Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13141 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 1 of 5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13141 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus BRANDON LAVERNE PARSONS, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:24-cr-00280-WWB-DCI-1 ____________________ Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Brandon Parsons appeals his total sentence of 600 months’ imprisonment—a downward variance from the guideline term of life—for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage USCA11 Case: 25-13141 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 2 of 5 2 Opinion of the Court 25-13141 in sexual activity, attempted production of child pornography, two counts of distribution of child pornography, possession or access with intent to view child pornography, and attempted transfer of obscene material to a minor. Parsons argues that the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court improperly weighed the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and failed to assign more weight to his mitigating history and characteristics— including his military service and traumatic childhood. When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of the circumstances under the abuse-of- discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consid- eration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper fac- tors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified). This Court may vacate a sentence only if it’s “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190 (citation modified). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it’s unreasonable in light of the record and the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020). Those factors include, among other things, USCA11 Case: 25-13141 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 3 of 5 25-13141 Opinion of the Court 3 “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the seriousness of the offense,” and the need to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). Regarding the seriousness of the offense—which is included under § 3553(a)(2)(A)—we’ve explained that “[t]he seriousness of a crime varies directly with the harm it causes” and that child sex crimes “are among the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal offenses.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1206 (citation modified). Addi- tionally, we’ve identified § 3553(a)(2)(C) as the “specific deterrence or incapacitation factor” and stated that the “threat of recidivism” posed by those who sexually abuse children is “appalling.” Id. at 1213–14 (citation modified). The weight given to the various § 3553(a) factors is left to the discretion of the district court, and we will not substitute our own judgment by reweighing the factors. United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1329 (11th Cir. 2024). The district court is not re- quired to give “equal weight” to all the factors and instead has dis- cretion to “attach great weight to one factor over others.” United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modi- fied). The district court’s analysis must be an “individualized as- sessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. As we’ve observed, “[a] sentence well below the statutory maximum indicates reasonableness.” United States v. Thomas, 108 F.4th 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). Moreover, we’ve ex- plained that “a sentence which may result in a defendant passing away while in custody, however tragic, is neither automatically a USCA11 Case: 25-13141 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 4 of 5 4 Opinion of the Court 25-13141 life sentence nor presumptively unreasonable.” United States v. Mos- quera, 886 F.3d 1032, 1052 (11th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980, 996 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We’ve upheld time and again sentences that will outlast a child pornographer’s life.”). Here, Parsons has failed to establish that his total sentence of 600 months’ imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. First, Parsons argues that the district court “fail[ed] to give reasonable weight to [his] mitigating characteristics” when sentencing him. Br. of Appellant at 24. To be sure, Parsons presented considerable evidence of his traumatic upbringing and military service, which the district court acknowledged. But these mitigating factors ex- isted alongside a significant amount of harm that Parsons inflicted on his underage victims. And the district court repeatedly empha- sized that the need to protect the public from Parsons was a partic- ularly important consideration in this case. Given the deference afforded to district courts in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the court here didn’t commit a clear error of judgment in balancing these considerations and “attach[ing] great weight” to some over others. Olson, 127 F.4th at 1276 (citation modified); see also Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th at 1329. Second, Parsons contends that the district court abused its discretion “by imposing a sentence that would imprison [Parsons] until past his natural life expectancy in prison.” Br. of Appellant at 27. But this Court has explained that “a sentence which may result in a defendant passing away while in custody, however tragic, is nei- USCA11 Case: 25-13141 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 11/10/2026 Page: 5 of 5 25-13141 Opinion of the Court 5 ther automatically a life sentence nor presumptively unreasona- ble.” Mosquera, 886 F.3d at 1052. In this case, because the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the fact that 600 months’ imprisonment may constitute “a de facto life sentence” for Parsons, Br. of Appellant at 27, isn’t sufficient to render his sentence substantively unreasonable. Finally, Parsons asserts that his sentence is substantively un- reasonable because it’s “comprised of the statutory-maximum sen- tence of several of his individual counts.” Br. of Appellant at 28. Parsons’s 600 months’ sentence, however, was well below the max- imum term that he could have received, which was life plus 1,200 months. And as we’ve previously underscored, “[a] sentence well below the statutory maximum indicates reasonableness.” Thomas, 108 F.4th at 1357. In sum, because we aren’t “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg- ment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors,” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (cita- tion modified), Parsons has failed to show that his sentence is sub- stantively unreasonable. AFFIRMED.