Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0468n.06 No. 26-3319 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nov 19, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO BARBARA SMITH, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) ) Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges. KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Barbara Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and theft of mail by a postal employee. Her plea agreement included an appellate waiver, which waived Smith’s right to appeal except in limited circumstances. At sentencing, the district court identified Smith’s conspiracy and wire-fraud counts as Class B felonies. It calculated Smith’s guidelines range as six to twelve months, sentenced her to four months of imprisonment and two months of home confinement followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a $700 special assessment and $29,247.54 in restitution. Soon after adjourning, the district court reconvened the sentencing hearing to correct its classification of Smith’s offenses to Class C felonies. On appeal, Smith argues that the district court should have resentenced her after it corrected its classification error. Because the appeal waiver in Smith’s plea agreement bars her claim, we DISMISS Smith’s appeal. No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith I. BACKGROUND Smith was a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. R. 45 (Final Revised Presentence Report “PSR” ¶ 9) (Page ID #321). Between September 2023 and July 2024, Smith and her partner, Brian Dudinsky, stole credit and debit cards from the mail, activated the cards via telephone, and used the cards to make purchases at stores. Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (Page ID #321). On July 23, 2025, a grand jury returned a ten-count indictment charging Smith with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One), five counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts Three, Four, Six, Seven, and Eight), and one count of theft of mail by a postal employee under 18 U.S.C. § 1709 (Count Ten). R. 1 (Indictment at 2–8) (Page ID #2–8). Smith pleaded guilty to all counts against her in the indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement. R. 22 (Plea Agreement at 3) (Page ID #95). With respect to sentencing, the plea agreement stated that the statutory maximum penalty for the wire-fraud and conspiracy counts was thirty years of imprisonment. Id. at 2 (Page ID #94). Smith and the government “agree[d] to recommend that the [district court] impose a sentence within the range and of the kind specified pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the computations and stipulations set forth” in the plea agreement. Id. at 4–5 (Page ID #96–97). The plea agreement also contained an appellate waiver. Smith “expressly and voluntarily” waived her right to appeal or collaterally attack her conviction or sentence, except in limited circumstances. Id. at 6–7 (Page ID #98–99). Specifically, Smith retained the right to appeal “any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum,” “any sentence to the extent it exceeds the maximum of the sentencing imprisonment range determined under the advisory Sentencing 2 No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith Guidelines in accordance with the sentencing stipulations and computations in this agreement,” and any claims based on “ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. At Smith’s plea hearing, the district court confirmed that Smith understood the consequences of her guilty plea. Among other things, it advised Smith that the wire-fraud and conspiracy charges were punishable by a statutory maximum of thirty years’ imprisonment. R. 52 (Change of Plea Tr. at 6–7) (Page ID #380–81). When asked if she understood, Smith responded: “Yes.” Id. The district court also reviewed the appellate waiver in the plea agreement. It explained that Smith reserved the right to appeal any sentence above the statutory maximum, any sentence above the guidelines range determined under the plea agreement, and any claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 14 (Page ID #388). The district court then asked: “Everything else you are waiving or giving up the right to appeal. You do understand?” Id. Smith answered: “Yes.” Id. In the end, confirming that Smith entered into the plea agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the district court accepted Smith’s guilty plea. Id. at 28–29 (Page ID #402–03). The district court sentenced Smith on March 30, 2026. R. 53 (Sent’g Tr. at 1) (Page ID #412). It concluded that Smith’s offense level was ten—consistent with the stipulations in the plea agreement—and criminal-history category was I, which yielded a guidelines range of six to twelve months. Id. at 12, 15 (Page ID #423, 426).1 In determining the sentence to impose on Smith, the district court repeatedly identified the wire-fraud and conspiracy counts as Class B felonies. See 1 The district court relied on the PSR to calculate Smith’s offense level and criminal-history category. See R. 53 (Sent’g Tr. at 9, 12) (Page ID #420, 423). Both the first disclosure of the PSR and the revised PSR listed the conspiracy and wire-fraud counts as Class B felonies with a maximum penalty of thirty years’ imprisonment. R. 28 (First PSR at 1–2) (Page ID #152–53); R. 33 (Revised PSR at 1–2) (Page ID #188–89). Smith did not object to this classification. See R. 33 (Revised PSR at 22) (Page ID #209). 3 No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith id. at 9, 15–16, 20 (Page ID #420, 426–27, 431). It noted that “when you’re in Class B felonies, it’s not probationable by law; by law.” Id. at 20 (Page ID #431). Ultimately, after considering the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Smith to four months of imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and two months of home confinement. Id. at 25 (Page ID #436). It also ordered three years of supervised release, a $700 special assessment, and $29,247.54 in restitution. Id. at 26 (Page ID #437). Before adjourning, the district court asked whether Smith had any objections to the sentence. Id. at 29 (Page ID #440). Smith’s counsel answered in the negative. Id. Minutes after adjourning, the district court reconvened the sentencing hearing “to make a correction for the record on the class levels of certain counts as well as the potential statutory maximum.” Id. at 32 (Page ID #443). The government then clarified that the conspiracy and wire- fraud counts “are all Class C felonies with a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years.” Id. Smith’s counsel agreed with the correction. Id. The district court then stated: “Nothing changes on my end. We overshot on Ms. Smith. It would be different if we undershot, but there’s no prejudice to her . . . .” Id. The district court did not invite renewed objections to the sentence, nor did Smith’s counsel object. See id. at 32–33 (Page ID #443–44).2 The district court entered judgment the same day, R. 41 (Judgment) (Page ID #288–95), and Smith timely appealed, R. 48 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #369). 2 The district court ordered a revised PSR. See R. 45 (Final Revised PSR at 1–2) (Page ID #317–18). 4 No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith II. ANALYSIS Smith argues that the district court erred when it failed to resentence Smith after recognizing that it had misclassified her offenses as Class B, rather than Class C, felonies. D. 17 (Appellant Br. at 10–15). That classification affects the kinds of sentences available. A defendant may not be sentenced to a term of probation for Class B felonies, 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(1), which are offenses with a maximum term of imprisonment of “twenty-five years or more,” id. § 3559(a)(2); conversely, a defendant is eligible for probation for certain Class C felonies, see id. § 3561(a), which have a maximum term of imprisonment of “less than twenty-five years but ten or more years,” id. § 3559(a)(3). Before we may address the merits of Smith’s argument, however, we must determine whether the appellate waiver in her plea agreement prevents her from bringing this appeal. In doing so, we assume, without deciding, that the district court committed error in its classification of Smith’s offenses as Class B felonies.3 We review de novo “whether a defendant waived [her] right to appeal [her] sentence in a valid plea agreement.” United States v. Smith, 344 F.3d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 2003). An appellate waiver “is binding and forecloses appellate review if (1) the defendant’s claim falls within the scope of the appeal waiver provision; and (2) the defendant ‘knowingly and voluntarily’ agreed to the plea agreement and waiver.” United States v. Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir. 2021). Both requirements are met here. 3 Wire fraud generally carries a maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. If the violation “affects a financial institution,” however, the maximum penalty increases to thirty years’ imprisonment. Id. Conspiracy carries “the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the . . . conspiracy.” Id. § 1349. 5 No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith Pursuant to her plea agreement, Smith agreed to waive her right to appeal her conviction or sentence, save for claims involving a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, a sentence that exceeds the guidelines range determined in accordance with the plea agreement, ineffective assistance of counsel, or prosecutorial misconduct. R. 22 (Plea Agreement at 6–7) (Page ID #98– 99). The appellate waiver therefore “operates as a general waiver with [four] narrowly drawn exceptions.” United States v. Patino, 150 F. App’x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2005). Smith’s claim that the district court committed error by misclassifying her offenses does not come within any of these exceptions. Her sentence was below the statutory maximum and within the guidelines range, and Smith does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.4 Accordingly, the appellate waiver covers Smith’s claim on appeal. See United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001) (“It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive ‘any right, even a constitutional right,’ by means of a plea agreement.” (quoting United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775–76 (6th Cir. 1995))); United States v. Mukhdomi, 170 F.4th 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2026) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges to a sentence fall within the scope of a general appellate waiver . . . .”). Second, Smith knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to raise this claim on appeal. She signed the plea agreement; initialed each page; and attested to reviewing the plea agreement with her counsel, understanding it, and voluntarily agreeing to its terms. R. 52 (Change of Plea Tr. at 26–28) (Page ID #400–02). At the plea hearing, the district court discussed the details of the plea agreement, and Smith confirmed that she understood the appellate rights she was giving 4 Smith correctly notes that she “retain[s] the ability to raise ineffective assistance in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” D. 17 (Appellant Br. at 19). 6 No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith up. Id. at 13–14 (Page ID #387–88). The district court expressly found that Smith entered into the plea agreement “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently,” with “a full understanding of everything” therein. Id. at 29 (Page ID #403). On this record, Smith’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 626 (6th Cir. 2004). Smith does not dispute that she knowingly and voluntarily entered into the appellate waiver, and that her claim does not fall within one of the four exceptions to the waiver. See D. 17 (Appellant Br. at 18); D. 19 (Appellant Reply Br. at 2). Rather, she contends that we should not enforce the appellate waiver because it “would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning[ that] it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713, 717 (2026); see D. 17 (Appellant Br. at 19); D. 19 (Appellant Reply Br. at 2–3). That “hard-to-meet standard” is not satisfied here. Hunter, 608 U.S. at 729. The Supreme Court clarified in Hunter that the miscarriage-of-justice exception is reserved for “extreme cases,” those in which “the justice system’s basic integrity is at stake.” Id. at 728. In adopting the exception, the Court hastened to explain that it does not apply to errors that are “uncertain,” “ordinary,” or ones that “a judge could reasonably make.” Id. at 727, 729. Specifically, “standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver,” including errors in “the detailed calculation of a Sentencing Guidelines range [or] the mandatory consideration of multiple sentencing factors.” Id. at 727. That said, the Court articulated a few examples of the kinds of “rare” errors that would satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice exception. Id. at 729. It indicated that, regardless of an appellate waiver, defendants may appeal “a sentence exceeding what the relevant statute allows,” “a 7 No. 26-3319, United States v. Smith sentence that is infected with a blatant constitutional error,” and a “sentence [that is] imposed without ‘some minimum of civilized procedure.’” Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192 (7th Cir. 2014)). The Court emphasized that these examples “serve to illustrate the high bar a defendant must surmount to overcome an appeal waiver.” Id. The error at issue in this case does not resemble the examples offered by the Court. It does not reflect an abandonment of institutional rules or an arbitrariness so severe that it damages the moral authority of the judicial system itself. Instead, the error constitutes the kind of “standard- fare error[] in misapplying sentencing law” that is “unfortunate but inevitable.” Id. at 727. The force of Smith’s argument to the contrary is especially diminished given that the district court corrected its error and reaffirmed the sentence imposed on Smith. R. 53 (Sent’g Tr. at 32) (Page ID #443). Moreover, the error did not render Smith’s sentence lawless. A defendant convicted of a Class C felony may be eligible for probation, but she is not guaranteed it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a); U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 5C1.1(c) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025). The district court had the authority to sentence Smith to a term of imprisonment regardless of whether her offense was a Class C or Class B felony. Thus, on this record, we cannot conclude that a miscarriage of justice occurred, and we must enforce the appellate waiver. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we DISMISS Smith’s appeal. 8