Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. James Jeffrey Boatwright, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2024-002039 Appeal From Chester County Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-491 Submitted October 2, 2026 โ€“ Filed November 18, 2026 AFFIRMED Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of Lancaster, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: James Jeffrey Boatwright appeals his conviction for first-degree burglary and sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, Boatwright argues the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motion because the State did not present any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence showing he had the intent to commit a crime when he entered the victim's home. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Boatwright's directed verdict motion because a reasonable inference from the evidence showed Boatwright entered the home with the intent to commit a crime. See State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 235, 781 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2016) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State." (quoting State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014))); id. ("[An appellate court's] review is limited to considering the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); State v. Odems, 395 S.C. 582, 586, 720 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2011) ("[I]f there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury."); S.C. Code Ann. ยง 16-11-311(A) (2015) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and either: (1) when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he or another participant in the crime: (a) is armed with a deadly weapon or explosive; . . . or (d) displays what is or appears to be a knife . . . ; or (3) the entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime."); State v. Christensen, 194 S.C. 131, 137-38, 9 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1940) (stating "mere[ly] breaking and entering a house is not a crime"); State v. Parker, 344 S.C. 250, 255 n.3, 543 S.E.2d 255, 258 n.3 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[L]arceny is the 'felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of another' against the owner's will or without his consent." (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Keith, 283 S.C. 597, 598, 325 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1985))); State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 92, 184 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1971) ("[P]roof of unlawful entry into a building which contains personal property that could be the subject o[f] larceny gives rise to an inference that will sustain a conviction of burglary." (quoting People v. Rossi, 250 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969))); State v. Meggett, 398 S.C. 516, 527, 728 S.E.2d 492, 498 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The question of the intent with which an act is done is one of fact and is ordinarily for jury determination except in extreme cases where there is no evidence thereon." (quoting State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971))); State v. Gilliland, 402 S.C. 389, 397, 741 S.E.2d 521, 526 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]he jury may base its determination of . . . intent upon evidence of the accused's actions once inside the dwelling."). AFFIRMED.1 WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.