Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-2673 ___________________________ United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Clinton Rongey Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau ____________ Submitted: October 19, 2026 Filed: November 5, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________ Before KELLY, BENTON, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Clinton Dale Rongey left his phone in his cousin’s truck. The cousin found many sexually explicit images of a three-year-old girl on the phone. Neighbors gave the phone to police, who arrested Rongey. Deputy Zack Austin and Sherriff Alonzo Bradwell interviewed him. Deputy Austin did not record part of the interview. Unrecorded, Rongey confessed to taking a sexually explicit picture of the three-year- old girl. At trial, Rongey sought to cross-examine Deputy Austin under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) about his firing (four years before) for giving cigarettes to inmates while he was a jailor at a county jail. After a hearing, the district court ruled that Rongey could not cross-examine Deputy Austin about this because it did not relate to his character for truthfulness. The jury found Rongey guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). The district court 1 sentenced him to 360 months (the maximum guideline sentence). He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. Rongey argues the district court procedurally erred by not reasonably explaining his sentence. Rongey did not object at sentencing, so this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Ross, 29 F.4th 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2022). Rongey must show: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights” and “(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The district court, in fact, reasonably explained Rongey’s sentence: The first of the things I have to consider, Mr. Rongey, in your case as in every case, is the nature and circumstances of the offense, which I have to say, though, it doesn’t really need to be said, is reprehensible, among the most reprehensible that I’ve seen on the bench, for at least nine months doing what you did to a vulnerable child who was in your care inflicting devastating harm on a vulnerable victim. 1 The Honorable Sarah E. Pitlyk, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. -2- The victim impact statement I’ll note clearly describes a lot of trauma the family of the victim has already been through. This was a horrific breach of trust on top of the other egregious aspects of the conduct and the harm to the victim that she will ultimately endure during the rest of the course of her life. The guidelines appropriately reflect the gravity of the offense and notably recommend more than a statutory maximum here. The mitigation that has been brought to bear by your attorney and the arguments that she made in her sentencing memorandum I think are already sufficiently accounted for in the reduction from life to 30 years, and, therefore, I find that reflecting the seriousness of the offense, deterring others, protection of the public, and the parity with similarly situated defendants in light of the presentation of the Government I’ll note the statutory mandatory minimum here and I will impose a sentence of 30 years to be followed by a lifetime of supervision finding that to be sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the statutory factors in your case. “The bar is not high for the adequacy of the court’s explanation when it imposes a within-Guidelines sentence,” and a “no-frills explanation” will suffice. United States v. Barbee, 44 F.4th 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 2022). Since the district court made an individualized assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors here, there was no procedural error, much less a plain one. I. Rongey argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court did not give proper weight to mitigating factors. This court reviews substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). It “will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the -3- applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 464. Rongey’s sentence is presumptively reasonable because it was within the guideline range. See United States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523, 535 (8th Cir. 2012). Rongey claims the district court gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors, as shown by the court’s statement that mitigating factors were “sufficiently accounted for in the reduction from life to 30 years [imposed by statute for this offense].” To the contrary, the district court considered mitigating factors like Rongey’s age but concluded the nature of the offense weighed more heavily. “Mere disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal.” United States v. Johnson, 151 F.4th 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2025). The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving Rongey’s age less weight than the other factors. II. Rongey argues the district court violated his constitutional right to confrontation by not allowing him to cross-examine Deputy Austin about his past firing for giving cigarettes to inmates—a violation of jail regulations. Rongey did not object on constitutional grounds at trial, citing only Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 2 This court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 484 F.3d 1006, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007). Plain error requires “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights” and “(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. “The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause affords criminal defendants the right to be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him.’” United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782, 794 (8th Cir. 2021), quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The primary purpose of this right is to guarantee the opportunity for effective cross- 2 On appeal, Rongey does discuss Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), but subsumes any Rule 608(b) objection under the Confrontation Clause and presents the issue as a constitutional claim. -4- examination, particularly with respect to a witness’s potential bias.” United States v. Clay, 883 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). District courts have “wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits” based on concerns about “confusion of the issues, . . . or interrogation that is . . . only marginally relevant.” Campbell, 986 F.3d at 794, quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). After a hearing, the district court found that Deputy Austin was fired for “rule-breaking,” not “lying.” The court concluded that the firing had no bearing on Deputy Austin’s character for truthfulness or bias and would have confused the issues. Not allowing cross examination on this subject was not an error, let alone a plain error. ******* The judgment is affirmed. ______________________________ -5-