State v. Harold B.

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  State v. Harold B. STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HAROLD B.* (AC 47910) Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js. Syllabus Convicted of several crimes, including assault in the second degree as a result of a physical altercation with the victim, M, that resulted in a scar on her forehead, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support the assault conviction because M did not suffer a serious physical injury in the form of a serious disfigurement. Held: The evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of assault in the second degree, as the jury could not reasonably have determined that the scar that resulted from the altercation with the defendant rose to the level of a serious disfigurement as defined under State v. Petion (332 Conn. 472) in that the scar was small and barely noticeable, a person’s eye would not be naturally drawn to it, and a reasonable person would not find it distressing or objectionable, as the injury was not of a magnitude that could be found to substantially detract from M’s appearance; accordingly, the conviction of second degree assault was reversed. The evidence, viewed cumulatively, provided a sufficient basis from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause serious physical injury to M required for a conviction of assault in the second degree pursuant to statute (§ 53a-60 (a) (1)), as the record showed that he choked her, expressed anger and rage toward her and repeatedly punched her in the forehead, and, contrary to the defendant’s assertion that the evidence did not show that he intended to cause serious physical injury, the act of punching M in the head three times was strongly corroborative of an intention to cause serious physical injury. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, as the jury reasonably could have inferred from the defendant’s words and conduct, in grabbing M from behind, holding her around the neck and making it difficult for her to breathe, that he had restrained M with the conscious objective to restrict her movements in such a manner as to interfere substantially with her liberty. * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that per- son’s identity may be ascertained.  State v. Harold B. This court determined that, although the evidence was insufficient with respect to the element of serious physical injury for purposes of the defen- dant’s conviction of assault in the second degree, because the jury’s verdict necessarily included a determination that, in the absence of serious physi- cal injury, all the elements of second degree assault had been proven, the appropriate remedy was to remand the case to the trial court with direction to modify the judgment to reflect a conviction of attempt to commit assault in the second degree and to resentence the defendant in accordance with that conviction. Argued April 21—officially released September 15, 2026 Procedural History Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of assault in the second degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, strangulation in the third degree, risk of injury to a child and disorderly conduct, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the jury before Weiner, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of assault in the second degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and disorderly conduct, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed in part; judgment directed; further proceedings. Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (defendant). Christopher A. Alexy, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Kathleen E. Morgan, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state). Opinion SEELEY, J. The defendant, Harold B., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of assault in the second degree in violation of Gen- eral Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1),1 unlawful restraint in the 1 General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person . . . .”  State v. Harold B. first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a),2 risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), and disorderly conduct in violation of Gen- eral Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of assault in the second degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree. Specifically, with respect to his conviction of assault in the second degree, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient for the jury reasonably to find that (1) the victim, M, suf- fered a serious physical injury in the form of a serious disfigurement and (2) he acted with the specific intent to inflict serious physical injury on M. With respect to his conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient for the jury reasonably to find that he acted with the specific intent to substantially interfere with M’s liberty. We agree with the defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient on the element of serious physical injury to support his conviction of assault in the second degree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of conviction. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. M had been in a relationship with the defendant, who was living with her, for about two months when the incident underlying the charges occurred. During the evening of July 12, 2022, M and the defendant had got- ten into an argument, which agitated the defendant. The next morning, July 13, 2022, M and the defendant got into another argument in the kitchen of the apartment after the defendant refused to help make something to eat for M’s youngest daughter. The defendant became aggravated with M after she asked him why he would not help make something to eat for her daughter, and he called M “lazy,” told her to “shut up,” and “doused her with water,” after which she told him that he had to leave. At that point, the defendant “blew out into a full 2 General Statutes § 53a-95 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of unlaw- ful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.”  State v. Harold B. rage” and grabbed a knife to try to cut a microwave that he bought for M, who asked him not to do that in front of her children. Thereafter, the defendant broke a wok that he had bought, grabbed M from behind and choked her and, in the process, pushed M’s oldest daughter, E, away, causing E to fall. At that point, M went to her bedroom, and the defen- dant followed M there. Along the way, M and the defendant engaged in a “shoving match” because he was grabbing things, including plants, and throwing them to the floor in an effort to destroy anything he had bought for M. In the bedroom, the defendant asked M to get the clothes that he had bought her for Mother’s Day, and, when M “went to open up the closet, [she] ended up getting cornered by [the defendant].” According to M, the defendant cornered her against the closet door and tried to bite her finger as she told him he had to leave. At that point, the defendant punched M in her forehead when her back was against the closet, causing M to fall. When M got back up, the defendant punched her again in the forehead, causing M to fall once more. After M got back up again, the defendant punched her a third time in the forehead, at which point M felt a “warm sensation on [her] forehead” and realized that she was bleeding.3 At approximately 1:50 p.m., Sheila Villegas, a 911 dispatcher employed by the city of New Haven, received a telephone call from a distressed fifteen year old, E, in which E reported that her mother, M, was being hit by M’s boyfriend, the defendant, and that the defendant had also “put his hands on” E. On the basis of that informa- tion, New Haven police officers were dispatched to M’s apartment. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Christopher Lawrence of the New Haven Police Department arrived at the scene.4 3 Two photographs of the injury to M’s forehead at the time of the incident were admitted into evidence. See footnote 6 of this opinion. 4 A DVD containing Lawrence’s body camera footage and still pho- tographs captured from the body camera footage were admitted into evidence at trial.  State v. Harold B. When Lawrence went upstairs to the third floor of the apartment building, he could hear arguing coming from inside M’s apartment. Upon entering M’s apartment, Lawrence first encountered the defendant, who stated to Lawrence, “just take me.” Next, Lawrence saw M and noticed that she had “apparent injuries” and was “very upset,” “quiet,” and “very sweaty.” With respect to the state of M’s apartment, Lawrence saw “potted plants and dirt all over the ground, and there was also blood on the ground.” While at the scene, Lawrence spoke with the defendant and received a statement from M.5 At that time, medical personnel had arrived and were treating M’s injuries. Specifically, M had a laceration on her forehead that was bleeding.6 As a result of her injuries, M was transported to Yale-New Haven Hospital, Saint Raphael campus (hospital), where she received treatment for her injuries, which included a computerized tomog- raphy (CT) scan of her head and facial bones.7 After M was taken to the hospital, the defendant was arrested and charged in connection with the incident. The defendant was charged by way of a five count information dated October 23, 2023, with assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (1), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a), strangulation in the third degree in violation of General 5 M’s statement to Lawrence was not marked for identification or admitted into evidence. 6 Still photographs of M’s injuries and how she looked when Lawrence first encountered her, which were taken from footage from Lawrence’s body camera, were admitted into evidence at trial. The photographs show a small laceration on M’s forehead, and blood from the laceration running down her face and chest. 7 Specifically, M received three sutures to close the laceration on her forehead, which was 2.5 centimeters in length, she was given pain medi- cation for head pain, and the CT scan of M’s head and facial bones was performed to ensure that she had not suffered any fractures or bleeding in her brain. Mark Kantrowitz Rollins, the attending physician at the hospital who treated M’s injuries, testified at the defendant’s trial. When asked what the results of the CT scan showed, if anything, he stated: “I believe that they saw the superficial laceration on the scalp, but nothing else.”  State v. Harold B. Statutes § 53a-64cc (a),8 risk of injury to a child in viola- tion of § 53-21 (a) (1), and disorderly conduct in violation of § 53a-182 (a) (1).9 The defendant elected to be tried by a jury, which heard evidence on November 15 and 16, 2023. At trial, the state presented testimony from Villegas; Lawrence; M; and Mark Kantrowitz Rollins, an attending physician who treated M for her injuries in the hospital’s emergency department. The defendant did not testify or present any witnesses in his defense. The jury found the defendant guilty of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (1), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a),10 risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1), and disorderly conduct in violation of § 53a-182 (a) (1). The defendant was sentenced on February 5, 2024, to a total effective term of twelve years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven years, with five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the defendant claims that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault in the second degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree.11 We begin with our well settled standard of review for assessing an insufficiency of the evidence claim. 8 See footnote 10 of this opinion. 9 The defendant also was charged in a part B information with being a persistent serious felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40 (c) and (k), and a persistent assault offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40d (a) and (b). The state, however, withdrew the part B information after the jury returned its verdict. 10 With respect to the charge of strangulation in the third degree, the court instructed the jury as follows: “You will only consider this count if you first unanimously find the defendant not guilty of count two, unlawful restraint in the first degree.” Because the jury found the defendant guilty of the unlawful restraint charge, it did not consider the strangulation charge. 11 We note that the defendant does not challenge his conviction of disorderly conduct and that his appellate counsel acknowledged at oral argument before this court that she was not challenging his conviction of risk of injury to a child.  State v. Harold B. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reason- ably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . “[T]he jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumu- lative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . “[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty. . . . “Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi- tude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact] may  State v. Harold B. draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ragalis, 235 Conn. App. 538, 547–48, 345 A.3d 844, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 934, 347 A.3d 877 (2025); see also State v. Franqui, 354 Conn. 400, 418–19, 354 A.3d 201 (2026). “When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, [appellate courts] construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 353 Conn. 382, 420, 342 A.3d 161 (2025). I The defendant claims on appeal that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault in the second degree because the state failed to present evidence demonstrating that (1) M suffered a serious physical injury and (2) he acted with the specific intent to inflict serious physical injury on M. We address each claim in turn. A We begin with the defendant’s claim that the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that M suffered a serious physical injury in the form of a serious disfigurement, as required for a conviction of assault in the second degree. Specifically, the defendant claims that the injury to M’s forehead does not rise to the level of serious disfigure- ment as defined by our Supreme Court in State v. Petion, 332 Conn. 472, 491–92, 211 A.3d 991 (2019), as the laceration was superficial and the resulting scar does not substantially detract from M’s appearance. We agree. We first briefly summarize the evidence at trial con- cerning the injury to M’s forehead. M testified that she had received treatment for her injuries at the hospital. Specifically, M testified that she had received “one and [one-half] to two sutures” and a CT scan. M stated that, when sutures were removed approximately seven days  State v. Harold B. later, she experienced pain and discomfort, and that she “had headaches for a while for . . . at least three to four days . . . .” M stated that she has a permanent scar from the incident. Photographs of the scar on M’s forehead, which were taken approximately one week prior to her testimony at the trial, were admitted into evidence. The photographs show a small, barely visible scar in the center of M’s forehead. M testified that the photographs accurately depicted her scar from one week prior to the trial, and that, when she squints, you can see the “dent still [there] . . . .” The prosecutor did not have M display her scar to the jury directly and presented the contem- poraneous photographs instead.12 Rollins, the attending physician at the hospital, testi- fied that M presented with complaints of a “ten out of ten headache” and had a 2.5 centimeter13 laceration to her forehead, which “was thoroughly irrigated to clean it out . . . [a]nd then repaired with [three] sutures.” Rol- lins testified that M received pain medication and a CT scan of her head and facial bones to ensure that she had not suffered any fractures or brain bleeding. Rollins explained that M’s CT scan did not indicate that she suffered from brain bleeding, and, when asked what the results of the CT scan showed, if anything, he stated: “I 12 Although M testified at trial, there is no evidence that M’s injury was visible to the jury as she testified. See State v. Leveille, 232 Conn. App. 687, 698, 337 A.3d 797 (2025) (“[a]t trial, the victim stepped down from the witness stand and showed the jury the ‘piece missing’ from his ear”). Accordingly, to the extent the state maintains that the jury accurately categorized M’s injury as a serious disfigurement because the jury saw M’s injury when she testified, we decline to consider this claim, as there is nothing in the record to substantiate it. 13 We note that 2.5 centimeters is equivalent to just less than one inch. See https://www.nist.gov/pml/owm/metric-si/unit-conversion/ approximate-conversions-us-customary-measures-metric (last visited September 10, 2026); see also State v. Jeffrey Z., 240 Conn. App. 1, 28, ___ A.3d ___ (2026) (court may take judicial notice of matters of established fact), petition for cert. filed (Conn. July 21, 2026) (No. 260113); see also Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 123 n.1, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977) (“types of facts considered suitable for the taking of judi- cial notice [are] those which are common knowledge and those which are capable of accurate and ready demonstration” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  State v. Harold B. believe that they saw the superficial laceration on the scalp, but nothing else.” (Emphasis added.) Addition- ally, Rollins testified that M had not experienced any fractures, did not complain of loss of consciousness or breathing trouble, and did not require a blood transfusion as a result of blood loss. When asked whether M would have a permanent scar, Rollins testified that “everybody heals differently. . . . [B]ased on my review of the photo and the chart, I think that most people would probably have a scar permanently. But everybody heals differ- ently, so I can’t say for sure.” On cross-examination, Rollins stated that his examination findings included “that 2.5 centimeter laceration surrounding swelling. There was a very superficial abrasion above the right eyebrow. There was tenderness around the left orbit, which is the . . . bones around the eye, as well as the left temple.” Finally, Rollins testified on cross-examination that, in his training and experience, three sutures is not “a lot to close a wound . . . .” Next, we set forth the legal principles that guide our resolution of this claim. “ ‘To convict the defendant of assault in the second degree under § 53a-60 (a) (1), the state was required to prove that (1) the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person, and (2) acting with such intent, the defendant caused serious physical injury to that person.’ ” State v. Kenneth B., 223 Conn. App. 270, 274–75, 308 A.3d 82, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952, 308 A.3d 1038 (2024); see also General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1); State v. Fisher, 342 Conn. 239, 250, 269 A.3d 104 (2022). “For purposes of [§ 53a-60 (a) (1)], ‘serious physical injury’ means ‘physi- cal injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . . .’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).” State v. Kenneth B., supra, 275. In the present case, the state’s theory of the case was that M sustained a serious physical injury in the form of a serious disfigurement.  State v. Harold B. In State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 475, our Supreme Court “examine[d] the parameters that should be used by the trier of fact to assess whether a defendant has inflicted serious physical injury in the form of serious disfigurement.” In doing so, the court first noted the dif- ference in the definition of “ ‘“[p]hysical injury” [which] means impairment of physical condition or pain’ ”; id., 481; see General Statutes § 53a-3 (3); and that of “ ‘“[s]eri- ous physical injury” [which] means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . . .’ ” State v. Petion, supra, 481. “These definitions plainly reflect a legislative intention to establish a mate- rial degree of difference between mere physical injury and serious physical injury. This differentiation is reflected in the severity of punishment attendant to each. Assault resulting in physical injury, unless inflicted by discharge of a firearm, carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, whereas assault resulting in serious physi- cal injury carries a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years. See General Statutes §§ 53a-35a (6) and (7), 53a-59 (b) and 53a-60 (b). Thus, [a]lthough it may often be difficult to distinguish between the two, such a distinction must be drawn; a person can be found guilty of assault in the first degree under . . . § 53a-59 [a] [1] only if he causes serious physical injury to another person.”14 (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Petion, supra, 481. 14 See State v. Stone, 326 Or. App. 200, 207–208, 532 P.3d 90 (“The difference between ‘physical injury’ and ‘serious physical injury’ is substantial, not slight. The 1970 commentary of the commission that drafted the definitions describes ‘serious physical injury’ as synonymous with ‘serious bodily harm’ and cites the Restatement of Torts for the proposition that ‘serious bodily harm’ is harm that ‘“is so grave that it is regarded as differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from other bodily harm.” ’ Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report §§ 3, 4 (July 1970) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 63 (b)) . . . .” (Citation omitted.)), opinion adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 328 Or. App. 203, 536 P.3d 1094 (2023).  State v. Harold B. Focusing on one type of physical injury in particular— serious disfigurement—the court in Petion distinguished between disfigurement and serious disfigurement, and established “a multifactor test to consider in determin- ing whether a jury reasonably could decide that a victim has suffered a serious physical disfigurement.” State v. Stepherson, 237 Conn. App. 65, 74, 350 A.3d 1174 (2026). Specifically, the court in Petion stated: “ ‘Disfig- urement’ means impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person that renders the person unsightly, misshapen or imperfect, or deforms the person in some manner, or otherwise causes a detrimental change in the external form of the person. ‘Serious dis- figurement’ is an impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person of a magnitude that substantially detracts from the person’s appear- ance from the perspective of an objective observer. In assessing whether an impairment or injury constitutes serious disfigurement, factors that may be considered include the duration of the disfigurement, as well as its location, size, and overall appearance. Serious disfigure- ment does not necessarily have to be permanent or in a location that is readily visible to others. The jury is not bound by any strict formula in weighing these factors, as a highly prominent scar in a less visible location may constitute serious disfigurement, just as a less prominent scar in a more visible location, especially one’s face, may constitute serious disfigurement.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 491. In reaching that conclusion, the court in Petion explained that the permanence of an injury is not a nec- essary condition for serious disfigurement, nor is it, by itself, sufficient to establish serious disfigurement. See id., 489. It then stated: “We are mindful that some of our Appellate Court’s decisions appear to suggest that, whenever a defendant inflicts an injury that leaves a per- manent scar, the evidence would be sufficient to permit the trier of fact to determine that serious disfigurement exists. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 78 Conn. App. 646, 655 n.3, 828 A.2d 651 (2003) (‘[a] permanent scar constitutes  State v. Harold B. serious and permanent disfigurement’). But see State v. Huckabee, 41 Conn. App. 565, 570–71, 677 A.2d 452 (‘[a] bullet wound is not per se serious physical injury’), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 903, 682 A.2d 1009 (1996). We agree with those jurisdictions that have recognized that, because any visible scar would mar the victim’s appear- ance and thus constitute disfigurement, the legislative choice of ‘serious’ disfigurement evidences an intent to require the presence of some other factor(s) in addition to permanence to render a scar a ‘serious’ disfigurement. See, e.g., Saelee v. State, Docket No. A-10004, 2011 WL 807391, *9 (Alaska App. March 2, 2011) (‘Even in the photographic exhibit, it is difficult to see this scar if one is not looking closely. If we were to declare this evidence sufficient to establish a “serious and protracted disfigure- ment,” we would essentially be saying that any visible scar constitutes a “serious physical injury” for purposes of the assault statutes. We do not believe that the legis- lature intended this term to be interpreted so broadly.’); State v. Silva, [75 Haw. 419, 433, 864 P.2d 583 (1993)] (‘[E]ven a small but noticeable scar on a person’s face, for example, is a disfigurement. However, such a scar would certainly not qualify as a “serious bodily injury” under the statutory definition nor should it.’); Hernan- dez v. State, [946 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tex. App. 1997)] (‘Simply that an injury causes a scar is not sufficient to establish serious permanent disfigurement. . . . There must be evidence of some significant cosmetic deformity caused by the injury.’ . . . [S]ee also State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 554 (Iowa 2010) (‘[s]carring may in some circumstances rise to the level of serious permanent disfigurement’); State v. Bledsoe, [920 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo. App. 1996)] (‘permanency of disfigurement is relevant . . . on the element of seriousness’). “Factors identified by other jurisdictions as relevant to the seriousness of a disfigurement in the form of a scar include its permanence, but also its location, size, and general appearance. See, e.g., State v. Roper, 136 S.W.3d 891, 898 (Mo. App. 2004); State v. Demers, Docket No. CX-03-297, 2003 WL 22952813, *1 (Minn.  State v. Harold B. App. December 16, 2003), review denied, Minnesota Supreme Court (February 25, 2004); People v. McKin- non, [15 N.Y.3d 311, 316, 937 N.E.2d 524, 910 N.Y.S.2d 767 (2010)]. If there is more than one disfiguring feature, courts, including our Appellate Court, have considered the cumulative effect of those features to assess serious- ness. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 16 Conn. App. 346, 357, 547 A.2d 1368, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 828, 552 A.2d 433 (1988); Levin v. State, 334 Ga. App. 71, 74, 778 S.E.2d 238 (2015), cert. denied, Georgia Supreme Court, Docket No. S16C0249 (January 11, 2016); Sloan v. State, Docket No. 49A02-1002-CR-195, 2010 WL 4813600, *2 (Ind. App. November 24, 2010) (decision without published opinion, 937 N.E.2d 938 [Ind. App. 2010]); State v. Roper, supra, 898.” State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 489–91. Before our Supreme Court in Petion applied those factors to the facts of that case, it noted: “Although ordinarily a factual question for the jury; see, e.g., State v. Almeda, [211 Conn. 441, 450, 560 A.2d 389 (1989)]; State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 489, 522 A.2d 249 (1987); there is a legal distinction between physical injury and serious physical injury that is not a purely subjective matter, and it is ultimately our responsibility to draw that line. See State v. Rossier, 175 Conn. 204, 207, 397 A.2d 110 (1978) (‘[a]lthough it may often be difficult to distinguish between [physical injury and serious physi- cal injury], such a distinction must be drawn’ before defendant can be found guilty of assault in first degree under § 53a-59 [a] [1] . . .); State v. Jeustiniano, 172 Conn. 275, 281, 374 A.2d 209 (1977) (‘[t]he degree of the injuries suffered by [the victim] was a proper ques- tion for the jury to decide if sufficient evidence were introduced’); Hernandez v. State, supra, 946 S.W.2d 113 (‘Disfigurement, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. However, when distinguishing between “bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” it is, again, a matter of degree. Simply that an injury causes a scar is not suf- ficient to establish serious permanent disfigurement. .  State v. Harold B. . . There must be evidence of some significant cosmetic deformity caused by the injury.’ . . .). “ ‘In reviewing the [legal] sufficiency of the evidence concerning this element of assault in the [second] degree, our task is to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict, and then to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the harm suffered rose to the level of a seri- ous physical injury under the statute.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 492–93. In Petion, the victim suffered “an approximately 1.38 inch (three and one-half centimeters) abrasion and an approximately 0.30 inch (three-quarters of one centimeter) laceration just above her left elbow. Just below her left elbow, on her forearm, [the victim] had an approximately 1.57 inch (four centimeter) laceration. The smaller laceration was closed with a single suture; the larger laceration was closed with ten sutures. The closed lacerations appear quite narrow. By the time of trial, the larger of the two lacerations had left a scar approximately the same length as the laceration, although it appears to be slightly wider in the magnified close-up than when sutured. The scar is a slightly lighter tone than the sur- rounding skin. No other injury is apparent.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 493–94. Our Supreme Court in Petion determined that a jury could not reasonably have concluded that the injuries sus- tained by the victim constituted a serious disfigurement. See id., 495. In particular, our Supreme Court clarified that the victim had suffered a disfigurement in the form of a permanent scar on her forearm; however, the scar was not in a prominent location, was “relatively small in size, uniform in shape (a straight line), and otherwise unremarkable in its general appearance.” Id., 494. The court observed that, “[a]lthough the scar is visible if one looks for it . . . its appearance is not such that one’s eye would naturally be drawn to it. Serious disfigurement requires something more than visibility, as it must be visible to mar one’s appearance and, hence, meet the  State v. Harold B. threshold for disfigurement.” Id. Accordingly, the court found that the evidence of the victim’s injury “compels the conclusion that the disfigurement is not of a mag- nitude that objectively could be found to substantially detract from [the victim’s] appearance.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 495. Applying the factors set forth in Petion to the present case, we conclude that the jury could not reasonably have determined that the injury to M’s forehead and resulting scar constituted a serious disfigurement. The evidence before the jury shows that M sustained a 2.5 centimeter laceration to her forehead that required three sutures to close. The laceration resulted in a permanent scar to M’s forehead. The scar is in a prominent location in the center of M’s forehead and is visible if one looks for it, but the scar itself is not prominent or otherwise remarkable,15 nor is it of the appearance that a person’s eye would be naturally drawn to it. See id. Indeed, Rollins referred to it as a “superficial laceration on the scalp, but nothing else.” (Emphasis added.) Superficial means “affecting only the outer part or surface: not deep or serious . . . .” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 1580. Although the small and barely noticeable scar on M’s forehead constitutes a disfigurement, as that term was defined in Petion, we conclude that the evidence before the jury was insufficient for it to have determined that it rose to the level of a serious disfig- urement, as required for a conviction of assault in the second degree. As in Petion, the injury to M’s forehead in the present case “is not of a magnitude that objectively could be found to substantially detract from [M’s] appear- ance.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Petion, supra, 332 Conn. 495; see, e.g., State v. Silva, supra, 75 Haw. 433 (“According to the Random House College Dictionary 380 (1979), a ‘disfigurement’ is, in relevant part, ‘something that disfigures, as a scar,’ while to ‘disfigure’ is ‘to mar the effect or excellence of.’ . . . Therefore, it follows that even a small but noticeable scar on a person’s face, 15 Prominent is defined as “standing out” or “readily noticeable.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (12th Ed. 2026) p. 1269.  State v. Harold B. for example, is a disfigurement. However, such a scar would certainly not qualify as a ‘serious bodily injury’ under the statutory definition nor should it. ‘Serious’ is defined in the dictionary as ‘giving cause for appre- hension; critical.’ . . . Conversely, a large, permanent scar on a person’s face from the corner of the eye to the jaw, for example, would clearly be considered ‘serious bodily injury’ under the statutory definition.” (Emphasis added.)). But see State v. Leveille, 232 Conn. App. 687, 690, 695, 699, 337 A.3d 797 (2025) (there was sufficient evidence from which jury reasonably could have found that victim suffered serious physical injury in form of serious disfigurement from scarring on his jaw, ear, and top of his head, as “victim sustained four lacerations to his head and face that required twenty-eight sutures and six staples to close” after defendant struck victim in face repeatedly with empty beer glass). Accordingly, the evidence of M’s injury is not legally sufficient to meet the threshold for serious disfigurement to support the defendant’s conviction of assault in the second degree. Our determination is supported by case law from other jurisdictions with similar definitions of serious physical injury and serious disfigurement, which dem- onstrates that a small, less noticeable scar to a victim’s face, although in a prominent location but