
FLOOD, Judge.
Defendant Christopher Mark Clements appeals his conviction for assault by
strangulation. On appeal, Defendant argues, first, the trial court erroneously
admitted video evidence of the alleged strangulation insufficient to satisfy Rule 901
of our Rules of Evidence; second, the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a
prior violent incident toward the alleged victim in violation of Rule 404(b) of our Rules
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Opinion of the Court
of Evidence, and the same should have been excluded under Rule 403; and third, the
alleged errors, taken together, require a new trial on the basis of cumulative error.
As the trial court properly authenticated the video evidence Defendant challenges
under Rule 901, it did not err in admitting that evidence. Moreover, Defendant has
preserved neither his Rule 404(b) argument nor his Rule 403 argument, and he has
not requested our review for plain error; thus, we dismiss his appeal in those respects.
Finally, as Defendant has not shown prejudicial error in the admission of any of the
challenged evidence, his cumulative error argument likewise fails.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case arises from a domestic incident on 2 February 2024 involving
Defendant and his then-romantic-partner, Rebekah Barrow. Defendant was indicted
on 2 July 2024, and his trial started on 4 February 2025.
The evidence at trial tended to show that Defendant, Barrow, and another man
named Ryan McNeil were living in Richlands, North Carolina. By Barrow’s account,
she and Defendant would argue frequently about her lack of employment at the time,
and Defendant would belittle her. She testified that, on one occasion in July of 2023,
“there was an instance [when she and Defendant were] arguing to where it became
physical and [she] had gotten thrown [] against the wall and thrown around[,]” but
she did not report the incident to anyone. Defendant did not object to the testimony
regarding the 2023 incident.
Barrow further testified that, on the date of the incident giving rise to the
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Opinion of the Court
proceedings against Defendant, Defendant was playing a video game in the same
room as Barrow when Defendant began arguing with her about household finances
and her lack of employment. McNeil attempted to deescalate the situation, and he
and Defendant left the room for thirty to sixty minutes; however, when Defendant
returned to the room, he was intoxicated and began teasing Barrow. Barrow
attempted to make Defendant stop, both verbally and by “mush[ing] him off of [her,]”
and she tried to walk away; however, Defendant followed her, put his arms around
her, and “proceed[ed] to choke [her] in the kitchen.” McNeil then removed Defendant
from Barrow, directed Barrow outside to his truck, and attempted to leave the home
with her. Defendant responded to their withdrawal by throwing a car battery charger
through the truck’s passenger-side window. Barrow then exited the vehicle, at which
point Defendant chased her down and began choking her again. McNeil once again
removed Defendant from Barrow, and Barrow ran to a neighbor’s house, where she
was allowed in for shelter.
In addition to Barrow’s testimony, the State’s evidence consisted, in relevant
part, of photographs of McNeil’s truck with a broken window and the car battery
charger that Defendant had thrown to shatter it, a brief cell phone video of the second
instance of Defendant choking Barrow taken by Defendant’s neighbor, Ring camera
footage from the same neighbor depicting Defendant chasing Barrow down the street
and hurling profanities, testimony from the neighbor responsible for the recordings
recounting that he had witnessed Defendant choking Barrow as he took the cell phone
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Opinion of the Court
video, and law enforcement testimony indicating that Barrow was distraught and had
red marks on her neck when the police arrived. At the time the Ring camera footage
was admitted, only Barrow had testified, and, after she indicated that she had
reviewed the videos and that they were fair and accurate depictions of her flight from
Defendant outside the home, Defendant objected. The trial court overruled the
objection and played the Ring camera footage for the jury.
Ultimately, the jury found Defendant guilty of assault inflicting injury by
strangulation, and he timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal from a final judgment
of a superior court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2025).
III. Analysis
On appeal, Defendant argues (A) the trial court erroneously admitted video
evidence of the alleged strangulation insufficient to satisfy Rule 901 of our Rules of
Evidence; (B) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior violent incident
toward the alleged victim in violation of Rule 404(b) of our Rules of Evidence and that
the same should have been excluded under Rule 403; and (C) the alleged errors, taken
together, require a new trial on the basis of cumulative error. We address each in
turn.
A. Rule 901
First, Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting, over his objection,
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Opinion of the Court
the Ring camera evidence he contends was improperly authenticated. “[T]he
appropriate standard of review for authentication of evidence is de novo.” State v.
Clemons, 274 N.C. App. 401, 409 (2020).
Under Rule 901 of our Rules of Evidence, “[t]he requirement of authentication
or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2025). Rule 901(b) of our Rules of Evidence
provides, in relevant part, for authentication of evidence by the following means:
By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this
rule:
(1) Testimony of Witness with Knowledge.--Testimony that
a matter is what it is claimed to be.
....
(9) Process or System.--Evidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result.
N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(1), (9) (2025). With respect to the authentication of video
evidence, we have said that
[t]he prerequisite that the offeror lay a proper foundation
for [a] videotape can be met by: (1) testimony that the
motion picture or videotape fairly and accurately
illustrates the events filmed, (illustrative purposes); (2)
proper testimony concerning the checking and operation of
the video camera and the chain of evidence concerning the
videotape; (3) testimony that the photographs introduced
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Opinion of the Court
at trial were the same as those [the witness] had inspected
immediately after processing (substantive purposes); or (4)
testimony that the videotape had not been edited, and that
the picture fairly and accurately recorded the actual
appearance of the area photographed.
State v. Mason, 144 N.C. App. 20, 25 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendant contends that, in this case, the State was required—and failed—to
authenticate the Ring camera evidence under Rule 901(b)(9), which permits
authentication by “[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-
1, Rule 901(b)(9) (2025). For this proposition, Defendant cites the following excerpt
from our Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Snead:
Rule 901(a) requires that evidence be authenticated by
showing that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims. Rule 901(b) lists ten examples of authentication
that meet the requirements of subsection (a). Recordings
such as a tape from an automatic surveillance camera can
be authenticated as the accurate product of an automated
process under Rule 901(b)(9). Evidence that the recording
process is reliable and that the video introduced at trial is
the same video that was produced by the recording process
is sufficient to authenticate the video and lay a proper
foundation for its admission as substantive evidence.
State v. Snead, 368 N.C. 811, 814 (2016) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). According to Defendant, this passage from Snead sets out the exclusive
standard by which video evidence may be authenticated. Specifically, he argues the
Snead standard operates to the exclusion of authentication under Rule 901(b)(1),
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Opinion of the Court
which permits authentication by testimony from a witness with knowledge that the
evidence in question “is what it is claimed to be.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(1)
(2025).
We think this is a misreading of Snead. First, and most saliently, Snead, by its
own terms, spoke to a sufficient means of authenticating evidence, not a necessary
one. Snead, 368 N.C. at 814 (“Evidence that the recording process is reliable and that
the video introduced at trial is the same video that was produced by the recording
process is sufficient to authenticate the video and lay a proper foundation for its
admission as substantive evidence.” (emphasis added)). Snead, therefore, purported
to neither invalidate other recognized means of authenticating video evidence nor
create an indispensable requirement for authentication.
Second, Snead contained a recognition that authentication by a witness with
knowledge was not at issue pursuant to Rule 901(b)(1), either at trial or on appeal.
Id. at 812–13 (“[D]efense counsel argued that[,] because [the authenticating witness]
was not at Belk on the date of the theft, he could not properly testify that the video
captured fairly and accurately what occurred on that date.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Many of our cases have contained similar acknowledgements. See State v.
Mason, 144 N.C. App. 20, 27 (2001) (remarking as to the absence of “testimony from
any witness that the tapes made on days immediately preceding and following the
robbery had been examined”); State v. Sibley, 140 N.C. App. 584, 586 (2000) (“The
State did not call any witnesses to testify that the camera was operating properly or
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that the information depicted on the videotape was an accurate representation of the
events at the time of filming.” (emphasis added)). The clear implication of these
remarks in our appellate courts’ analyses is that testimony by a witness with
knowledge remains a viable avenue for the authentication of video evidence.
Here, the trial court properly authenticated the Ring camera evidence through
Barrow’s testimony that the video fairly depicted what happened on 2 February 2024.
The trial court, therefore, did not err under Rule 901.
B. Rule 404(b)
Defendant next argues the trial court erred under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 by
allowing Barrow to testify as to Defendant’s episode of physical violence toward her
in 2023. He also argues the trial court offered an inadequate instruction limiting the
jury’s consideration of that prior act during the jury charge. According to Defendant,
all of these arguments were preserved on the basis that he made a single objection to
the contents of the limiting instruction during the charge conference. In attempting
to represent this single, nonspecific objection as adequate to preserve all three of
these arguments on appeal, he has relinquished even the limited review to which he
might have otherwise been entitled.
Under our Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[i]n order to preserve an issue for
appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the
court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.” N.C. R.
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App. P. 10(a)(1) (2025). Failure to observe the requisite timeliness and specificity
requirements will result in the dismissal of inadequately preserved issues on appeal;
moreover, our Supreme Court has cautioned that an objection or motion “is not
sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence if the
defendant does not object to that evidence at the time it is offered at trial.” State v.
Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 76 (2000) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). And, while a
defendant may allege on appeal that the admission of evidence of his prior bad acts
was erroneous under a plain error standard, he is entitled to such review only if he
“specifically and distinctly” alleges that the admission amounted to plain error. State
v. Dennison, 359 N.C. 312, 312–13 (2005).
Here, Defendant did not timely object to the evidence of the 2023 incident.
Although he objected during the charge conference, his objection to the proposed jury
instruction did not communicate—explicitly or contextually—that the basis for the
objection was the failure to correct a purported impropriety in the fact that the prior
bad act testimony was admitted. Indeed, it is unclear that Defendant’s instructional
argument on appeal actually embraces a defect in the instruction, as he challenges it
exclusively on bases that relate back to the initial admission of the evidence. Cf. State
v. Norris, 287 N.C. App. 302, 313 (2022) (“[The d]efendant did not seek our review for
plain error, and we will not entertain an improperly appealed instructional error
argument simply because it arrived within the Trojan horse of a fatal variance
heading in [the d]efendant’s brief.”). Moreover, Defendant has not acknowledged his
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failure to preserve these issues for appeal, let alone “specifically and distinctly”
sought our review for plain error. Dennison, 359 N.C. at 312–13.
Consequently, none of the issues Defendant raises pertaining to prior bad act
evidence are properly before us, and we dismiss his appeal with respect to those
issues.
C. Cumulative Error
Finally, Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors
requires reversal. “Cumulative errors lead to reversal when[,] ‘taken as a whole[,]’
they ‘deprived [the] defendant of his due process right to a fair trial free from
prejudicial error.’” State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 426 (2009) (quoting State v.
Canaday, 355 N.C. 242, 254 (2002)). “[C]umulative error requires there be multiple
significant errors before an appellate court can conclude that a defendant has met
the high bar of demonstrating that he has been wholly deprived of his due process
right to a fair trial free from prejudicial error.” State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797, 852
(2024) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, for the reasons explained above, Defendant has not identified any
instance of prejudicial error at his trial. Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, the
trial court had erred in the respects he identified, the alleged errors—the failure to
adequately authenticate a video with contents corroborated robustly across the
remainder of the State’s evidence and the admission of a brief reference to an episode
of domestic violence in 2023 to which Defendant did not object—would not constitute
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“multiple significant errors” such that reversal on cumulative error grounds would be
appropriate. Id. As such, Defendant’s argument lacks merit.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant has not shown error in the admission of the Ring camera videos he
contests under Rule 901, and he has failed to preserve his challenge to the admission
of prior bad act testimony altogether. As a result, Defendant also has not established
that reversal is required on the basis of cumulative error.
NO ERROR IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
Judges STROUD and GRIFFIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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