Karen Crowley v. Jeffrey Cassidy
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-5258
JudgeAlice M. Batchelder; Helene N. White; Amul R. Thapar
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0455n.06
Case No. 26-5258
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
)
KAREN CROWLEY, as surviving spouse and
next kin on behalf of all wrongful death ) FILED
) Nov 16, 2026
beneficiaries, deceased Casey Crowley,
) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
JEFFREY CASSIDY, Sheriff, et al.,
) TENNESSEE
Defendants, )
)
OPINION
BENJAMIN BEACH, JR., Deputy Officer, in )
his individual capacity, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Before: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
THAPAR, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., concurred.
WHITE, J. (pp. 11–15), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Casey Crowley started a scuffle with Sergeant Michael Nygaard.
During this struggle, Officer Benjamin Beach heard Nygaard yell, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!”
Hearing two shots ring out, Beach shot Casey.1 Beach’s use of force wasn’t unreasonable, let
alone clearly so. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
1
We mean no disrespect by using Casey Crowley’s first name. We use it here only to distinguish between Casey
Crowley and Karen Crowley, who brings this suit.
No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
I.
One afternoon, a Dollar General employee called 911, requesting a welfare check on Casey
Crowley. Officers Beach and McCready showed up first and found Casey slumped over the
steering wheel of his truck. When roused, Casey provided identification but couldn’t carry a
coherent conversation. The officers repeatedly asked him to exit his truck, but he refused to
comply. When Sergeant Nygaard arrived, he too asked Casey to step out of the truck. Casey still
refused. By now, the officers suspected that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Casey’s resistance turned physical when Nygaard attempted to remove Casey’s keys from
the ignition. As Nygaard reached into the vehicle, Casey seized his arm and tried to stop him from
grabbing Casey’s keys. McCready and Beach then grabbed Casey to try to get him under control.
From there, the melee intensified. Nygaard shouted, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!” followed
by, “I’ll blow your f*cking head off!” Beach then saw Nygaard draw his firearm. Seconds later,
Nygaard shot Casey. A few seconds after that, Beach shot Casey. The officers immediately
performed CPR and called for assistance, but Casey sadly passed away.
Police officers recovered a gun from Casey’s person and another from his truck. They also
found a bag of methamphetamine in Casey’s pocket. And a toxicology report confirmed there was
a high level of methamphetamine in Casey’s blood during the incident.
Casey’s wife, Karen Crowley, sued Nygaard and Beach, claiming they’d used excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers moved for
summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity to
both officers. Only Beach appealed.
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II.
We begin, as we must, with the threshold question of whether we have jurisdiction over
this appeal. Courts of appeals have jurisdiction over district courts’ final decisions. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. The denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment is characterized as a final decision,
which can be immediately appealed. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 771–72 (2014). But we
have jurisdiction only if the appeal raises “purely legal questions.” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37
F.4th 362, 365 (6th Cir. 2022). So we must “isolate” and address the legal questions raised, while
ignoring the defendant’s efforts to challenge the plaintiff’s version of the facts. DeVooght v. City
of Warren, 157 F.4th 893, 897–98 (6th Cir. 2025). Beach raises a mixture of factual and legal
arguments on appeal. We don’t have jurisdiction to consider the factual disputes, so we set them
aside. But we retain jurisdiction over whether Beach is entitled to qualified immunity under the
facts as Crowley sees them.
III.
Qualified immunity gives breathing room to law enforcement officers who must often
“make split-second judgments” in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” scenarios about how
much force is appropriate. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). If officers’ difficult
decisions in those circumstances are open to second-guessing by judges from the secure comfort
of their chambers, the doctrine can’t do its job. So qualified immunity shields an officer from suit
unless (1) his actions violated a federal right that (2) was clearly established when he acted.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018).
Crowley claims Beach violated Casey’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable use
of force. So Crowley must show not only that Beach’s use of force was unreasonable but also that
this unreasonableness was clearly established. That’s very hard to do. Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
798, 801 (6th Cir. 2020). The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard defers to officers’
decisions on the ground, and qualified immunity’s clearly-established prong magnifies that
deference. Id. So Crowley is up against two tiers of deference. She can’t clear either.
A.
The first question is whether Beach’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances he faced. Whether a use of force is reasonable isn’t “capable of
precise definition or mechanical application.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). So the
Supreme Court has provided three factors to help evaluate reasonableness: (1) “the severity of the
crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others”; and (3) “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. These factors only “help inform our ultimate inquiry,” which is always
whether a certain use of force was justified under “the totality of the circumstances” faced by the
officer. Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015). So the Graham factors don’t add
up to a rigid legal test.
What’s more, the Graham factors aren’t even of equal weight. The Supreme Court has
recognized as much, noting that while the crime-severity factor “can carry weight in the analysis,”
the suspect’s conduct during his police encounter is “always relevant” to the analysis as an
indicator of the threat he poses. Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025) (emphasis added). Indeed,
years before Graham, the Court had said the use of deadly force was reasonable when an officer
“has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm” to the
officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). And we’ve read Garner’s
reasonableness analysis to mean we’re to “primarily focus[]” on Graham’s imminent-threat factor
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
in cases involving deadly force. Jordan v. Howard, 987 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, the
imminent-threat factor is the one that matters most.
That’s especially so because the crime-severity factor often isn’t in play at the outset of
many police encounters. In many routine cases like traffic stops, an officer will face “inherent[]
risk” because he’ll have no idea whom he’s about to encounter. Barnes, 605 U.S. at 86
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). After all, even people pulled over for “ordinary traffic violations”
could “‘turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.’” Id. at 85–86 (quoting Florence
v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 334 (2012)). That means the
severity of the suspected crime often isn’t certain until an officer is further along in his encounter
with the suspect. So it’s hardly surprising that there isn’t a single case in which either the Supreme
Court or our court has found that an officer unreasonably used deadly force in the face of a
suspect’s imminent, deadly threat just because his underlying crime wasn’t serious enough.
But that’s what the officers were dealing with here. While Casey wasn’t initially suspected
of committing any crime, he soon escalated matters into a close-quarters brawl. So what matters
most from that point on is the imminent-threat factor.
That factor favors Beach because he reasonably believed Casey posed an immediate and
deadly threat to him and his fellow officers. And that’s what is relevant for reasonableness:
Beach’s reasonable belief that he faced a serious threat and had to respond in a split second. See
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). It doesn’t matter that Beach’s belief might’ve turned
out to have been mistaken after the fact. See id. After all, officers don’t have the luxury of playing
Monday-morning quarterback before responding to what they reasonably think is an imminent
threat to their lives.
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
Based solely on uncontested facts, Beach had ample reason to reasonably believe Casey
posed an imminent and deadly threat. Beach was in the middle of a close-quarters brawl that
Casey—whom Beach believed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs—had instigated with
the three officers. At that hand-to-hand range, Casey “could raise and fire a gun with little or no
time for an officer to react.” Thomas v. City of Columbus, 854 F.3d 361, 366 (6th Cir. 2017).
Amid this chaos, Beach heard a fellow officer yell that Casey had a gun. Beach then heard more
yelling and two gunshots. Only then did Beach fire. From start to finish, the whole encounter
lasted about half a minute. There wasn’t any “time or space” for Beach to step back and “monitor
[Casey], issue a warning, or take cover.” Id. at 366–67. Beach knew Casey was a physical threat
because he’d begun the fight with the officers. Beach believed Casey was intoxicated. Beach
heard Nygaard warn that Casey had a gun and then heard two shots go off. Given all Beach knew
at the time, a wait-and-see approach might well have meant his death. These uncontested facts
establish the reasonableness of Beach’s belief that Casey was an imminent threat to his and his
fellow officers’ lives.
Resisting this conclusion, Crowley contends that a reasonable officer couldn’t have
believed her husband posed an imminent threat because he “did not brandish a firearm.”
Appellee’s Br. at 15. But it doesn’t matter whether Beach himself saw Casey brandishing a gun.
Indeed, we assume for present purposes that he didn’t. Even so, the key question is whether
Nygaard’s yell that Casey had a gun, immediately followed by two gunshots, could’ve made Beach
believe Casey was somehow trying to use a gun. From the perspective of a reasonable officer in
Beach’s shoes, we must say yes.
What’s more, Nygaard had the best view of Casey’s right side. Beach was positioned in
such a way that he wouldn’t have been able to easily tell what Casey was doing with his right hand.
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
And Nygaard, who was wrestling with Casey’s left hand, also had a much better vantage point of
where that hand was and where it might’ve been reaching or pulling. In the heat of an intense
physical struggle, Beach reasonably could’ve believed either that Nygaard had shot Casey because
he was reaching for the gun Nygaard had just yelled about or that Casey had fired the shots. So it
wasn’t unreasonable for Beach to believe Casey posed an imminent, deadly threat and thus fire his
weapon.
Finally, the third Graham factor: whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or trying
to flee. While this factor couldn’t make Beach’s use of force unreasonable given the imminent
threat he believed he faced, the factor favors Beach here. Casey was actively resisting arrest by
“physically struggling with” and “disobeying” the officers. Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 641
(6th Cir. 2015). It’s uncontested that Casey disobeyed multiple orders to exit his car and instead
“grabbed Nygaard’s arm and began a physical struggle.” R. 44, Pg. ID 310, 311, 314. That active
resistance bolsters Beach’s justification for using deadly force.
Ultimately, the reasonableness of Beach’s actions must be judged from “the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene,” not from the clear vantage of hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at
396. Forced in mayhem to act in seconds, a reasonable officer in Beach’s shoes could’ve believed
Casey posed an imminent, deadly threat while actively resisting arrest. That means Beach’s use
of deadly force was reasonable and therefore not a violation of Casey’s Fourth Amendment rights.
And because we conclude that Beach’s actions didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment, we must also
conclude that the law doesn’t clearly establish that they did.
B.
But even if Beach’s actions did violate the Fourth Amendment, he’d still be entitled to
qualified immunity because he didn’t violate a clearly established right. Crowley bears the burden
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
of establishing that Beach violated Casey’s clearly established rights. Bell, 37 F.4th at 367. That’s
a heavy burden by design because qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.” Wesby, 593 U.S. at 63. To carry her burden, Crowley must
show that Casey’s right not to be shot by Beach in these circumstances was so clearly established
that every reasonable officer would’ve known the right was beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Crowley can only carry that burden if she points to a case in which “an
officer taking similar actions in similar circumstances was held to have violated” the Fourth
Amendment. Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. 568, 574 (2026) (per curiam). Indeed, the prior case must
squarely govern such that every reasonable officer in Beach’s position would’ve known in an
instant that Beach’s use of force was unreasonable. Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018).
Crowley doesn’t point to a single such case in her brief. See Appellee’s Br. at 20–24. Not
one case she cites involved the undisputed circumstances here: an officer who fired after he was
engaged in a close-quarters struggle with the suspect, heard the suspect had a gun, and then heard
shots. Crowley cites several cases in which this court has denied qualified immunity because there
was a dispute as to whether the plaintiff pointed a gun at the officers. But, as we’ve already
explained, the relevant question is whether Beach could’ve reasonably believed Casey posed an
imminent threat based on Nygaard’s yell and shots. Thus, Beach didn’t have to wait to see Casey
point and shoot the gun. The closest Crowley gets to a relevant case is one where an officer shot
at a man who said he had a gun and then partially opened his door. See Campbell v. Cheatham
County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 47 F.4th 468, 473–75 (6th Cir. 2022). But that’s far afield of the facts
here.
In fact, we’ve held that there wasn’t a constitutional violation in a case like this one.
Cooper v. City of Columbus, No. 22-3251, 2023 WL 1434055, at *2 (6th Cir. 2023). There, Officer
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
Narewski was in a “hand-to-hand struggle” with a suspect in the “confined” space of a car. Id. at
*7. A fellow officer “announced” that the suspect had a gun. Id. “Then there was a gunshot.” Id.
In a “couple of seconds,” Narewski pulled away from the suspect and fatally shot him. Id. As in
this case, it turned out that the fellow officer was the one who’d fired the shot, while the suspect’s
gun had “remained in his pocket” and was “never discharged.” Id. Still, we concluded that a
reasonable officer in Narewski’s shoes could’ve thought that the suspect was trying to reach for a
gun and that the fellow officer’s shot was actually the suspect’s. Id. So we held that Narewski’s
use of deadly force wasn’t unreasonable. Id. at *8.
True, Cooper is an unpublished case. But that designation doesn’t matter here for two
reasons. First, Cooper isn’t being used to show that the law is clearly established. Cf. Bell, 37
F.4th at 367–68. Rather, it’s just an illustration that the unreasonableness of actions like Beach’s
isn’t beyond debate. After all, if it was, Cooper couldn’t have concluded that Narewski’s actions
were reasonable. And second, we’ve relied on unpublished opinions before to find that an alleged
right hasn’t been clearly established. Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citation omitted);
Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 879 (6th Cir. 2003); Cahoo v. SAS Analytics, Inc., 912 F.3d 887,
906–07 (6th Cir. 2019). We do no more here. When case law at the time of an officer’s action
suggests his action is lawful, its unlawfulness can’t have been clearly established.
Because Crowley hasn’t identified a case involving circumstances like those Beach faced,
the law didn’t “put [Beach] on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.” Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021). So Beach is entitled to qualified immunity.
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
* * *
In the end, Beach is entitled to qualified immunity on Crowley’s Fourth Amendment claim
against him. But the district court didn’t address whether Beach was immune from Crowley’s
state-law claims. So we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Officers were called to conduct a welfare check
on a man who was reported to be slumped over the steering wheel of a running pickup truck in a
parking lot near a Dollar General store. When the first two officers arrived, they spoke with Casey
Crowley, the truck’s driver. Crowley provided identification to the officers but told them that he
was tired and struggled to communicate coherently with them. The officers then ordered Crowley
to exit the truck, but he refused. When a third officer reached into the truck to turn it off, Crowley
grabbed the officer’s arm, and a physical struggle ensued.
While the three officers were trying to pull Crowley out of the truck, defendant Deputy
Benjamin Beach, Jr. heard a fellow officer yell, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!” Beach then saw
that officer draw his gun. After hearing two shots, Beach drew his own gun and shot Crowley
twice. Crowley died from his gunshot wounds.
But Crowley never fired, brandished, or attempted to brandish the gun in his right pocket.
In fact, when Crowley was shot, his right hand was grabbing the truck’s passenger-seat headrest
and was nowhere near the gun in his right pocket. The majority concludes nonetheless that Beach
acted reasonably when he shot Crowley. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, I disagree.
The majority concludes as well that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly
established, observing that no cases Crowley cites involved “an officer who fired after he was
engaged in a close-quarters struggle with the suspect, heard the suspect had a gun, and then heard
shots.” Majority Op. at 8. But we have repeatedly held that individuals have a right not to be shot
merely for possessing a gun unless they are reasonably perceived as posing an imminent threat to
officers or others. Those cases would have put Beach on notice that shooting Crowley—who
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
merely possessed a gun and, based on his position, could not have posed an immediate threat to
the officers—violated Crowley’s constitutional rights.
Because the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Beach, I would affirm.
I.
I construe the record in Crowley’s favor as the non-moving party. Campbell v. Cheatham
Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 47 F.4th 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2022). When Crowley was shot, his left hand
was holding onto Sergeant Nygaard’s arm, and his right hand was grabbing the passenger-seat
headrest. Crowley’s gun remained in his right pocket. Crowley was not trying to reach for his
gun when Nygaard and Beach shot him in quick succession.
Drawing reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to Crowley, Beach could
not have seen “a glimpse of something black in Crowley’s hand” (as Beach claims) before shooting
him because Crowley was holding his identification cards, not a gun, in his right hand. R. 29-2,
PageID 233. And to the extent Beach saw Crowley’s right hand before shooting, it was neither
holding a gun nor near one. Further, before hearing two gunshots, Beach saw Nygaard draw his
gun after yelling “I’ll blow your f*cking head off!” The majority reasons that “Nygaard had the
best view of [Crowley’s] right side” and that “Beach was positioned in such a way that he wouldn’t
have been able to easily tell what [Crowley] was doing with his right hand.” Majority Op. at 6.
But Beach was close enough to the struggle that he was “grabb[ing] Crowley” and pulling on the
hood of Crowley’s sweatshirt when Nygaard yelled about the gun and shot Crowley. R. 29-2,
PageID 232–33. Indeed, Beach was close enough to Crowley that Beach had blood on his face
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
and uniform after the shooting. So under these circumstances, it would not have been difficult for
Beach to see Crowley’s right hand on the passenger-seat headrest.
No reasonable officer in Beach’s position would have believed that Crowley had fired the
two shots or that “[Crowley] was somehow trying to use a gun.” Majority Op. at 6. Nygaard
yelled that Crowley had a gun, but Beach never saw one. And Crowley’s right hand was grabbing
the passenger-seat headrest; it was not near the gun in his right pocket. So the only person Beach
could have reasonably believed was “trying to use a gun” was Nygaard, whom Beach had heard
threaten to shoot Crowley and had seen pointing a gun only moments before Beach heard two
gunshots. In these circumstances, it was not reasonable for Beach to draw his firearm and fire two
more shots at Crowley, who posed no threat.
The majority relies on the requirement that we assess the reasonableness of Beach’s actions
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. But even when accounting for the
necessary split-second decision making, Beach’s use of deadly force was still unreasonable. Our
decision in Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2008), is instructive. In that case, we
affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to two officers who shot an unarmed suspect. Floyd,
518 F.3d at 401. Officer Reynoso (the second officer) followed behind the first officer as the two
pursued a fleeing, reportedly armed suspect with their guns drawn. Id. at 408. As the officers
rounded a corner, Reynoso heard a gunshot and saw the first officer “slump down and to the side
to take cover.” Id. Reynoso claimed that he reasonably believed that the suspect had shot the
other officer and that Reynoso thus responded reasonably—even if mistakenly—by immediately
shooting the suspect. Id. Reynoso conceded that when he shot, he was looking only at the
suspect’s body but never at his hands, which were raised and empty. Id. We concluded that
Reynoso failed to “explain how any reasonable officer could have formed a belief” that the
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suspect—“an unarmed man with his empty hands allegedly up” had shot the other officer. Id. We
observed that the only basis for Reynoso’s belief was hearing a gunshot and seeing the other officer
take cover. Id. We rejected Reynoso’s argument that he had acted reasonably, explaining that
“[h]ad Reynoso looked at [the suspect’s] hands even momentarily before shooting him in the chest,
he would have seen that [the suspect] was unarmed.” Id. (emphasis added).
Like the officer in Floyd, Beach insists that he acted reasonably by shooting Crowley given
Beach’s purported uncertainty about who had fired the first two shots. But had Beach looked at
Crowley’s hands even momentarily before shooting him, Beach would have seen that Crowley was
not brandishing or attempting to brandish a gun. This would not have been difficult for Beach,
who was next to Crowley and acknowledges that he saw at least one of Crowley’s hands before
shooting.1 Beach’s failure to do so was unreasonable.
II.
The majority also concludes that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly
established. In the majority’s view, no cases show that Crowley’s “right not to be shot by Beach
in these circumstances was so clearly established that every reasonable officer would’ve known
the right was beyond debate.” Majority Op. at 8. The majority observes that Crowley fails to cite
any cases involving the situation here: “an officer who fired after he was engaged in a close-
quarters struggle with the suspect, heard the suspect had a gun, and then heard shots.” Id.
But “[i]t has been clearly established in this circuit for some time that ‘individuals have a
right not to be shot unless they are perceived as posing a threat to officers or others.’” King v.
Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 664 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 468
1
Although Beach stated that he “saw a glimpse of something black in Crowley’s hand” before
shooting, he could not specify which hand. R. 29-2, PageID 233.
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No. 26-5258, Crowley v. Cassidy
(6th Cir. 2006)) (collecting cases); see also Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 896 (6th Cir.
2007) (“[E]ven when a suspect has a weapon, but the officer has no reasonable belief that the
suspect poses a danger of serious physical harm to him or others, deadly force is not justified.”)
(collecting cases). In King, we thus had “little trouble concluding that if [an officer] shot [a
suspect] while he was lying on his couch and not pointing a gun at the officers, [the officer]
violated [the suspect’s] clearly[]established right to be free from deadly force” even if the suspect
possessed a gun. 694 F.3d at 664; see also Campbell, 47 F.4th at 482 (“[O]ur caselaw ... [has]
made clear that merely possessing a weapon, without more, is insufficient to justify the use of
deadly force against a suspect.”) (collecting cases). Further, in Floyd we rejected the officer’s
argument that he acted reasonably—even if mistakenly—by shooting a suspect without pausing
momentarily to determine whether the suspect was actually brandishing a weapon. 518 F.3d at
408–09.
Under Crowley’s version of events, this case law establishes the relevant right. It is
undisputed that Beach heard Nygaard yell about a gun and threaten to shoot Crowley, and then
Beach heard two shots after he saw Nygaard draw his gun. So Beach reasonably believed that
Crowley possessed a gun. But Beach never saw Crowley’s gun before shooting. Indeed, looking
at Crowley’s hands even momentarily would have revealed that Crowley was not brandishing or
reaching for a gun, and thus posed no threat. Under these circumstances, our case law clearly
establishes that no reasonable officer in Beach’s shoes would have believed that using deadly force
against Crowley was reasonable.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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