Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 1 of 10 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-10590 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DARRYL PAYNE, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 3:25-cr-00206-BL-SMD-1 ____________________ Before BRANCH, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Darryl Panye appeals his 12-month-and-one-day sentence for failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration and No- USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 2 of 10 2 Opinion of the Court 26-10590 tification Act (“SORNA”). On appeal, Payne argues that his sen- tence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to properly consider the circumstances of his case and his personal characteristics. In response, the government moves to dismiss Payne’s appeal pursuant to a sentence-appeal waiver in his plea agreement. After careful review, we conclude that Payne know- ingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, his challenge falls within the appeal waiver, and no exception applies. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY In March 2025, a grand jury indicted Payne with one count of failing to register under SORNA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (“Count 1”). Payne pled guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the government’s agreement not to bring additional charges against Payne for the conduct described in the indictment, to rec- ommend that Payne receive a sentence at the low end of the guide- line range, and to recommend a reduction for acceptance of re- sponsibility. The parties’ agreement included a set of stipulated facts stating that Payne traveled to Alabama between 2023 and 2025 and knowingly failed to register or update his registration un- der SORNA there. Under a section titled “THE DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF APPEAL AND COLLATERAL ATTACK,” the plea agreement reflected that Payne was giving up most of his appellate rights. Spe- cifically, the provision stated: USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 3 of 10 26-10590 Opinion of the Court 3 Understanding that 18 U.S.C. § 3742 provides for ap- peal by a defendant of the sentence under certain cir- cumstances, the defendant expressly waives any and all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal the conviction, sentence, or order of forfeiture. The de- fendant further expressly waives the right to attack the conviction or sentence in any post-conviction pro- ceeding, including proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Exempt from this waiver is the right to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction or sentence on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. The provision also noted that Payne would be released from the appeal waiver if the government exercised its right to appeal. Additionally, the plea agreement clarified that it represented the entire agreement between the parties, and that Payne had en- tered it freely and voluntarily. Payne initialed every page of the document and signed the final page. His attorney also signed the last page of the agreement beneath a certification that she had ad- vised Payne of the nature of the offense, applicable penalties, and rights Payne was waiving. Payne appeared for a change-of-plea hearing before the mag- istrate judge. 1 He was placed under oath and warned that he could 1 Payne consented to a magistrate judge conducting the change-of-plea hear- ing. USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 4 of 10 4 Opinion of the Court 26-10590 be prosecuted for perjury if he made any false statements. Payne confirmed that he had not recently been treated for mental illness or consumed any drugs, alcohol, or medicine that day. He also stated that he had discussed the indictment with his attorney, with whom he was satisfied. Additionally, Payne confirmed that he had reviewed, read, and understood the plea agreement, and was plead- ing guilty of his own free will. The magistrate judge ensured Payne understood that he was pleading guilty to a felony and would not be able to withdraw his plea based on the sentence he received. The magistrate judge also discussed the sentencing process and the maximum penalties Payne could face. Next, the magistrate judge explained that Payne’s plea agreement contained a sentence-appeal waiver, pur- suant to which he was “giving up [his] right to file any sort of appeal or collateral challenge to [his] conviction or [his] sentence,” with limited exceptions. Payne’s counsel noted that she had addressed those exceptions with Payne, and he confirmed he understood the appeal waiver provision. The magistrate judge also ensured that Payne understood the trial rights he was waiving. The government then informed Payne of the essential ele- ments of the charged offense. The parties stipulated that Payne was subject to SORNA’s registration requirements due to a prior conviction but failed to update his registration after relocating to Alabama. The magistrate judge found that there was an adequate factual basis for the plea, and Payne pled guilty. The magistrate judge then determined that Payne had entered the plea knowingly USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 5 of 10 26-10590 Opinion of the Court 5 and voluntarily and recommended that the district court accept it. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, accepted Payne’s plea, and adjudged him guilty of Count 1. Prior to sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presen- tence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI calculated a base of- fense level of 16 but reduced it by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 13. 2 It also assigned Payne a criminal history category of II due to his prior convictions. Based on an offense level of 13 and criminal history category of II, Payne’s guideline range was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. Payne moved for a downward variance, requesting a sen- tence of time served, and filed a sentencing memorandum in sup- port of his request. The government also filed a sentencing mem- orandum, maintaining that Payne should receive 15 months in prison. At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSI’s sentencing calculations, finding that Payne’s advisory guideline imprisonment range was 15 to 21 months, to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. 3 The court then turned to the plea agreement and the government recited its terms. The government specified that, pursuant to the agreement, Payne “expressly waive[d] the 2 The government filed a motion to reduce Payne’s offense level for ac- ceptance of responsibility, which the district court granted. 3 The PSI reflected that an appropriate term of supervised release was five years to life. USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 6 of 10 6 Opinion of the Court 26-10590 right to attack [his] conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceedings except for ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecu- torial misconduct.” It also noted that Payne would be released from the appeal waiver if the government exercised its right to ap- peal. The court asked Payne whether the government’s summary of the plea agreement aligned with his understanding of it, and he responded affirmatively. Payne allocuted, and the district court heard arguments on his motion for a downward variance. Payne asserted that a sen- tence of time served was warranted considering his difficult up- bringing, progress in improving his life after his prior incarceration, and family obligations. The government submitted that a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment, at the low end of the guideline range, was appropriate given the nature of Payne’s offense. The district court granted Payne’s motion for a downward variance, noting, in- ter alia, that Payne had overcome various personal struggles and accepted responsibility for his actions. After stating that it had con- sidered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court imposed a 12-month sentence, followed by a five-year term of supervised re- lease. It explained that Payne’s sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing and was reasonable considering the Section 3553(a) fac- tors. The court then solicited objections to the sentence and Payne requested a prison sentence of 12 months and one day to trigger his eligibility for good-time credits. The government did not ob- ject, and the court imposed the requested sentence. It later entered judgment to this effect. Payne’s appeal followed. USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 7 of 10 26-10590 Opinion of the Court 7 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the validity and scope of an appeal-waiver provi- sion de novo. Rudolph v. United States, 92 F.4th 1038, 1043 (11th Cir. 2024). III. DISCUSSION On appeal, Payne argues that his 12-month-and-one day sen- tence is substantively unreasonable. He acknowledges that the dis- trict court correctly calculated his sentence and varied downward from the guideline range but maintains that his personal history and characteristics warranted a larger downward variance. The government moves to dismiss Payne’s appeal based on the sentence-appeal waiver in his plea agreement. It argues that Payne’s valid plea agreement contained a provision that explicitly conveyed that Payne was waiving his right to appeal, and his attor- ney advised him of the appeal waiver. Thus, the government as- serts that it was “manifestly clear that Payne understood he was waiving his right to appeal.” Additionally, the government main- tains that the magistrate judge questioned Payne about the appeal waiver during the change-of-plea hearing and determined that Payne’s plea was knowing and voluntary. Finally, it contends that Payne’s challenge to his below-guideline sentence does not fall within any of the appeal waiver’s exceptions and its enforcement would not result in a “miscarriage of justice” under Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). Sentence appeal waivers are enforceable if they are made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 8 of 10 8 Opinion of the Court 26-10590 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993). To enforce an appeal waiver, “[t]he gov- ernment must show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver during the [plea] colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the rec- ord that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” Id. at 1351; see also United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the touchstone for as- sessing” if a sentence appeal waiver was made knowingly and vol- untarily “is whether ‘it was clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances’” (al- terations adopted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352–53)). “We have consistently enforced knowing and volun- tary appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bas- comb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). In Hunter, the Supreme Court held that an otherwise valid appeal waiver “is unenforceable when it would result in a miscar- riage of justice.” Hunter, 608 U.S. at 727. However, that exception is limited. An appeal waiver “may be set aside only if the sentence is marred by the kind of egregious error that would bring the judi- cial system into disrepute.” Id. The error must also be “obvi- ous—not one a judge could reasonably make.” Id. Examples of cases in which the miscarriage-of-justice exception applies involve sentences that (1) exceed statutory maximums; (2) are “infected USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 9 of 10 26-10590 Opinion of the Court 9 with a blatant constitutional error;” and (3) are imposed without a basic civilized procedure. 4 Id. at 728. Here, Payne’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable be- cause he made it knowingly and voluntarily. Payne signed the plea agreement, certifying that he voluntarily agreed to all its terms—including the explicit waiver of his right to appeal his sen- tence or conviction. Moreover, at the change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge specifically questioned Payne about the appeal waiver and ensured he understood its significance by stating that Payne was “giving up [his] right to file any sort of appeal or collat- eral challenge to [his] conviction or [his] sentence,” with limited exceptions. Payne’s attorney also confirmed that she had advised him of the waiver’s exceptions. Additionally, Payne expressed to the magistrate judge that he understood the appeal waiver provi- sion, and we assume his statements are true. See United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994) (“There is a strong pre- sumption that the statements made during [a plea] colloquy are true.”). Thus, Payne knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350–51. Furthermore, Payne’s challenge to the substantive reasona- bleness of his sentence does not fall within any of the waiver’s ex- ceptions. Payne has not asserted ineffective-assistance-of-counsel or prosecutorial misconduct claims, and the government has not appealed. Additionally, he has not argued that the district court 4 The Supreme Court clarified that this list is not exhaustive. See Hunter, 608 U.S. at 728. USCA11 Case: 26-10590 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 11/03/2026 Page: 10 of 10 10 Opinion of the Court 26-10590 erred so obviously and egregiously that enforcing his appeal waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Hunter, 608 U.S. at 727. Instead, Payne concedes that the district court properly calculated his sentence and imposed a term of imprisonment below the guide- line range. Thus, he has not shown that his valid appeal waiver should not be enforced. Id. IV. CONCLUSION In sum, Payne knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence, his challenge on appeal falls within the scope of that waiver, and no exception applies. Accordingly, we apply the waiver by its terms. Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1294. DISMISSED.