State v. Barrino
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1094
JudgeJudge April Wood
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1094
Filed 18 November 2026
Cabarrus County, Nos. 22CR363845-120, 23CR000478-120, 23CR000479-120
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
LAMONT ALEXANDER BARRINO
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 9 December 2024 by Judge
Michael D. Duncan in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 25 August 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R.
Green, Jr., for the State.
Blau & Hynson, PLLC, by Daniel M. Blau, for the Defendant.
WOOD, Judge.
Lamont Alexander Barrino (“Defendant”) appeals judgments entered 9
December 2024 upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of three counts of possession of
a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to make a motion to suppress
evidence obtained by an allegedly deficient search warrant; (2) the trial court erred
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
by denying his motions to dismiss and subsequently entering judgment on all three
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon; (3) the trial court erred by giving
ambiguous jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict based on theories not
charged or supported by the evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to
intervene ex mero motu during the State’s closing argument. After a careful review
of the record and applicable law, we conclude Defendant received a fair trial free from
prejudicial error.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 29 September 2022 and 22 November 2022, Defendant participated in video
calls with an inmate at the Alamance County Detention Center. The video call
system, HomeWAV, requires participants to provide their name and a profile picture
when signing up for an account. These video calls are monitored and recorded; and
if violations are observed, the videos are flagged. On 29 September 2022 and 22
November 2022, Defendant was a registered participant in video calls that were
flagged for violations. These video call recordings showed Defendant, who was on
supervised probation, in possession of what appeared to be firearms during the calls.
Officer Jason Bensavage (“Officer Bensavage”) with the North Carolina
Department of Adult Corrections viewed the video calls, noted the appearance and
discussion of firearms, and contacted Defendant’s probation officer, Jaxon Hale
(“Officer Hale”). After speaking with Officer Bensavage and reviewing screenshots
from the video calls, Officer Hale initiated a warrantless search of Defendant’s home
-2-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
on 14 December 2022; warrantless searches were a condition of Defendant’s
probation. Officer Bensavage also participated in the warrantless search of
Defendant’s home. Officers located an AR-15 under a dresser in Defendant’s
daughter’s bedroom and a safe in Defendant’s bedroom closet. The safe had a small
hole through which they could see it contained firearms.
That same day, based on the information obtained from the warrantless search
and video call recordings, Detective Paul Rodriguez (“Detective Rodriguez”) of the
Cabarrus County Sheriff’s Office obtained and subsequently executed a search
warrant on Defendant’s home. During the search, Defendant’s fiancée, Destini
Kemrey (“Kemrey”), gave officers the passcode to the safe located in the bedroom
closet; the passcode was Defendant’s birthday. Ultimately, an AR-15, two black Glock
handguns, a tan Polymer handgun, ammunition, and a P80 micro conversion kit were
seized pursuant to the search warrant.
Defendant was arrested after the search and subsequently indicted on three
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon arising from the alleged possessions of
firearms on 29 September 2022, 22 November 2022, and 14 December 2022.1 Each
indictment identified a different firearm Defendant was accused of possessing.
1 The original indictment on the charge ending in *478 listed the offense date of 22
November 2022; the trial court allowed the State to amend this offense date to 14 December 2022
just prior to the start of trial without objection from the defense and the amendment is not contested
on appeal. For simplicity, we will refer to this charge as being indicted with the offense date of 14
December 2022.
-3-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
Indictment *845 identified an “AR-15 style pistol” possessed on 29 September 2022;
indictment *478 identified a “Glock 43 9mm pistol” possessed on 14 December 2022;
and indictment *479 identified a “Polymer 80 9mm pistol” possessed on 22 November
2022.
Defendant’s trial commenced in Cabarrus County Superior Court on 2
December 2024. Officer Shaunnise Brinege (“Officer Brinege”) of the Alamance
County Sheriff’s Office testified first for the State regarding her role in monitoring
activity inside of the Alamance County Detention Center including the HomeWAV
video calls. The video call recordings from 29 September 2022 and 22 November 2022
were entered as State’s Exhibits 2 and 3, respectively, and played for the jury during
Officer Brinege’s testimony. Officer Hale, Officer Bensavage, and Detective
Rodriguez each also testified for the State. Officer Hale testified about conducting a
transfer visitation at Defendant’s former residence located on Sunderland Road prior
to his move to Kirkland Court. Using his knowledge of the inside layout and
appearance of the Sunderland Road home, Officer Hale was able to identify it as
Defendant’s location during the 29 September 2022 video call. In the 22 November
2022 video, Defendant begins the call in a vehicle and then goes inside his Kirkland
Court home. Officer Bensavage testified that the AR-15 seized from Kirkland Court
on 14 December 2022 appears to be the same as the firearm seen in Defendant’s
possession in the 29 September 2022 jail call video.
-4-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
Although Defendant argues the firearms seen in the video calls were air soft
guns or replicas, Officer Bensavage and Detective Rodriguez both testified that they
believed the firearms seen in the video call recordings and the firearms seized from
Defendant’s residence were not air soft guns or replicas.
At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss all
charges on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the submission
of the charges to the jury and that there was a variance between the crime alleged in
the indictment and the evidence presented to the jury. Also, Defendant made a
motion to dismiss the charge ending in *478, because the State had not presented
evidence that he possessed a Glock 43 on 14 December 2022. Defendant argued that
because the evidence presented tended to demonstrate that the firearms were in the
safe, there was insufficient evidence to support a determination that he had actual or
constructive possession of it. The trial court denied the motions. Testifying for the
defense, Kemrey asserted that the safe and the firearms contained in it were all
legally registered to her, not Defendant, and that there were BB guns in the garage.
Defendant renewed his motions to dismiss at the close of all evidence; the trial court
again denied the motions to dismiss.
During the charge conference, there was extensive discussion about how to
instruct the jury. Specifically, the parties discussed whether the trial court should
read the possession of a firearm by a felon instruction just once and instruct the jury
to apply it to each of the three charges or whether the instruction should be read in
-5-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
full for each of the three charges of possession of a firearm by a felon. There was
further discussion about whether the offense dates should be included on the verdict
sheets. The parties ultimately agreed to include the offense dates for each charge on
the verdict sheets.
On 6 December 2024, the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty of all
three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court found Defendant to
be a prior record level five and sentenced him to 19 to 32 months of imprisonment for
each count to run consecutively. Defendant entered timely notice of appeal on 10
December 2024.
II. Analysis
Defendant asserts four arguments on appeal. First, Defendant argues he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to make a
motion to suppress evidence obtained by an allegedly deficient search warrant.
Second, Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss and
by subsequently entering judgment on all three counts of possession of a firearm by
a felon. Third, Defendant argues the trial court erred by giving ambiguous jury
instructions that allowed the jury to convict him based on theories not charged in the
indictment or supported by the evidence. Lastly, Defendant argues the trial court
erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State’s closing argument. For
the reasons stated herein, we conclude Defendant received a fair trial free from
prejudicial error.
-6-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to make a motion to suppress the evidence collected pursuant to the
search warrant. Specifically, Defendant argues that the failure to make a motion to
suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because the search warrant
application did not establish probable cause nor did it show any connection between
the crime he was alleged to have committed and the premises to be searched.
In contrast, the State argues Defendant has failed to meet his burden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel and, regardless, viewed in the totality
of the circumstances, the search warrant application established probable cause. We
agree.
This Court reviews whether a defendant received ineffective assistance under
the de novo standard of review. State v. Reber, 296 N.C. App. 114, 118, 908 S.E.2d
410, 415 (2024). Under a de novo review, this Court considers the matter anew and
freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower court. State v. Williams, 362
N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008). To show ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test. State v. Corrothers, 295 N.C. App.
192, 197, 905 S.E.2d 237, 242 (2024).
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
-7-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.
Reber, 296 N.C. App. at 118, 908 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).
An objective reasonableness standard is used to measure the first prong and
requires a defendant to overcome the presumption that the challenged action may
have been a trial strategy. Id. at 118-19, 908 S.E.2d at 415. To establish prejudice
under the second prong, a defendant must show “there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at
119, 908 S.E.2d at 415 (cleaned up).
A search warrant application, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-244, must
contain “a statement of probable cause and allegations of fact supporting the
statement of probable cause. The statements must be supported by one or more
affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances establishing probable
cause.” Id. at 119, 908 S.E.2d at 416 (quoting State v. Eddings, 280 N.C. App. 204,
209, 866 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2021)). This Court applies the totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether probable cause exists which requires a “common-sense
decision based on all the circumstances that there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 119-20,
908 S.E.2d at 416 (quoting State v. McCoy, 100 N.C. App. 574, 576, 397 S.E.2d 355,
-8-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
357 (1990)). The issuing magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision
and “may draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to
him by applicants for a warrant.” Id. at 120, 908 S.E.2d at 416 (quoting State v. Riggs,
328 N.C. 213, 221, 400 S.E.2d 429, 434 (1991)). This determination of probable cause
is given great deference. Id. The elements of possession of a firearm by a felon are:
“(1) defendant was previously convicted of a felony; and (2) thereafter possessed a
firearm.” State v. Wiggins, 210 N.C. App. 128, 133, 707 S.E.2d 664, 669 (2011)
(quoting State v. Wood, 185 N.C. App. 227, 235, 647 S.E.2d 679, 686 (2007)).
In the case sub judice, the search warrant application stated that the “property
/ evidence to be seized” was:
Property belonging to [Defendant] including firearms,
firearm attachments, ammunition, and any controlled
substances located in the residence.
Indicia: Items of personal property showing constructive
possession of the premises to be searched and the items to
be seized. These items are to include, but are not limited
to, photographs, addressed mail, receipts, cancelled checks,
utility bills, telephone bills, and house and vehicle keys.
Additionally, the search warrant application included the following information: (1)
“[t]his investigation concerns a convicted felon in possession of firearms” and that
Detective Rodriguez, the applicant, “was contacted by Probation Officer [Bensavage]
about [Defendant]. Probation Officer [Bensavage] stated that [Defendant] conducted
a jail call and was holding guns in the jail call”; (2) screenshot photos from the jail
call tending to show Defendant with firearms; (3) that a probationary search of the
-9-
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
residence was conducted to search for firearms and probation officers located a safe
in the bedroom closet of the home and could see through the small hole what appeared
to be the same firearm seen in the video; (4) the applicant believes there is evidence
to support violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1, the possession of firearms by a
felon statute; and (5) the applicant asserts Defendant is in possession of firearms at
his home on Kirkland Court, the residence that the warrant seeks to search.
The search warrant application clearly states Defendant is a felon not allowed
to be in possession of firearms, includes screenshots from the video calls of him with
firearms, and includes information from the warrantless search of his residence on
Kirkland Court where firearms were found. Under the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude probable cause existed to support the search warrant. Further, we
conclude that because probable cause existed for the search warrant, trial counsel
was not deficient for failing to make a motion to suppress. Therefore, we hold
Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Motions to Dismiss Two of Three Counts of Possession of Firearm by a
Felon
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss
because the evidence presented supports only one charge of possession of a firearm
by a felon, not three. Although Defendant maintains he was only ever in possession
of air soft guns, he asserts that if he did possess the firearms he should have been
charged with only one offense, not three, because there is no evidence he obtained the
- 10 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
firearms at different periods of time. In other words, Defendant argues he possessed
all of the firearms in question at each date simultaneously even though not all can be
seen in the videos. Alternatively, Defendant argues that at most the evidence could
support two offenses provided his former Sunderland Road residence and his current
Kirkland Court residence are determined to be materially different locations. In
contrast, the State argues the evidence supports all three charges because Defendant
was caught with firearms in distinct, separate locations weeks and months apart.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence
de novo, considering the matter anew and substituting our own judgment for that of
the lower court. State v. Lee, 213 N.C. App. 392, 398, 713 S.E.2d 174, 179 (2011).
When considering a motion to dismiss, “the court need only determine whether there
is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the
defendant’s being the perpetrator of the offense.” Id. “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Reaves, 297 N.C. App. 877, 881, 911 S.E.2d 791, 794 (2025)
(quoting State v. Summey, 228 N.C. App. 730, 733, 746 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2013)). The
trial court must consider all evidence admitted in the light most favorable to the
State, giving the benefit of every reasonable inference and contradiction in its favor.
Id.
“It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to
purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any firearm.” N.C.
- 11 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a). “[T]he State need only prove two elements to establish the
crime of possession of a firearm by a felon: (1) defendant was previously convicted of
a felony; and (2) thereafter possessed a firearm.” Wiggins, 210 N.C. App. at 133, 707
S.E.2d at 669 (quoting Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 235, 647 S.E.2d at 686).
In State v. Garris, where the defendant’s convictions of possession of a firearm
by a felon stemmed from his simultaneous possession of multiple firearms, this Court
held that
a review of the applicable firearms statute shows no
indication that the North Carolina Legislature intended for
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a) to impose multiple penalties
for a defendant’s simultaneous possession of multiple
firearms. We hold that defendant should be convicted and
sentenced only once for possession of a firearm by a felon
based on his simultaneous possession of both firearms.
Id. at 134, 707 S.E.2d at 669 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Garris, 191 N.C. App. 276,
285, 663 S.E.2d 340, 348 (2008)). In State v. Wiggins this Court relied on Garris when
determining that the defendant’s possession of firearms during three separate
criminal acts over the course of a two-hour time period constituted a single possessory
offense rather than three separate offenses. Id. at 134, 138, 707 S.E.2d at 670, 672.
That determination hinged on “the extent to which the weapons in question were
acquired and possessed at different times.” Id. at 138, 707 S.E.2d at 672. Further,
this Court reasoned that it believed
the same logic utilized in Garris is clearly applicable to this
case, leading us to conclude that, since simultaneous
possession of more than one firearm supports only one
- 12 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
the fact that Defendant may have fired those weapons,
which were obtained and possessed simultaneously, on
more than one occasion during the commission of several
substantive crimes does not support multiple possession-
based convictions and sentences.
Id. at 134, 707 S.E.2d at 670.
However, just months following Wiggins, this Court determined in State v. Lee
that “[i]f the evidence shows that the defendant possessed a weapon on different days
and in different locations, the holding from Wiggins is not controlling, and the
defendant can be charged with multiple offenses.” Lee, 213 N.C. App. at 399, 713
S.E.2d at 179 (emphasis added). This Court in Lee distinguished itself from Wiggins
and held the defendant could be convicted of multiple counts of possession of a firearm
by a felon:
In contrast to Wiggins, where the substantive offenses
were committed in close geographic and temporal
proximity, the offenses in the instant case were committed
in nine different locations on ten different days over the
course of a month. While the evidence tended to show that
defendant used the same weapon during each armed
robbery, the robberies all occurred on different days in
different locations. Because each possession of the weapon
was separate in time and location, we hold the trial court
did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the
multiple weapons possession charges.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm while a
felon on 29 September 2022, 22 November 2022, and 14 December 2022. While
- 13 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
Defendant argues there is no evidence that he obtained the firearms at different times
or relinquished and then reacquired possession of them between 29 September 2022
and 14 December 2022, this fact is immaterial because the evidence, taken in the
light most favorable to the State, tends to show that Defendant possessed at least one
firearm in three separate and distinct locations, on three separate and distinct days,
weeks and months apart. Just as this Court held in Lee, “we hold the trial court did
not err in denying [D]efendant’s motion to dismiss the multiple [possession of a
firearm by a felon] charges.” Id.
C. Ambiguous Jury Instruction
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by giving ambiguous jury
instructions that allowed the jury to convict him on theories not charged in the
indictments or supported by the evidence, thereby violating his right to a unanimous
verdict of the jury pursuant to Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina
Constitution.
While Defendant raised several concerns about the jury instructions during
the charge conference and deliberations, he concedes the issue raised on appeal is not
among those concerns raised at trial. Defendant cites State v. Wilson as support for
his contention that “where an error violates the right to a unanimous jury verdict
under Article I, Section 24, it is preserved for appeal without any action by counsel”;
however, in State v. May, our Supreme Court clarified that it was “specified in Wilson
that when a violation of Article I, Section 24 involves an instruction to less than all
- 14 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
the jurors, that error is preserved as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 363 N.C. 478,
484, 681 S.E.2d 325, 330 (2009); State v. May, 368 N.C. 112, 118, 772 S.E.2d 458, 462
(2015) (emphasis added). Such is not the case here; Defendant is misguided in his
reliance on Wilson. Generally, constitutional issues not raised at trial are waived for
appellate review; however, constitutional issues related to the trial court’s
instructions to the jury may be reviewed for plain error. May, 368 N.C. at 118, 772
S.E.2d at 462.
“Our plain error test requires the accused to show that (1) a fundamental error
occurred at trial (2) that had a probable impact on the outcome and (3) is an
exceptional case that warrants plain error review.” State v. Bowman, 387 N.C. 509,
515, 915 S.E.2d 134, 139 (2025).
As discussed supra, there was extensive discussion regarding the instructions
to the jury and verdict sheets. Prior to reading the substantive offense instruction,
the trial court instructed the jury that although they would need to consider three
separate charges, he would read the instruction only once:
Ladies and gentlemen, the defendant has been charged
with three separate counts of possessing a firearm after
having been convicted of a felony. I could read to you the
same instruction three separate times. I don’t believe
that’s necessary. If you want me to, I can do that. But the
same instruction will apply to the same three charges and
three dates of offense, and I’ve gone over those with you,
but I’ll go over them again. September the 29th of 2022,
November the 22nd of 2022, and December 14th of 2022.
Those are the three separate dates of offense for the three
separate charges. I’m only going to read the possession of
- 15 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
firearm by felon instruction one time, but you have to make
a decision on the three separate charges, although I’m
reading it one time.
Defendant stipulated to the fact that he had a felony offense conviction prior to the
dates at issue, 29 September 2022, 22 November 2022, and 14 December 2022. The
trial court instructed that on each date, “the defendant was a convicted felon and had
knowledge that he was not allowed to possess a firearm.” The trial court then read
the possession instruction one time and explained that the jury would receive a
“straightforward” verdict sheet with the date of the offense on it.
During deliberations, the jury sent notes with questions on three separate
occasions. In the first note the jury requested to view portions of the first video call
recording and some of the physical evidence exhibits; the trial court allowed the
request. After the jury left the courtroom, Defendant asked whether the verdict forms
listed the weapon alleged for each date or whether just the date was listed. Defendant
then argued it was important that the jury knew which firearm corresponded to each
date because the indictment includes a specific firearm for each date. The trial court
declined to change the verdict form and noted the objection. The trial court then
received the second note from the jury.
The second note asked to view portions of the video from 22 November 2022
and to view additional physical evidence; the note stated in full:
Jury would like to see the real Polymer 80 against the
picture presented by the defense (toy).
- 16 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
In addition - Jury would like to see the video of the Polymer
80 between the defendants legs & under the arm.
Fast forward = watching from leaving the car into the
house into the closest -> where conversion kit was located.
The trial court allowed the jury’s request. Following the break and while the jury
was out of the courtroom, the trial court informed counsel that it would agree to
instruct the jury regarding which firearm Defendant was alleged to have possessed
in each indictment. The trial court instructed the jurors:
I want to make sure that I go over - - again, this is going
back to the instructions I gave you earlier. I told you they
were three separate charges. You’ve got the separate dates
of offense.
In 22 CRS 363845, that is date of offense September 29,
2022. The State alleges that the defendant was in
possession of a firearm by felon AR-15 style pistol.
In 23 CRS 478, with date of offense December the 14th of
2022, the State alleges possession of firearm by felon by
having in defendant’s possession a Glock 43 nine
millimeter pistol.
And then in 23 CRS 479, date of offense November 22, 2022
. . . the State alleges the defendant was in possession of
firearm by felon, the Polymer 80, nine-millimeter pistol.
Shortly after resuming deliberations, the jury sent a third note which stated:
The jury is confused!
The verdict sheet stipulates possession of a firearm by
felon.
In the last instructions the Judge said specific firearms.
For example for the 9/29/22 – is it any firearm or
- 17 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
specifically for the AR 15
Please review the verdict sheet.
The State argued it shouldn’t matter which specific firearm on which date. In
contrast, Defendant argued “we saw this coming,” referenced his earlier objections,
and reiterated his belief that in order for the jury to find him guilty of each charge, it
must find that he was in possession of the specific firearm on the date specified in
each indictment. The trial court asked whether the specific firearm indicated in each
indictment was just surplusage. The State argued it was surplusage while Defendant
argued it was not. Ultimately, the trial court agreed to read the stipulations to the
jury again and to clarify the two elements of the offenses. The trial court instructed
in relevant part:
And the second element of the offense of possession of
firearm by felon . . . [a]fter the defendant was convicted of
a felony, [he] possessed a firearm. Let me read it to you one
more time. The second element says, that after the
defendant was convicted of a felony, the defendant
possessed a firearm.
The jury returned their verdicts less than an hour later.
Defendant argues that the jury was instructed in a way that allowed him to be
found guilty on different theories, causing a risk of a nonunanimous verdict because
the trial court initially did not specify which firearms correlated to the offense dates
at issue in its instructions but then later gave instructions which specified the
firearms alleged in the indictments. We disagree.
- 18 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
Based on the holding in Lee as discussed supra, a defendant can be convicted
of multiple charges of possession of a firearm by a felon even when the firearm is the
same for each offense when the instances of possession have occurred on different
days in different locations. Lee, 213 N.C. App. at 399, 713 S.E.2d at 179. Further,
“the State need only prove two elements to establish the crime of possession of a
firearm by a felon: (1) defendant was previously convicted of a felony; and (2)
thereafter possessed a firearm.” Wiggins, 210 N.C. App. at 133, 707 S.E.2d at 669
(quoting Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 235, 647 S.E.2d at 686). Therefore, which specific
firearm the jury believed Defendant to have had in his possession relative to each
charge is immaterial; the jury need only find that Defendant was in possession of a
firearm on the date corresponding to each charge as indicated on the separate verdict
sheets. Our Supreme Court has established,
that “if the trial court merely instructs the jury
disjunctively as to various alternative acts which will
establish an element of the offense, the requirement of
unanimity is satisfied.” . . . In other words, a disjunctive
instruction does not violate a defendant’s right to a
unanimous verdict if that instruction only involves
alternative acts which will establish an element of an
offense. The jury does not need to be unanimous in finding
a particular act among two or more alternative acts that
constitute an element of an offense.
Bowman, 387 N.C. at 516, 915 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting State v. Lawrence, 360 N.C.
368, 374, 627 S.E.2d 609, 612 (2006)). While we acknowledge the jury experienced
some confusion, after a thorough review of the record and transcript, in accord with
- 19 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
the binding precedent set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Bowman, we hold
Defendant was not deprived of his right to a unanimous jury and the trial court did
not err.
D. Failure to Intervene During Closing Argument
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero
motu during the State’s closing arguments. Specifically, Defendant argues the
statements were crafted to prejudice him and lead the jury to a conclusion based not
on the evidence before them, but on misleading characterizations crafted by the
prosecution. Defendant further argues that a juror hearing the State’s closing could
only interpret it “one way: that [Defendant’s] trial had been pointless, and that he
had wasted the jurors’ time by going to trial.”
Because Defendant did not object to the State’s closing argument, he “must
establish that the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu. To establish such abuse, [D]efendant
must show that the [State’s] comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they
rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.” State v. Ball, 292 N.C. App. 151, 163,
897 S.E.2d 20, 29 (2024) (quoting State v. Tart, 372 N.C. 73, 80-81, 824 S.E.2d 837,
842 (2019)). However, “[e]ven when an appellate court determines that a trial court
erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu, a new trial will be granted only if ‘the
remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and
thus should have been excluded by the trial court.’” Id. (quoting Tart, 372 N.C. at 82,
- 20 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
824 S.E.2d at 843). To show the requisite prejudice, the “defendant has the burden
to show a reasonable possibility that, had the errors in question not been committed,
a different result would have been reached at trial.” State v. Goins, 377 N.C. 475, 478,
858 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2021) (quoting State v. Huey, 370 N.C. 174, 185, 804 S.E.2d 464,
473 (2017)).
A prosecutor’s closing argument is improper if it “becomes abusive, injects his
personal experiences, expresses his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the
evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or makes arguments on the
basis of matters outside the record except for matters concerning [that] which the
court may take judicial notice.” State v. Hensley, 277 N.C. App. 308, 312, 858 S.E.2d
138, 141 (2021) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1230(a)). “[P]rosecutors are given wide
latitude in the scope of their argument and may argue to the jury the law, the facts
in evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,” and “on the basis of his
analysis of the evidence, argue any position or conclusion with respect to a matter at
issue.” Id. (quoting Huey, 370 N.C. at 180, 804 S.E.2d at 469). When determining
whether an argument is grossly improper, the context in which the remarks are made
and their brevity to the argument as a whole is considered. Id. Further, “[t]he control
of the arguments of counsel must be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge,
and the appellate courts ordinarily will not review the exercise of the trial judge’s
discretion in this regard unless the impropriety of counsel’s remarks is extreme and
is clearly calculated to prejudice the jury in its deliberations.” Id. (quoting State v.
- 21 -
STATE V. BARRINO
Opinion of the Court
Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 368-69, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)).
Defendant challenges the following statements made by the State:
These are not weapons in society to show to your friends,
grin ear to ear, and get that reaction. I am telling you
[Defendant], and the legislature has said, he cannot have a
gun because he had been proven unworth, unsafe,
whatever. What I’m saying is that if he is doing that for
that reaction, if he was not a felon, he should not have a
gun if that is what he’s looking to get from his friends, an
enjoyment reaction out of these types of weapons.
....
Now, you’ve got an instruction that just because somebody
was charged with a crime, that that is not evidence of guilt.