Maodi v. Islamic Republic of Iran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHIMON MAODI et al., Plaintiffs, v. Case No. 24-cv-1146 (ACR) (GMH) ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This action is brought by six plaintiffs arising out of a series of coordinated terrorist attacks that occurred across southern Israel on October 7, 2023, in which Noi Maodi was killed (“the Attacks”). His estate and members of his family (“Family Member Plaintiffs”) bring this action against the Islamic Republic of Iran under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, seeking compensation for their physical and emotional injuries. They allege that the Attacks were orchestrated by Hamas with material support from Iran. When Iran failed to appear to defend this action, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgement. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion and awarding damages as detailed below. 1 1 The relevant docket entries considered by the undersigned are (1) Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ECF No. 1; (2) Affidavit Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 8; (3) Certificate of Clerk Mailing Copy of Summons and Complaint to Iran, ECF No. 11; (4) Notice of Failed Service under 28 U.S.C. §1608(a)(3), ECF No. 12; (5) Affidavit Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 13; (6) Certificate of Clerk dispatching copy of summons and complaint to Iran, ECF No. 15; (7) Summons Returned Unexecuted, ECF No. 16; (8) Affidavit for Default, ECF No. 18; (9) Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 19; and (10) Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 21. Citations to page numbers herein reflect the pagi- nation assigned by the Electronic Case Filing system.  I. BACKGROUND A. The Killing of Noi Maodi At the time of his death, Noi 2 was a 29-year-old dual Israeli and American citizen living in Israel. ECF No. 1, ¶ 13; No. 21-2 at 9; No. 21-11 at 1. In 2022, he moved back to Israel from the United States. ECF No. 21-8, ¶ 8. After returning to Israel, he worked on his father’s flower farm and planned to return to school to study for a master’s degree in child psychology. ECF No. 21-5, ¶¶ 8, 10–11. On October 6, 2023, Noi gathered with his extended family in Moshav Yated in Israel to celebrate Simchat Torah. ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 4. The next morning, Noi attended the nearby Psyduck music festival. Id., ¶ 5. He was joined by his two brothers-in-law, Tomer Kitayevich and Moti, as well as his nephew, Matan. 3 Id., ¶ 5. At around 6:30 A.M. on October 7, 2023, they observed heavy barrages of missile fire launched into Israel while on their way to the festival. Id., ¶ 7. Fearing for their safety, they turned around to drive home in Tomer’s car. Id. During the drive back, they were ambushed by “terrorists” at an intersection near Noi’s parent’s home. Id., ¶ 9; ECF No. 21-2 at 18. According to Tomer, the sole survivor of the attack, upon seeing the car, the attackers “directed a barrage of gunfire towards [it].” ECF No. 21-4, ¶ 9. Noi sustained a bullet wound to his head and shouted that he was bleeding. Id. After a few sec- onds, Noi became quiet and their car rolled to stop. Id. The attackers again opened fire. Id., ¶ 10. Noi, Moti, and Matan were killed in the attack. Id., ¶ 10. Noi’s body was identified several days later through DNA evidence. Id., ¶ 17. 2 Because this case involves family members with the same last name, the undersigned introduces Plaintiffs by first and last name and subsequently refers to them by first name. 3 Because Plaintiffs did not provide last names for Matan and Moti, the undersigned will refer to them by only their first names. 2  B. Iran’s Role in the October 7 Attacks In his sworn declaration, Tomer does not identify his attackers. Id., ¶ 9. But Plaintiffs allege that the attack was executed by Hamas utilizing “Iran’s funding, training, and weapons.” ECF No. 21-2 at 9. To support these allegations, Plaintiffs rely on the expert report of Dr. Colin Clarke. Id. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert must be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and their testimony must be “based on sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Reviewing the record herein, the undersigned finds Dr. Clarke qualifies as an expert on Middle East Terrorism pursuant to rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 Dr. Clarke’s April 29, 2025’s expert report explains that Noi was killed as part of a series of attacks carried about by Hamas from Gaza into Israel on October 7, 2023, which killed approx- imately 1,200 people. ECF No. 21-3 at 26. There is evidence that Hamas began planning the Attacks as far back as 2021. Id. These plans were eventually condensed into a 40-page “battle plan” that was intercepted by Israeli intelligence operatives. Id. at 26–27. Indeed, on the day of the attack, Dr. Clarke explains, the battle plan was followed “almost to the letter.” Id. at 27. First, Hamas launched a barrage of rockets into Israel “as the opening salvo.” Id. The rockets were followed by drone attacks to disable the security systems on the Israeli-Gaza border. Id. After the security systems were disabled, Hamas conducted “a blitzkrieg-style assault using paragliders and 4 Dr. Clarke has spent his career “studying terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism.” ECF No. 21-3 at 3. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Id. He then worked at the RAND Corporation for ten years. Id. While at the RAND corporation, Dr. Clarke worked on terrorism- related projects for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. intelligence community, and U.S. military’s com- batant commands. Id. at 3–4. Dr. Clarke also previously taught courses on terrorism at Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Politics and Strategy and Served as Director of Policy and Research at the Soufan Group. Id. at 4. Cur- rently, Dr. Clarke works as an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at the Hague. Id. Dr. Clarke has testified before Congress as an expert witness on terrorism-related issues multiple times and has pub- lished several books on the subject. Id. at 4–5. He was also previously qualified as an expert in “Middle Eastern Terrorism” in Cabrera, et al., v. Islamic Republic of Iran. Id. at 6; Cabrera, et al., v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 18-cv-2065, 19-cv-2065, 2022 WL 2817730, at *4 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022). 3 motorcycles.” Id. The Attacks occurred in and around Southern Israel, where the Psyduck music festival was located. Id. at 3, 26. As discussed in greater depth below, Dr. Clarke opines that there is substantial evidence that Iran’s support was “[e]ssential” to the Attacks. Id. at 28. For instance, in the lead up to the Attacks, there were multiple high-level meetings between Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Hamas fighters “to provide instruction and strategize.” Id. Additionally, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) recovered Iranian sniper rifles as well as Iranian-made mortar rounds, fuses, and demolition charges used in the Attacks. Id. at 32. Dr. Clarke opines that such instances of support are part of Iran’s broader usage of terrorist groups as proxies “effectively to challenge Israel, the United States, and a range of other powers all vying for influence in the Middle East.” Id. at 7. Based on the evidence he reviewed, Dr. Clarke concludes that Iran “directly enabled Hamas’s execution of [the Attacks].” Id. at 34. C. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 19, 2024, seeking to hold Iran responsible under the terrorism exception of the FSIA for Noi’s death. ECF No. 1. On June 20, 2024, they filed a request to proceed with service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), a provision of the FSIA that allows for service to be attempted on a foreign state via any form of mail requiring a signed receipt. ECF No. 8. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), the Clerk of Court dispatched one copy of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit, together with a translation in Persian to the Acting Foreign Minister of Iran on July 2, 2024, via the U.S. Postal Service. ECF No. 11. The materials were not delivered. ECF No. 13-1 at 1. After waiting the requisite 30 days, Plaintiffs requested service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). ECF No. 13-1 at 1–2. Section 1608(a)(4) allows for service to be attempted on a foreign state by sending the summons, complaint, and notice of suit through diplomatic channels 4 if service cannot be made within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). On August 14, 2024, the Clerk mailed two copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit, together with a translation of each into Persian to the U.S. Department of State. ECF No. 15. Service was executed on Iran via diplomatic note on November 11, 2024. ECF No. 16. Thereafter, Defendants had until January 10, 2025, to file an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). When Defendants failed to respond by the deadline, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit in support of default against Iran on January 24, 2025. ECF No. 18. The Clerk of the Court entered default on January 29, 2025. ECF No. 19. On November 12, 2025, in anticipation of Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, the case was referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. Minute Order (Nov. 12, 2025). On January 30, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment as to liability and for an award of compensatory, economic, and punitive damages. ECF No. 21. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a two-step process for entry of default judg- ment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b); see also United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accounts, 473 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020). First, a plaintiff must request “that the Clerk of Court enter default against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Cryptocurrency, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). Second, the plaintiff must then apply for a default judgment against the absent defendant. Id. (citing Fed. R. Ci v. P. 55(b)). A default judgment is available only when “the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Doe v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 18-cv-66, 2020 WL 5422844, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 10, 2020) (internal citations omitted). “[D]efault judgment is war- ranted if a defendant is a ‘totally unresponsive’ party and its default is plainly willful, as reflected by its failure to respond, ‘either to the summons and complaint, the entry of default, or the motion for default judgment.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). However, a notation of default by the 5 Clerk of the Court against an unresponsive defendant does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judgment. Rather, it is appropriate only if the complaint's well-pleaded allegations, ac- cepted as true, state an adequate claim for relief. See Marmaras v. Marafatsos, No. 18-1236, 2019 WL 3414363, at *2 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019); Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2008). In other words, entry of default “‘establishes the defaulting party's liability for the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint,’ but not for allegations that are not sufficiently pleaded.” United States v. $6,999,925.00 of Funds Associated with Velmur Mgmt. Pte Ltd., 368 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011)). In that way, “‘[c]onceptually, . . . a motion for default judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.’” Doe, 2020 WL 5422844, at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015)). Before a default judgment can be entered against a foreign sovereign, the FSIA requires a plaintiff to establish his or her “claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). That evidence must also be admissible. Owens v. Islamic Republic of Sudan, 864 F. Supp. 3d 751, 786–87 (D.C. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom on other grounds., Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020). A court must “scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations and ‘may not unquestioningly accept a complaint’s unsupported allegations as true.’” Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic, 363 F. Supp. 3d 141, 152 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211 (D.D.C. 2012)). However, “[c]ourts take uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence as true.” Blank v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-3645, 2021 WL 3021450, at *6 (D.D.C. July 17, 2021) (internal citations omitted). An evidentiary hearing is not required; rather, a “plaintiff may establish proof by affidavit.” Com- pagnie Sahélienne d'Entreprise v. Republic of Guinea, No. 20-cv-1536, 2021 WL 2417105, at *2 6 (D.D.C. June 14, 2021); see also Przewozman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 628 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312 (D.D.C. 2022) (“‘In the absence of an evidentiary hearing,’ plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction by making a ‘prima facie showing’ based on ‘their plead- ings,’ and ‘bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.’” (quoting Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). Additionally, “the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a federal court of its ‘affirmative obligation’ to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.” Egypt Dep't of Def. v. Alboghdady, No. 21-cv-1144, 2021 WL 3737682, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021) (quoting James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The party seeking the default judgment is required to demonstrate that “the court has both subject- matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the absent defendant.” Rad- manesh v. Gov't of Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1708, 2019 WL 1787615, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Radmanesh v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 F.4th 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2021). And “‘[e]ven if there are sufficient contacts for a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it lacks power to do so unless the procedural requirements of effective service of process are satisfied.’” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2021). If a court deems default judgment appropriate, it must independently determine the appro- priate remedies. See Pescatore v. Palmera Pineda, 345 F. Supp. 3d 68, 70 (D.D.C. 2018) (“‘[U]nless the amount of damages is certain, the court is required to make an independent deter- mination of the sum to be awarded.’” (quoting Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001))). Specifically, “unlike a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as to liability, a court does not take factual allegations related to damages as true.” Doe, 2020 WL 5422844, at *6. Rather, “a 7 court makes its damages determination ‘in light of the facts and the circumstances of the case at hand.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. Whittemore, 691 F. Supp. 2d 198, 209 (D.D.C. 2010)). “While the court may conduct a hearing to fix the amount of damages, it is not required to do so, ‘as long as it ensure[s] that there [is] a basis for the damages specified in the default judgement.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. China Holdings, Inc., No. 09-cv-2045, 2010 WL 11603046, at *2 (D.D.C. Sep. 24, 2010) (alterations in original)). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs move for the entry of a default judgment against Iran and an award of damages. To receive them, they must establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic- tion over Iran, Iran’s liability for Noi’s death, and their entitlement to damages. Taking those issues in turn, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs have established subject matter and personal ju- risdiction, Iran’s liability for Noi’s death, and their entitlement to damages. Accordingly, the un- dersigned recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion, entering a default judgment, and awarding damages in the amounts outlined below. A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the FSIA, the Court has personal jurisdiction over any defendant if (1) the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and (2) the defendant was properly served. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Therefore, the undersigned begins with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims before turning to service of process. Section 1330(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code grants district courts original juris- diction “without regard to amount in controversy” over (1) nonjury civil actions (2) as to any claim for relief in personam (3) against a foreign state (4) provided that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under sections 1605 to 1607 of the FSIA or under international agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a); Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2017); Reed, 8 845 F. Supp. 2d at 210. The first three factors are easily met here: (1) Plaintiffs filed a nonjury civil action, (2) seeking in personam relief, (3) against a foreign state, Iran. See generally ECF No. 1. Thus, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present “nonjury civil action” against Iran “if, and only if, the conditions for the waiver of immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A are satisfied.” Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Fritz I”), 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2018). Plaintiffs contend that this lawsuit falls within the FSIA’s “terrorism exception” because Defendants provided material support and resources to Hamas causing Plaintiffs’ personal injuries because of an extrajudicial killing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); ECF No. 21-2 at 9. The terrorism exception provides that: A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). For an FSIA claim to be heard in federal court, the victims seeking relief under this exception must prove that (1) “the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act . . . occurred,” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); and (2) “the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act . . . occurred a national of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 5 For a foreign sovereign’s immunity to be nullified, the plaintiffs must also (3) seek monetary damages “for personal injury or death caused by ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking”; and (4) the act, or the provision of material support or resources for the act, must be engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of the defendant. 5 Section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii) also requires that, in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the claimant must afford the foreign state a “reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with the accepted international rules of arbitration.” Because the Attacks at issue here occurred in Israel, the Plaintiffs do not need to satisfy the arbitration requirements. ECF No. 21-2 at 9; see also Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 35 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the plaintiffs did not need to satisfy the third arbitration requirement because they brought suit against Syria for a terrorist attack that occurred in Jordan). 9 Mohammad v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). Each requirement will be addressed in turn. 1. State Sponsor of Terrorism The United States designated Iran a state sponsor of terror in January 1984, and it has remained so designated since that time. See Determination Pursuant to Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979—Iran, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02 (Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Secretary of State George P. Shultz); Selig v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F. Supp. 3d 40, 59 (D.D.C. 2021) (noting that “the U.S. State Department designated Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism [https://perma.cc/VF4X-JQU4] (last visited on September 14, 2026). 2. Plaintiff’s Citizenship Plaintiffs have submitted evidence establishing that Noi became a U.S. citizen prior to his death. Noi’s father Shimon Maodi attests in his declaration that Noi was a dual citizen of both Israel and the U.S. ECF No. 21-5, ¶ 4. The declaration of Noi’s sister Shani Rosenberg also discusses Noi’s reaction to becoming an American citizen. ECF No. 21-9, ¶ 8. Plaintiffs do not provide direct evidence of Noi’s citizenship. But such evidence is not required at this stage. See Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 326-327 (D.D.C. 2014) (accepting that the plaintiffs were U.S. citizens at the default stage when they presented “[u]controverted affidavit evidence”); see also Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (same). To be sure, the Family Member Plaintiffs are all Israeli citizens. ECF No. 21-5, ¶ 2; ECF No. 21-7, ¶ 2; ECF No. 21-8, ¶ 2; ECF No. 21-9, ¶ 2; ECF No. 21-10, ¶ 2. But “‘this fact is non- consequential’ for jurisdictional purposes. . . because ‘the waiver of foreign sovereign immunity applies so long as ‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the’ terrorist attack, a U.S. national, 10 member of the armed forces, or government employee.’” Estate of Fouty v. Syrian Arab Republic, 743 F. Supp. 3d 118, 145 (D.D.C. 2024) (quoting Force v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 F. Supp. 3d 323, 369 (D.D.C. 2020) (emphasis added)). Because the direct victim—Noi—was a U.S. citi- zen, all Plaintiffs have satisfied FSIA’s citizenship requirement. 3. Extrajudicial Killing An “[e]xtrajudicial killing” is defined for purposes of the FSIA (by means of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”)) as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.” TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note); 28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). Plaintiffs therefore must show: “(1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a constituted court.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 770. The Attacks that killed Noi meet those requirements. To begin, it is indisputable that Noi’s death, as a result of the Attacks, constitutes a killing—he was shot in the head while driving home from a music festival. The Attacks also clearly involved some level of deliberation. Owens, 864 F.3d at 770. A deliberated killing is “simply one undertaken with careful consideration, not on a sudden impulse.” Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 363 (quoting Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 242, 264 (D.D.C. 2016)). As discussed above, the Attacks involved intensive planning, investment, and coordination by Hamas and others, dating back to at least 2021. ECF No. 21-3 at 26–27. Finally, there is no evidence in the record that the Attacks were authorized by “a prior judgement affording judicial guarantees or due process.” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 202 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 11 774 F.3d 1044, 1050–51 (concluding that the third prong of Owens is satisfied when a killing is done without a showing of due process). Nor were they “lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation,” TVPA § 3(a)—Hamas is not a country, it is a terrorist group. See ECF No. 21-3 at 11. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Noi’s death was the result of an extrajudicial killing. 4. Material Support Material support is the provision of “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, in- cluding currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, train- ing, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communica- tions equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transporta- tion, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3) (defining “material support or resources” for the purposes of the FSIA to have the “meaning given that term in section 2339A of title 18.”). Although evidence found sufficient to demonstrate a foreign sovereign’s material support of a terrorist organization varies, successful showings have generally focused on the foreign state's offer of safe haven to the terrorist group, provision of financing, weapons, or assistance with its recruitment, or motive to foment unrest in an area where the group is operating. See generally W.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 427 F. Supp. 3d 117, 136 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that Iran pro- vided material support to the Badr Organization through support of efforts to overthrow Sunni rule in Iraq and direct funding); Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (finding Syria provided material support to AQI by allowing it to operate and plan terrorist attacks from within Syria by providing essential financing to the group); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding Syria provided material support to AQI by offering it a safe haven for its operations, and by supporting its training and recruitment efforts); Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 12 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that Iran provided material support to Hezbollah by funding training camps). As a threshold matter, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evi- dence that Hamas was responsible for the Attacks at this stage. In his sworn declaration, the sole survivor of the incident, Tomer, stated that his attackers were “terrorists.” ECF No. 21-4, ¶¶ 9–10. In his expert report, Dr. Clarke outlined how these terrorists were likely affiliated with Hamas. He pointed to statements made by Hamas leaders, the Iranian government, and Israeli officials attrib- uting responsibility of the Attacks, at least in part, to Hamas. ECF No. 21-3 at 18, 27, 31. There is also extensive evidence of Hamas’s involvement in the planning and execution of the Attacks. In 2021, Hamas’s leadership reached out to an IRGC-QF commander requesting $500 million over two years to plan a “spectacular attack.” Id. at 26. And, in 2022, the IDF intercepted a 40-page document from Hamas outlining plans for an attack on Israel. Id. at 26–27. The plans in this document closely mirrored the execution of the Attacks. Id. at 27. Although Plaintiffs do not point to statements of Hamas claiming credit for the Attacks, circumstantial evidence of a terrorist group’s responsibility has been deemed sufficient in other FSIA cases. See, e.g., Hamen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 401 F. Supp. 3d 85, 96–97 (D.D.C. 2019) (accepting the plaintiffs’ claim that Houthis were responsible for a kidnapping based on uncontro- verted testimony that it was carried out by soldiers known to be allied with the group); Frost v. Islamic of Iran, 383 F. Supp. 3d 33, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2019) (crediting testimony that kidnappers were affiliated with Saraya al-Salam when the building where victims were detained displayed relevant flags); W.A., 427 F. Supp. 3d at 117, 135 (concluding that the Badr Organization was responsible for an unclaimed killing based on witness testimony that the attack was consistent with Badr’s historic behavior, as well as other circumstantial evidence pointing to the organization). 13 Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Hamas carried out the attack that killed Noi. See ECF No. 21-3 at 26 (stating that Noi was one of the victims of the Attacks). Plaintiffs have also provided satisfactory proof that Iran provided material support to Ha- mas. The undersigned is unaware of a case in this Circuit addressing that question with respect to the Attacks at issue. But multiple Courts in this Circuit have concluded that Iran provided material support to Hamas in attacks pre-dated October 7, 2023. See Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 76–77; Przewozman, 754 F. Supp. 3d. at 21; Henkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 18-cv-1273, 19-cv- 1184, 2021 WL 2914036, at *2 (D.D.C. July 12, 2021). In those cases, and others, plaintiffs have relied on expert testimony and government reports, as Plaintiffs have here, to demonstrate the foreign state's material support of the terrorist organization at issue. See Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 337; W.A., 427 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (D.D.C. 2019); Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 28; Gates, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 56; Ben-Rafael, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 47. Here, Plaintiffs use Dr. Clarke’s expert report to link Hamas and Iran. Dr. Clarke states that Iran has financially supported Hamas both directly and indirectly since the group’s founding in the 1980s. ECF No. 21-3 at 25. For instance, in 2020, the U.S. State Department estimated that Iran provided $100 million annually in combined support for Hamas. Id. And in 2022, a year before the Attacks, the then-leader of Hamas claimed that Iran provided them $70 million a year. Id. Dr. Clarke further attests that the Iranian government also provided Hamas significant organi- zational and operational support, including helping disseminate propaganda, supporting Hamas’s recruitment efforts, and providing training and weapons to its members. Id. at 13–24. He bases this conclusion on specific examples, including an IDF report that the IRGC-QF provided training to approximately 500 Hamas fighters at a training program held in 2023. Id. at 29. He also notes that then-Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar in 2019 claimed that Iran was vital to helping Hamas 14 restore its rocket stockpiles after they were depleted in the group’s 2012 and 2014 operations. Id. at 23. Again, similar evidence has been found sufficient in FSIA cases to demonstrate Iran’s ma- terial support of Hamas. See Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d. at 76–77; Henkin, 2021 WL 2914036, at *2; Przewozman, 754 F. Supp. 3d. at 21. Dr. Clarke further explains how Iran supported Hamas in the lead up to the Attacks. As mentioned previously, Hamas requested funding from Iran for the planning of the Attacks in 2021. ECF No. 21-3 at 26. This coordination continued, with IRGC officials repeatedly meeting with Hamas leaders in Beirut to help refine the attack plans. Id. at 31. Dr. Clarke also highlights evi- dence that Iran provided Hamas with weapons and technical expertise. Id. at 32. The IDF recov- ered weapons used by Hamas for the Attacks that included “Iranian sniper rifles, Chinese and Russian small arms and light weapons, including AK-47 assault rifles, and rocket- propelled gre- nades made in North Korea and Bulgaria.” Id. The IDF also found Iranian-made mortar rounds, fuses, and demolition charges after the Attacks. Id. Describing the weapons’ link to Iran, Retired General Frank McKenzie, former commander of U.S. Central Command, opined that “[Hamas] got them from somewhere. And the technology assistance to put it together certainly came from Iran.” Id. Finally, Plaintiffs have shown that Iran’s material support of Hamas was a legally sufficient cause of the Attacks. See Owens, 864 F.3d at 778 (requiring plaintiffs to show that the foreign sovereign’s material support is a legally sufficient cause of the terrorist attack at issue). To satisfy this standard, Plaintiffs must show that (1) the defendant’s actions were a “substantial factor” in the sequence of events that caused plaintiff’s injury and (2) the injury was a “reasonably foresee- able consequence or anticipated as a natural consequence” of defendant’s conduct. Id. at 794 (quoting Rothstein v. UBS, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)). In Przewozman, for example, the Court 15 held that Iran’s support was a “substantial factor” in an attack, even without evidence tying that support to the attack at issue, because Iran’s aid was essential to the terrorist group’s total operating capacity. Przewozman, 754 F. Supp. 3d. at 22; see also Doe, 2020 WL 5422844, at *11. Plaintiffs in this case have introduced evidence that Iran’s support was not just vital to Hamas’s total oper- ating capacity, but also to executing the Attacks at issue. Similarly, Plaintiffs have also shown that their injuries were a reasonably foreseeable con- sequence of Iran’s actions supporting Hamas. In previous cases, sufficient evidence of foreseea- bility has included actively encouraging the group to carry out attacks on civilians in Israel. See Przewozman, 754 F. Supp. 3d at 22. Here, Iran not only encouraged, but also actively supported Hamas in executing the Attacks. See ECF No. 21-3 at 28. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. B. Personal Jurisdiction The undersigned next examines if effective service has been made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), which governs personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. That section provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction . . . where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Service is made on a foreign state under section 1608 in one of four ways: 1. by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision; 2. if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents; 3. if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a 16  signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned, or 4. if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph (3), by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a trans- lation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the at- tention of the Director of Special Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). The methods of service provided in section 1608(a) are listed in order of preference; plaintiffs must attempt the first method before proceeding to the next. Angellino v. Royal Family Al-Saud, 688 F.3d 771, 773 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “[S]trict adherence to the terms of 1608(a) is required” and “neither substantial compliance, nor actual notice, suffice[s].” Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia, 785 F.3d 26, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). As many litigants do in FSIA cases against Iran, Plaintiff served Iran via diplomatic channels pursuant to Section 1608(a)(4). Iran does not have a special arrangement for service with the Plaintiffs, nor has it “entered into any international convention governing service” of judicial documents, so sections 1608(a)(1) and 1608(a)(2) do not provide avenues for service. Blank, 2021 WL 3021450, at *8. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiffs attempted service under section 1608(a)(3) and requested the Clerk of the Court mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran. See ECF No. 8-1 at 1. On July 2, 2024, the Clerk of the Court mailed “one copy of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of [Iran], by regis- tered mail . . . to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1608(a)(3).” ECF No. 11 at 1. On August 13, 2024, Plaintiffs sent a letter to the Clerk stating that no response was received from Defendants. ECF No. 12. Thus, Plaintiffs obligation to attempt service first 17 under section 1608(a)(3) before moving to service section 1608(a)(4) under was satisfied. See Doe, 2020 WL 5422844, at *12 (concluding “[n]othing more was required for [the plaintiffs] to satisfy their obligations to attempt service under section 1608(a)(3)” after the Clerk of the Court mailed the documents and the Syrian Foreign Ministry refused delivery); Ben-Rafael, 5