Peo v. Ritchie

23CA1960 Peo v Ritchie 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 23CA1960 Boulder County District Court No. 21CR1740 Honorable Patrick Butler, Judge The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew James Ritchie, Defendant-Appellant. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Lipinsky and Gomez, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Solicitor General and Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellee Lucy H. Deakins, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Andrew James Ritchie, was convicted of first degree murder as a complicitor after a woman with whom he was romantically involved killed her husband. ¶2 On appeal, Ritchie contends that the trial court erred by denying his for-cause challenge to a juror who, after disclosing that she had been the victim of a crime and suffered from post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), expressed that she could not be a fair juror in the case. Because we agree that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the for-cause challenge, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.1 I. Background ¶3 At the outset of jury selection, the trial court explained “a few basic rules of law that apply in all criminal cases,” including the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proof, the defendant’s right to remain silent, and the jurors’ duty to decide the case on the evidence presented at trial and the law contained in the instructions. When the court asked the venire if anyone did not 1 In light of our disposition, we need not address Ritchie’s challenge to his sentence and the restitution order. 1  understand, or could not follow, these principles, no prospective jurors raised their hands. ¶4 During the lawyers’ voir dire, Ritchie’s counsel asked the venire whether anyone had concerns about being a juror in a first degree murder trial. Multiple jurors said they did, including Juror P. Juror P disclosed that about twenty years earlier, “somebody threatened to kill [her] and [her] family,” she suffered from “serious [PTSD],” and she was “already . . . very stressed about what ha[d] been going on and what ha[d] been talked about” in the courtroom. She explained that the jury selection process was “a little retraumatizing” and that she was “already thinking about other things instead of listening to everything,” which she “absolutely” thought would continue throughout the trial. She expressed that she “could not be a fair juror” in this “kind of murder case.” ¶5 Later, after another juror was questioned at the bench, Juror P asked to speak privately with the court and the lawyers. She revealed that she had previously met one of the prosecutors at an event and thought the prosecutor was “fantastic,” and that the encounter was “pulling [her] really strongly in terms of what [she was] hearing and thinking” about the case. The trial court 2  acknowledged that during trials, “sometimes people like lawyers, don’t like lawyers, have mixed reactions about them,” but said it was important not to have “a lawyer’s performance . . . determine the outcome” of the trial. The court asked Juror P whether she would be able “to decide the case based on the evidence presented, not whether [she did] or [did not] like a particular attorney.” Juror P said that she believed she could. ¶6 Defense counsel subsequently challenged Juror P for cause based on her comments about her “traumatic experiences” that caused her to have “a serious doubt about her ability to be fair and impartial.” The prosecutor recalled Juror P’s statements about her trauma, but she did not recall that Juror P doubted her ability to be fair, so the prosecutor objected to the challenge. The trial court sided with the prosecution: It denied the for-cause challenge because it believed that Juror P had “indicated that [she] could still be fair and impartial even though [she] ha[d] some emotional experience from hearing about what the evidence may be.” ¶7 The next day, having reviewed her notes, defense counsel renewed her challenge to Juror P. She clarified that Juror P had discussed being the victim of a crime twenty years before and 3  “actually didn’t say that she had a doubt but said that she can’t be fair.” The trial court maintained its prior position, reiterating that it believed Juror P had “indicated [her] ability to be fair and impartial to both sides.” ¶8 All the jurors who expressed a concern with their ability to be fair in light of the charges were excused, either for cause or peremptorily, except Juror P. II. For-Cause Challenge to Juror P A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review ¶9 Criminal defendants have a right to a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. To protect this right, a trial court must excuse prospective jurors who express bias in favor of either side or who are otherwise unable to fulfill their responsibilities as jurors. See § 16-10-103(1)(a), (j), C.R.S. 2026; § 13-71-105(2)(c), C.R.S. 2026. ¶ 10 Still, not every prospective juror who enters the courtroom with some preconceived belief about the case must be dismissed. People v. Slusher, 2026 COA 30, ¶ 84. If, after further examination and rehabilitative efforts, the court is convinced that a juror can impartially evaluate the evidence and follow the court’s instructions 4  on the law, that juror should not be removed for cause. Marko v. People, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 21. “But when a prospective juror’s statements compel the inference that he or she cannot decide the issues fairly, and no rehabilitation occurs, the challenge for cause must be granted.” People v. Gulyas, 2022 COA 34, ¶ 19. ¶ 11 The standard of review is not subject to serious dispute: We review a trial court’s denial of a for-cause challenge for an abuse of discretion. Vigil v. People, 2019 CO 105, ¶ 14; Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485 (Colo. 1999). A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Gulyas, ¶ 20. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we consider the totality of the prospective juror’s statements during voir dire. People v. Blassingame, 2021 COA 11, ¶ 9. ¶ 12 When the trial court’s denial of a for-cause challenge amounts to an abuse of discretion, and the challenged juror sits on the jury, the error is structural, and reversal is required. People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 30. 5  B. Discussion ¶ 13 The facts are undisputed. Juror P said that she suffered from PTSD due to her experience as a crime victim; the discussion about the case during voir dire was “a little retraumatizing”; she “absolutely” believed she would not be able to “listen[] to everything” during the trial; and, based on these concerns, she thought she could not be fair. Neither the prosecution nor the court questioned Juror P about these concerns. Ritchie argues that the court therefore erred by denying his challenge for cause. ¶ 14 The People counter with several unpersuasive arguments. First, they say that unless a juror’s self-professed inability to be fair is based on actual bias or enmity against a party, the juror need not be dismissed for cause. Thus, Juror P’s belief that she could not be fair, which was based on an inability “to focus on the evidence,” did not provide grounds for dismissal. ¶ 15 That argument misapprehends Colorado law. A juror’s obligation is to “render a fair and impartial verdict based on the instructions given by the judge and the evidence presented at trial.” People v. Clemens, 2017 CO 89, ¶ 16; see also § 16-10-103(1)(j) (the court must be satisfied that the jurors “will render an impartial 6  verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial”). A juror who cannot listen to the proceedings or “focus on the evidence” presented at trial cannot render a fair and impartial verdict based on that evidence. As the trial court in this case put it when questioning a different juror, “The main key . . . [is][,] Can you listen to the evidence and observe evidence, even the demeanor of the witnesses, apply the law that [the court] give[s], and try to reach a verdict?” See Blassingame, ¶ 26 (The question is not whether a prospective juror has “unequivocally state[d] her partiality for one side,” but rather whether she can “fairly evaluate the evidence.”). ¶ 16 To the extent the People rely on People v. Fink, 579 P.2d 659 (Colo. App. 1978), for the proposition that only a juror’s actual bias against a party, not her emotional distress about a prior crime, is grounds for dismissal for cause, their reliance is misplaced. In that case, the trial court dismissed a juror who was “experiencing considerable emotional distress” based on her husband’s prior victimization, even though she had “displayed no enmity or bias against [the] defendant.” Id. at 660, 661. 7 ¶ 17 In any event, Juror P’s comments do indicate a bias against Ritchie. Juror P linked her PTSD to the prior death threats she had received, and the PTSD was the reason she could not be fair. She explained to defense counsel that “the violence” associated with this case was “retraumatizing” in a way that prevented her from engaging with the proceedings. In other words, her inability to be fair could be traced back to her experience as the victim of a crime similar to the one Ritchie was accused of committing. ¶ 18 Second, we disagree that the court adequately rehabilitated Juror P during the bench conference concerning her prior interaction with and positive feelings about the prosecutor. The court’s question, which effectively asked whether Juror P could set aside her feelings about the prosecutor, did not address Juror P’s initial declaration that she could not be fair due to her PTSD stemming from her experience as a crime victim. ¶ 19 The same circumstance was addressed in People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319 (Colo. App. 2007). There, a juror first revealed that she had learned some information about the case through the media but, after questioning, agreed that she could follow the law and base her decision solely on evidence presented in court. She 8 also said that she would be distracted by having to miss a class and might try to rush through deliberations. Id. at 320-21. Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause, but the court denied the challenge. Id. at 321. Later, the juror expressed strong feelings about drug use and self-defense. Id. When defense counsel renewed the for-cause challenge, the court referred back to the juror’s earlier agreement to follow the law and overruled the challenge. Id. The division reversed, concluding that although the court’s earlier rehabilitation resolved any concerns about pretrial publicity and possible distractions, it did not resolve the entirely separate concern about the juror’s bias toward drug users. Id. at 321-22; see People v. Clark, 2022 COA 33, ¶ 17 (prospective juror who expressed a racial bias was not rehabilitated because “the limited rehabilitation the court performed focused on whether [the juror] would apply the correct burdens of proof — not whether he could (or would) set aside his admitted bias”), aff’d, 2024 CO 55; Blassingame, ¶¶ 25-27 (the court erred by denying a for-cause challenge when the court rehabilitated the juror on one ground for dismissal but failed to “adequately account[] for [the juror’s] repeated suggestions that her own past trauma would adversely 9  impact her ability to fairly evaluate the evidence”); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1992) (the trial court’s general questions about whether a juror can be fair and impartial are insufficient to rehabilitate a juror with “dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty”); State v. Villeda, 526 P.3d 1213, 1219 (Or. Ct. App. 2023) (when a juror’s “excavated bias relates to a specific opinion, any rehabilitation need[s] to sufficiently address that opinion to permit the court to conclude that the juror could ‘disregard such opinion and try the issue impartially’” (citation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 546 P.3d 268 (Or. 2024); Gosling v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 541, 544 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (the court’s rehabilitation was insufficient because, “[i]nstead of engaging in a specific inquiry regarding the nature and extent of [the juror’s] bias,” the court explained the standards for determining the credibility of witnesses). ¶ 20 And here, the problem was exacerbated by the court’s misrecollection of Juror P’s voir dire comments. We do not agree that the court could properly have relied on Juror P’s later comments during the bench conference to rehabilitate her with respect to her unrelated earlier expression of partiality, but even if 10  the court could have, it did not. Rather, the court denied the for- cause challenge based on its belief that Juror P had been rehabilitated on her PTSD-related bias — that is, because she “indicated that [she] could still be fair and impartial even though [she] ha[d] some emotional experience from hearing about what the evidence may be.” But Juror P never said that; she said the opposite — that she could not be fair due to her ongoing trauma, which had produced an emotional reaction to the voir dire discussion. See Gulyas, ¶ 25 (acknowledging that in reviewing denial of for-cause challenges, deference is accorded to the trial court based on its superior position in assessing juror demeanor and credibility, but declining to apply that principle when the court’s decision was based on a misrecollection of the juror’s statements). ¶ 21 Finally, we reject the argument that the court’s introductory remarks to the venire and the jurors’ silence in response sufficiently addressed Juror P’s later expression of partiality. True, “a juror’s silence in response to questions posed to the venire can be sufficient evidence of rehabilitation after that juror has indicated a preconceived notion.” Clemens, ¶ 12 (emphasis added). But here, 11  Juror P’s disclosure that she could not be fair came after the court’s initial recitation of legal principles and its questions about the jurors’ ability to apply them. We do not read Clemens to endorse a process of anticipatory rehabilitation through silence. ¶ 22 Even given our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss Juror P. After Juror P unequivocally said that she could not be fair based on her emotional distress, neither the prosecution nor the court elicited any counterbalancing assurances of impartiality specific to that expressed bias. Accordingly, the court should have granted Ritchie’s for-cause challenge. See Gulyas, ¶ 24; Merrow, 181 P.3d at 321. And because Juror P sat on the jury, reversal is required. See Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 30. III. Disposition ¶ 23 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE GOMEZ concur. 12