United States v. Timothy Ehn
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-5971
JudgeRonald Lee Gilman; Stephanie Dawkins Davis; Andre B. Mathis
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0476n.06
Case Nos. 26-5971, 26-5972, 26-6005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Nov 20, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
TIMOTHY EHN, D.C., )
Defendant-Appellant. )
) OPINION
)
Before: GILMAN, DAVIS, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges
DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Defendant Timothy Ehn moves to administratively stay the
imminent sale of property located at 8780 U.S. 42 in Florence, Kentucky (the “Real Estate”),
pending resolution of his appeals (26-5971, 26-5972, 26-6005). Concluding that we lack
jurisdiction over those appeals, we dismiss them and deny the motion as moot.
I.
A jury convicted Timothy Ehn and William Siefert of health-care fraud. See United States
v. Siefert, 161 F.4th 379, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2025). As part of their sentences, the district court
“ordered restitution payments in the amount of $3,773,569.30 against Defendant Ehn and
$1,968,763.10 against Defendant Siefert.” (Order, R. 367, PageID 9140). The United States then
moved for a Charging Order to put a lien against Ehn and Siefert’s interests in GT Enterprise, LLC
(in which each defendant holds a 50% stake). (Mot. for Charging Order, R. 334; Mot. for Charging
Case Nos. 26-5971/5972/6005, United States v. Ehn
Order, R. 335). The district court granted the motion and issued a Charging Order to “be treated
as a lien upon the interests of each Defendant . . . in favor of the United States . . . like any other
lien under 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c).” (Order, R. 367, PageID 9147). It also appointed Michael B.
Baker as receiver for GT Enterprise and its assets (the Real Estate is GT Enterprise’s primary
asset). (See Mot., R. 417, PageID 9637).
The appointment granted the receiver authority “to market or engage a reputable brokerage
company to market the assets of GT[ Enterprise] for sale . . . subject to obtaining approval of the
Court.” (Id. (citation modified)). He did just that and subsequently moved the court to approve a
sale of the Real Estate in the amount of $2.4 million, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2001. (See Mot. to
Approve Sale, R. 471, PageID 10064). The court granted the motion, and the sale is set to close
on November 23, 2026. (See Order, R. 496). Ehn filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on the same date
that the court approved the sale, which was September 16, 2026. (See In re Timothy Ehn, No. 26-
20942, (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2026), R. 1, 1).
Throughout the postjudgment proceedings, Ehn generally “[took] issue with what the”
court “authorized” the receiver to do. (Tr. of Mot. Hr’g, R. 444, PageID 9793–94). After the court
approved the sale of the Real Estate, he specifically moved to stay “any distribution of sale
proceeds or other disputed receivership funds” and any “closing, transfer of title, or asset
distribution” related to the Real Estate. (Mot., R. 497, PageID 10185). The district court found
“no just reason” to grant “a stay,” and denied Ehn’s motion. (Order, R. 505, PageID 10249). Ehn
then filed this emergency motion to administratively stay the sale of the Real Estate pending appeal
-2-
Case Nos. 26-5971/5972/6005, United States v. Ehn
of both the order approving the sale (the “Sale Order”) (Order, R. 496), and the order denying his
motion for a stay (the “Stay Order”) (Order, R. 505). (26-5971, Mot., ECF 7, 2).1
II.
We have an independent obligation to assess jurisdiction, which requires us to confirm both
our authority to consider the subject matter of an appeal and the appellant’s Article III standing to
bring it. See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir. 2004) (subject matter
jurisdiction); LLP Mortg., Ltd. v. Brinley, 547 F.3d 643, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2008) (Article III
standing).
As noted, Ehn appeals from both the Sale Order and the Stay Order. His appeal of the Sale
Order, however, is untimely. We are empowered to exercise jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory
orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(2). But “[i]n a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district
court within 14 days” of “the order being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).2 The district
court entered the Sale Order on September 16, 2026. (See Order, R. 496, PageID 10179). Ehn did
not notice his appeal of that order until November 9, 2026. (See Notice of Appeal, R. 513). He
claims that his motion seeking “substitute counsel, an extension of time, and preservation of the
receivership’s records and assets,” filed on September 21, 2026, “may be treated as [a timely]
1
Ehn also noticed an appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to supplement and motion to appoint
counsel. (See Order, R. 508; Notice of Appeal, R. 510). The appeal of that order has nothing to do with the Real
Estate, nor do we have jurisdiction over it, as it is not a final order, an appealable interlocutory order, or an appealable
collateral order. It is, therefore, dismissed.
2
Ehn contends that if the government’s argument is correct that “collecting restitution is civil in nature,” then this is
a civil collection proceeding, and he therefore had 60 days to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B). (Appellant’s Reply, ECF 10, 4 (citation modified)). But whether the collection
process is civil in nature is irrelevant. The 14-day deadline applies to “criminal case[s],” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A),
and Ehn’s case is undeniably criminal.
-3-
Case Nos. 26-5971/5972/6005, United States v. Ehn
notice of appeal.” (Appellant’s Reply, ECF 10, 4). But we do not entertain constructive notices
of appeal unless they strictly comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. See Smith v.
Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). Ehn’s motion does not do so; it neither “designates the judgment
. . . from which the appeal is taken” nor “name[s] the court to which the appeal is taken.” Fed. R.
App. P. 3(c)(1)(B)–(C). The operative notice of appeal, then, is the one Ehn filed on November
9. That is well outside the 14-day window, so we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal
of the Sale Order, and that appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
As for the Stay Order, Ehn properly noticed his appeal within two weeks of the Order’s
entry. (See Notice of Appeal, R. 509). But the Stay Order is not a final order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, so we lack jurisdiction unless it qualifies as an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.
We are skeptical that it meets the criteria for either, but even assuming that it does, Ehn does not
have Article III standing to maintain an appeal of it, and we, therefore, lack jurisdiction to consider
it.
Recall that Ehn filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on September 16, 2026. “The
commencement of [that] case . . . create[d] an estate . . . comprised of . . . all legal or equitable
interests [Ehn had] in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). And
Ehn identified his 50% stake in GT Enterprise as one such legal or equitable interest. (In re
Timothy Ehn, No. 26-20942, R. 13 at 6–7); see also Tyler v. DH Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455,
461 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The nature and extent of property rights in bankruptcy are determined by the
underlying substantive law.” (citation omitted)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.250 (“A limited
liability company interest shall be personal property.”). That interest, therefore, is now part of the
estate. See Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., 698 F.3d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that, when
a debtor files for bankruptcy, his estate “bec[o]me[s] the owner of all of [his] property”); (see also
-4-
Case Nos. 26-5971/5972/6005, United States v. Ehn
Mot., R. 497, PageID 10182 (“Defendant’s bankruptcy petition created a bankruptcy estate . . . ,
which includes . . . potential residual equity, claims, or property rights in connection with the
commercial property subject to the receivership.”)). And that means the bankruptcy trustee—not
Ehn—is “the real party in interest” for any claims related to GT Enterprise. See Wieburg v. GTE
Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1)(F). So the trustee
has standing to pursue those claims, but Ehn does not.
It is well-established that a plaintiff lacks Article III standing unless he has: (1) “suffered
an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) established “a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) shown that it is
“likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citation modified). Ehn fails at the first
step.
“The advent of the chapter 7 estate and the appointment of the chapter 7 trustee divest the
chapter 7 debtor of all right, title[,] and interest in nonexempt property of the estate at the
commencement of the case.” In re Amir, 436 B.R. 1, 10 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
“As a result, the chapter 7 trustee is often the only party who has standing to appeal an order that
impacts the disposition of property of the estate.” Id. And, in this case, the trustee has not appealed
the Stay Order impacting the disposition of GT Enterprise. Nor does Ehn possess authority to do
so on her behalf. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that
“[f]ederal courts must hesitate before resolving a controversy . . . on the basis of the rights of third
persons not parties to the litigation”); (see also Appellant’s Reply, ECF 10, 3 (noting that when
asked, the trustee declined to “abandon all interest in” GT Enterprise). As a chapter 7 debtor, Ehn
-5-
Case Nos. 26-5971/5972/6005, United States v. Ehn
no longer holds an interest in GT Enterprise. See King v. Johnson, No. 1:22-cv-1037, 2023 WL
5110930, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2023) (“Under federal bankruptcy law, . . . upon filing a petition
for bankruptcy, all of a debtor’s interests in a limited liability company become the property of the
bankruptcy estate and are therefore subject to the control of the trustee of that estate.”).3 Yet he
appeals from an order declining to stay the sale of that entity’s commercial property. In other
words, he attempts to assert the rights of the bankruptcy trustee, a third person not party to the
litigation. That is not his prerogative. And for that reason, he lacks Article III standing to appeal
the Stay Order, so that appeal must be dismissed.
The dismissal of Ehn’s appeals moots his motion for a stay pending those appeals. The
motion is, therefore, denied as moot.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS Ehn’s appeals (26-5971, 26-5972, 26-6005) for
lack of jurisdiction and DENY his motion for a stay pending appeal as moot.
3
Ehn argues that the Real Estate is not part of the bankruptcy estate. (Appellant’s Reply, ECF 10, 2–3). But that is
irrelevant because his interest in GT Enterprise is what matters for purposes of standing, and he lost that interest when
he filed for bankruptcy.
-6-