Full Opinion

FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40676-8-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) JAMES MICHAEL JONES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) COONEY, A.C.J. — A jury found James Jones guilty of two counts of assault in the second degree, felony harassment, unlawful imprisonment, intimidating a witness, tampering with a witness, and attempted violation of a domestic violence no contact order. Before trial, Mr. Jones moved to proceed pro se. The court found his request equivocal and denied the motion. On appeal, Mr. Jones argues (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful imprisonment. The State concedes Mr. Jones’ request to proceed pro se was No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones unequivocal but contends the court properly denied his motion based on his disruptive behavior. We accept the State’s concession but conclude that Mr. Jones’ disruptive behavior was not a sufficient basis to deny his motion to proceed pro se. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We further conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for unlawful imprisonment. BACKGROUND Mr. Jones and Minoka Redstar began a relationship in February 2023 and soon moved into a house owned by “one of [Mr. Jones’] friends’” in Disautel, Washington. Supp. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 300. They remained there for a couple weeks, and frequently drank and used drugs together. During that period, Mr. Jones became angry with Ms. Redstar and choked, pushed, threatened, and yelled at her. Ms. Redstar eventually escaped and ran to a friend’s apartment. The following day, she sought treatment for her injuries at a hospital, and her aunt reported the incident to law enforcement. The State charged Mr. Jones with two counts of assault in the second degree, felony harassment, unlawful imprisonment, intimidating a witness, tampering with a witness, and attempted violation of a no contact order, all with domestic violence enhancements. The court held 29 pretrial hearings. Mr. Jones was disruptive and argumentative at several of the hearings. Mr. Jones demanded to be removed from the courtroom at a hearing on July 31, 2023. He then refused to appear for an omnibus hearing the 2 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones following week. At an omnibus hearing on August 15 and a readiness hearing on December 21, 2023, Mr. Jones apologized for his behavior, and explained that he was experiencing “some emotional distress” and dealing with “personal things.” VRP at 19, 40. At the December 21 readiness hearing, defense counsel advised the court that Mr. Jones wanted to “fire” him. VRP at 39. At the next review hearing on January 5, 2024, the court noted it had not yet ruled on Mr. Jones’ request for new counsel, but defense counsel represented that another attorney had agreed to take over the case. The court approved of the substitution of counsel. At the next readiness hearing, held two weeks later, the State moved to continue trial to allow Mr. Jones’ new attorney time to prepare. Mr. Jones became angry about the potential continuance and again demanded to be removed from the courtroom. Mr. Jones had another outburst at a readiness hearing on March 11 after the court granted the State’s motion for an additional continuance. Two weeks later, the court addressed a letter from Mr. Jones requesting a new attorney, among other matters. Mr. Jones did not appear to renew his request for a substitution of counsel at that hearing. At a readiness hearing on April 1, Mr. Jones briefly argued with the court before clarifying, “I’d like to keep my attorney, and I’d like to go to trial.” VRP at 84. About a month later, Mr. Jones moved to proceed pro se. The court conducted an extensive colloquy to ensure Mr. Jones’ decision was knowing and voluntary and that he 3 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones understood “the ramifications, and the duties and responsibilities of acting in the court.” VRP at 106. When asked why he wanted to represent himself, Mr. Jones responded, “Just because this is my right, this is what I prefer to do.” VRP at 107. Mr. Jones further explained, Your Honor, I’ve made it no secret through this entire year of, you know, trying to get speedy trial, many different things that I have issues with. It’s not with my counsel . . . personally. It’s the whole way the matter has been handled. So, now I would like exercise my right for pro se. VRP at 107. The court again asked Mr. Jones to clarify his reasons for wanting to proceed pro se: THE COURT: So, is it—is your—I guess the primary thrust of your request just frustration with the delay in getting this matter to trial? MR. JONES: Your Honor, like I have previously stated, I’ve gone over it so many times, several times throughout this entire time. You know, I don’t know what else more I need to say, you know, of why I have come to the decision of wanting to handle the matter on my own. Thank you. VRP at 107-08. In response to the court’s questions, Mr. Jones stated he had a 12th-grade education, had “written some motions before,” had “stud[ied] at the law library,” was familiar with the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, and would continue to study them. VRP at 108-09. He also stated he understood (1) the maximum penalties he faced, (2) that the court could not assist him or provide legal advice at trial, (3) how he would need to conduct direct examination if he chose to testify, (4) and that, if convicted, he 4 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones could not obtain a reversal on appeal “on the grounds that [he was] a bad lawyer.” VRP at 111. The court cautioned that, once he waived counsel, whether he could later withdraw the waiver would be within the court’s discretion. Mr. Jones stated his decision to proceed pro se was voluntary. The court again asked Mr. Jones to explain why he wanted to represent himself, and he responded: For all the many reasons that I have stated that are on the record before. If need be, I can bring them all up again. You know, it has all been documented. Since I’ve been here, my speedy trial rights have been violated clearly. You may disagree with that, but I don’t. And there’s just too many different reasons why and to get into right now. If it becomes a matter that we need to discuss—Your Honor, [Judge] Grim, I have just—I’ve mentioned it over and over, and over again in court when we’ve come in here. My many, many issues. Some dealing with health, also religious, dietary, me being here, the extravagant bond. Just, you know, many, many different reasons. If we need to have another reason to go into more further depth on it, I guess we could. But I mean, it’s just—I’ve stated it several times, Your Honor. VRP at 114. The court expressed concern that trial was only 25 days away. Mr. Jones responded, “[T]hat’s more time than I need.” VRP at 115. The court ultimately denied Mr. Jones’ request to proceed pro se, concluding his request was equivocal. The court explained: Okay. Well, if you’ll let me explain my thought process here, sir. You indicated that you may have some familiarity with law, rules of 5 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones evidence, the rules of criminal procedure. But I think, I understood your comments to mean that you would get up to speed on that, essentially, before trial. I have some concerns regarding whether you can adequately do that to the level of an attorney prior to trial, which again, is 25 days from now. So, setting aside the timeliness, the Court has to consider also whether the request made is unequivocal. So, in other words, you know, is this based on a pure desire to represent oneself, or is this made out of frustration regarding the process generally. Delaying getting to trial, delay regarding treatment in the jail— or frustration regarding treatment in the jail, frustration regarding the prosecutor or the Judge. And here is where the Court really has concerns regarding the—I’m trying to say this here. Whether the request is equivocal or not. I’ve asked a number times today what is driving this request to represent yourself, and you reference, you know, everything else that’s happened thus far. Including, you know, the delays, your unhappiness with [the prosecutor], you know, unhappy with prior decisions of the Court, you know, treatment by jail staff, etcetera. But all of that, you know, is separate and apart from a wish to represent yourself, so. VRP at 115-16. Mr. Jones responded that he did not believe that (1) he had “been represented by [his] public defenders the way [he] should be,” (2) he had additional witnesses he needed to call, (3) he felt ignored by his attorneys, and (4) the only evidence he had seen was a police report. VRP at 116, 118. Mr. Jones added that he “need[ed] to build [his] own defense because the Court or the State, which is supposed to be allowing [him] to do this has dropped the ball,” leaving him with “no defense to go into trial with.” VRP at 116- 6 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones 18. The court ruled that Mr. Jones’ “request to represent himself is equivocal” because “[i]t’s born primarily of frustration with the process.” VRP at 120. Mr. Jones later engaged in profane, argumentative exchanges with the court at three subsequent hearings. Mr. Jones’ case proceeded to a jury trial in July 2024. Ms. Redstar testified that, after returning to the Disautel house, Mr. Jones became angry when he heard her listening to a song called “I’m not racist.” VRP at 313. She testified that while in the shower, Mr. Jones yelled that she “didn’t deserve to live, [she] didn’t deserve [her] last name, and [she] didn’t deserve to be an Indian American woman.” VRP at 314. Ms. Redstar testified that he pushed her into the shower, causing her to hit her “tailbone against the . . . faucet.” VRP at 315. She stated that after she got out of the shower, Mr. Jones choked her “for about a minute and a half” and pushed her onto the bed where she again hit her tailbone. VRP at 317. Ms. Redstar testified that Mr. Jones then restrained her and continued to yell and threaten her. While she tried to get her shoes, Ms. Redstar claimed she felt unable to leave, in part because Mr. Jones told her she “wouldn’t make it out alive.” VRP at 320. Ms. Redstar testified that when said she wanted to leave, Mr. Jones responded that it was “too bad” and told her “to clean up the mess that he made.” VRP at 323. Ms. Redstar further testified that Mr. Jones threatened to “scalp” her, pushed her, and spat in her face. VRP at 321. She estimated the incident lasted about 45 minutes. Ms. Redstar testified 7 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones that when Mr. Jones eventually went to the bathroom, she fled without shoes or her jacket into the cold and snow. The jury found Mr. Jones guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 90 months in prison followed by 18 months of community custody. Mr. Jones timely appeals. ANALYSIS RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION Mr. Jones contends the trial court erred by denying his timely, unequivocal request to proceed pro se. We agree, reverse, and remand for a new trial. Defendants have a right to self-representation under the Washington State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). This right is afforded despite the potentially detrimental impact it can have on a defendant and the administration of justice. State v. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d 496, 503, 229 P.3d 714 (2010). The erroneous denial of the right to self-representation requires reversal. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 737, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). Both the United States Supreme Court and Washington courts recognize a strong presumption against a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel. In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 396, 986 P.2d 790 (1999). We review a trial court’s denial of a request to proceed pro se for an abuse of discretion. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 504. A court abuses its 8 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or “rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard.” State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003). When a defendant makes a request to proceed pro se, the trial court must determine whether the request is timely and unequivocal. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 737. A request to proceed pro se is equivocal when it reflects frustration with trial delays or dissatisfaction with counsel, rather than a clear desire for self-representation. State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 585-87, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001); State v. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369, 378-79, 816 P.2d 1 (1991). “However, when a defendant makes a clear and knowing request to proceed pro se, such a request is not rendered equivocal by the fact that the defendant is motivated by something other than a singular desire to conduct his or her own defense.” State v. Modica, 136 Wn. App. 434, 442, 149 P.3d 446 (2006), aff’d, 164 Wn.2d 83, 186 P.3d 1062 (2008). If the defendant’s request is timely and unequivocal, the court must determine—typically through a colloquy—whether the waiver of counsel is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 504. “The grounds that allow a court to deny a defendant the right to self-representation are limited to a finding that the defendant’s request is equivocal, untimely, involuntary, or made without a general understanding of the consequences.” Id. at 504-05. A court may not deny a defendant’s request to proceed pro se on grounds that self-representation may impair the defendant’s ability to present their case or because of “concerns that 9 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones courtroom proceedings will be less efficient and orderly than if the defendant were represented by counsel.” Id. at 505. A defendant may not, however, invoke self- representation to delay or obstruct the administration of justice. Id. at 509, 509 n.4; see also State v. Vermillion, 112 Wn. App. 844, 851, 51 P.3d 188 (2002). Mr. Jones contends the court abused its discretion by denying his right to self- representation because the request was timely and unequivocal. The State concedes timeliness and unequivocality but argues we may affirm on any ground supported by the record and that Mr. Jones’ disruptive conduct throughout the pendency of the case provided an independent basis for the court to deny his motion to proceed pro se. In denying Mr. Jones’ motion, the court ruled that his “request to represent himself [was] equivocal” because it was “born primarily of frustration with the process.” VRP at 120. Before doing so, the court conducted an extensive colloquy in which Mr. Jones articulated his reasons for seeking self-representation, described his legal knowledge, and acknowledged the consequences of waiving his right to counsel. Mr. Jones explained that he sought self-representation to assert his right to a speedy trial because of concerns about how his attorney was handling his case and because he wanted to call additional witnesses at his trial. Mr. Jones emphasized the firmness of his decision, stating, “I don’t know what else more I need to say, you know, of why I have come to the decision of wanting to handle the matter on my own.” VRP at 108. 10 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones The State concedes that Mr. Jones’ request to represent himself was unequivocal. We agree. Mr. Jones clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation. He detailed the reasons why he wanted to proceed pro se and repeatedly asked the court to allow him to represent himself going forward. Although the trial court erred in deeming Mr. Jones’ request equivocal, the State argues this court may affirm on any basis supported by the record. The State urges us to conclude that Mr. Jones’ disruptive conduct throughout the pendency of the case supplied an independent basis to deny self-representation. Mancini v. City of Tacoma, 196 Wn.2d 864, 877, 479 P.3d 656 (2021); State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 242-43, 937 P.2d 587 (1997). Although we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, we are unpersuaded that Mr. Jones’ past conduct justified the denial of his timely and unequivocal request for self-representation. Here, the State points to multiple hearings at which Mr. Jones was disruptive and uncooperative. The State argues this pattern of disorderly conduct provided a sufficient basis to deny Mr. Jones’ request to proceed pro se. In support of its argument, the State primarily relies on State v. Hemenway, 122 Wn. App. 787, 95 P.3d 408 (2004), and State v. Bolar, 118 Wn. App. 490, 78 P.3d 1012 (2003). In Hemenway, the defendant exhibited a sustained pattern of disruptive conduct: he refused to speak at his initial appearance, sought affidavits of prejudice against multiple judges, refused to cooperate with appointed counsel, obtained at least one 11 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones substitution of counsel, and repeatedly demanded to be removed from the courtroom when he did not get his way. 122 Wn. App. at 793-95. When the trial court declined to appoint yet another attorney, the defendant stated he had “no other choice” but to represent himself. Id. at 793. This court held that “considering Hemenway’s continuous and purposeful disruptive misconduct toward the court and its officers, the totality of the circumstances of Hemenway’s self-representation request, and the presumption against waiver of a right to counsel,” the trial court did not err in denying his request to proceed pro se. Id. at 796. In Bolar, this court upheld the denial of the defendant’s request to proceed pro se, reasoning in part that his repeated vacillation between keeping counsel and representing himself was “part of a concerted effort of purposeful disruption designed to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” 118 Wn. App. at 516. The court also emphasized that the defendant had threatened his attorney, was disruptive in the courtroom, and abused “the court and its processes.” Id. at 517. By contrast, in Madsen, our Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by denying Mr. Madsen’s request to proceed pro se. The court explained: The Court of Appeals held that Madsen was generally disruptive, particularly during the May hearing. It must be remembered, however, that a criminal defendant’s right to pro se status cannot be denied simply because affording the right will be a burden on the efficient administration of justice. . . . Though Madsen did interrupt the trial court on several occasions, Madsen was trying to address substantive issues that the record 12 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones shows he clearly thought were unresolved and were not addressed by the court. A court may deny pro se status if the defendant is trying to postpone the administration of justice. Madsen never requested a continuance. A court may not deny pro se status merely because the defendant is unfamiliar with legal rules or because the defendant is obnoxious. Courts must not sacrifice constitutional rights on the altar of efficiency. 168 Wn.2d at 509. Although Mr. Jones was occasionally disruptive during several of the 29 pretrial hearings, the record reflects—and the State acknowledges—that he also participated in numerous productive, uneventful proceedings, including the hearing at which he engaged in an extensive and largely respectful colloquy regarding his request to proceed pro se. Further, Mr. Jones’ outbursts appear to have stemmed from frustration with the process and the pace of the proceedings, not from a calculated effort to obstruct the orderly administration of justice or delay proceedings. 1 Indeed, Mr. Jones explained that he sought self-representation, in part, to bring his case to trial more quickly. When the court noted that trial was only 25 days away, Mr. Jones responded, “[T]hat’s more time than I need.” VRP at 115. Like the defendant in Madsen, Mr. Jones never requested a continuance. 1 See State v. Breedlove, 79 Wn. App. 101, 109, 900 P.2d 586 (1995) (“[T]here is no evidence in the record that Breedlove’s request to proceed pro se, despite its timing or the fact that it was accompanied by a motion for continuance, was designed to delay his trial.”). 13 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones Even if Mr. Jones was at times disruptive, disrespectful, or “obnoxious,” that history did not supply a sufficient basis to deny his timely and unequivocal request to proceed pro se, and, notably, it was not the basis on which the court denied the motion. See Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 509. The trial court therefore erred in denying Mr. Jones his constitutional right to self-representation. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Mr. Jones argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful imprisonment. We disagree. The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law this court reviews de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). In a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine ‘whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 201, 86 P.3d 139 (2004) (quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it.” State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 849, 72 P.3d 748 (2003). We can infer criminal intent from the defendant’s conduct, and circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry equal weight. Varga, 151 Wn.2d at 201. However, “inferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013). 14 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the State prove every element of an alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). If, at trial, the State fails to present sufficient evidence to support the elements of the crime, double jeopardy prohibits a retrial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment does not afford the State a second opportunity to supply evidence in a second trial that it failed to muster in the first. Id. Mr. Jones argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful imprisonment because the State failed to prove his assaultive conduct was undertaken for the purpose of restraining Ms. Redstar. The State responds that Ms. Redstar’s testimony—particularly that Mr. Jones told her he would kill her if she tried to leave—was sufficient to establish that he knowingly and unlawfully restrained her. “Restrain” means “to restrict a person’s movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his or her liberty.” RCW 9A.40.010(6). Restraint is without consent if it is accomplished through “physical force, intimidation, or deception.” RCW 9A.40.010(6). A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment “if he or she knowingly restrains another person.” RCW 9A.40.040(1). Consistent with these statutes, the jury was instructed that to convict Mr. Jones of unlawful imprisonment, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 15 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones (1) That on or about February 27, 2023, defendant knowingly restrained the movements of Minoka Redstar in a manner that substantially interfered with her liberty; (2) That such restraint was without Minoka Redstar’s consent; (3) That the defendant knew that such restraint was without Minoka Redstar’s consent; (4) That such restraint was without legal authority; (5) That any of these events occurred in the State of Washington. Clerk’s Papers at 545. Mr. Jones argues there was no evidence his assaultive conduct was intended to prevent Ms. Redstar from leaving the house. The record, however, contains evidence from which the jury could find knowing restraint. Ms. Redstar testified that she did not feel she could leave because Mr. Jones told her she “wouldn’t make it out alive.” VRP at 320. She further testified about Mr. Jones’ prolonged and violent assault on her. During the incident, Ms. Redstar again told Mr. Jones that she wanted to leave, and he responded, “[T]oo bad,” and directed her “to clean up the mess that he made.” VRP at 323. Ms. Redstar testified she was only able to escape—barefoot and without her coat— when Mr. Jones went to the bathroom. This testimony was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Mr. Jones knowingly restrained Ms. Redstar without her consent, at minimum through intimidation. Evidence was admitted that Mr. Jones assaulted Ms. Redstar over an extended period and 16 No. 40676-8-III State v. Jones threatened her when she attempted to leave. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Mr. Jones’ conviction for unlawful imprisonment. CONCLUSION The trial court erred in denying Mr. Jones’ timely and unequivocal request to proceed pro se. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. Lastly, sufficient evidence supported Mr. Jones’ conviction for unlawful imprisonment. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. Cooney, A.C.J. WE CONCUR: Lawrence-Berrey, J. Murphy, J. 17