Denis Ariel Calix-Castro v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket3D2025-0347
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 18, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-0347
Lower Tribunal No. F20-17725-B
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Denis Ariel Calix-Castro,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lody Jean,
Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Lourdes B. Fernandez,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J.
A jury convicted appellant, Denis Ariel Calix-Castro, of three counts of
lewd and lascivious molestation of a child under twelve, in violation of section
800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), and one count of simple battery, in
violation of section 784.03, Florida Statutes, rendered following a jury trial.
He raises two complaints on appeal. First, he claims the trial court abused
its discretion when it restricted his cross-examination of the alleged victim,
D.T. Second, he contends the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to a twelve-person jury when it empaneled a six-person
jury to decide his case. Neither contention has merit. Finding no error
because the proffered line of questioning was repetitive and our precedent
authorizes a six-person jury, we affirm.1
I
D.T. was the daughter of Calix-Castro’s girlfriend. During the COVID–
19 pandemic, she moved to North Carolina and lived with her maternal aunt
for a short period of time. While there, she told her aunt that Calix-Castro
molested her when she was between four and six years old.
1
In supplemental briefing, Calix-Castro raises an unpreserved challenge to
his conviction by a six-person jury. He does so in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari review of Kian v. Florida,
146 S. Ct. 2732 (2026).
2
The State charged Calix-Castro by felony information with four counts
of lewd and lascivious molestation of a child under the age of twelve. It
charged D.T.’s mother, too, with child neglect and failure to report child
abuse. The mother entered into a negotiated plea. She served nine months
in the county jail and agreed to testify against Calix-Castro.
Calix-Castro proceeded to trial. His theory was simple—D.T.’s aunt
“planted” the molestation accusations in D.T.’s head so that she could “keep”
D.T. because the aunt wanted a grandchild. Defense counsel elicited
testimony to that effect from D.T.’s mother, and, on cross-examination, from
D.T. herself. D.T. testified that her aunt “probably” put stuff in her head. But
again and again, she testified that she did not remember the specifics of what
her aunt may have told her. She had been a small child at the time, she
explained, and had not seen her aunt since the pandemic.
A six-person jury found Calix-Castro guilty on three of the molestation
charges and guilty of the lesser included offense of battery on the remaining
count. Calix-Castro never objected to the six-person jury, not during
empanelment and not at any point during the trial. The trial court sentenced
him to concurrent forty-year prison terms on the molestation counts and 364
days on the battery count, followed by a life term of probation. This appeal
followed.
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II
A
We review limits on cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. The
standard is deferential, and deliberately so. As we have said before,
although wide latitude is permitted on cross-examination in a criminal trial,
“its scope and limitation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and
is not subject to review except for a clear abuse of discretion.” Diaz v. State,
747 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (quoting Tompkins v. State, 502
So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986)); Bugg v. State, 295 So. 3d 1238, 1246 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2020) (“[A] criminal defendant should be afforded wide latitude to cross-
examine the State’s witnesses, especially when cross-examining a key
prosecution witness.” (citation omitted)). But wide latitude is not unlimited
latitude. A trial court may limit cross-examination for any number of reasons,
including to prevent “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”
See Recco v. State, 264 So. 3d 273, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citation
modified) (finding abuse of discretion where “alleged victim’s credibility was
a central issue in [the] case and [a]ppellant’s ability to challenge that
credibility was unduly encumbered”). The United States Supreme Court has
said the same, observing that “interrogation that is repetitive or only
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marginally relevant” may be properly limited at trial. See Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
B
The transcript demonstrates that the trial court acted well within that
discretion here. This is not a case in which the trial court forbade an entire
line of questioning. Instead, the contrary is true. The defense was allowed
to elicit testimony from D.T. and others supporting its theory of defense—
that the aunt “coached [D.T.] to fabricate the allegations against both [Castro]
and the mother” so she could “keep” D.T.
D.T. conceded that her aunt “probably” put notions in her head. But
she said, more than once, that she did not “really remember” the specifics of
what she and her aunt discussed. No questions remained unanswered.
Cross-examination is not a license to pose the same question to a witness
until the answer changes. Under these circumstances, the judge’s decision
to restrict further cross-examination as to the contents of the conversation
cannot be deemed “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable,” and so it was not an
abuse of discretion. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203
(Fla. 1980) (citation omitted).
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C
In closing, we are bound to reject the further claim that, by empaneling
a six-person jury, the trial court violated Calix-Castro’s constitutional rights.
See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 103 (1970); Serrano-Delgado v. State, 392 So. 3d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2024); Morales-Alaffita v. State, 376 So. 3d 791, 793 (Fla. 2d DCA
2023); Ryan v. State, 390 So. 3d 86, 87 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (citing
Jimenez v. State, 167 So. 3d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)); Brown v. State, 359
So. 3d 408, 410 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Simpson v. State, 368 So. 3d 513,
513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023); Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022). Accordingly, we affirm on all issues.
Affirmed.
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