Cheyenne Marron v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMarch 26, 2021
Docket2D19-1335
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CHEYENNE MARRON, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D19-1335
)
STATE OF FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed March 26, 2021.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee
County; Nicholas R. Thompson, Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and
Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and David Campbell,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellee.
LUCAS, Judge.
Cheyenne Marron and four others were involved in an armed robbery that
left one victim dead and another injured. Pursuant to a plea agreement she reached
with the State, Ms. Marron was adjudicated guilty and sentenced on the following
counts: count I, second-degree murder with a firearm, 150 months of incarceration
followed by 150 months of probation; count II, attempted second-degree murder with a
firearm, 126 months of incarceration followed by two years of probation; count III, armed
robbery, 150 months of incarceration followed by 150 months of probation; and count
IV, conspiracy to commit robbery, 60 months of incarceration. All of the counts were set
to run concurrently.
While Ms. Marron's direct appeal was pending before this court, her
attorney filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion with the circuit
court.1 In her postconviction motion, Ms. Marron argued that her sentence on count II
was illegal because she would still be incarcerated and serving her prison sentence
under counts I and III when the probationary period began on count II. The circuit court
never ruled on the motion, and so it was deemed denied by operation of rule
3.800(b)(2)(B). See Sirmons v. State, 264 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ("[I]f a
trial court does not rule on a motion to correct a sentencing error filed while an appeal is
pending within sixty days, the motion shall be deemed denied." (citing Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.800(b)(2)(B))). Ms. Marron now brings this separate appeal in which she argues that
the circuit court erred when it denied her rule 3.800 postconviction motion. Her
argument is well taken.
It is well settled that a court cannot sentence a defendant to serve
probation while that defendant would still be serving a separate sentence in prison. See
Nobles v. State, 605 So. 2d 996, 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (observing it would be
1See Proctor v. State, 901 So. 2d 994, 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ("Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) provides that 'If an appeal is pending, a
defendant or the state may file in the trial court a motion to correct a sentencing
error.' ").
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"reversible error to impose simultaneous terms of imprisonment and probation" (citing
Barr v. State, 474 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Brudie v. State, 467 So. 2d 1113
(Fla. 2d DCA 1985))); Robinson v. State, 198 So. 3d 1088, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
("[T]he incarcerative portions of all counts must be completed before the probationary
portion of any count begins." (quoting Hatton v. State, 689 So. 2d 1195, 1195 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997))). The sentences the circuit court imposed run afoul of this limitation.2
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to correct the
sentences in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed; remanded with instructions.
KHOUZAM, C.J., and LABRIT, J., Concur.
2The State suggests that, notwithstanding the written sentence the circuit
court entered, the presiding judge intended Ms. Marronโs probation to commence only
upon completion of all of her prison sentences. That may be true, but it is not apparent
from our review of the record that that intent was ever expressed. And we are not at
liberty to go beyond what the presiding judge actually said on the record to glean what
sentence the judge intended to impose. Cf. Nobles, 605 So. 2d at 996 ("Probably the
trial court planned that the probationary terms [in one case number] . . . would run
concurrently with the [other] probationary terms . . . and consecutive to the prison
term . . . . However, neither the written sentences nor the oral pronouncement of the
sentences make that clear.").
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