Kristel Rose Maestas v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 20, 2021
Docket1D19-1767
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D19-1767
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KRISTEL ROSE MAESTAS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
William F. Stone, Judge.
April 20, 2021
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Kristel Maestas, and Ronald Bell were convicted
for the kidnapping and murder of Cordell Richards. Appellant
raises three issues on appeal, only one of which has merit. We
affirm her first two issues without comment. We reverse and
remand her the third issue for the reasons discussed herein.
Appellant and Mr. Bell were juveniles at the time of the
murder. On April 17, 2000, Appellant was convicted of first-degree
felony murder (count 1) and armed kidnapping (count 2) and
sentenced to consecutive terms of life in prison. Following the
decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Appellant
successfully challenged her life sentence in count 2 and was
resentenced to thirty years in prison to run consecutively to the life
sentence in count 1.
In 2015, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief
under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Falcon v. State,
162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015), arguing her life sentence in count 1 was
unconstitutional and she was entitled to a subsequent judicial
review of her sentence. The lower court set a resentencing hearing
pursuant to sections 921.1401, 921.1402, and 775.082, Florida
Statutes. The evidence and argument at the 2018 resentencing
hearing focused on the propriety of Appellant’s life sentence under
section 921.1401. Defense counsel noted, depending on the court’s
decision in the resentencing, Appellant would be entitled to a
section 921.1402 sentence review at a later date and asked the
court to order such review.
The lower court’s sentencing order made lengthy findings –
supported by competent, substantial evidence – under the factors
in section 921.1401(2)(a)-(j) and affirmed Appellant’s life sentence
in count 1. With regard to the section 921.1402 review, the court
made findings “out of an abundance of caution.” The court found
Appellant would be entitled to a section 921.1402 review hearing
on count 1 “after serving fifteen years, beginning April 17, 2000.
However, because [she] has already served fifteen years and has
had the benefit of this resentencing proceeding, a sentencing
review on count one is unnecessary.” The court found Appellant
would be eligible for a section 921.1402 review only on count 2,
after serving twenty years, beginning April 17, 2000.
In her third issue on appeal, Appellant argues the lower court
erred in denying her request for a section 921.1402 review on count
1, finding it unnecessary because she had already served fifteen
years and had the benefit of the section 921.1401 hearing. We
agree.
We recently considered a similar issue in co-defendant Bell’s
case. Bell v. State, No. 1D19-1542, 2021 WL 670449 (Fla. 1st DCA
February 22, 2021). In Bell, the lower court sua sponte conducted
a section 921.1402 sentence review at Bell’s section 921.1401
resentencing hearing. Bell’s sentencing order was similar to the
Appellant’s in that the lower court made section 921.1402 findings
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“out of an abundance of caution” and determined an additional
sentence review was unnecessary because Bell had already served
fifteen years and had the benefit of the resentencing hearing. The
panel in Bell held the lower court’s conflated section 921.1402
review was inappropriate because Bell had not initiated the review
via an application to the court of original jurisdiction. Bell, 2021
WL 670449 at *5.
While Appellant’s order setting the resentencing hearing did
reference section 921.1402, defense counsel made clear they were
asking for that review later in a separate proceeding. Appellant
has a right to an independent sentence review under section
921.1402, and the lower court deprived her of such by deeming the
section 921.1401 resentencing hearing sufficient. We reverse the
portion of the sentencing order denying Appellant’s request for a
sentence review under section 921.1402. We affirm the remainder
of the order on review.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
ROBERTS, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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David J. Joffe of Joffe Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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