Full Opinion

23-6871 United States v. Thornton UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of November, two thousand twenty-six. Present: SUSAN L. CARNEY, MICHAEL H. PARK, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. ________________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. 23-6871 BRINAE THORNTON, AKA LUXURY, Defendant-Appellant.* ________________________________________ FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: RANDALL D. UNGER, Kew Gardens, NY. FOR APPELLEE: KATHRYN WHEELOCK (David R. Felton, Courtney Heavy, Shiva Logarajah, James Ligtenberg, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys for Jamie McDonald, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY. * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Halpern, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED in part and AFFIRMED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. Defendant-Appellant Brinae Thornton appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction following her guilty plea to one count of racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The district court sentenced Thornton principally to 210 months of imprisonment, followed by a two-year term of supervised release, and imposed the twelve standard conditions of supervision recommended in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). Thornton now challenges one of those conditions—the Non-Association Condition—which states: “You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.” We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. “This Court generally reviews the imposition of supervised release conditions for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298, 304 (2d Cir. 2024). But “plain error review applies when a defendant had a meaningful opportunity to make objections and failed to raise them before the district court at sentencing.” United States v. McAdam, 165 F.4th 688, 698 (2d Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). To show plain error, a party must demonstrate “(1) an error, (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. at 699. The Non-Association 2 Condition was recommended in the PSR, and Thornton did not object to it at sentencing, so we review for plain error. Thornton argues that the district court did not adequately justify imposing the Non- Association Condition as applied to her communications with her father, who has been convicted of a felony. We agree. Although district courts have “broad discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release,” United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018), “when a fundamental liberty interest is implicated by a sentencing condition, we must first consider the sentencing goal to which the condition relates, and whether the record establishes its reasonableness,” United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir. 2005). Then, we must consider “whether it represents a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve that goal.” Id. Although “a district court need not explain its reasoning when imposing standard conditions,” a condition that implicates a protected familial relationship requires “a more thorough justification.” United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d 165, 183–184 (2d Cir. 2020). The district court did not provide any explanation for its imposition of the Non-Association Condition, nor did it address the application of the Non-Association Condition to Thornton’s interactions with her father. We thus remand “to allow the district court to provide further justification for this condition as applied to [Thornton’s] immediate family members or to exempt such communications and interactions from the restriction.” Id. at 184. Thornton also challenges the Non-Association Condition as applied to her communications with convicted felons other than her father. Her arguments—that the district court failed to explain the condition, that the condition was not “tailored to [her] particular circumstances,” and that the condition is not reasonably related to the goals of sentencing—are premised on 3 requirements governing the imposition of special conditions, not standard ones. See United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen determining whether to impose a special condition,” a district court “must make an individualized assessment” and “state on the record the reason for imposing it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. DeJesus, 182 F.4th 233, 244 (2d Cir. 2026) (stating special conditions must “serve the non-retributive purposes of sentencing” and require “narrow tailoring” when they implicate a fundamental liberty interest (internal quotation marks omitted)). Standard conditions like the Non-Association Condition “presumptively appl[y] to all terms of supervised release,” and a district court “need not explain its reasoning when imposing” them. Sims, 92 F.4th at 120; Bryant, 976 F.3d at 183. * * * We have considered Thornton’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED as to the Non- Association Condition to the extent it implicates Thornton’s communications with her father and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. We otherwise AFFIRM the judgment.1 FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 1 It is further ordered that counsel’s pending motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and the government’s pending motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, for summary affirmance are DENIED as moot. 4