Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two November 10, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59731-4-II Respondent, v. DUPINDER SINGH, PUBLISHED OPINION Appellant. MAXA, P.J. – Dupinder Singh appeals his four convictions of felony communication with a minor for immoral purposes (CMIP). Singh’s convictions arose from a series of sexually explicit Snapchat messages he exchanged in November 2020 with 14-year-old AD and later with a law enforcement officer posing as AD. The evidence showed that Singh communicated with AD or an officer posing as AD on four different dates, and the State charged Singh with one count of CMIP for each date (counts I- IV). After a bench trial, the trial court found that the communications occurred “on four separate and distinct occasions” and convicted Singh on all four counts. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 199. Singh does not dispute that the communications occurred on these four dates or that they were for immoral purposes. He argues that three of the four CMIP convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the communications constituted a single, ongoing No. 59731-4-II course of conduct and therefore a single unit of prosecution. Alternatively, Singh argues that two of the four CMIP convictions violate double jeopardy because there was at most one disengagement in the communications and therefore only two units of prosecution. We hold that two of Singh’s four CMIP convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Accordingly, we affirm Singh’s CMIP convictions on counts I and III, vacate his convictions on counts II and IV, and remand for resentencing. FACTS In November 2020, 35-year-old Singh began communicating with 14-year-old AD on Snapchat. Snapchat is an Internet-based social media application that allows users to send photos, videos, and messages to one another. Singh and AD communicated on November 16 and 17 regarding sexual matters and then AD met up with Singh on November 17 when Singh again discussed sex. After a law enforcement officer learned about the communications, he used AD’s Snapchat to communicate with Singh on November 21 and 22. Those communications again involved sexual matters. The State charged Singh with four counts of CMIP, one for each date that Singh communicated with AD or with Stockdale posing as AD: November 16 (count I), November 17 (count II), November 21 (count III), and November 22 (count IV).1 Singh waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, AD testified that she and Singh exchanged Snapchat messages. AD told Singh that she was 14 years old. According to AD, the communications started “casual” but “very 1 The State also charged Singh with fourth degree assault with sexual motivation, third degree attempted child molestation, third degree attempted child rape, and first degree possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Those charges are not at issue on appeal. 2 No. 59731-4-II quickly” turned “sexual.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (May 21, 2024) at 60-61. Singh called her names like “baby girl” and “sweetheart,” talked about getting married and having children together, and discussed having sex with her. RP (May 21, 2024) 61-62. Singh and AD also exchanged sexually explicit photographs. AD did not recall exactly when their communications occurred, but she testified that they took place on different days. And they occurred a few days before she talked to the law enforcement officer. AD and a friend also met Singh in person. Singh drove them around in his truck. He eventually parked at a truck stop, where he talked to AD about kissing her and having sex with her. Sometime after meeting Singh, AD was taken into custody at a juvenile detention facility in connection with an unrelated matter. On November 20, Officer Kyle Stockdale interviewed AD about that matter. During the interview, AD told Stockdale that she had been communicating with an adult man on Snapchat, he had sent her messages referencing sex, and they had met in person. Through investigation, Stockdale was able to determine that Singh and AD started communicating via Snapchat on November 16, 2020, and that they met on November 17. Stockdale took over AD’s Snapchat account with her consent. When he first accessed the account, Stockdale found many unanswered messages from Singh, and it appeared to him that Singh had been frantically trying to reach AD. Stockdale said that it appeared that AD had not responded to these messages because she was in detention. Stockdale changed the account’s settings so that messages would be retained unless someone intentionally deleted them. Stockdale did not tell Singh that he was a law enforcement officer, and Singh believed that he was communicating with AD. 3 No. 59731-4-II On November 21, Stockdale, posing as AD, began messaging Singh. According to Stockdale, the messages “turned to sexual fairly quickly.” RP (May 21, 2024) at 112. Stockdale testified that Singh discussed having sex and his favorite sexual positions. Stockdale told Singh that “she” was 14 years old. On November 22, Singh described graphic sexual acts and asked sexually explicit questions about AD’s body. Singh and Stockdale also planned an in-person meeting for that day. Officers arrested Singh when he arrived for that meeting. During their exchange on Snapchat, Singh deleted a number of messages immediately after Stockdale viewed them. However, screenshots and photographs of some of the surviving messages between Singh and Stockdale were admitted at trial as exhibit 16. According to Stockdale, the exhibit included messages from both November 21 and 22. But exhibit 16 contained no dates or timestamps showing when the messages were sent. The trial court convicted Singh of four counts of CMIP. The court found that “the communications between [Singh] and A.D. (or Officer Stockdale posing as 14 year old A.D.), on four separate and distinct occasions, on or about November 16, November 17, November 21 and November 22, 2020, were sexual in nature based on evidence presented and witness testimony.” CP at 199. And the court found that Singh “communicated electronically with AD and someone he believed was AD for immoral purposes on each occasion charged.” CP at 199 (emphasis added). Singh appeals his four CMIP convictions. ANALYSIS Singh argues that his four felony CMIP convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We agree in part. 4 No. 59731-4-II A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no “person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution provides, “No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Under these provisions, a defendant can be charged with multiple offenses arising from the same conduct, but double jeopardy prohibits multiple convictions for the same conduct. State v. Hall, 168 Wn.2d 726, 729-30, 230 P.3d 1048 (2010). We review double jeopardy claims de novo. Id. at 729. When a defendant has multiple convictions under the same statutory provision, the “unit of prosecution” analysis applies. State v. Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975, 980, 329 P.3d 78 (2014). This analysis asks, “ ‘what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act.’ ” Id. at 980-81 (quoting State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 634, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998)). In other words, the unit of prosecution analysis involves statutory interpretation and legislative intent. State v. Canter, 17 Wn. App. 2d 728, 737, 487 P.3d 916 (2021). A unit of prosecution may either be an single act or a course of conduct. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 731. Our approach to analyzing a unit of prosecution issue involves three steps: (1) analyzing the statute, (2) reviewing the statute’s history, and (3) performing a factual analysis. Id. at 730. The factual analysis is necessary because even after the unit of prosecution is identified, “ ‘the facts in a particular case may reveal more than one unit of prosecution is present.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Varnell, 162 Wn.2d 165, 168, 170 P.3d 24 (2007)). “If the legislature fails to define the unit of prosecution or its intent is unclear, under the rule of lenity any ambiguity must be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple 5 No. 59731-4-II offenses.” Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 730 (quoting State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 711, 107 P.3d 728 (2005)). Singh relies on Hall, where the defendant was convicted of three counts of witness tampering. 168 Wn.2d at 729. The convictions were based on over 1,200 telephone calls the defendant made to a witness in which he tried to convince her not to testify or to testify falsely. Id. The relevant statute, RCW 9A.72.120(1)(a), stated that a person is guilty of witness tampering if they “attempt[ ] to induce a witness” to “[t]estify falsely or . . . withhold any testimony.” Id. at 730-31. The Supreme Court held that under the statute’s plain language, the unit of prosecution was the “ongoing attempt to persuade a witness not to testify.” Id. at 734 (emphasis added). The court rejected the notion that each telephone call was a separate offense, which would lead to the absurd result that the defendant could be charged with 1,200 crimes. Id. at 737. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant committed only one offense of witness tampering. Id. The court expressly did not address the situation where “additional attempts to induce are interrupted by a substantial period of time.” Id at 737-38. B. STATUTORY ANALYSIS The first step is analyzing the statute. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 730. Analyzing the unit of prosecution is an issue of statutory construction and legislative intent. Canter, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 737. In determining the legislative intent regarding the unit of prosecution, we look first to the relevant statute’s plain meaning. State v. Madden, 16 Wn. App. 2d 327, 333, 480 P.3d 1154 (2021). If a word is not defined in the statute, we can consider dictionary definitions to determine the word’s ordinary meaning. State v. Moss, 37 Wn. App. 2d 241, 245, 590 P.3d 1173 (2026). 6 No. 59731-4-II Singh was convicted under RCW 9.68A.090, which states, (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a person who communicates with a minor for immoral purposes, or a person who communicates with someone the person believes to be a minor for immoral purposes, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. (2) A person who communicates with a minor for immoral purposes is guilty of a class C felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW . . . if the person communicates with a minor or with someone the person believes to be a minor for immoral purposes . . . through the sending of an electronic communication. (3) For the purposes of this section, “electronic communication” has the same meaning as defined in [RCW 9A.90.120].[2] (Emphasis added.) RCW 9A.90.120(8) states that “ ‘electronic communication’ means the transmission of information by wire, radio, optical cable, electromagnetic, or other similar means. ‘Electronic communication’ includes, but is not limited to, email, internet-based communications, pager service, and electronic text messaging.” (Emphasis added). Based on the statutory language, the unit of prosecution for felony CMIP is communicating with a minor – or someone the defendant believes is a minor – for immoral purposes through an electronic communication. RCW 9.68A.090(2). Whether this unit of prosecution refers to each individual contact or a course of conduct depends on the interpretation of the terms “communicates” and “an electronic communication.” RCW 9.68A.090(2) does not define “communicates.” But the use of the verb “communicates” rather than the singular noun “a communication” suggests that the term could encompass multiple contacts. And the dictionary definition of “communicate” is “to send 2 RCW 9.68A.090(3) actually cites to the definition in former RCW 9.61.260 (2004), which was recodified as RCW 9A.90.120. LAWS OF 2022 ch. 231 § 4. RCW 9A.90.120 provides definitions relevant to cyber harassment. 7 No. 59731-4-II information or messages sometimes back and forth: speak, gesticulate, or write to another to convey information: interchange thoughts.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 460 (2002) (emphasis added). Under this definition, “communicates” could refer either to a single contact or to multiple “back and forth” contacts. The other key term is in the last sentence of RCW 9.68A.090(2), which refers to “the sending of an electronic communication.” The use of the word “an” before a singular noun could mean that each contact is a separate offense. However, that portion of the statute relates to the classification of the offense as a felony instead of a gross misdemeanor, not whether the substantive offense of communication with a minor for immoral purposes occurred. Further, the definition of “electronic communication” in RCW 9A.90.120(8) includes “internet-based communications.” (Emphasis added.). So that term is not necessarily limited to an individual contact. As a result, the legislative intent in the use of “an electronic communication” in RCW 9.68A.090(2) is not clear. Based on an analysis of the statutory language, the unit of prosecution under RCW 9.68A.090(2) could include either a single contact or a continuing course of conduct. This means that the legislative intent is unclear, and we must apply the rule of lenity. See Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 730. Therefore, we conclude that the unit of prosecution for CMIP can include a course of conduct involving multiple contacts. C. STATUTE’S HISTORY The next step is examining the statute’s history. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 730. The language of the offense of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes has remained relatively unchanged over time, although the offense has been codified under different chapters. See 13B Seth A. Fine , WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW AND SENTENCING, § 30:06 (3d ed. 2019). 8 No. 59731-4-II None of the amendments to what is now codified as RCW 9.68A.090 provide any assistance in determining whether “communicates” refers to a singular contact or a continuing course of conduct. In 2006, the legislature added the phrase “or if the person communicates with a minor or with someone the person believes to be a minor for immoral purposes, including the purchase or sale of commercial sex acts and sex trafficking, through the sending of an electronic communication” to RCW 9.68A.090(2). LAWS OF 2006, ch. 139, § 1. But as discussed above, the reference to “an electronic communication” in that statute does not unambiguously indicate that the unit of prosecution is limited to each separate contact. Therefore, the legislative history does not compel a different result than the statutory analysis. D. FACTUAL ANALYSIS The final step is to perform a factual analysis as to the unit of prosecution, because concluding that the unit of prosecution for CMIP can include a course of conduct involving multiple contacts is not necessarily determinative. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 730. As noted above, “ ‘the facts in a particular case may reveal more than one unit of prosecution is present.’ ” Id. (quoting Varnell, 162 Wn.2d at 168). Once the unit of prosecution is identified, the specific facts of each case will determine the number of units of prosecution. And “[i]f there is still doubt, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of a single unit.” Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 737. Counts I through IV correspond to Singh’s communications with AD, and later with Stockdale, on November 16, 17, 21, and 22. Singh assigns error to the trial court’s findings that the communications occurred “on four separate and distinct occasions” and that he 9 No. 59731-4-II communicated for immoral purposes “on each occasion charged,” to the extent they treat each date as a separate unit of prosecution. CP at 199. Singh and AD exchanged messages on November 16 and 17. AD testified that the sexual messages were sent on different days. After Singh and AD met in person on November 17, officers took AD into juvenile detention, where she remained for several days without her phone and stopped responding to Singh. The parties did not exchange messages again until November 21, when Stockdale reinitiated contact posing as AD. Singh and Stockdale then exchanged messages on November 21 and 22. The analysis above demonstrates that the exchange of multiple electronic messages can constitute a course of conduct that represents a single unit of prosecution. “But when the parties disengage for an extended period after a series of communication, the course of conduct – and the unit of prosecution – necessarily ends.” In re Pers. Restraint of Zimmerman, No. 56946-9-II, slip op. at 51 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056946-9-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.3 “A new course of conduct and a new unit of prosecution begins when the parties reinitiate contact. In other words, each separate engagement constitutes a separate unit of prosecution.” Id. at 51. 1. November 16 and 17 Singh and AD exchanged multiple messages on November 16 and 17. The question is whether Singh and AD disengaged for an extended period of time on those days. AD’s testimony shows only that there were communications between Singh and AD on two different days. A sufficient disengagement can exist when there are communications on 3 GR 14.1(c) allows us to cite to unpublished opinions if necessary for a reasoned decision. 10 No. 59731-4-II different days depending on the facts, but a change in date is not necessarily a disengagement. The State relies on Zimmerman, where this court concluded that there were separate engagements and units of prosecution on different days when there was no contact for 10 and 12 hours. Zimmerman, slip op. at 51. But here, there was no testimony regarding when on November 16 and 17 the communications occurred. Without more information, the evidence is insufficient to show a significant disengagement.4 Because the record leaves doubt about whether the parties disengaged their communications between November 16 and November 17, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of a single unit of prosecution for these dates. See Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 737. Therefore, we conclude that the communications on November 16 and 17 constitute one engagement and one unit of prosecution.5 2. November 17 and November 21 There was no evidence of any communications between Singh and AD between November 17 and November 21, when Stockdale – posing as AD – reinitiated contact. We conclude that this break of several days was a disengagement for an extended period such that the communications on November 21 constituted a new unit of prosecution. Singh argues that there was only one engagement because he continued to message AD on Snapchat for the same immoral purpose while she was in detention, even though she stopped 4 The State acknowledges that “AD’s testimony, while stating the communication happened on two different days, arguably could be insufficient to show a sufficient disengagement without more information.” Br. of Resp’t at 16. 5 Arguably, the Snapchat messages on November 16 and 17 and the in-person communications on November 17 constitute different units of prosecution because Singh used different methods of communication. But the State did not make that argument at trial or on appeal. 11 No. 59731-4-II responding. We disagree. Unanswered messages show, at most, that Singh was trying to reinitiate contact, not that the parties remained engaged. 3. November 21 and 22 Singh and Stockdale posing as AD exchanged multiple messages on November 21 and 22. Again, the question is whether Singh and Stockdale disengaged for an extended period of time on those days. Stockdale’s testimony and exhibit 16 show only that there were communications between Singh and Stockdale on those two days. But as noted above, a change in date is not necessarily a disengagement. Here, there was no testimony regarding when on November 21 and 22 the communications occurred. Stockdale did not testify about any gap in the messages exchanged on November 21 and 22, and the surviving messages in exhibit 16 contain no dates or time stamps. The record shows only that the communications occurred on different days, but a change in date is not itself a disengagement. Without more information, the evidence is insufficient to show a significant disengagement. Because the record leaves doubt about whether the parties disengaged their communications between November 21 and 22, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of a single unit of prosecution for pair these dates. See Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 737. Therefore, we conclude that the communications on November 21 and 22 constitute a second engagement and unit of prosecution. Accordingly, we hold that two of Singh’s four CMIP convictions – for count II and count IV – violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. 12 No. 59731-4-II CONCLUSION We affirm Singh’s CMIP convictions on counts I and III, vacate his convictions on counts II and IV, and remand for resentencing. MAXA, P.J. We concur: LEE, J. CHE, J. 13