Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0455n.06 Case No. 26-5258 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ) KAREN CROWLEY, as surviving spouse and next kin on behalf of all wrongful death ) FILED ) Nov 16, 2026 beneficiaries, deceased Casey Crowley, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF JEFFREY CASSIDY, Sheriff, et al., ) TENNESSEE Defendants, ) ) OPINION BENJAMIN BEACH, JR., Deputy Officer, in ) his individual capacity, ) ) Defendant-Appellant. ) Before: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. THAPAR, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., concurred. WHITE, J. (pp. 11–15), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Casey Crowley started a scuffle with Sergeant Michael Nygaard. During this struggle, Officer Benjamin Beach heard Nygaard yell, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!” Hearing two shots ring out, Beach shot Casey.1 Beach’s use of force wasn’t unreasonable, let alone clearly so. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. 1 We mean no disrespect by using Casey Crowley’s first name. We use it here only to distinguish between Casey Crowley and Karen Crowley, who brings this suit. No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy I. One afternoon, a Dollar General employee called 911, requesting a welfare check on Casey Crowley. Officers Beach and McCready showed up first and found Casey slumped over the steering wheel of his truck. When roused, Casey provided identification but couldn’t carry a coherent conversation. The officers repeatedly asked him to exit his truck, but he refused to comply. When Sergeant Nygaard arrived, he too asked Casey to step out of the truck. Casey still refused. By now, the officers suspected that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Casey’s resistance turned physical when Nygaard attempted to remove Casey’s keys from the ignition. As Nygaard reached into the vehicle, Casey seized his arm and tried to stop him from grabbing Casey’s keys. McCready and Beach then grabbed Casey to try to get him under control. From there, the melee intensified. Nygaard shouted, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!” followed by, “I’ll blow your f*cking head off!” Beach then saw Nygaard draw his firearm. Seconds later, Nygaard shot Casey. A few seconds after that, Beach shot Casey. The officers immediately performed CPR and called for assistance, but Casey sadly passed away. Police officers recovered a gun from Casey’s person and another from his truck. They also found a bag of methamphetamine in Casey’s pocket. And a toxicology report confirmed there was a high level of methamphetamine in Casey’s blood during the incident. Casey’s wife, Karen Crowley, sued Nygaard and Beach, claiming they’d used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity to both officers. Only Beach appealed. -2- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy II. We begin, as we must, with the threshold question of whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over district courts’ final decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment is characterized as a final decision, which can be immediately appealed. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771–72 (2014). But we have jurisdiction only if the appeal raises “purely legal questions.” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 365 (6th Cir. 2022). So we must “isolate” and address the legal questions raised, while ignoring the defendant’s efforts to challenge the plaintiff’s version of the facts. DeVooght v. City of Warren, 157 F.4th 893, 897–98 (6th Cir. 2025). Beach raises a mixture of factual and legal arguments on appeal. We don’t have jurisdiction to consider the factual disputes, so we set them aside. But we retain jurisdiction over whether Beach is entitled to qualified immunity under the facts as Crowley sees them. III. Qualified immunity gives breathing room to law enforcement officers who must often “make split-second judgments” in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” scenarios about how much force is appropriate. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). If officers’ difficult decisions in those circumstances are open to second-guessing by judges from the secure comfort of their chambers, the doctrine can’t do its job. So qualified immunity shields an officer from suit unless (1) his actions violated a federal right that (2) was clearly established when he acted. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). Crowley claims Beach violated Casey’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable use of force. So Crowley must show not only that Beach’s use of force was unreasonable but also that this unreasonableness was clearly established. That’s very hard to do. Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d -3- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy 798, 801 (6th Cir. 2020). The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard defers to officers’ decisions on the ground, and qualified immunity’s clearly-established prong magnifies that deference. Id. So Crowley is up against two tiers of deference. She can’t clear either. A. The first question is whether Beach’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances he faced. Whether a use of force is reasonable isn’t “capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). So the Supreme Court has provided three factors to help evaluate reasonableness: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. These factors only “help inform our ultimate inquiry,” which is always whether a certain use of force was justified under “the totality of the circumstances” faced by the officer. Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015). So the Graham factors don’t add up to a rigid legal test. What’s more, the Graham factors aren’t even of equal weight. The Supreme Court has recognized as much, noting that while the crime-severity factor “can carry weight in the analysis,” the suspect’s conduct during his police encounter is “always relevant” to the analysis as an indicator of the threat he poses. Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025) (emphasis added). Indeed, years before Graham, the Court had said the use of deadly force was reasonable when an officer “has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm” to the officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). And we’ve read Garner’s reasonableness analysis to mean we’re to “primarily focus[]” on Graham’s imminent-threat factor -4- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy in cases involving deadly force. Jordan v. Howard, 987 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, the imminent-threat factor is the one that matters most. That’s especially so because the crime-severity factor often isn’t in play at the outset of many police encounters. In many routine cases like traffic stops, an officer will face “inherent[] risk” because he’ll have no idea whom he’s about to encounter. Barnes, 605 U.S. at 86 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). After all, even people pulled over for “ordinary traffic violations” could “‘turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.’” Id. at 85–86 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 334 (2012)). That means the severity of the suspected crime often isn’t certain until an officer is further along in his encounter with the suspect. So it’s hardly surprising that there isn’t a single case in which either the Supreme Court or our court has found that an officer unreasonably used deadly force in the face of a suspect’s imminent, deadly threat just because his underlying crime wasn’t serious enough. But that’s what the officers were dealing with here. While Casey wasn’t initially suspected of committing any crime, he soon escalated matters into a close-quarters brawl. So what matters most from that point on is the imminent-threat factor. That factor favors Beach because he reasonably believed Casey posed an immediate and deadly threat to him and his fellow officers. And that’s what is relevant for reasonableness: Beach’s reasonable belief that he faced a serious threat and had to respond in a split second. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). It doesn’t matter that Beach’s belief might’ve turned out to have been mistaken after the fact. See id. After all, officers don’t have the luxury of playing Monday-morning quarterback before responding to what they reasonably think is an imminent threat to their lives. -5- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy Based solely on uncontested facts, Beach had ample reason to reasonably believe Casey posed an imminent and deadly threat. Beach was in the middle of a close-quarters brawl that Casey—whom Beach believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs—had instigated with the three officers. At that hand-to-hand range, Casey “could raise and fire a gun with little or no time for an officer to react.” Thomas v. City of Columbus, 854 F.3d 361, 366 (6th Cir. 2017). Amid this chaos, Beach heard a fellow officer yell that Casey had a gun. Beach then heard more yelling and two gunshots. Only then did Beach fire. From start to finish, the whole encounter lasted about half a minute. There wasn’t any “time or space” for Beach to step back and “monitor [Casey], issue a warning, or take cover.” Id. at 366–67. Beach knew Casey was a physical threat because he’d begun the fight with the officers. Beach believed Casey was intoxicated. Beach heard Nygaard warn that Casey had a gun and then heard two shots go off. Given all Beach knew at the time, a wait-and-see approach might well have meant his death. These uncontested facts establish the reasonableness of Beach’s belief that Casey was an imminent threat to his and his fellow officers’ lives. Resisting this conclusion, Crowley contends that a reasonable officer couldn’t have believed her husband posed an imminent threat because he “did not brandish a firearm.” Appellee’s Br. at 15. But it doesn’t matter whether Beach himself saw Casey brandishing a gun. Indeed, we assume for present purposes that he didn’t. Even so, the key question is whether Nygaard’s yell that Casey had a gun, immediately followed by two gunshots, could’ve made Beach believe Casey was somehow trying to use a gun. From the perspective of a reasonable officer in Beach’s shoes, we must say yes. What’s more, Nygaard had the best view of Casey’s right side. Beach was positioned in such a way that he wouldn’t have been able to easily tell what Casey was doing with his right hand. -6- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy And Nygaard, who was wrestling with Casey’s left hand, also had a much better vantage point of where that hand was and where it might’ve been reaching or pulling. In the heat of an intense physical struggle, Beach reasonably could’ve believed either that Nygaard had shot Casey because he was reaching for the gun Nygaard had just yelled about or that Casey had fired the shots. So it wasn’t unreasonable for Beach to believe Casey posed an imminent, deadly threat and thus fire his weapon. Finally, the third Graham factor: whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or trying to flee. While this factor couldn’t make Beach’s use of force unreasonable given the imminent threat he believed he faced, the factor favors Beach here. Casey was actively resisting arrest by “physically struggling with” and “disobeying” the officers. Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2015). It’s uncontested that Casey disobeyed multiple orders to exit his car and instead “grabbed Nygaard’s arm and began a physical struggle.” R. 44, Pg. ID 310, 311, 314. That active resistance bolsters Beach’s justification for using deadly force. Ultimately, the reasonableness of Beach’s actions must be judged from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” not from the clear vantage of hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Forced in mayhem to act in seconds, a reasonable officer in Beach’s shoes could’ve believed Casey posed an imminent, deadly threat while actively resisting arrest. That means Beach’s use of deadly force was reasonable and therefore not a violation of Casey’s Fourth Amendment rights. And because we conclude that Beach’s actions didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment, we must also conclude that the law doesn’t clearly establish that they did. B. But even if Beach’s actions did violate the Fourth Amendment, he’d still be entitled to qualified immunity because he didn’t violate a clearly established right. Crowley bears the burden -7- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy of establishing that Beach violated Casey’s clearly established rights. Bell, 37 F.4th at 367. That’s a heavy burden by design because qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Wesby, 593 U.S. at 63. To carry her burden, Crowley must show that Casey’s right not to be shot by Beach in these circumstances was so clearly established that every reasonable officer would’ve known the right was beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Crowley can only carry that burden if she points to a case in which “an officer taking similar actions in similar circumstances was held to have violated” the Fourth Amendment. Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568, 574 (2026) (per curiam). Indeed, the prior case must squarely govern such that every reasonable officer in Beach’s position would’ve known in an instant that Beach’s use of force was unreasonable. Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018). Crowley doesn’t point to a single such case in her brief. See Appellee’s Br. at 20–24. Not one case she cites involved the undisputed circumstances here: an officer who fired after he was engaged in a close-quarters struggle with the suspect, heard the suspect had a gun, and then heard shots. Crowley cites several cases in which this court has denied qualified immunity because there was a dispute as to whether the plaintiff pointed a gun at the officers. But, as we’ve already explained, the relevant question is whether Beach could’ve reasonably believed Casey posed an imminent threat based on Nygaard’s yell and shots. Thus, Beach didn’t have to wait to see Casey point and shoot the gun. The closest Crowley gets to a relevant case is one where an officer shot at a man who said he had a gun and then partially opened his door. See Campbell v. Cheatham County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 47 F.4th 468, 473–75 (6th Cir. 2022). But that’s far afield of the facts here. In fact, we’ve held that there wasn’t a constitutional violation in a case like this one. Cooper v. City of Columbus, No. 22-3251, 2023 WL 1434055, at *2 (6th Cir. 2023). There, Officer -8- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy Narewski was in a “hand-to-hand struggle” with a suspect in the “confined” space of a car. Id. at *7. A fellow officer “announced” that the suspect had a gun. Id. “Then there was a gunshot.” Id. In a “couple of seconds,” Narewski pulled away from the suspect and fatally shot him. Id. As in this case, it turned out that the fellow officer was the one who’d fired the shot, while the suspect’s gun had “remained in his pocket” and was “never discharged.” Id. Still, we concluded that a reasonable officer in Narewski’s shoes could’ve thought that the suspect was trying to reach for a gun and that the fellow officer’s shot was actually the suspect’s. Id. So we held that Narewski’s use of deadly force wasn’t unreasonable. Id. at *8. True, Cooper is an unpublished case. But that designation doesn’t matter here for two reasons. First, Cooper isn’t being used to show that the law is clearly established. Cf. Bell, 37 F.4th at 367–68. Rather, it’s just an illustration that the unreasonableness of actions like Beach’s isn’t beyond debate. After all, if it was, Cooper couldn’t have concluded that Narewski’s actions were reasonable. And second, we’ve relied on unpublished opinions before to find that an alleged right hasn’t been clearly established. Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citation omitted); Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 879 (6th Cir. 2003); Cahoo v. SAS Analytics, Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 906–07 (6th Cir. 2019). We do no more here. When case law at the time of an officer’s action suggests his action is lawful, its unlawfulness can’t have been clearly established. Because Crowley hasn’t identified a case involving circumstances like those Beach faced, the law didn’t “put [Beach] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021). So Beach is entitled to qualified immunity. -9- No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy * * * In the end, Beach is entitled to qualified immunity on Crowley’s Fourth Amendment claim against him. But the district court didn’t address whether Beach was immune from Crowley’s state-law claims. So we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. - 10 - No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Officers were called to conduct a welfare check on a man who was reported to be slumped over the steering wheel of a running pickup truck in a parking lot near a Dollar General store. When the first two officers arrived, they spoke with Casey Crowley, the truck’s driver. Crowley provided identification to the officers but told them that he was tired and struggled to communicate coherently with them. The officers then ordered Crowley to exit the truck, but he refused. When a third officer reached into the truck to turn it off, Crowley grabbed the officer’s arm, and a physical struggle ensued. While the three officers were trying to pull Crowley out of the truck, defendant Deputy Benjamin Beach, Jr. heard a fellow officer yell, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!” Beach then saw that officer draw his gun. After hearing two shots, Beach drew his own gun and shot Crowley twice. Crowley died from his gunshot wounds. But Crowley never fired, brandished, or attempted to brandish the gun in his right pocket. In fact, when Crowley was shot, his right hand was grabbing the truck’s passenger-seat headrest and was nowhere near the gun in his right pocket. The majority concludes nonetheless that Beach acted reasonably when he shot Crowley. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I disagree. The majority concludes as well that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established, observing that no cases Crowley cites involved “an officer who fired after he was engaged in a close-quarters struggle with the suspect, heard the suspect had a gun, and then heard shots.” Majority Op. at 8. But we have repeatedly held that individuals have a right not to be shot merely for possessing a gun unless they are reasonably perceived as posing an imminent threat to officers or others. Those cases would have put Beach on notice that shooting Crowley—who - 11 - No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy merely possessed a gun and, based on his position, could not have posed an immediate threat to the officers—violated Crowley’s constitutional rights. Because the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Beach, I would affirm. I. I construe the record in Crowley’s favor as the non-moving party. Campbell v. Cheatham Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 47 F.4th 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2022). When Crowley was shot, his left hand was holding onto Sergeant Nygaard’s arm, and his right hand was grabbing the passenger-seat headrest. Crowley’s gun remained in his right pocket. Crowley was not trying to reach for his gun when Nygaard and Beach shot him in quick succession. Drawing reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to Crowley, Beach could not have seen “a glimpse of something black in Crowley’s hand” (as Beach claims) before shooting him because Crowley was holding his identification cards, not a gun, in his right hand. R. 29-2, PageID 233. And to the extent Beach saw Crowley’s right hand before shooting, it was neither holding a gun nor near one. Further, before hearing two gunshots, Beach saw Nygaard draw his gun after yelling “I’ll blow your f*cking head off!” The majority reasons that “Nygaard had the best view of [Crowley’s] right side” and that “Beach was positioned in such a way that he wouldn’t have been able to easily tell what [Crowley] was doing with his right hand.” Majority Op. at 6. But Beach was close enough to the struggle that he was “grabb[ing] Crowley” and pulling on the hood of Crowley’s sweatshirt when Nygaard yelled about the gun and shot Crowley. R. 29-2, PageID 232–33. Indeed, Beach was close enough to Crowley that Beach had blood on his face - 12 - No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy and uniform after the shooting. So under these circumstances, it would not have been difficult for Beach to see Crowley’s right hand on the passenger-seat headrest. No reasonable officer in Beach’s position would have believed that Crowley had fired the two shots or that “[Crowley] was somehow trying to use a gun.” Majority Op. at 6. Nygaard yelled that Crowley had a gun, but Beach never saw one. And Crowley’s right hand was grabbing the passenger-seat headrest; it was not near the gun in his right pocket. So the only person Beach could have reasonably believed was “trying to use a gun” was Nygaard, whom Beach had heard threaten to shoot Crowley and had seen pointing a gun only moments before Beach heard two gunshots. In these circumstances, it was not reasonable for Beach to draw his firearm and fire two more shots at Crowley, who posed no threat. The majority relies on the requirement that we assess the reasonableness of Beach’s actions from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. But even when accounting for the necessary split-second decision making, Beach’s use of deadly force was still unreasonable. Our decision in Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2008), is instructive. In that case, we affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to two officers who shot an unarmed suspect. Floyd, 518 F.3d at 401. Officer Reynoso (the second officer) followed behind the first officer as the two pursued a fleeing, reportedly armed suspect with their guns drawn. Id. at 408. As the officers rounded a corner, Reynoso heard a gunshot and saw the first officer “slump down and to the side to take cover.” Id. Reynoso claimed that he reasonably believed that the suspect had shot the other officer and that Reynoso thus responded reasonably—even if mistakenly—by immediately shooting the suspect. Id. Reynoso conceded that when he shot, he was looking only at the suspect’s body but never at his hands, which were raised and empty. Id. We concluded that Reynoso failed to “explain how any reasonable officer could have formed a belief” that the - 13 - No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy suspect—“an unarmed man with his empty hands allegedly up” had shot the other officer. Id. We observed that the only basis for Reynoso’s belief was hearing a gunshot and seeing the other officer take cover. Id. We rejected Reynoso’s argument that he had acted reasonably, explaining that “[h]ad Reynoso looked at [the suspect’s] hands even momentarily before shooting him in the chest, he would have seen that [the suspect] was unarmed.” Id. (emphasis added). Like the officer in Floyd, Beach insists that he acted reasonably by shooting Crowley given Beach’s purported uncertainty about who had fired the first two shots. But had Beach looked at Crowley’s hands even momentarily before shooting him, Beach would have seen that Crowley was not brandishing or attempting to brandish a gun. This would not have been difficult for Beach, who was next to Crowley and acknowledges that he saw at least one of Crowley’s hands before shooting.1 Beach’s failure to do so was unreasonable. II. The majority also concludes that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established. In the majority’s view, no cases show that Crowley’s “right not to be shot by Beach in these circumstances was so clearly established that every reasonable officer would’ve known the right was beyond debate.” Majority Op. at 8. The majority observes that Crowley fails to cite any cases involving the situation here: “an officer who fired after he was engaged in a close- quarters struggle with the suspect, heard the suspect had a gun, and then heard shots.” Id. But “[i]t has been clearly established in this circuit for some time that ‘individuals have a right not to be shot unless they are perceived as posing a threat to officers or others.’” King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 664 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 468 1 Although Beach stated that he “saw a glimpse of something black in Crowley’s hand” before shooting, he could not specify which hand. R. 29-2, PageID 233. - 14 - No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy (6th Cir. 2006)) (collecting cases); see also Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 896 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven when a suspect has a weapon, but the officer has no reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger of serious physical harm to him or others, deadly force is not justified.”) (collecting cases). In King, we thus had “little trouble concluding that if [an officer] shot [a suspect] while he was lying on his couch and not pointing a gun at the officers, [the officer] violated [the suspect’s] clearly[]established right to be free from deadly force” even if the suspect possessed a gun. 694 F.3d at 664; see also Campbell, 47 F.4th at 482 (“[O]ur caselaw ... [has] made clear that merely possessing a weapon, without more, is insufficient to justify the use of deadly force against a suspect.”) (collecting cases). Further, in Floyd we rejected the officer’s argument that he acted reasonably—even if mistakenly—by shooting a suspect without pausing momentarily to determine whether the suspect was actually brandishing a weapon. 518 F.3d at 408–09. Under Crowley’s version of events, this case law establishes the relevant right. It is undisputed that Beach heard Nygaard yell about a gun and threaten to shoot Crowley, and then Beach heard two shots after he saw Nygaard draw his gun. So Beach reasonably believed that Crowley possessed a gun. But Beach never saw Crowley’s gun before shooting. Indeed, looking at Crowley’s hands even momentarily would have revealed that Crowley was not brandishing or reaching for a gun, and thus posed no threat. Under these circumstances, our case law clearly establishes that no reasonable officer in Beach’s shoes would have believed that using deadly force against Crowley was reasonable. Accordingly, I dissent. - 15 -