Full Opinion

FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40789-6-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) MITCHELL EUGENE CRANE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) STAAB, C.J. — This is Mitchell Crane’s second appeal. In his first appeal, Crane successfully argued that his sentence was based on an incorrect offender score and we remanded for resentencing. In this appeal, Crane contends the resentencing court exceeded the scope of its authority by imposing a community custody condition not imposed in the original judgment and sentence and by entering no-contact orders with expiration dates beyond the maximum allowable duration. On de novo resentencing, the slate is clean and a court is not restricted by conditions imposed at the first sentencing. In this case, the court did not exceed its authority by imposing community custody conditions that were not imposed in the first sentencing. However, we agree that the no-contact orders contained impermissible expiration dates, and we remand for the limited purpose of correcting the expiration No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane dates. To be clear, we are not remanding for resentencing and the correction on remand does not require Crane’s appearance in court. BACKGROUND Following a jury trial, Mitchell Crane was convicted of intimidating a witness, possession of an unlawful firearm, and 29 counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The court sentenced Crane based on an offender score of 7. The court also entered a harassment no-contact order prohibiting Crane from contacting A.J.K. for 10 years. The order was signed and filed on January 5, 2022, and indicated an expiration date of January 5, 2032. Crane appealed his convictions and sentence. State v. Crane, No. 38688-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf /386881_unp.pdf. This court affirmed Crane’s convictions but agreed his offender score was incorrectly calculated and remanded for resentencing with the correct offender score. Crane, No. 38688-1-III, slip op. at 1. Regarding remand, the opinion stated: We affirm the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction and remand for the trial court to resentence Mr. Crane under a corrected offender score. .... The court correctly concluded that Mr. Crane’s two 2015 convictions were the same criminal conduct and it should have therefore counted them as one point. Remand for resentencing is necessary. .... We affirm Mr. Crane’s conviction for unlawfully possessing the Mossberg .12-gauge short-barrel shotgun, affirm the trial court’s finding that possession of an unlawful firearm conviction and the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction are not the same criminal conduct, and, 2 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane based on Mr. Crane’s 2015 convictions encompassing the same criminal conduct, remand for resentencing with an offender score of 6. Crane, No. 38688-1-III, slip op. at 1, 14-15. The court resentenced Crane on November 4, 2024, using an offender score of 6. At the hearing, the State asked the court to impose 12 months of community custody on the intimidating a witness conviction. Defense counsel objected. Although counsel acknowledged that intimidating a witness is a crime against persons for which community custody was statutorily required, he argued that the original sentencing court had not imposed community custody and that the condition therefore should not be added at resentencing. Counsel maintained that the purpose of resentencing was limited to correcting the offender score and adjusting Crane’s sentence accordingly, while all other conditions of the original judgment and sentence should remain unchanged. The State also addressed the existing harassment no-contact order, explaining its belief that the order remained in effect but providing “another one just in case the court wanted to enter it today.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 7. The court accepted the order, stating, “It’s a new sentencing.” RP at 7. The court ultimately imposed 12 months of community custody. It also entered harassment no-contact orders prohibiting Crane from contacting A.J.K., J.M.K., and A.W.W. through November 4, 2034. Crane appeals. 3 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane ANALYSIS Crane contends the resentencing court exceeded the scope of its authority when it imposed a community custody condition not included in his original sentence and reissued no-contact orders because this court’s remand was limited to resentencing based on the correct offender score. He additionally contends the no-contact orders exceed the maximum permissible duration. The State responds that this court did not restrict the scope of resentencing and that the trial court therefore properly conducted a de novo resentencing. The State further argues that community custody was statutorily required for Crane’s intimidating a witness conviction. We agree with the State that the court properly resentenced Crane de novo and therefore had authority to impose community custody and enter new no-contact orders. However, the record establishes that at least one of the orders extends beyond the maximum permissible duration. We therefore remand for the trial court to correct the expiration date. “[U]nless the reviewing court restricts resentencing to narrow issues, any resentencing should be de novo.” State v. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 238, 244, 532 P.3d 652 (2023). “If the Court of Appeals mandate limits the questions for resolution by the resentencing court, the resentencing court must limit its review.” Id. at 246. “Nevertheless, the remand must clearly convey the intent to limit the scope of resentencing.” Id. Thus, “[b]y ordering resentencing without any specific instructions or any prohibitions, the reviewing court returns the case to the trial court to consider every 4 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane aspect of the offender’s sentences de novo.” Id. “Without a limitation, the resentencing court should consider sentencing de novo and entertain any relevant evidence that it could have heard at the first sentencing.” Id. Indeed, “[a] resentencing remand order carries a presumption of de novo resentencing.” Id. Here, nothing in this court’s prior opinion clearly conveyed an intent to limit the scope of resentencing. The opinion identified the erroneous offender score as the error requiring remand and repeatedly directed the trial court to resentence Crane using a corrected score of 6. Crane, No. 38688-1-III, slip op. at 1, 14-15. The opinion did not direct the trial court to modify only the offender score, preserve all other portions of the original judgment and sentence, or otherwise prohibit reconsideration of any sentencing component. Nor did it identify any issue as beyond the trial court’s authority on remand. Although the corrected offender score was the reason for the remand, the mandate did not clearly limit the resentencing court. The resentencing court was therefore required to conduct an independent, de novo sentencing rather than simply amend the original judgment and sentence to substitute an offender score of 6. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 244, 246. Crane argues that the State had a full opportunity to request community custody at the original sentencing and failed to do so. He relies on caselaw stating that “the law wishes to prevent relitigation of an issue after the party enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question.” Id. at 244. However, as the quoted case 5 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane immediately explains, “[b]ut in criminal cases, the court does not wish to strictly apply this principle. In the interest of truth and fair sentencing, a court on a sentence remand should be able to take new matters into account on behalf of either the government or the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the fact that community custody was not imposed at the first sentencing does not, by itself, prevent the resentencing court from considering the issue during a de novo resentencing. Moreover, “[t]he resentencing judge may not rely on a previous court’s sentence determination and fail to conduct its own independent review. Otherwise, the offender is deprived of de novo review.” Id. at 249 (citation omitted). Had the resentencing court accepted Crane’s position that every aspect of the original sentence other than the offender score was effectively fixed, it would have treated the original sentencing court’s determination as controlling rather than conducting the independent review required by Dunbar. Because the remand was unrestricted, the court was entitled to consider the community custody component anew and was not bound by the original court’s failure to impose it.1 1 “A court shall, in addition to the other terms of the sentence, sentence an offender to community custody for one year . . . for . . . [a]ny crime against persons under RCW 9.94A.411(2).” RCW 9.94A.701(3)(a); see also RCW 9.94A.411(2) (categorizing “Intimidating a Witness (RCW 9A.72.110)” in “crimes against persons” (capitalization omitted)). 6 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane Crane likewise argues that the portions of the original judgment and sentence unaffected by his first appeal remained final. He relies on State v. Rowland, which states: “[c]orrecting an erroneous sentence in excess of statutory authority does not affect the finality of that portion of the judgment and sentence that was correct and valid when imposed.” 160 Wn. App. 316, 326, 249 P.3d 635 (2011). But that statement does not establish that every component of a sentence necessarily remains fixed whenever an appellate court remands for resentencing based on a discrete sentencing error. Instead, the statement provides rationale supporting a reviewing court’s authority to limit the scope of resentencing on remand to specific corrections when appropriate. Id. at 326-27. As Dunbar explains, the scope of the resentencing court’s authority turns on the appellate mandate, and a limitation must be clearly conveyed. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 246. Here, this court imposed no such limitation. Rather, it remanded for resentencing with a corrected offender score. Crane, No. 38688-1-III, slip op. at 1, 14-15. Under the presumption recognized in Dunbar, the resulting resentencing was de novo. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 246. This conclusion is also consistent with Dunbar’s recognition that “[d]uring resentencing, the trial court may impose the identical sentence or a greater or lesser sentence.” Id. at 249. Accordingly, the resentencing court was not required to reproduce every lawful component of the original judgment and sentence unchanged. It had 7 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane authority to independently determine the appropriate sentence, including whether statutorily required community custody applied. The same analysis defeats Crane’s challenge to the court’s authority to enter no- contact orders at resentencing. At the hearing, the State informed the court that it believed the existing harassment order remained in effect but provided “another one just in case the court wanted to enter it today.” RP at 7. The court accepted the order, explaining, “It’s a new sentencing.” RP at 7. Given the unrestricted remand and the resulting de novo resentencing, the court did not exceed its authority merely by considering and entering no-contact orders as part of the new judgment and sentence. Crane nevertheless correctly identifies a defect in the duration of at least one of those orders. He frames his argument under RCW 10.99.050, and the parties debate the applicability of cases interpreting that statute. But chapter 10.99 RCW governs crimes involving domestic violence. RCW 10.99.010. The record does not indicate that Crane’s offenses involved domestic violence. Instead, the record identifies the orders as harassment no-contact orders entered in connection with Crane’s intimidating a witness conviction.2 Thus, RCW 10.99.050 does not apply. Nevertheless, intimidating a witness is a class B felony punishable by a maximum term of 10 years. RCW 9A.72.110; RCW 9A.20.021. A sentencing court may not 2 Pursuant to RCW 9A.46.040, .080, RCW 26.50.110. 8 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane impose crime-related prohibitions, including no-contact provisions, for a period exceeding the statutory maximum sentence for the underlying crime. State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008). Here, the original sentencing court entered a harassment no-contact order protecting A.J.K. on January 5, 2022, with an expiration date of January 5, 2032. At resentencing on November 4, 2024, the State confirmed that the no-contact order remained in effect, but the court entered a new order that expires on November 4, 2034. Thus, as to A.J.K., the orders prohibit Crane from contacting A.J.K. for 12 years, exceeding the 10-year statutory maximum applicable to the underlying class B felony. See RCW 9A.72.110; RCW 9A.20.021; Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 32. The order protecting A.J.K. therefore requires correction. The record is less clear regarding the orders protecting J.M.K. and A.W.W. The parties apparently agree that the resentencing court re-issued the same no-contact orders imposed at the original sentencing. However, the appellate record contains only one order from the first sentencing hearing—the order protecting A.J.K. The record contains three orders from the second sentencing hearing, protecting A.J.K., J.M.K., and A.W.W. Accordingly, on this record, we can definitively conclude that the order protecting only A.J.K. exceeds the maximum permissible duration because the record establishes both its original January 5, 2022, issuance and its subsequent extension to November 4, 2034. As 9 No. 40789-6-III State v. Crane presented, the orders protecting J.M.K. and A.W.W. do not independently establish a period exceeding 10 years and therefore appear facially compliant. We affirm Crane’s sentence, but remand for the limited purpose of correcting the expiration date on any of the no-contact orders so that Crane is not prohibited from contacting the protected person for more than 10 years. This limited remand does not require resentencing and does not require Crane’s presence in court. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. _________________________________ Staab, C.J. WE CONCUR: _________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J. _________________________________ Murphy, J. 10