State of New Jersey v. John A. Wells
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA-1808-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1808-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN A. WELLS, a/k/a
JOHNIE WELLS, JOHN
ARTHUR WELLS, JR.,
SAFAR A. MUHAMMAD,
JOHNNIE S. SHABAZZ, and
JOHNNY SHABAZZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted September 23, 2026 – Decided November 18, 2026
Before Judges Vinci and Zazzali-Hogan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 15-10-
1275.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Hudson E. Knight, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant John A. Wells appeals from a December 10, 2024 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm the well-reasoned written decision of the PCR judge.1
I.
Defendant was involved in a robbery and attempted robbery of two
patrons' purses at two different supermarket parking lots on October 26 and
October 28, 2014. In each incident, defendant drove up to a victim who was
pushing a shopping cart, snatched the purse, and drove away. Both victims
identified the car as a dark colored vehicle, and the police confirmed the car was
a Saab registered in defendant's wife's name based upon the license plate
reported by one of the victims.
After the second incident on October 28, the police generated a text
message through a community messaging app alerting the public to the crime.
The message described the perpetrator as a black male driving a dark-colored
1
The facts leading to defendant's conviction and sentence are set forth in our
opinion on defendant's direct appeal. State v. Wells, No. A-0341-18 (App. Div.
Feb. 19, 2021).
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vehicle. The manager at the local car dealership where defendant worked saw
the message and realized that the supermarket where the second crime occurred
was behind the dealership, the description of the perpetrator matched defendant
and he recalled defendant driving a "bluish" Saab a few weeks prior. The
manager called the police, which led to defendant's arrest.
In 2015, the grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with
two counts of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-degree attempted
theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:20-3(a); and third-degree theft by unlawful taking,
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a).
The matter was tried before a jury in 2018. Defendant testified against
the advice of counsel. Defendant was acquitted regarding the first robbery but
was found guilty of the second. After appropriate mergers, he was sentenced as
a persistent offender to a fifteen-year prison term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
3(a), and subject to parole ineligibility and mandatory parole supervision
pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed. The New
Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v.
Wells, 246 N.J. 442 (2021).
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On June 30, 2023, defendant filed a petition for PCR, asserting that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel. He claimed trial counsel failed to
adequately review discovery and prepare for trial because he did not present
discovery regarding defendant's shoulder injury or request surveillance video
from his employer; adequately prepare him to testify; adequately emphasize
third-party guilt to the jury; and remove himself as counsel after defendant fired
him.
On December 10, 2024, after hearing oral argument, the PCR judge
entered an order denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing ,
which was supported by a written decision. He first addressed the shoulder
injury. Defendant alleged his attorney should have argued that defendant would
not have been able to grab a purse from the victim due to a shoulder injury. He
had no witnesses to support that argument. Similarly, the only documentation
to support a shoulder injury was an operative report, which refers only to surgery
on his right shoulder two years prior to the robberies. Defendant did not provide
any evidence of any limitations to either shoulder.
As noted by the PCR judge, the jury had the benefit of the shopping center
surveillance video showing defendant approached the victims on their right side.
If he approached each victim on their right side, he would have used his left arm,
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making his injury argument illogical. Consequently, the PCR judge concluded
counsel made a reasonable and "strategic choice" to avoid a "glaring
inconsistency" in defendant's argument, and there was no likelihood of success
regarding his injury defense. The PCR judge concluded that defendant needed
to "overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised reasonable
professional judgment and sound trial strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities."
State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013).
Next, the PCR judge addressed trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate
defendant's alibis and alternative theories of third-party guilt. At trial,
defendant's attorney advised the judge that defendant had not given him an "alibi
per se" and had "merely mentioned that he loaned the car out to certain
individuals in his family periodically." In other words, the alibi issue actually
relates to the third-party guilt argument.
Defendant contends his attorney should have provided evidence that his
brother and brother-in-law were the perpetrators. Similarly, defendant asserted
that had his attorney obtained surveillance video from his workplace, it would
have "likely" shown that either his brother or brother-in-law picked up the Saab
at his work before the second robbery and returned it after the robbery. The
PCR court noted that "[w]hen, and from where, such video footage may have
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been captured, is not the subject of clarification." Regardless, the PCR judge
reasoned that evidence of that theory was presented to the jury. The PCR judge
concluded that for each of these issues, defendant failed to establish the two
elements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Addressing defendant's decision to testify, the PCR judge noted that after
counsel advised the trial court he would not call any witnesses, the trial judge
engaged in a Fifth Amendment colloquy informing defendant it was his choice
whether to testify. Defendant claims that counsel did not advise him regarding
testifying. Citing State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.
1999), the PCR judge noted the allegation that counsel failed to advise defendant
of the benefits or risks of offering testimony was "devoid of any detail." The
PCR judge concluded that against his attorney's advice, defendant had
knowingly and voluntarily decided to testify and that defendant provided no
evidence to support his claim the attorney was unprepared. Therefore, the PCR
judge rejected this argument.
Meanwhile, the day before trial began, defendant advised the trial court
he intended to file an ethics complaint against his trial attorney but never
claimed he fired his attorney. The PCR judge noted defendant did not file a
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direct appeal as to this issue and declined to consider that argument pursuant to
Rule 3:22-4(a) and -5.
Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration.
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHICH IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED PURSUANT TO
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
BY ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE NEW
JERSEY CONSTITUTION.
POINT II
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE BY NOT DEVELOPING A DEFENSE
OF THIRD-PARTY GUILT, BY NOT ARGUING
THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH, AND BY FAILING TO
REQUEST AN APPROPRIATE JURY
INSTRUCTION.
POINT III
TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
REVIEW THE DISCOVERY PROVIDED BY THE
STATE, DISCUSS THE CASE WITH HIS CLIENT,
OR PREPARE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY.
POINT IV
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL
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ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED DEFENDANT DUE
TO COUNSEL'S PRIOR MISCONDUCT.
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II.
We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,
181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed
questions of fact and law. Ibid. We may "conduct a de novo review" of the
court's factual findings where the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App.
Div. 2020).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong Strickland test by showing: (1) "counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment;" and (2) "the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test). Failure to meet either prong
of the Strickland/Fritz test results in the denial of a petition for PCR. See State
v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).
Under the first prong, counsel's representation must be objectively
unreasonable. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015). "The test is not whether
defense counsel could have done better, but whether [they] met the
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constitutional threshold for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543
(2013).
Informed strategic choices "are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690. Even strategic choices made after limited investigation are
afforded great deference and are assessed for reasonableness. State v. Petrozelli,
351 N.J. Super. 14, 22 (App. Div. 2002). Trial strategy is clearly within the
discretion of competent trial counsel. State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 321
(App. Div. 1983). A reviewing court must be "highly deferential" to the
discretion of counsel in determining which witnesses to call at trial. State v.
Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005).
Under the "'second, and far more difficult, prong of the' Strickland
standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
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In demonstrating that counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant
must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Further, because prejudice is not presumed, ibid.,
a defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel undermined the
reliability" of the proceeding, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26
(1984).
However, a PCR petitioner asserting "his trial attorney inadequately
investigated his case, . . . must assert the facts that an investigation would have
revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal
knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." Porter, 216
N.J. at 353 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170).
III.
The second and third arguments 2 raised on appeal overlap and are
generally related to allegations that counsel failed to adequately review
discovery; investigate third-party guilt or request a jury instruction on that issue;
and prepare defendant to testify.
2
Defendant's "argument" within the first point heading simply restates the law.
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According to defendant, his trial attorney failed to review and present
discovery related to a shoulder injury and should have retained an expert. He
does not, however, identify any specific evidence and what that evidence would
have shown. He merely cites an operative report and claims his attorney should
have retained an expert. Regardless, the operative report was addressed by the
PCR judge, who noted the document is dated 2013, unsigned, and refers only to
surgery on defendant's right shoulder. There is no certification supporting
defendant's assertions as to the ineffectiveness of his attorney regarding this
issue.
We agree with the PCR judge's conclusion that defendant failed to
"overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised reasonable professional
judgment and sound trial strategy in fulfilling his responsibilities" by not
pursuing an illogical theory. Nash, 212 N.J. at 542. He provided no evidence
in an affidavit or certification of an injury to either shoulder to support his claim
it was impossible for him to commit the robberies or to show what any additional
investigation would have revealed. Further, defendant's theory is belied by the
fact that the jury saw the video of the robbery and reached its own determination
whether defendant committed the crimes.
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Counsel's strategic decision to forgo pursuit of a theory devoid of any
corroborating evidence was objectively reasonable. Because defendant actually
testified about his shoulder injury, he cannot assert prejudice due to his
attorney's failure to elaborate on the theory that it was not physically possible
for defendant to reach out of the driver's-side window with his left hand.
Defendant's claims, therefore, fail both prongs of the Strickland test.
Defendant's next argument focuses on the failure to investigate alibis,
procure surveillance video, present third-party guilt, and request a jury
instruction on the issue. As noted by the PCR judge, there was no alibi, which
related to the third-party defense.
Likewise, defendant's assertion regarding the failure to investigate a
possible video to show a third party was responsible for the crimes fails under
Porter. First, there is no proof that any surveillance video existed. Second,
defendant only asserted that such video "may" show or "could have shown" that
his brother or brother-in-law took the car off the lot on the day of either robbery.
Defendant contends that "if videos as described by defendant did in fact exist,
they would have been capable of creating reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.)
Defendant's argument is based on pure speculation. Consequently, defendant
does not meet the standard set forth in Porter. See also State v. Hannah, 248
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N.J. 148, 181 (2021) (stating there must be "specific evidence" linking the third
person to the crime).
More importantly, defendant did testify that his brother and brother-in-
law drove his car on October 28. The jury chose to disbelieve defendant's
testimony.
Defendant's related argument that the judge "should have recognized the
existence of the third-party guilt issue and instructed accordingly" also fails. He
cites no legal authority in support of this argument, and the PCR judge explained
the infirmities regarding the third-party guilt argument. Even if his trial attorney
failed to request that instruction, he fails to demonstrate that the jury would have
reached a different result. Defendant fails to explain how he satisfies the two-
part test under Strickland.
Defendant also claims that he did not "thoroughly discuss" his right to
testify with his trial attorney. Defendant provides no examples of what counsel
should have discussed with him or how the alleged omission resulted in his
conviction and sentence. There is no proof that defendant's attorney misadvised
him on any issue. Most importantly, the judge thoroughly questioned defendant
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regarding his decision to testify, and he testified against the advice of counsel. 3
Defendant does not articulate how counsel was ineffective under Strickland.
Defendant further raises allegations in support of his ineffective assistance
counsel claim related to his attorney's "prior misconduct." Defendant contends
that an evidentiary hearing on all of these issues should have been held because
of counsel's "questionable past conduct" and his "failure to withdraw." This
argument fails because defendant does not explain how that alleged prior
misconduct is similar to any misconduct alleged here. Similarly, the PCR judge
found that the trial judge considered defendant's request for new counsel and
denied the request. We agree with the PCR judge that defendant did not
demonstrate relevance, but more importantly, he failed to raise this issue on his
direct appeal.
A request for a PCR evidentiary hearing is governed by Rule 3:22-10(b).
The Rule states:
3
Defendant's attorney's advice not to testify was based upon sound reasoning
because defendant changed his story between the time of his arrest and trial.
When he was initially questioned by the police, defendant admitted he drives a
Saab; drove it on October 28; "never" allows anyone else including his wife
drive it; went to the supermarket at issue that day; and "may have bumped into"
a woman at the supermarket. In comparison, at trial, he testified that his brother
borrowed the car that day; his brother-in-law returned it; his wife does drive the
car; and he was at the supermarket at issue because it was near a pizza restaurant
he frequents and a nail salon visited by his wife.
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A defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing
only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in
support of [PCR.] . . . To establish a prima facie case,
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood
that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the
light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately
succeed on the merits.
[R. 3:22-10(b).]
For each issue, defendant's allegations were "too vague, conclusory [and]
speculative" under Rule 3:22-10(e)(2) to warrant an evidentiary hearing. He
does not provide any certifications beyond his own self-serving certification to
support any of his arguments, nor does he articulate what any specific evidence
would have shown. Defendant has failed to demonstrate how trial counsel's
performance was deficient or that any of the strategic decisions were
unreasonable. His argument is undercut by his acquittal on one of the robberies.
Because defendant has not proven a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the
merits considering the facts in the light most favorable for him, he cannot
establish a prima facie case in support of PCR on any issues. Thus, the judge
correctly denied the request for an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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