State v. James Jeffrey Boatwright
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2024-002039
StatusUnpublished
๐ฐ News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
James Jeffrey Boatwright, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2024-002039
Appeal From Chester County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-491
Submitted October 2, 2026 โ Filed November 18, 2026
AFFIRMED
Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of
Lancaster, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: James Jeffrey Boatwright appeals his conviction for first-degree
burglary and sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, Boatwright
argues the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motion because the State
did not present any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence showing he had
the intent to commit a crime when he entered the victim's home. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold the trial
court did not err in denying Boatwright's directed verdict motion because a
reasonable inference from the evidence showed Boatwright entered the home with
the intent to commit a crime. See State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 235, 781 S.E.2d
352, 353 (2016) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate
court] views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the State." (quoting State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460
(2014))); id. ("[An appellate court's] review is limited to considering the existence
or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); State v. Odems, 395 S.C. 582, 586,
720 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2011) ("[I]f there is any direct or substantial circumstantial
evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court
must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury."); S.C. Code Ann.
ยง 16-11-311(A) (2015) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the
person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the
dwelling, and either: (1) when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in
immediate flight, he or another participant in the crime: (a) is armed with a deadly
weapon or explosive; . . . or (d) displays what is or appears to be a knife . . . ; or (3)
the entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime."); State v. Christensen, 194 S.C.
131, 137-38, 9 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1940) (stating "mere[ly] breaking and entering a
house is not a crime"); State v. Parker, 344 S.C. 250, 255 n.3, 543 S.E.2d 255, 258
n.3 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[L]arceny is the 'felonious taking and carrying away of the
goods of another' against the owner's will or without his consent." (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Keith, 283 S.C. 597, 598, 325 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1985)));
State v. Haney, 257 S.C. 89, 92, 184 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1971) ("[P]roof of unlawful
entry into a building which contains personal property that could be the subject o[f]
larceny gives rise to an inference that will sustain a conviction of burglary."
(quoting People v. Rossi, 250 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969))); State v.
Meggett, 398 S.C. 516, 527, 728 S.E.2d 492, 498 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The question
of the intent with which an act is done is one of fact and is ordinarily for jury
determination except in extreme cases where there is no evidence thereon."
(quoting State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971))); State
v. Gilliland, 402 S.C. 389, 397, 741 S.E.2d 521, 526 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]he jury
may base its determination of . . . intent upon evidence of the accused's actions
once inside the dwelling.").
AFFIRMED.1
WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.