State of Washington v. James Michael Jones
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket40676-8
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
FILED
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 40676-8-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
JAMES MICHAEL JONES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
COONEY, A.C.J. — A jury found James Jones guilty of two counts of assault in the
second degree, felony harassment, unlawful imprisonment, intimidating a witness,
tampering with a witness, and attempted violation of a domestic violence no contact
order. Before trial, Mr. Jones moved to proceed pro se. The court found his request
equivocal and denied the motion.
On appeal, Mr. Jones argues (1) the trial court violated his constitutional right to
self-representation, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
unlawful imprisonment. The State concedes Mr. Jones’ request to proceed pro se was
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unequivocal but contends the court properly denied his motion based on his disruptive
behavior. We accept the State’s concession but conclude that Mr. Jones’ disruptive
behavior was not a sufficient basis to deny his motion to proceed pro se. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand for a new trial. We further conclude the evidence was sufficient
to support the conviction for unlawful imprisonment.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Jones and Minoka Redstar began a relationship in February 2023 and soon
moved into a house owned by “one of [Mr. Jones’] friends’” in Disautel, Washington.
Supp. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 300. They remained there for a couple weeks,
and frequently drank and used drugs together. During that period, Mr. Jones became
angry with Ms. Redstar and choked, pushed, threatened, and yelled at her. Ms. Redstar
eventually escaped and ran to a friend’s apartment. The following day, she sought
treatment for her injuries at a hospital, and her aunt reported the incident to law
enforcement. The State charged Mr. Jones with two counts of assault in the second
degree, felony harassment, unlawful imprisonment, intimidating a witness, tampering
with a witness, and attempted violation of a no contact order, all with domestic violence
enhancements.
The court held 29 pretrial hearings. Mr. Jones was disruptive and argumentative
at several of the hearings. Mr. Jones demanded to be removed from the courtroom at a
hearing on July 31, 2023. He then refused to appear for an omnibus hearing the
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following week. At an omnibus hearing on August 15 and a readiness hearing on
December 21, 2023, Mr. Jones apologized for his behavior, and explained that he was
experiencing “some emotional distress” and dealing with “personal things.” VRP at 19,
40.
At the December 21 readiness hearing, defense counsel advised the court that Mr.
Jones wanted to “fire” him. VRP at 39. At the next review hearing on January 5, 2024,
the court noted it had not yet ruled on Mr. Jones’ request for new counsel, but defense
counsel represented that another attorney had agreed to take over the case. The court
approved of the substitution of counsel. At the next readiness hearing, held two weeks
later, the State moved to continue trial to allow Mr. Jones’ new attorney time to prepare.
Mr. Jones became angry about the potential continuance and again demanded to be
removed from the courtroom. Mr. Jones had another outburst at a readiness hearing on
March 11 after the court granted the State’s motion for an additional continuance.
Two weeks later, the court addressed a letter from Mr. Jones requesting a new
attorney, among other matters. Mr. Jones did not appear to renew his request for a
substitution of counsel at that hearing. At a readiness hearing on April 1, Mr. Jones
briefly argued with the court before clarifying, “I’d like to keep my attorney, and I’d like
to go to trial.” VRP at 84.
About a month later, Mr. Jones moved to proceed pro se. The court conducted an
extensive colloquy to ensure Mr. Jones’ decision was knowing and voluntary and that he
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understood “the ramifications, and the duties and responsibilities of acting in the court.”
VRP at 106. When asked why he wanted to represent himself, Mr. Jones responded,
“Just because this is my right, this is what I prefer to do.” VRP at 107. Mr. Jones further
explained,
Your Honor, I’ve made it no secret through this entire year of, you
know, trying to get speedy trial, many different things that I have issues
with. It’s not with my counsel . . . personally. It’s the whole way the
matter has been handled. So, now I would like exercise my right for pro se.
VRP at 107. The court again asked Mr. Jones to clarify his reasons for wanting to
proceed pro se:
THE COURT: So, is it—is your—I guess the primary thrust of your
request just frustration with the delay in getting this matter to trial?
MR. JONES: Your Honor, like I have previously stated, I’ve gone
over it so many times, several times throughout this entire time. You know,
I don’t know what else more I need to say, you know, of why I have come
to the decision of wanting to handle the matter on my own. Thank you.
VRP at 107-08.
In response to the court’s questions, Mr. Jones stated he had a 12th-grade
education, had “written some motions before,” had “stud[ied] at the law library,” was
familiar with the rules of evidence and criminal procedure, and would continue to study
them. VRP at 108-09. He also stated he understood (1) the maximum penalties he faced,
(2) that the court could not assist him or provide legal advice at trial, (3) how he would
need to conduct direct examination if he chose to testify, (4) and that, if convicted, he
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could not obtain a reversal on appeal “on the grounds that [he was] a bad lawyer.” VRP
at 111. The court cautioned that, once he waived counsel, whether he could later
withdraw the waiver would be within the court’s discretion. Mr. Jones stated his decision
to proceed pro se was voluntary.
The court again asked Mr. Jones to explain why he wanted to represent himself,
and he responded:
For all the many reasons that I have stated that are on the record
before. If need be, I can bring them all up again. You know, it has all been
documented. Since I’ve been here, my speedy trial rights have been
violated clearly. You may disagree with that, but I don’t. And there’s just
too many different reasons why and to get into right now.
If it becomes a matter that we need to discuss—Your Honor, [Judge]
Grim, I have just—I’ve mentioned it over and over, and over again in
court when we’ve come in here. My many, many issues. Some dealing
with health, also religious, dietary, me being here, the extravagant bond.
Just, you know, many, many different reasons.
If we need to have another reason to go into more further depth on it,
I guess we could. But I mean, it’s just—I’ve stated it several times, Your
Honor.
VRP at 114. The court expressed concern that trial was only 25 days away. Mr. Jones
responded, “[T]hat’s more time than I need.” VRP at 115. The court ultimately denied
Mr. Jones’ request to proceed pro se, concluding his request was equivocal. The court
explained:
Okay. Well, if you’ll let me explain my thought process here, sir.
You indicated that you may have some familiarity with law, rules of
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evidence, the rules of criminal procedure. But I think, I understood your
comments to mean that you would get up to speed on that, essentially,
before trial.
I have some concerns regarding whether you can adequately do that
to the level of an attorney prior to trial, which again, is 25 days from now.
So, setting aside the timeliness, the Court has to consider also whether the
request made is unequivocal.
So, in other words, you know, is this based on a pure desire to
represent oneself, or is this made out of frustration regarding the process
generally. Delaying getting to trial, delay regarding treatment in the jail—
or frustration regarding treatment in the jail, frustration regarding the
prosecutor or the Judge.
And here is where the Court really has concerns regarding the—I’m
trying to say this here. Whether the request is equivocal or not. I’ve asked
a number times today what is driving this request to represent yourself, and
you reference, you know, everything else that’s happened thus far.
Including, you know, the delays, your unhappiness with [the
prosecutor], you know, unhappy with prior decisions of the Court, you
know, treatment by jail staff, etcetera. But all of that, you know, is separate
and apart from a wish to represent yourself, so.
VRP at 115-16.
Mr. Jones responded that he did not believe that (1) he had “been represented by
[his] public defenders the way [he] should be,” (2) he had additional witnesses he needed
to call, (3) he felt ignored by his attorneys, and (4) the only evidence he had seen was a
police report. VRP at 116, 118. Mr. Jones added that he “need[ed] to build [his] own
defense because the Court or the State, which is supposed to be allowing [him] to do this
has dropped the ball,” leaving him with “no defense to go into trial with.” VRP at 116-
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18. The court ruled that Mr. Jones’ “request to represent himself is equivocal” because
“[i]t’s born primarily of frustration with the process.” VRP at 120. Mr. Jones later
engaged in profane, argumentative exchanges with the court at three subsequent hearings.
Mr. Jones’ case proceeded to a jury trial in July 2024. Ms. Redstar testified that,
after returning to the Disautel house, Mr. Jones became angry when he heard her listening
to a song called “I’m not racist.” VRP at 313. She testified that while in the shower,
Mr. Jones yelled that she “didn’t deserve to live, [she] didn’t deserve [her] last name,
and [she] didn’t deserve to be an Indian American woman.” VRP at 314. Ms. Redstar
testified that he pushed her into the shower, causing her to hit her “tailbone against
the . . . faucet.” VRP at 315. She stated that after she got out of the shower, Mr. Jones
choked her “for about a minute and a half” and pushed her onto the bed where she again
hit her tailbone. VRP at 317.
Ms. Redstar testified that Mr. Jones then restrained her and continued to yell and
threaten her. While she tried to get her shoes, Ms. Redstar claimed she felt unable to
leave, in part because Mr. Jones told her she “wouldn’t make it out alive.” VRP at 320.
Ms. Redstar testified that when said she wanted to leave, Mr. Jones responded that it was
“too bad” and told her “to clean up the mess that he made.” VRP at 323. Ms. Redstar
further testified that Mr. Jones threatened to “scalp” her, pushed her, and spat in her face.
VRP at 321. She estimated the incident lasted about 45 minutes. Ms. Redstar testified
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that when Mr. Jones eventually went to the bathroom, she fled without shoes or her jacket
into the cold and snow.
The jury found Mr. Jones guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 90
months in prison followed by 18 months of community custody.
Mr. Jones timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
Mr. Jones contends the trial court erred by denying his timely, unequivocal request
to proceed pro se. We agree, reverse, and remand for a new trial.
Defendants have a right to self-representation under the Washington State
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 22; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562
(1975). This right is afforded despite the potentially detrimental impact it can have on a
defendant and the administration of justice. State v. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d 496, 503, 229
P.3d 714 (2010). The erroneous denial of the right to self-representation requires
reversal. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 737, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).
Both the United States Supreme Court and Washington courts recognize a strong
presumption against a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel. In re Det. of Turay, 139
Wn.2d 379, 396, 986 P.2d 790 (1999). We review a trial court’s denial of a request to
proceed pro se for an abuse of discretion. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 504. A court abuses its
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discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or “rests on facts unsupported in the
record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard.” State v. Rohrich, 149
Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003).
When a defendant makes a request to proceed pro se, the trial court must
determine whether the request is timely and unequivocal. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 737. A
request to proceed pro se is equivocal when it reflects frustration with trial delays or
dissatisfaction with counsel, rather than a clear desire for self-representation. State v.
Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 585-87, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001); State v. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369,
378-79, 816 P.2d 1 (1991). “However, when a defendant makes a clear and knowing
request to proceed pro se, such a request is not rendered equivocal by the fact that the
defendant is motivated by something other than a singular desire to conduct his or her
own defense.” State v. Modica, 136 Wn. App. 434, 442, 149 P.3d 446 (2006), aff’d, 164
Wn.2d 83, 186 P.3d 1062 (2008). If the defendant’s request is timely and unequivocal,
the court must determine—typically through a colloquy—whether the waiver of counsel
is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 504.
“The grounds that allow a court to deny a defendant the right to self-representation
are limited to a finding that the defendant’s request is equivocal, untimely, involuntary, or
made without a general understanding of the consequences.” Id. at 504-05. A court may
not deny a defendant’s request to proceed pro se on grounds that self-representation may
impair the defendant’s ability to present their case or because of “concerns that
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courtroom proceedings will be less efficient and orderly than if the defendant were
represented by counsel.” Id. at 505. A defendant may not, however, invoke self-
representation to delay or obstruct the administration of justice. Id. at 509, 509 n.4; see
also State v. Vermillion, 112 Wn. App. 844, 851, 51 P.3d 188 (2002).
Mr. Jones contends the court abused its discretion by denying his right to self-
representation because the request was timely and unequivocal. The State concedes
timeliness and unequivocality but argues we may affirm on any ground supported by the
record and that Mr. Jones’ disruptive conduct throughout the pendency of the case
provided an independent basis for the court to deny his motion to proceed pro se.
In denying Mr. Jones’ motion, the court ruled that his “request to represent himself
[was] equivocal” because it was “born primarily of frustration with the process.” VRP at
120. Before doing so, the court conducted an extensive colloquy in which Mr. Jones
articulated his reasons for seeking self-representation, described his legal knowledge, and
acknowledged the consequences of waiving his right to counsel. Mr. Jones explained
that he sought self-representation to assert his right to a speedy trial because of concerns
about how his attorney was handling his case and because he wanted to call additional
witnesses at his trial. Mr. Jones emphasized the firmness of his decision, stating, “I don’t
know what else more I need to say, you know, of why I have come to the decision of
wanting to handle the matter on my own.” VRP at 108.
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The State concedes that Mr. Jones’ request to represent himself was unequivocal.
We agree. Mr. Jones clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation.
He detailed the reasons why he wanted to proceed pro se and repeatedly asked the court
to allow him to represent himself going forward.
Although the trial court erred in deeming Mr. Jones’ request equivocal, the State
argues this court may affirm on any basis supported by the record. The State urges us to
conclude that Mr. Jones’ disruptive conduct throughout the pendency of the case supplied
an independent basis to deny self-representation. Mancini v. City of Tacoma, 196 Wn.2d
864, 877, 479 P.3d 656 (2021); State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 242-43, 937 P.2d 587
(1997). Although we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, we are
unpersuaded that Mr. Jones’ past conduct justified the denial of his timely and
unequivocal request for self-representation.
Here, the State points to multiple hearings at which Mr. Jones was disruptive and
uncooperative. The State argues this pattern of disorderly conduct provided a sufficient
basis to deny Mr. Jones’ request to proceed pro se. In support of its argument, the State
primarily relies on State v. Hemenway, 122 Wn. App. 787, 95 P.3d 408 (2004), and State
v. Bolar, 118 Wn. App. 490, 78 P.3d 1012 (2003).
In Hemenway, the defendant exhibited a sustained pattern of disruptive conduct:
he refused to speak at his initial appearance, sought affidavits of prejudice against
multiple judges, refused to cooperate with appointed counsel, obtained at least one
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substitution of counsel, and repeatedly demanded to be removed from the courtroom
when he did not get his way. 122 Wn. App. at 793-95. When the trial court declined to
appoint yet another attorney, the defendant stated he had “no other choice” but to
represent himself. Id. at 793. This court held that “considering Hemenway’s continuous
and purposeful disruptive misconduct toward the court and its officers, the totality of the
circumstances of Hemenway’s self-representation request, and the presumption against
waiver of a right to counsel,” the trial court did not err in denying his request to proceed
pro se. Id. at 796.
In Bolar, this court upheld the denial of the defendant’s request to proceed pro se,
reasoning in part that his repeated vacillation between keeping counsel and representing
himself was “part of a concerted effort of purposeful disruption designed to obstruct the
orderly administration of justice.” 118 Wn. App. at 516. The court also emphasized that
the defendant had threatened his attorney, was disruptive in the courtroom, and abused
“the court and its processes.” Id. at 517.
By contrast, in Madsen, our Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by
denying Mr. Madsen’s request to proceed pro se. The court explained:
The Court of Appeals held that Madsen was generally disruptive,
particularly during the May hearing. It must be remembered, however, that
a criminal defendant’s right to pro se status cannot be denied simply
because affording the right will be a burden on the efficient administration
of justice. . . . Though Madsen did interrupt the trial court on several
occasions, Madsen was trying to address substantive issues that the record
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shows he clearly thought were unresolved and were not addressed by the
court. A court may deny pro se status if the defendant is trying to postpone
the administration of justice. Madsen never requested a continuance. A
court may not deny pro se status merely because the defendant is unfamiliar
with legal rules or because the defendant is obnoxious. Courts must not
sacrifice constitutional rights on the altar of efficiency.
168 Wn.2d at 509.
Although Mr. Jones was occasionally disruptive during several of the 29 pretrial
hearings, the record reflects—and the State acknowledges—that he also participated in
numerous productive, uneventful proceedings, including the hearing at which he engaged
in an extensive and largely respectful colloquy regarding his request to proceed pro se.
Further, Mr. Jones’ outbursts appear to have stemmed from frustration with the process
and the pace of the proceedings, not from a calculated effort to obstruct the orderly
administration of justice or delay proceedings. 1 Indeed, Mr. Jones explained that he
sought self-representation, in part, to bring his case to trial more quickly. When the court
noted that trial was only 25 days away, Mr. Jones responded, “[T]hat’s more time than I
need.” VRP at 115. Like the defendant in Madsen, Mr. Jones never requested a
continuance.
1
See State v. Breedlove, 79 Wn. App. 101, 109, 900 P.2d 586 (1995) (“[T]here is
no evidence in the record that Breedlove’s request to proceed pro se, despite its timing or
the fact that it was accompanied by a motion for continuance, was designed to delay his
trial.”).
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Even if Mr. Jones was at times disruptive, disrespectful, or “obnoxious,” that
history did not supply a sufficient basis to deny his timely and unequivocal request to
proceed pro se, and, notably, it was not the basis on which the court denied the motion.
See Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 509. The trial court therefore erred in denying Mr. Jones his
constitutional right to self-representation.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Mr. Jones argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
unlawful imprisonment. We disagree.
The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law this court reviews de novo.
State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). In a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine
‘whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 201, 86 P.3d 139 (2004) (quoting State v.
Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). “A claim of insufficiency admits
the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it.”
State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 849, 72 P.3d 748 (2003). We can infer criminal intent
from the defendant’s conduct, and circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry
equal weight. Varga, 151 Wn.2d at 201. However, “inferences based on circumstantial
evidence must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178
Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013).
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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the State prove
every element of an alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). If, at trial, the State fails to present
sufficient evidence to support the elements of the crime, double jeopardy prohibits a
retrial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). The
double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment does not afford the State a second
opportunity to supply evidence in a second trial that it failed to muster in the first. Id.
Mr. Jones argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
unlawful imprisonment because the State failed to prove his assaultive conduct was
undertaken for the purpose of restraining Ms. Redstar. The State responds that Ms.
Redstar’s testimony—particularly that Mr. Jones told her he would kill her if she tried to
leave—was sufficient to establish that he knowingly and unlawfully restrained her.
“Restrain” means “to restrict a person’s movements without consent and without
legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his or her liberty.” RCW
9A.40.010(6). Restraint is without consent if it is accomplished through “physical force,
intimidation, or deception.” RCW 9A.40.010(6). A person is guilty of unlawful
imprisonment “if he or she knowingly restrains another person.” RCW 9A.40.040(1).
Consistent with these statutes, the jury was instructed that to convict Mr. Jones of
unlawful imprisonment, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
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(1) That on or about February 27, 2023, defendant knowingly restrained
the movements of Minoka Redstar in a manner that substantially
interfered with her liberty;
(2) That such restraint was without Minoka Redstar’s consent;
(3) That the defendant knew that such restraint was without Minoka
Redstar’s consent;
(4) That such restraint was without legal authority;
(5) That any of these events occurred in the State of Washington.
Clerk’s Papers at 545.
Mr. Jones argues there was no evidence his assaultive conduct was intended to
prevent Ms. Redstar from leaving the house. The record, however, contains evidence
from which the jury could find knowing restraint. Ms. Redstar testified that she did not
feel she could leave because Mr. Jones told her she “wouldn’t make it out alive.” VRP at
320. She further testified about Mr. Jones’ prolonged and violent assault on her. During
the incident, Ms. Redstar again told Mr. Jones that she wanted to leave, and he
responded, “[T]oo bad,” and directed her “to clean up the mess that he made.” VRP at
323. Ms. Redstar testified she was only able to escape—barefoot and without her coat—
when Mr. Jones went to the bathroom.
This testimony was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Mr. Jones
knowingly restrained Ms. Redstar without her consent, at minimum through intimidation.
Evidence was admitted that Mr. Jones assaulted Ms. Redstar over an extended period and
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threatened her when she attempted to leave. The evidence was therefore sufficient to
support Mr. Jones’ conviction for unlawful imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Jones’ timely and unequivocal request to
proceed pro se. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. Lastly, sufficient
evidence supported Mr. Jones’ conviction for unlawful imprisonment.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Cooney, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
Murphy, J.
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