Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87523-0-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION LELAND DULANI HARRIS, Appellant. MANN, J. — Leland Harris pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder with a deadly weapon for trying to stab his ex-girlfriend to death in 2013. Harris stipulated to an aggravating factor that the crime was committed in the presence of their minor children. At sentencing, Harris argued that the trial court could not consider, for the purpose of imposing an exceptional sentence, any facts other than those inherent in the aggravating factor. The trial court found that the presence of the children warranted an exceptional sentence above the standard range, but accepted Harris’s argument that the court could not consider facts not inherent in the aggravating factor, such as the age of the children. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 18 years to ensure that Harris would remain in prison until the children reached adulthood, regardless of their age at the time of the crime. No. 87523-0-I/2 In 2024, Harris unsuccessfully moved for resentencing under CrR 7.8(b), arguing that his offender score included an out-of-state conviction rendered invalid following the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). The trial court concluded that while the one-point error in Harris’s offender score rendered his judgment and sentence (J&S) invalid on its face, he nevertheless failed to show the requisite prejudice for collateral relief. Harris appeals the trial court’s denial of his CrR 7.8(b) motion. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Underlying Incident The underlying facts were summarized by this court in Harris’s direct appeal: In early 2013, Leland Harris and Carmen Young had been in a dating relationship in New Jersey for about six years and had two children together, ages five and three. The relationship was marred by domestic violence and eventually Harris was incarcerated. While he was serving his sentence, Young moved to Washington. After Harris’s release from custody, Young allowed him to come to Washington to visit her and the children for a week. At the end of the week, Harris refused to leave, but he eventually agreed to do so and Young bought him a return ticket to New Jersey. The day before Harris was scheduled to leave, Young returned home from work to find him drinking outside her apartment building. Harris followed Young into her apartment and they sat quietly on the sofa for a while. Suddenly, Harris grabbed her by the hair and said[,] “Bitch, I’m not going to let you take my kids from me.” He then dragged her into the kitchen by her hair. Harris pulled a knife from the kitchen drawer and dragged Young to the bedroom. The[ir] younger child came running into the bedroom and as Young “was holding [H.H.], telling [H.H.] to calm down and stop crying and go in her room . . . [t]hat’s when [Harris] stabbed [Young] the first time, when Young was holding [H.H.] . . . [Harris] stabbed [Young] on [her] left side and said[,] ‘I’m going to kill you bitch.’” Their older child started to enter the bedroom and Young told the two to leave. Harris kicked both -2- No. 87523-0-I/3 children out of the room and closed the door. He then stabbed Young again, this time in the chest, before fleeing with Young’s cell phone. A neighbor found Young bleeding profusely and called the police. When the police arrived, they found the children shaking and distraught. As Young explained that she had been stabbed by Harris, Harris returned to the scene and confessed to the crime. He was placed under arrest. Young was taken to Harborview Medical Center and treated for injuries to her kidney, spleen[,] pancreas[,] and lung. State v. Harris, No. 71408-2-I, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 6, 2015) (unpublished) (citations omitted), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/714082.pdf. Harris was charged with second degree attempted murder—domestic violence while armed with a deadly weapon, and an aggravating factor that the crime involved domestic violence and occurred within sight or sound of his and the victim’s minor children. He was also charged with two counts of fourth degree assault—domestic violence for kicking the children during the crime. After plea negotiations, the State agreed to dismiss the fourth degree assault charges—which would have otherwise increased Harris’s offender score on the attempted murder charge—and allowed Harris to plead guilty to the attempted murder by entering an Alford 1 plea. Harris, No. 71408- 2-I, slip op. at 1. On the first day of trial, Harris pleaded guilty as charged to second degree attempted murder, the deadly weapon enhancement, the domestic violence allegation, and the aggravating factor that his and the victim’s minor children were present. 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). -3- No. 87523-0-I/4 B. Sentencing Hearing In early 2014, the sentencing court calculated Harris’s offender score as one, based on a 2010 New Jersey conviction for possession of a controlled substance that was mislabeled as a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. As a result, Harris’s total standard sentence range, including the deadly weapon enhancement, was calculated as 124.5 to 199.5 months in prison. The State recommended an exceptional sentence totaling 216 months based on Harris’s guilty plea and stipulation to the aggravating factor. Harris disagreed, arguing that because he had not stipulated to the probable cause certification for purposes of sentencing, the court could not consider any facts beyond the basic one inherent in the aggravating factor—that the crime was committed in front of Harris’s and the victim’s minor children—in deciding whether to impose an exceptional sentence. Without specifying the length, Harris recommended a sentence within the standard sentence range. At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that even without considering the aggravating factor, the “viciousness” of Harris’s crime warranted a sentence at the high- end of the standard sentence range: 199.5 months. The sentencing court further found that an exceptional sentence above the standard range was warranted based on the stipulated aggravating factor. Nonetheless, the court explained that it would accept Harris’s contention that it could not consider any circumstances about the children’s involvement, including their age, beyond the plain fact that they were present when the crime was committed. Based on that, the sentencing court imposed an exceptional -4- No. 87523-0-I/5 sentence of 216 months or 18 years to ensure that Harris would remain in prison until the children reached adulthood, regardless of their age at the time of the crime. We affirmed Harris’s exceptional sentence on direct appeal, and a mandate reflecting the same was issued in 2016. C. Procedural History In the wake of Blake, Harris’s New Jersey conviction for possession of a controlled substance was no longer comparable to a felony under Washington law. Harris’s offender score therefore dropped from one to zero, creating a post-Blake standard sentence range of 92.25 to 165 months, in addition to the deadly weapon enhancement, for a total range of 116.25 to 189 months. On May 28, 2021, Harris filed a pro se CrR 7.8(b) motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that Blake rendered his J&S facially invalid. The trial court determined that the motion was time barred by RCW 10.73.090(1) and transferred it to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP) on June 14, 2021. On September 16, 2021, after determining that Harris’s 2010 New Jersey conviction was in fact only for simple possession of a controlled substance, we remanded the PRP to the trial court “to determine what effect the Blake decision has on Harris’s [J&S].” On July 25, 2024, now aided by counsel, Harris filed a new CrR 7.8(b) resentencing motion. The State opposed the motion with its own, seeking transfer to this court for consideration as a PRP. The State provided the trial court with the full transcript of Harris’s plea and sentencing hearings. A show cause hearing on the merits of Harris’s CrR 7.8(b) resentencing motion and the State’s motion to transfer as a PRP took place on November 1, 2024. The trial -5- No. 87523-0-I/6 court determined that (1) Harris’s motion was not time barred by RCW 10.73.090(1); and (2) Harris made a substantial showing of entitlement to relief “because the New Jersey conviction only matters if it’s equivalent to the Washington statute, and the Washington statute was declared unconstitutional.” Nonetheless, the trial court ultimately denied Harris’s CrR 7.8(b) resentencing motion on the merits by quoting at length the sentencing judge’s reasoning for imposing the 216-month exceptional sentence. The trial court found that “the sentencing court would have imposed the same exceptional sentence irrespective of offender score,” and concluded that Harris’s miscalculated offender score “was not a fundamental defect amounting to a miscarriage of justice.” Harris appeals. II. ANALYSIS Assuming that the trial court correctly determined that Harris’s CrR 7.8 motion escaped the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090, Harris argues that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that he was not entitled to resentencing under CrR 7.8(b). 2 We disagree. 3 2 The court reviews a trial court’s ruling on CrR 7.8 motion for abuse of discretion. State v. Frohs, 22 Wn. App. 2d 88, 92, 511 P.3d 1288 (2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on untenable factual grounds or was made for untenable legal reasons.” Frohs, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 92. 3 The State urges that we conclude that the trial court erred by not transferring Harris’s CrR 7.8 resentencing motion to this court as a PRP. The State argues that the trial court improperly determined that Harris’s sentence was facially invalid and thus not subject to the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090. The State contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Personal Restraint of Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d 356, 359, 552 P.3d 302 (2024), applies only to a “serious” or “extreme [upward] miscalculation” of a defendant’s offender score, and not a one-point error such as Harris’s. We agree that Fletcher does not directly address whether, in the context of an upward exceptional sentence, a one-point offender score error and resulting standard range sentence result in a J&S that is facially invalid. But, as we discuss below, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’s CrR 7.8 resentencing motion, we need not reach the State’s argument. -6- No. 87523-0-I/7 A. An Incorrect Offender Score Amounts to Nonconstitutional Error A CrR 7.8 motion for resentencing is a collateral attack. State v. Molnar, 198 Wn.2d 508-09, 497 P.3d 858 (2021). “‘Relief by way of collateral attack is extraordinary,’ and the ‘bases for [c]ollateral attack are limited because collateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders.’” State v. Drake, 32 Wn. App. 2d 390, 394, 556 P.3d 170 (2024) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Basra, 10 Wn. App. 2d 279, 287, 448 P.3d 107 (2019), review denied, 4 Wn.3d 1007 (2025)). To obtain collateral relief, a defendant “‘must show either that he or she was actually and substantially prejudiced by constitutional error or that his or her trial suffered from a fundamental defect of a nonconstitutional nature that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d 356, 379, 552 P.3d 302 (2024) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501, 506, 301 P.3d 450 (2013)). A miscalculated offender score is nonconstitutional error. Accordingly, Harris must show that including the Blake offense in the calculation of his offender score amounted to a fundamental defect resulting in a “complete miscarriage of justice.” Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d at 379. B. Harris’s J&S is not Void Once the procedural requirements of CrR 7.8(c) are satisfied, a trial court may provide relief on the merits if the J&S is void or for any other reason justifying relief. CrR 7.8(b)(4), (5). Harris first asserts that the upward miscalculation of his offender score based on an out-of-state conviction rendered his J&S void. See CrR 7.8(b)(4). The State -7- No. 87523-0-I/8 responds that while Harris’s J&S might have been erroneous, that does not render it void. We agree with the State. “A void judgment is one entered by a court ‘which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved.’” State v. Zavala-Reynoso, 127 Wn. App. 119, 122, 110 P.3d 827 (2005) (quoting Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1, 7, 448 P.2d 490 (1968)). In Zavala- Reynoso, the defendant argued that his J&S was void because it was based on an incorrect offender score. 127 Wn. App. at 123. But the court rejected the argument, explaining that it fell outside CrR 7.8(b)(4) because the defendant did not contest the trial court’s jurisdiction or inherent power to sentence him. Zavala-Reynoso, 127 Wn. App. at 123. Like the defendant in Zavala-Reynoso, Harris does not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction or inherent power to enter his J&S. Instead, he focuses only on the upward miscalculation of his offender score and associated standard sentence range. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(4). C. Harris Fails to Establish That He is Entitled to Collateral Relief Alternatively, Harris contends that his miscalculated offender score and resulting standard sentence range constituted nonconstitutional error that entitles him to collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5). We disagree. The catch-all provision of CrR 7.8(b)(5) allows for collateral relief in situations not covered by subsections (1) through (4), and in circumstances “‘where the interests of -8- No. 87523-0-I/9 justice most urgently require.’” State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 128, 285 P.3d 27 (2012) (quoting State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83, 88, 776 P.2d 132 (1989)). Relying on State v. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d 528, 541 P.3d 415, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1007 (2024), the trial court concluded that Harris failed to establish that he was entitled to collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5). In Pascuzzi, the defendant was convicted of two counts of child molestation, and a jury found an aggravating factor that Pascuzzi had abused a position of trust in committing the crime. 29 Wn. App. 2d at 530. Pascuzzi’s offender score was 8, and the top-end of his standard sentence range was 171 months to life. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 531. Based on the aggravating factor, as well as the trial court’s determination that other unscored convictions resulted in a “presumptive sentence that was clearly too lenient,” Pascuzzi was given an exceptional sentence of 200 months to life. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 530-31. In announcing Pascuzzi’s sentence, the trial court noted that the aggravating factor alone supported the exceptional sentence, and that the length of the exceptional sentence was appropriate “‘regardless of the defendant’s offender score.’” Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 531 (quoting record). Pascuzzi filed a CrR 7.8 resentencing motion on the ground that one of the convictions used to calculate his offender score was rendered unconstitutional after Blake. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 531-32. The trial court determined that Pascuzzi’s motion was not time barred and that he had made a substantial showing that he was entitled to relief under CrR 7.8. According to the procedure outlined in CrR 7.8(c), the trial court held a show cause hearing, and ultimately denied Pascuzzi’s resentencing motion. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 532. -9- No. 87523-0-I/10 Pascuzzi appealed, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing because his exceptional sentence was based on an erroneously calculated offender score and standard sentencing range. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 533. Pascuzzi contended that it was unclear whether the trial court would have imposed the same exceptional sentence had it been aware of the correct standard sentencing range. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 533. Division Two of this court rejected the argument, explaining that Pascuzzi failed to show “a fundamental defect [that] result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice,” given that the record evidenced that the trial court “would have imposed the same [exceptional] sentence even if Pascuzzi’s offender score had been different.” Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 534-35. The court further explained that when a “‘sentencing court incorrectly calculates the standard [sentence] range before imposing an exceptional sentence’” reversal is not required if “‘the record clearly indicates the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence anyway.’” Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 534 (quoting State v. Parker, 132 Wn.2d 182, 189, 937 P.2d 575 (1997)). Here, relying on Pascuzzi, the trial court reviewed the record and determined that Harris failed to establish that he was entitled to collateral relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5). The court explained its reasoning as follows: 4 So already, we have Judge Amini saying[,] I’m basing my decision solely on the fact that there was a plea to an aggravating factor. We know Judge Amini says [that] the aggravating factor is the victim’s children being present. So we get to the sentence. Judge Amini says, quote, “I am giving [Harris] above the standard range to 216 months because by that time, both of these children will be 18 years old,” end quote. 4 Although the trial court referred to the sentencing judge as Judge Susan Amini, it appears that the sentencing judge was in fact Judge Laura Gene Middaugh. -10- No. 87523-0-I/11 Judge Amini continued, quote, “And it just seems to me that when you try to murder your children’s mother, there is going to be a no-contact order, and the best thing is to make this last until the children are 18, and that is 216 months, from the information that I have in front of me. So I am imposing the 216 months,” end quote. But Judge Amini continued, quote, “[b]ecause that basically puts [Harris] in prison until these children are adults, and then they can do what they want, but they are protected, basically, as they are minors, and I think that is appropriate under the circumstances,” end quote. Now, the defense argues in that Judge Amini never said that the standard [sentence] range did not matter, but Judge Amini did not need to say what did not matter because Judge Amini was very, very clear about what did matter. And so it follows that I conclude that the sentencing court would have imposed the same exceptional sentence irrespective of offender score, and it follows from that that the incorrect sentencing score was not a fundamental defect amounting to a [complete] miscarriage of justice, and so I’m denying [Harris]’s request that he be resentenced. Harris argues that Pascuzzi has been “critically undermined” by Fletcher. We disagree. Fletcher reaffirmed the longstanding principle that an erroneous offender score error amounts to nonconstitutional error and thus warrants relief on collateral attack only if the defendant establishes that the error “is a fundamental defect that inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d at 383 (citation omitted). In that case, Fletcher had established the requisite prejudice because his offender score error “had a dramatic impact on the standard sentencing range, and there is a high probability that the mistake affected the original sentence.” Fletcher, 3 Wn.3d at 381 (emphasis added). In contrast, the miscalculation of Harris’s standard sentence range was approximately 10 months and did not affect Harris’s ultimate exceptional sentence. The sentencing court’s decision to impose the 216-month exceptional sentence was based on the court’s intent to impose a sentence that would last until Harris’s minor children -11- No. 87523-0-I/12 reached the age of 18, regardless of their age at the time. Harris cannot show that scoring error had a dramatic impact on the sentence imposed. Based on the trial court’s review of the record and its reasoning under Pascuzzi, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Harris’s CrR 7.8 resentencing motion. Affirmed. WE CONCUR: -12-