United States v. Reggie Jordan
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-3685
JudgeRaymond M. Kethledge; Eric L. Clay; John B. Nalbandian
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0459n.06
No. 25-3685
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Nov 16, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
)
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v. )
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
)
OHIO
REGGIE JORDAN, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. OPINION
)
)
Before: KETHLEDGE, Chief Judge; CLAY, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Chief Judge. Reggie Jordan challenges the constitutionality of his
indictment and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We reject his challenges and affirm.
I.
In March 2022, Jordan took assault rifles, handguns, and ammunition to a gun range and
later depicted his excursion in a video posted to a social media account. Police saw the video and
investigated. It turned out that Jordan had previously been convicted of aggravated robbery, after
he struck the victim in the head with a gun and stole $1,000. Jordan also had multiple prior
convictions for selling drugs.
Police obtained a warrant to search Jordan’s apartment, where they found six guns,
including several rifles. One handgun (shown in Jordan’s video) had been reported as stolen. The
police also found a second handgun in the kitchen, along with digital scales and a drug press. The
press and one scale later tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl residue.
No. 25-3685, United States v. Jordan
A grand jury thereafter indicted Jordan under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) as a
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Jordan moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing
that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him. The district court
rejected both challenges, and a jury later convicted him. In preparation for sentencing, Probation
calculated Jordan’s guidelines range. His base offense level—26, the highest available for a felon-
in-possession offense—resulted from his past convictions and his guns’ ability to fire using high-
capacity magazines. His final offense level was 33, after enhancements for the number of guns
recovered by the officers, the fact that one of them had been stolen, and because of the drug scales
and press found with the guns. Combined with his criminal history score—VI, also the highest
recognized under the guidelines—Jordan’s offense level yielded a guidelines range of 235 to 293
months. The relevant statutory maximum capped Jordan’s sentence at 120 months, however, so
that became his guideline recommendation.
Jordan requested a downward variance from that statutory maximum, arguing that his
possession of firearms did not involve violent conduct. The district court later held a sentencing
hearing, but continued it mid-hearing after learning of some pending state criminal charges against
Jordan. Those charges arose before Jordan’s federal indictment, when officers responded to a
noise complaint at Jordan’s apartment. There, they found Jordan apparently overdosing on drugs,
with another man unconscious in a bathroom, apparently after trying to flush drugs down a toilet.
The officers also found stacks of money and zip-lock baggies containing fentanyl and cocaine.
The district court in Jordan’s sentencing hearing said that he should be sentenced on those state
charges before his federal ones. Jordan was later convicted of drug possession in his state case
and sentenced to a 16-year minimum prison sentence.
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No. 25-3685, United States v. Jordan
Before the second sentencing hearing, both the government and Jordan filed supplemental
sentencing memoranda. The government argued for a 120-month sentence, which the government
said should run consecutively to his state sentence, given that the federal and state offenses
involved different conduct. Jordan sought a concurrent sentence below the statutory maximum.
The court soon held a second sentencing hearing, where it reviewed the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors and imposed a 120-month sentence consecutive to the state sentence. This appeal
followed.
II.
A.
Jordan challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss his indictment, which
we review de novo. See United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2004). Jordan
argues that § 922(g)(1) violates his right to “keep and bear Arms,” both on its face and as applied
to him. U.S Const. amend. II. The Second Amendment presumptively protects the right of all
American citizens, including felons, to possess a gun. See United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th
637, 649 (6th Cir. 2024). But “our nation’s history and tradition demonstrate that Congress may
disarm individuals they believe are dangerous.” Id. at 657.
Circuit precedent forecloses Jordan’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1). See id. Meanwhile,
§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional “as it applies to dangerous individuals.” Id. at 662. The question here
is whether Jordan is a “dangerous individual” for purposes of that rule. On that point, Jordan bears
the “burden to demonstrate that he is not dangerous, and thus falls outside of § 922(g)(1)’s
constitutionally permissible scope.” Id. at 657.
Here, Jordan’s conviction for aggravated robbery “speak[s] directly to whether [he] is
dangerous,” not least because he struck his victim in the head with a gun. Id. at 658. Jordan thus
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No. 25-3685, United States v. Jordan
“presents a danger to others or the public.” Id. at 662. Jordan was also convicted twice of drug
trafficking, which poses a “significant threat of danger” to others. Id. at 659. The record affords
ample grounds to justify Jordan’s disarmament. See United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794, 805
(6th Cir. 2024).
B.
Jordan argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review the
reasonableness of his sentence for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Willoughby, 742
F.3d 229, 243 (6th Cir. 2014). The district court imposed a sentence within the guidelines range,
so Jordan’s sentence is “presumptively reasonable.” Id.
Jordan argues specifically that the district court gave undue weight to his criminal history
and character in sentencing him. A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court
“gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Bistline, 720
F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 2013). Not all the factors “are important in every sentencing; often one or
two prevail, while others pale.” United States v. Bridgewater, 479 F.3d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 2007).
Here, the court discussed all the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including his criminal record and
potential mitigating factors alike. And Jordan’s criminal history itself bore on multiple factors that
§ 3553(a) required the district court to consider. The court said as much, noting that Jordan’s
criminal history required a sentence that would “protect the public, provide adequate deterrence,
[and] reflect the seriousness of the offense.” The court’s emphasis on Jordan’s criminal history
was reasonable.
Jordan cites several cases in arguing otherwise, but each case involved a sentence that
varied significantly above the guidelines range. See United States v. Johnson, 26 F.4th 726, 736
(6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Lee,
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No. 25-3685, United States v. Jordan
974 F.3d 670, 677 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Warren, 771 F. App’x 637, 638 (6th Cir. 2019).
Here, by contrast, the statutory maximum limited the district court to a sentence of just over half
of the one the guidelines would otherwise recommend. The circumstances accounted for by the
guidelines—the details of the offense and Jordan’s prior convictions—thus amply supported
imposing the statutory maximum. Jordan’s sentence is substantively reasonable.
C.
Finally, Jordan argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, because the district
court made it consecutive to his state sentence. We review that decision too for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2009).
Jordan contends that the district court overlooked U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d), which reminds
district courts of their discretion to make a sentence concurrent or consecutive. But the court said
it had read Jordan’s supplemental sentencing memorandum, which discussed the relevant
provision at length. See United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 2009). And the
court made its reasons for the sentence “generally clear.” Berry, 565 F.3d at 342 (quotation
omitted). Immediately after discussing the § 3553(a) factors, the court said it would impose a
consecutive sentence “for the reasons . . . just stated.” And the state and federal offenses involved
entirely unrelated conduct, which likewise supports the court’s decision to make the sentences
consecutive. Cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 405 (1995). The district court did not abuse
its discretion.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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