State Of Washington, V. Leland Dulani Harris
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket87523-0
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 87523-0-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LELAND DULANI HARRIS,
Appellant.
MANN, J. — Leland Harris pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder with
a deadly weapon for trying to stab his ex-girlfriend to death in 2013. Harris stipulated to
an aggravating factor that the crime was committed in the presence of their minor
children. At sentencing, Harris argued that the trial court could not consider, for the
purpose of imposing an exceptional sentence, any facts other than those inherent in the
aggravating factor. The trial court found that the presence of the children warranted an
exceptional sentence above the standard range, but accepted Harris’s argument that
the court could not consider facts not inherent in the aggravating factor, such as the age
of the children. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 18 years to ensure
that Harris would remain in prison until the children reached adulthood, regardless of
their age at the time of the crime.
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In 2024, Harris unsuccessfully moved for resentencing under CrR 7.8(b), arguing
that his offender score included an out-of-state conviction rendered invalid following the
Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521
(2021). The trial court concluded that while the one-point error in Harris’s offender
score rendered his judgment and sentence (J&S) invalid on its face, he nevertheless
failed to show the requisite prejudice for collateral relief. Harris appeals the trial court’s
denial of his CrR 7.8(b) motion.
We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Incident
The underlying facts were summarized by this court in Harris’s direct appeal:
In early 2013, Leland Harris and Carmen Young had been in a dating
relationship in New Jersey for about six years and had two children
together, ages five and three. The relationship was marred by domestic
violence and eventually Harris was incarcerated. While he was serving
his sentence, Young moved to Washington. After Harris’s release from
custody, Young allowed him to come to Washington to visit her and the
children for a week. At the end of the week, Harris refused to leave, but
he eventually agreed to do so and Young bought him a return ticket to
New Jersey.
The day before Harris was scheduled to leave, Young returned home from
work to find him drinking outside her apartment building. Harris followed
Young into her apartment and they sat quietly on the sofa for a while.
Suddenly, Harris grabbed her by the hair and said[,] “Bitch, I’m not going
to let you take my kids from me.” He then dragged her into the kitchen by
her hair. Harris pulled a knife from the kitchen drawer and dragged Young
to the bedroom. The[ir] younger child came running into the bedroom and
as Young “was holding [H.H.], telling [H.H.] to calm down and stop crying
and go in her room . . . [t]hat’s when [Harris] stabbed [Young] the first
time, when Young was holding [H.H.] . . . [Harris] stabbed [Young] on [her]
left side and said[,] ‘I’m going to kill you bitch.’” Their older child started to
enter the bedroom and Young told the two to leave. Harris kicked both
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children out of the room and closed the door. He then stabbed Young
again, this time in the chest, before fleeing with Young’s cell phone.
A neighbor found Young bleeding profusely and called the police. When
the police arrived, they found the children shaking and distraught. As
Young explained that she had been stabbed by Harris, Harris returned to
the scene and confessed to the crime. He was placed under arrest.
Young was taken to Harborview Medical Center and treated for injuries to
her kidney, spleen[,] pancreas[,] and lung.
State v. Harris, No. 71408-2-I, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 6, 2015) (unpublished)
(citations omitted), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/714082.pdf.
Harris was charged with second degree attempted murder—domestic violence
while armed with a deadly weapon, and an aggravating factor that the crime involved
domestic violence and occurred within sight or sound of his and the victim’s minor
children. He was also charged with two counts of fourth degree assault—domestic
violence for kicking the children during the crime. After plea negotiations, the State
agreed to dismiss the fourth degree assault charges—which would have otherwise
increased Harris’s offender score on the attempted murder charge—and allowed Harris
to plead guilty to the attempted murder by entering an Alford 1 plea. Harris, No. 71408-
2-I, slip op. at 1. On the first day of trial, Harris pleaded guilty as charged to second
degree attempted murder, the deadly weapon enhancement, the domestic violence
allegation, and the aggravating factor that his and the victim’s minor children were
present.
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
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B. Sentencing Hearing
In early 2014, the sentencing court calculated Harris’s offender score as one,
based on a 2010 New Jersey conviction for possession of a controlled substance that
was mislabeled as a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute. As a result, Harris’s total standard sentence range, including the deadly
weapon enhancement, was calculated as 124.5 to 199.5 months in prison.
The State recommended an exceptional sentence totaling 216 months based on
Harris’s guilty plea and stipulation to the aggravating factor. Harris disagreed, arguing
that because he had not stipulated to the probable cause certification for purposes of
sentencing, the court could not consider any facts beyond the basic one inherent in the
aggravating factor—that the crime was committed in front of Harris’s and the victim’s
minor children—in deciding whether to impose an exceptional sentence. Without
specifying the length, Harris recommended a sentence within the standard sentence
range.
At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that even without considering the
aggravating factor, the “viciousness” of Harris’s crime warranted a sentence at the high-
end of the standard sentence range: 199.5 months. The sentencing court further found
that an exceptional sentence above the standard range was warranted based on the
stipulated aggravating factor. Nonetheless, the court explained that it would accept
Harris’s contention that it could not consider any circumstances about the children’s
involvement, including their age, beyond the plain fact that they were present when the
crime was committed. Based on that, the sentencing court imposed an exceptional
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sentence of 216 months or 18 years to ensure that Harris would remain in prison until
the children reached adulthood, regardless of their age at the time of the crime.
We affirmed Harris’s exceptional sentence on direct appeal, and a mandate
reflecting the same was issued in 2016.
C. Procedural History
In the wake of Blake, Harris’s New Jersey conviction for possession of a
controlled substance was no longer comparable to a felony under Washington law.
Harris’s offender score therefore dropped from one to zero, creating a post-Blake
standard sentence range of 92.25 to 165 months, in addition to the deadly weapon
enhancement, for a total range of 116.25 to 189 months.
On May 28, 2021, Harris filed a pro se CrR 7.8(b) motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, arguing that Blake rendered his J&S facially invalid. The trial court determined
that the motion was time barred by RCW 10.73.090(1) and transferred it to this court for
consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP) on June 14, 2021. On September
16, 2021, after determining that Harris’s 2010 New Jersey conviction was in fact only for
simple possession of a controlled substance, we remanded the PRP to the trial court “to
determine what effect the Blake decision has on Harris’s [J&S].”
On July 25, 2024, now aided by counsel, Harris filed a new CrR 7.8(b)
resentencing motion. The State opposed the motion with its own, seeking transfer to
this court for consideration as a PRP. The State provided the trial court with the full
transcript of Harris’s plea and sentencing hearings.
A show cause hearing on the merits of Harris’s CrR 7.8(b) resentencing motion
and the State’s motion to transfer as a PRP took place on November 1, 2024. The trial
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court determined that (1) Harris’s motion was not time barred by RCW 10.73.090(1);
and (2) Harris made a substantial showing of entitlement to relief “because the New
Jersey conviction only matters if it’s equivalent to the Washington statute, and the
Washington statute was declared unconstitutional.” Nonetheless, the trial court
ultimately denied Harris’s CrR 7.8(b) resentencing motion on the merits by quoting at
length the sentencing judge’s reasoning for imposing the 216-month exceptional
sentence. The trial court found that “the sentencing court would have imposed the
same exceptional sentence irrespective of offender score,” and concluded that Harris’s
miscalculated offender score “was not a fundamental defect amounting to a miscarriage
of justice.”
Harris appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
Assuming that the trial court correctly determined that Harris’s CrR 7.8 motion
escaped the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090, Harris argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by concluding that he was not entitled to resentencing under CrR
7.8(b). 2 We disagree. 3
2 The court reviews a trial court’s ruling on CrR 7.8 motion for abuse of discretion. State v. Frohs,
22 Wn. App. 2d 88, 92, 511 P.3d 1288 (2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on
untenable factual grounds or was made for untenable legal reasons.” Frohs, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 92.
3 The State urges that we conclude that the trial court erred by not transferring Harris’s CrR 7.8
resentencing motion to this court as a PRP. The State argues that the trial court improperly determined
that Harris’s sentence was facially invalid and thus not subject to the one-year time bar in RCW
10.73.090. The State contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Personal Restraint of Fletcher,
3 Wn.3d 356, 359, 552 P.3d 302 (2024), applies only to a “serious” or “extreme [upward] miscalculation”
of a defendant’s offender score, and not a one-point error such as Harris’s. We agree that Fletcher does
not directly address whether, in the context of an upward exceptional sentence, a one-point offender
score error and resulting standard range sentence result in a J&S that is facially invalid. But, as we
discuss below, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’s CrR 7.8
resentencing motion, we need not reach the State’s argument.
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No. 87523-0-I/7
A. An Incorrect Offender Score Amounts to Nonconstitutional Error
A CrR 7.8 motion for resentencing is a collateral attack. State v. Molnar, 198
Wn.2d 508-09, 497 P.3d 858 (2021). “‘Relief by way of collateral attack is
extraordinary,’ and the ‘bases for [c]ollateral attack are limited because collateral relief
undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of trial, and
sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders.’” State v. Drake, 32
Wn. App. 2d 390, 394, 556 P.3d 170 (2024) (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Basra, 10 Wn. App. 2d 279, 287, 448 P.3d 107 (2019),
review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1007 (2025)). To obtain collateral relief, a defendant “‘must
show either that he or she was actually and substantially prejudiced by constitutional
error or that his or her trial suffered from a fundamental defect of a nonconstitutional
nature that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” In re Pers.
Restraint of Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d 356, 379, 552 P.3d 302 (2024) (quoting In re Pers.
Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501, 506, 301 P.3d 450 (2013)). A miscalculated
offender score is nonconstitutional error. Accordingly, Harris must show that including
the Blake offense in the calculation of his offender score amounted to a fundamental
defect resulting in a “complete miscarriage of justice.” Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d at 379.
B. Harris’s J&S is not Void
Once the procedural requirements of CrR 7.8(c) are satisfied, a trial court may
provide relief on the merits if the J&S is void or for any other reason justifying relief.
CrR 7.8(b)(4), (5).
Harris first asserts that the upward miscalculation of his offender score based on
an out-of-state conviction rendered his J&S void. See CrR 7.8(b)(4). The State
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responds that while Harris’s J&S might have been erroneous, that does not render it
void. We agree with the State.
“A void judgment is one entered by a court ‘which lacks jurisdiction of the parties
or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the
particular order involved.’” State v. Zavala-Reynoso, 127 Wn. App. 119, 122, 110 P.3d
827 (2005) (quoting Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1, 7, 448 P.2d 490 (1968)). In Zavala-
Reynoso, the defendant argued that his J&S was void because it was based on an
incorrect offender score. 127 Wn. App. at 123. But the court rejected the argument,
explaining that it fell outside CrR 7.8(b)(4) because the defendant did not contest the
trial court’s jurisdiction or inherent power to sentence him. Zavala-Reynoso, 127 Wn.
App. at 123.
Like the defendant in Zavala-Reynoso, Harris does not challenge the trial court’s
jurisdiction or inherent power to enter his J&S. Instead, he focuses only on the upward
miscalculation of his offender score and associated standard sentence range. We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris collateral relief
under CrR 7.8(b)(4).
C. Harris Fails to Establish That He is Entitled to Collateral Relief
Alternatively, Harris contends that his miscalculated offender score and resulting
standard sentence range constituted nonconstitutional error that entitles him to
collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5). We disagree.
The catch-all provision of CrR 7.8(b)(5) allows for collateral relief in situations not
covered by subsections (1) through (4), and in circumstances “‘where the interests of
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justice most urgently require.’” State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 128, 285 P.3d 27 (2012)
(quoting State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83, 88, 776 P.2d 132 (1989)).
Relying on State v. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d 528, 541 P.3d 415, review denied,
3 Wn.3d 1007 (2024), the trial court concluded that Harris failed to establish that he was
entitled to collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5).
In Pascuzzi, the defendant was convicted of two counts of child molestation, and
a jury found an aggravating factor that Pascuzzi had abused a position of trust in
committing the crime. 29 Wn. App. 2d at 530. Pascuzzi’s offender score was 8, and
the top-end of his standard sentence range was 171 months to life. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn.
App. 2d at 531. Based on the aggravating factor, as well as the trial court’s
determination that other unscored convictions resulted in a “presumptive sentence that
was clearly too lenient,” Pascuzzi was given an exceptional sentence of 200 months to
life. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 530-31. In announcing Pascuzzi’s sentence, the trial
court noted that the aggravating factor alone supported the exceptional sentence, and
that the length of the exceptional sentence was appropriate “‘regardless of the
defendant’s offender score.’” Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 531 (quoting record).
Pascuzzi filed a CrR 7.8 resentencing motion on the ground that one of the
convictions used to calculate his offender score was rendered unconstitutional after
Blake. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 531-32. The trial court determined that Pascuzzi’s
motion was not time barred and that he had made a substantial showing that he was
entitled to relief under CrR 7.8. According to the procedure outlined in CrR 7.8(c), the
trial court held a show cause hearing, and ultimately denied Pascuzzi’s resentencing
motion. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 532.
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Pascuzzi appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing because his
exceptional sentence was based on an erroneously calculated offender score and
standard sentencing range. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 533. Pascuzzi contended that
it was unclear whether the trial court would have imposed the same exceptional
sentence had it been aware of the correct standard sentencing range. Pascuzzi, 29
Wn. App. 2d at 533. Division Two of this court rejected the argument, explaining that
Pascuzzi failed to show “a fundamental defect [that] result[ed] in a complete miscarriage
of justice,” given that the record evidenced that the trial court “would have imposed the
same [exceptional] sentence even if Pascuzzi’s offender score had been different.”
Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 534-35. The court further explained that when a
“‘sentencing court incorrectly calculates the standard [sentence] range before imposing
an exceptional sentence’” reversal is not required if “‘the record clearly indicates the
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence anyway.’” Pascuzzi, 29 Wn.
App. 2d at 534 (quoting State v. Parker, 132 Wn.2d 182, 189, 937 P.2d 575 (1997)).
Here, relying on Pascuzzi, the trial court reviewed the record and determined that
Harris failed to establish that he was entitled to collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5). The
court explained its reasoning as follows: 4
So already, we have Judge Amini saying[,] I’m basing my decision solely
on the fact that there was a plea to an aggravating factor. We know Judge
Amini says [that] the aggravating factor is the victim’s children being
present. So we get to the sentence. Judge Amini says, quote, “I am
giving [Harris] above the standard range to 216 months because by that
time, both of these children will be 18 years old,” end quote.
4 Although the trial court referred to the sentencing judge as Judge Susan Amini, it appears that
the sentencing judge was in fact Judge Laura Gene Middaugh.
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Judge Amini continued, quote, “And it just seems to me that when you try
to murder your children’s mother, there is going to be a no-contact order,
and the best thing is to make this last until the children are 18, and that is
216 months, from the information that I have in front of me. So I am
imposing the 216 months,” end quote.
But Judge Amini continued, quote, “[b]ecause that basically puts [Harris] in
prison until these children are adults, and then they can do what they
want, but they are protected, basically, as they are minors, and I think that
is appropriate under the circumstances,” end quote.
Now, the defense argues in that Judge Amini never said that the standard
[sentence] range did not matter, but Judge Amini did not need to say what
did not matter because Judge Amini was very, very clear about what did
matter. And so it follows that I conclude that the sentencing court would
have imposed the same exceptional sentence irrespective of offender
score, and it follows from that that the incorrect sentencing score was not
a fundamental defect amounting to a [complete] miscarriage of justice,
and so I’m denying [Harris]’s request that he be resentenced.
Harris argues that Pascuzzi has been “critically undermined” by Fletcher. We
disagree. Fletcher reaffirmed the longstanding principle that an erroneous offender
score error amounts to nonconstitutional error and thus warrants relief on collateral
attack only if the defendant establishes that the error “is a fundamental defect that
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d at 383
(citation omitted). In that case, Fletcher had established the requisite prejudice because
his offender score error “had a dramatic impact on the standard sentencing range, and
there is a high probability that the mistake affected the original sentence.” Fletcher, 3
Wn.3d at 381 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the miscalculation of Harris’s standard sentence range was
approximately 10 months and did not affect Harris’s ultimate exceptional sentence. The
sentencing court’s decision to impose the 216-month exceptional sentence was based
on the court’s intent to impose a sentence that would last until Harris’s minor children
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reached the age of 18, regardless of their age at the time. Harris cannot show that
scoring error had a dramatic impact on the sentence imposed.
Based on the trial court’s review of the record and its reasoning under Pascuzzi,
we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Harris’s CrR 7.8
resentencing motion.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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