Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1808-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN A. WELLS, a/k/a JOHNIE WELLS, JOHN ARTHUR WELLS, JR., SAFAR A. MUHAMMAD, JOHNNIE S. SHABAZZ, and JOHNNY SHABAZZ, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Submitted September 23, 2026 – Decided November 18, 2026 Before Judges Vinci and Zazzali-Hogan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 15-10- 1275. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hudson E. Knight, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant John A. Wells appeals from a December 10, 2024 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the well-reasoned written decision of the PCR judge.1 I. Defendant was involved in a robbery and attempted robbery of two patrons' purses at two different supermarket parking lots on October 26 and October 28, 2014. In each incident, defendant drove up to a victim who was pushing a shopping cart, snatched the purse, and drove away. Both victims identified the car as a dark colored vehicle, and the police confirmed the car was a Saab registered in defendant's wife's name based upon the license plate reported by one of the victims. After the second incident on October 28, the police generated a text message through a community messaging app alerting the public to the crime. The message described the perpetrator as a black male driving a dark-colored 1 The facts leading to defendant's conviction and sentence are set forth in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal. State v. Wells, No. A-0341-18 (App. Div. Feb. 19, 2021). A-1808-24 2 vehicle. The manager at the local car dealership where defendant worked saw the message and realized that the supermarket where the second crime occurred was behind the dealership, the description of the perpetrator matched defendant and he recalled defendant driving a "bluish" Saab a few weeks prior. The manager called the police, which led to defendant's arrest. In 2015, the grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with two counts of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-degree attempted theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:20-3(a); and third-degree theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). The matter was tried before a jury in 2018. Defendant testified against the advice of counsel. Defendant was acquitted regarding the first robbery but was found guilty of the second. After appropriate mergers, he was sentenced as a persistent offender to a fifteen-year prison term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44- 3(a), and subject to parole ineligibility and mandatory parole supervision pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Wells, 246 N.J. 442 (2021). A-1808-24 3 On June 30, 2023, defendant filed a petition for PCR, asserting that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He claimed trial counsel failed to adequately review discovery and prepare for trial because he did not present discovery regarding defendant's shoulder injury or request surveillance video from his employer; adequately prepare him to testify; adequately emphasize third-party guilt to the jury; and remove himself as counsel after defendant fired him. On December 10, 2024, after hearing oral argument, the PCR judge entered an order denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing , which was supported by a written decision. He first addressed the shoulder injury. Defendant alleged his attorney should have argued that defendant would not have been able to grab a purse from the victim due to a shoulder injury. He had no witnesses to support that argument. Similarly, the only documentation to support a shoulder injury was an operative report, which refers only to surgery on his right shoulder two years prior to the robberies. Defendant did not provide any evidence of any limitations to either shoulder. As noted by the PCR judge, the jury had the benefit of the shopping center surveillance video showing defendant approached the victims on their right side. If he approached each victim on their right side, he would have used his left arm, A-1808-24 4 making his injury argument illogical. Consequently, the PCR judge concluded counsel made a reasonable and "strategic choice" to avoid a "glaring inconsistency" in defendant's argument, and there was no likelihood of success regarding his injury defense. The PCR judge concluded that defendant needed to "overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and sound trial strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013). Next, the PCR judge addressed trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate defendant's alibis and alternative theories of third-party guilt. At trial, defendant's attorney advised the judge that defendant had not given him an "alibi per se" and had "merely mentioned that he loaned the car out to certain individuals in his family periodically." In other words, the alibi issue actually relates to the third-party guilt argument. Defendant contends his attorney should have provided evidence that his brother and brother-in-law were the perpetrators. Similarly, defendant asserted that had his attorney obtained surveillance video from his workplace, it would have "likely" shown that either his brother or brother-in-law picked up the Saab at his work before the second robbery and returned it after the robbery. The PCR court noted that "[w]hen, and from where, such video footage may have A-1808-24 5 been captured, is not the subject of clarification." Regardless, the PCR judge reasoned that evidence of that theory was presented to the jury. The PCR judge concluded that for each of these issues, defendant failed to establish the two elements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Addressing defendant's decision to testify, the PCR judge noted that after counsel advised the trial court he would not call any witnesses, the trial judge engaged in a Fifth Amendment colloquy informing defendant it was his choice whether to testify. Defendant claims that counsel did not advise him regarding testifying. Citing State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999), the PCR judge noted the allegation that counsel failed to advise defendant of the benefits or risks of offering testimony was "devoid of any detail." The PCR judge concluded that against his attorney's advice, defendant had knowingly and voluntarily decided to testify and that defendant provided no evidence to support his claim the attorney was unprepared. Therefore, the PCR judge rejected this argument. Meanwhile, the day before trial began, defendant advised the trial court he intended to file an ethics complaint against his trial attorney but never claimed he fired his attorney. The PCR judge noted defendant did not file a A-1808-24 6 direct appeal as to this issue and declined to consider that argument pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(a) and -5. Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration. POINT I DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BY ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION. POINT II AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY NOT DEVELOPING A DEFENSE OF THIRD-PARTY GUILT, BY NOT ARGUING THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH, AND BY FAILING TO REQUEST AN APPROPRIATE JURY INSTRUCTION. POINT III TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY REVIEW THE DISCOVERY PROVIDED BY THE STATE, DISCUSS THE CASE WITH HIS CLIENT, OR PREPARE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY. POINT IV AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL A-1808-24 7 ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED DEFENDANT DUE TO COUNSEL'S PRIOR MISCONDUCT. A-1808-24 8 II. We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed questions of fact and law. Ibid. We may "conduct a de novo review" of the court's factual findings where the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong Strickland test by showing: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment;" and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test). Failure to meet either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test results in the denial of a petition for PCR. See State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012). Under the first prong, counsel's representation must be objectively unreasonable. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015). "The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether [they] met the A-1808-24 9 constitutional threshold for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013). Informed strategic choices "are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Even strategic choices made after limited investigation are afforded great deference and are assessed for reasonableness. State v. Petrozelli, 351 N.J. Super. 14, 22 (App. Div. 2002). Trial strategy is clearly within the discretion of competent trial counsel. State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 321 (App. Div. 1983). A reviewing court must be "highly deferential" to the discretion of counsel in determining which witnesses to call at trial. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005). Under the "'second, and far more difficult, prong of the' Strickland standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A-1808-24 10 In demonstrating that counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Further, because prejudice is not presumed, ibid., a defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984). However, a PCR petitioner asserting "his trial attorney inadequately investigated his case, . . . must assert the facts that an investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." Porter, 216 N.J. at 353 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170). III. The second and third arguments 2 raised on appeal overlap and are generally related to allegations that counsel failed to adequately review discovery; investigate third-party guilt or request a jury instruction on that issue; and prepare defendant to testify. 2 Defendant's "argument" within the first point heading simply restates the law. A-1808-24 11 According to defendant, his trial attorney failed to review and present discovery related to a shoulder injury and should have retained an expert. He does not, however, identify any specific evidence and what that evidence would have shown. He merely cites an operative report and claims his attorney should have retained an expert. Regardless, the operative report was addressed by the PCR judge, who noted the document is dated 2013, unsigned, and refers only to surgery on defendant's right shoulder. There is no certification supporting defendant's assertions as to the ineffectiveness of his attorney regarding this issue. We agree with the PCR judge's conclusion that defendant failed to "overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and sound trial strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities" by not pursuing an illogical theory. Nash, 212 N.J. at 542. He provided no evidence in an affidavit or certification of an injury to either shoulder to support his claim it was impossible for him to commit the robberies or to show what any additional investigation would have revealed. Further, defendant's theory is belied by the fact that the jury saw the video of the robbery and reached its own determination whether defendant committed the crimes. A-1808-24 12 Counsel's strategic decision to forgo pursuit of a theory devoid of any corroborating evidence was objectively reasonable. Because defendant actually testified about his shoulder injury, he cannot assert prejudice due to his attorney's failure to elaborate on the theory that it was not physically possible for defendant to reach out of the driver's-side window with his left hand. Defendant's claims, therefore, fail both prongs of the Strickland test. Defendant's next argument focuses on the failure to investigate alibis, procure surveillance video, present third-party guilt, and request a jury instruction on the issue. As noted by the PCR judge, there was no alibi, which related to the third-party defense. Likewise, defendant's assertion regarding the failure to investigate a possible video to show a third party was responsible for the crimes fails under Porter. First, there is no proof that any surveillance video existed. Second, defendant only asserted that such video "may" show or "could have shown" that his brother or brother-in-law took the car off the lot on the day of either robbery. Defendant contends that "if videos as described by defendant did in fact exist, they would have been capable of creating reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) Defendant's argument is based on pure speculation. Consequently, defendant does not meet the standard set forth in Porter. See also State v. Hannah, 248 A-1808-24 13 N.J. 148, 181 (2021) (stating there must be "specific evidence" linking the third person to the crime). More importantly, defendant did testify that his brother and brother-in- law drove his car on October 28. The jury chose to disbelieve defendant's testimony. Defendant's related argument that the judge "should have recognized the existence of the third-party guilt issue and instructed accordingly" also fails. He cites no legal authority in support of this argument, and the PCR judge explained the infirmities regarding the third-party guilt argument. Even if his trial attorney failed to request that instruction, he fails to demonstrate that the jury would have reached a different result. Defendant fails to explain how he satisfies the two- part test under Strickland. Defendant also claims that he did not "thoroughly discuss" his right to testify with his trial attorney. Defendant provides no examples of what counsel should have discussed with him or how the alleged omission resulted in his conviction and sentence. There is no proof that defendant's attorney misadvised him on any issue. Most importantly, the judge thoroughly questioned defendant A-1808-24 14 regarding his decision to testify, and he testified against the advice of counsel. 3 Defendant does not articulate how counsel was ineffective under Strickland. Defendant further raises allegations in support of his ineffective assistance counsel claim related to his attorney's "prior misconduct." Defendant contends that an evidentiary hearing on all of these issues should have been held because of counsel's "questionable past conduct" and his "failure to withdraw." This argument fails because defendant does not explain how that alleged prior misconduct is similar to any misconduct alleged here. Similarly, the PCR judge found that the trial judge considered defendant's request for new counsel and denied the request. We agree with the PCR judge that defendant did not demonstrate relevance, but more importantly, he failed to raise this issue on his direct appeal. A request for a PCR evidentiary hearing is governed by Rule 3:22-10(b). The Rule states: 3 Defendant's attorney's advice not to testify was based upon sound reasoning because defendant changed his story between the time of his arrest and trial. When he was initially questioned by the police, defendant admitted he drives a Saab; drove it on October 28; "never" allows anyone else including his wife drive it; went to the supermarket at issue that day; and "may have bumped into" a woman at the supermarket. In comparison, at trial, he testified that his brother borrowed the car that day; his brother-in-law returned it; his wife does drive the car; and he was at the supermarket at issue because it was near a pizza restaurant he frequents and a nail salon visited by his wife. A-1808-24 15 A defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of [PCR.] . . . To establish a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits. [R. 3:22-10(b).] For each issue, defendant's allegations were "too vague, conclusory [and] speculative" under Rule 3:22-10(e)(2) to warrant an evidentiary hearing. He does not provide any certifications beyond his own self-serving certification to support any of his arguments, nor does he articulate what any specific evidence would have shown. Defendant has failed to demonstrate how trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any of the strategic decisions were unreasonable. His argument is undercut by his acquittal on one of the robberies. Because defendant has not proven a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits considering the facts in the light most favorable for him, he cannot establish a prima facie case in support of PCR on any issues. Thus, the judge correctly denied the request for an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed. A-1808-24 16