Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT EMMANUEL RUIZ, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 2D2025-2118 September 9, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Teri K. Dees, Judge. Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Ronald N. Toward, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tayna Alexander, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. GUARD, Judge. Emmanuel Ruiz appeals two unrelated judgments and sentences: one for manslaughter with a firearm and a second for carrying a concealed firearm. He pled open to both. Before he was sentenced, Ruiz moved to withdraw his pleas to both. Because the trial court erred in denying that motion as we explain below, we reverse his judgment and sentence for manslaughter with a firearm. We affirm his judgment and sentence for carrying a concealed firearm. I. On August 1, 2023, the State charged Emmanuel Ruiz with (1) carrying a concealed firearm (case number 2023CF001974AX) and (2) manslaughter with a firearm (case number 2023CF001976AX). Ruiz was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses. On August 1, 2024, Ruiz pled open in both cases. On December 30, 2024, Ruiz filed a motion to withdraw his pleas, which he subsequently amended twice. On April 8 and May 2, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and heard argument on Ruiz's motion to withdraw his pleas. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw Ruiz's pleas, Ruiz's former counsel testified that when they first met, Ruiz told him that he did not want a trial. Thereafter, the former counsel did not discuss with Ruiz the possibility of suppressing Ruiz's statements to law enforcement related to the manslaughter with a firearm case because counsel thought that filing such a motion would run counter to Ruiz's direction regarding not wanting to go to trial. Ruiz's former counsel believed that there was a basis to suppress his statements under Miranda.1 At the hearing, the trial court was provided with an audio recording of Ruiz's interview with detectives including the detective’s advising Ruiz of his Miranda rights. On May 7, 2025, the trial court denied Ruiz's motion to withdraw his pleas, finding no good cause had been established. On July 11, 2025, the trial court sentenced Ruiz to twenty years in prison followed by one year of community control and six years of probation. II. While Ruiz raised several grounds to withdraw his pleas in this appeal, only one ground requires us to analyze further, and that is his former counsel's failure to advise him regarding the possibility of filing a motion to suppress Ruiz’s statements to law enforcement in his 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 manslaughter case. Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.170(f) provides that "[t]he court may in its discretion, and shall on good cause," permit a no contest plea to be withdrawn at any time before sentencing. We have held that "good cause" exists "when the defendant's plea was 'infected by misapprehension, undue persuasion, ignorance, or was entered by one not competent to know its consequence or that it was otherwise involuntary, or that the ends of justice would be served by withdrawal of such plea.' " Lehmkuhle v. State, 20 So. 3d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Onnestad v. State, 404 So. 2d 403, 405 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)). We have held repeatedly that entry of a plea relying on mistaken advice constitutes good cause and supports withdrawal of a plea. See, e.g., Crane v. State, 69 So. 3d 357, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Johnson v. State, 971 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)); Cornett v. State, 922 So. 2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Shell v. State, 501 So. 2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Trenary v. State, 453 So. 2d 1132, 1133-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Fifth District has held that failing to advise a defendant of a possible motion to suppress incriminating statements to police is good cause for withdrawing a plea before sentencing. Nicol v. State, 892 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). In Nicol, the defendant entered a guilty plea, the court accepted the plea, and sentencing was deferred. Id. at 1170. Before sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea, alleging it was not voluntarily entered. Id. Before entering the pleas, the defendant had been advised that his incriminating statements to police would be used against him at trial and he was unaware that there was a viable argument for suppressing them. Id. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion by determining "that . . . a motion to suppress would 3 likely have been denied." Id. at 1171. The Fifth District reversed. Id. In reversing, the Fifth District stated that the inquiry on a motion to withdraw a plea should have focused on "whether the defendant had demonstrated that his guilty plea was infected by misapprehension or ignorance" and not the likelihood of success on the motion to suppress. Id. at 1172. As the Fifth District concluded, the trial court there should have granted the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea because trial counsel never discussed a suppression motion with the defendant before he entered the plea and the defendant would not have entered a plea had he been advised that there was a basis to challenge the evidence. Id. Here, like Nicol, Ruiz was never advised that there was a viable motion to suppress his incriminating statements to law enforcement. Former counsel testified that he thought there was a legitimate issue with the Miranda waiver that would support suppressing that evidence. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, the trial court reviewed Ruiz's interview with law enforcement. It is unclear why the trial court reviewed that interview and what, if any, weight the trial court's review played in its denial. We want to make clear that we agree with Nicol that in deciding a motion to withdraw a plea for failing to advise regarding a motion to suppress the likelihood of success of a motion to suppress is not relevant. Instead, the trial court should only consider whether the defendant is acting on misapprehension or ignorance on that issue. On this record, Ruiz was wholly unaware of the possibility of suppressing his statements and established good cause to withdraw his plea to his manslaughter with a firearm case. Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly denied Ruiz's motion to withdraw his plea before sentencing, and we reverse Ruiz’s judgment and sentence for manslaughter with a firearm. 4 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 5