State of New Jersey v. Eric A. Burnham
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledDecember 21, 2022
DocketA-3519-20
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3519-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
December 21, 2022
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
ERIC A. BURNHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted December 12, 2022 – Decided December 21, 2022
Before Judges Whipple, Mawla, and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Accusation No.
21-02-0181.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Valeria Dominguez, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MARCZYK, J.S.C., t/a
The question before us on appeal is whether sales tax should be included
when calculating the "full retail value" of merchandise under New Jersey's
shoplifting gradation statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c). This issue has not been
authoritatively addressed in any prior decisions. For the reasons discussed
below, we conclude sales tax should not be included as part of the valuation of
the full retail value of merchandise when determining the gradation of
shoplifting offenses.
Defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree shoplifting, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
11(b)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(3), and third-degree shoplifting, N.J.S.A.
2C:20-11(b)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(2). The trial court subsequently
imposed two three-year probationary terms and two ninety-day jail terms to
run concurrently. Defendant appeals and primarily argues the third-degree
gradation statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(2), should not be interpreted to
encompass sales tax. Based on our review of the record and the applicable
legal principles, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
On February 11, 2020, defendant shoplifted a PlayStation 4 video game
console from a Kohl's department store. The price of the PlayStation 4 was
$299.99, exclusive of sales tax. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(3),
defendant's charge for shoplifting the PlayStation 4 was given a fourth -degree
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gradation because the value of the merchandise was at least $200, but did not
exceed $500. On February 27, 2020, defendant returned to Kohl's and
shoplifted an Xbox One, the price of which was $499.99, but with sales tax
included the cost was over $500. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(2),
defendant's charge for shoplifting the Xbox One was given a third-degree
gradation, based on the total cost of the merchandise exceeding $500.
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I
AS THIS COURT PREVIOUSLY HELD AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THE SHOPLIFTING
GRADATION STATUTE, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c),
DOES NOT ENCOMPASS SALES TAX. THE
TRIAL COURT MUST THEREFORE AMEND THE
JUDGMENT TO REFLECT THAT SHOPLIFTING
MERCHANDISE VALUED BY THE RETAILER AT
$499.99 EXCLUSIVE OF TAX IS A FOURTH-
DEGREE OFFENSE, NOT A THIRD-DEGREE
OFFENSE.
POINT II
THIS COURT MUST ALSO ORDER A
RESENTENCING BECAUSE (1) THE
SENTENCING COURT ERRONEOUSLY VIEWED
[DEFENDANT] AS A THIRD-DEGREE
OFFENDER, AND (2) THE SENTENCING COURT
FAILED TO APPLY MITIGATING FACTOR
[FOURTEEN] EVEN THOUGH [DEFENDANT]
WAS UNDER AGE [TWENTY-SIX] AT THE TIME
OF THE OFFENSE.
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The State counters defendant acknowledged at the plea colloquy the
Xbox One was valued at over $500 and therefore waived his right to contest
the charge to which he pled guilty. The State further contends defendant did
not receive an excessive sentence, and the trial court properly weighed and
applied the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors. Moreover, the
State asserts defendant received a significantly lower sentence than his
potential exposure for a third-degree shoplifting conviction. Lastly, the State
notes defendant never requested the trial court to apply mitigating factor
fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14).
II.
Because defendant neither moved before the trial court for his plea to be
vacated based on an improper gradation of the shoplifting offense, nor
requested the court consider mitigating factor fourteen, our review is under the
plain error standard. R. 2:10-2. Under that standard, we disregard any errors
or omissions "unless [they are] of such a nature as to have been clearly capable
of producing an unjust result . . . ." R. 2:10-2. "Plain error is a high bar . . . ."
State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019). "The 'high standard' used in
plain error analysis 'provides a strong incentive for counsel to interpose a
timely objection, enabling the trial court to forestall or correct a potential
error.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193, 203 (2016)).
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III.
Shoplifting is defined as purposely taking possession of merchandise
offered for sale by a store with the intention of depriving the merchant of the
possession, use, or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same
"without paying to the merchant the full retail value thereof." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
11(b)(1). "Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree . . . if the full
retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000" and a
crime of the fourth degree "if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least
$200 but does not exceed $500." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(c)(2)-(c)(3). "Full retail
value" is defined by the statute as "the merchant's stated or advertised price of
the merchandise[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11(a)(7).
To determine whether sales tax is properly included in calculating the
full retail value under the shoplifting statute, it is useful to examine the
statutory gradation scheme for theft. Theft constitutes a crime of the third
degree if "[t]he amount involved exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000" and a
crime of the fourth degree if "the amount involved is at least $200 but does not
exceed $500." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(a) and (3). Notably, the "[a]mount
involved" is defined as "the fair market value at the time and place of the
operative act." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(m). Importantly, although the shoplifting
statute is silent as to whether sales tax should be considered in determining the
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full retail value, the general theft statute provides the "amount involved" in a
theft "shall include, but shall not be limited to, the amount of any State tax
avoided, evaded or otherwise unpaid, improperly retained or disposed of. "
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b).1
In short, the Legislature determined in adopting the theft statutes the
amount of sales tax should be considered in determining the "amount
involved" in the theft. However, the Legislature made no such determination
in enacting the shoplifting statute. We generally do not assume the Legislature
intended anything other than the plain language of the statute. See, e.g.,
Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 517 (2009) ("The Legislature knows how
to draft a statute to achieve [a] result when it wishes to do so."). Therefore, we
believe the better approach is to interpret "full retail price" to mean the pre-tax
price.
Moreover, the purpose of the shoplifting statute is "preventing the loss
of merchandise without full payment—the protection of inventory." De
1
Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 5 on N.J.S.A.
2C:20-11 (2022), notes "[t]he phrase 'full retail value' is defined by N.J.S.A.
2C:20-11(a)(7). It merely means price. This phrase should not be confused
with the concept of value used in grading offenses under 2C:20-2(b). As used
there, the value of goods stolen is not necessarily exactly the same as the retai l
price." Further, "[t]he phrase, 'full retail value' is used in an entirely different
context and conclusiveness of price as value is required insofar as flexibility
would allow a shoplifter to alter price labels and argue that he was merely
correcting them to reflect true or market value." Ibid.
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Angelis v. Jamesway Dep't Store, 205 N.J. Super. 519, 525 (App. Div. 1985).
The sales tax on a particular piece of merchandise is not a part of a store's
inventory, and it should not be considered in assessing the value of the
merchandise stolen. Accordingly, we conclude there is no basis for the State
to include sales tax when grading a defendant's shoplifting charge.
The presentencing report in the record indicates the Xbox One at issue
was valued at $499.99. The State does not dispute this figure. The State's
third-degree gradation of the shoplifting charge—for a value exceeding $500—
appears to have improperly included sales tax. Because this merchandise's full
retail value was not calculated properly, it had a potentially significant impact
on defendant given that a third-degree shoplifting offense exposes him to a
significantly longer term of imprisonment than a fourth-degree offense. Based
on the analysis above, we determine defendant's conviction of a third-degree
shoplifting offense must be reversed.
A guilty verdict may be molded to convict on a lesser-included offense if
"(1) defendant has been given his day in court, (2) all the elements of the
lesser included offense are contained in the more serious offense[,] and (3)
defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense is implicit in, and part of, the
jury verdict." State v. Farrad, 164 N.J. 247, 266 (2000) (citation omitted).
Here, because fourth-degree shoplifting requires proof of the same elements as
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third-degree shoplifting—the only difference being that the punishment is less
severe if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not
exceed $500—defendant's judgment of conviction must be amended to reflect
a conviction for fourth-degree shoplifting as a lesser-included offense of third-
degree shoplifting. Lastly, because we are remanding for resentencing
regarding the molded fourth-degree shoplifting charge, the trial court should
also consider mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), in its
decision.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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