United States v. Joel Lubin
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
Docket26-10415
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-10415
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOEL LUBIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cr-20391-BB-1
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and GRANT and LAGOA, Cir-
cuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joel Lubin appeals his sentence of 60 months of imprison-
ment following his guilty plea for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
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2 Opinion of the Court 26-10415
He argues that the district court failed to state whether it granted
the government’s motion for a downward departure based on his
substantial assistance, and if it did so, it failed to explain how that
departure affected his guideline range. He also argues that his sen-
tence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Lubin pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349. A probation officer prepared a
presentence investigation report that calculated a base offense level
of 7. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. The report added an 18-level enhancement
for a loss amount of $7,249,457.94. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). It added 4
levels because Lubin was an organizer or leader of the offense,
which involved five or more participants. Id. § 3B1.1(a). It sub-
tracted 3 levels for Lubin’s acceptance of responsibility, id.
§ 3E1.1(a)-(b), which resulted in a total offense level of 26. With a
criminal history score of 0 and criminal history category of I, it cal-
culated a guideline range of 63 to 78 months of imprisonment. The
statutory maximum sentence for Lubin’s offense was 20 years.
The government moved for a downward departure,
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, based on Lubin’s substantial assistance. At sen-
tencing, it explained that Lubin had been charged as part of an in-
vestigation targeting for-profit schools and was responsible for is-
suing diplomas to individuals who had not achieved a nursing de-
gree or diploma. It stated that Lubin made “a good amount of
money” from the offense but had been cooperative from the outset
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26-10415 Opinion of the Court 3
of the investigation by identifying his cohorts and satisfying his for-
feiture obligations. It requested a sentence of one-third from the
lower end of Lubin’s guideline range. The district court inquired
about the extent of Lubin’s cooperation and the status of his co-
horts. Lubin acknowledged the seriousness of his offense but ar-
gued that his lack of criminal history, service, family support, and
assistance to the government warranted a prison sentence of 24
months. The district court stated that neither party objected to the
presentence investigation report and adopted its calculation of an
offense level of 26, criminal history category of I, and guideline
range of 63 to 78 months of imprisonment.
The district court stated that Lubin’s “horrific” conduct en-
dangered the public by allowing unqualified individuals to provide
health care for his personal financial gain. It stated that it consid-
ered his lack of criminal history, substantial assistance, the nature
and characteristics of the offense, the sophisticated means used to
commit the offense, and the need to promote respect for the law,
deter similar conduct, and avoid unwarranted disparities. After
considering the relevant factors, the district court granted a down-
ward departure and imposed a prison sentence of 60 months fol-
lowed by 2 years of supervised release and a fine of $25,000. Lubin
did not object. After the sentencing hearing, the district court
stated that it granted the motion for a downward departure in a
paperless order “for the reasons stated on the record.”
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
If a defendant fails to object to the procedural reasonable-
ness of his sentence in the district court, we review for plain error.
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). Pro-
cedural errors include miscalculating “the Guidelines range, treat-
ing the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an ex-
planation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We review the substantive rea-
sonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Id. A district court
abuses its discretion when it fails to consider factors due significant
weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor,
or commits a clear error of judgment. United States v. Sotelo, 130
F.4th 1229, 1244 (11th Cir. 2025).
III. DISCUSSION
The district court committed no plain procedural error. It
granted a downward departure for substantial assistance. See United
States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005). But the gov-
ernment “has no control over whether or to what extent the dis-
trict court will depart from the Guidelines.” United States v. Livesay,
525 F.3d 1081, 1091 (11th Cir. 2008). Even after granting a down-
ward departure, the district court must consider the statutory sen-
tencing factors before imposing a sentence. United States v. McVay,
447 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2006). And Lubin fails to explain how
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26-10415 Opinion of the Court 5
any procedural error led the district court to impose a harsher sen-
tence or otherwise prejudiced his substantial rights.
Lubin’s sentence is also substantively reasonable. The dis-
trict court considered the relevant sentencing factors and deter-
mined that a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment was appro-
priate based on the seriousness of his offense, lack of criminal his-
tory, and substantial assistance. Based on this record, we are not
“left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment” in sentencing Lubin to 60
months of imprisonment, which was also well below the statutory
maximum sentence of 20 years. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Lubin’s sentence.