United States v. Tre' Anthony Roberts
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-14102
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-14102
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRE’ ANTHONY ROBERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:25-cr-60042-RS-1
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tre’ Anthony Roberts appeals his 140-month sentence for
coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity
under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The government moves to dismiss this
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-14102
appeal as barred by the sentence appeal waiver in Roberts’s plea
agreement. After careful review, we grant the government’s
motion and dismiss this appeal as barred by the sentence appeal
waiver.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2025, a grand jury charged Roberts in a superseding
indictment with (1) attempted production of material involving
sexual exploitation of a minor from August 2023 through October
2023, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Count 1);
(2) coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity
on September 15, 2023, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)
(Count 2); and (3) a second § 2422(b) violation on October 22, 2023
(Count 3).
Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Roberts pled
guilty to Count 2 in exchange for the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3.
As part of his guilty plea, Roberts admitted that in 2023 he engaged
in “grooming behaviors” over text with his sixteen-year-old cousin
by inducing her into engaging in sexual activity with him and
requesting that she produce child pornography.
In particular, on or about September 15, 2023, Roberts
induced the victim into engaging in sexual activity with him via
text message when he was sleeping over at her home. At that time,
Roberts texted the victim if she would “rub one out for me,” and
asked her if she was “[c]oming down or we going in the kitchen.”
The victim responded, “[c]oming down,” and about twenty-eight
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25-14102 Opinion of the Court 3
minutes later, Roberts texted the victim, “[s]ee how tired your
hand/arm got that’s how we (men) be feeling.”
The plea agreement contained, among other things, a
sentence appeal waiver, which stated that Roberts agreed to
“waive[] all rights . . . to appeal any sentence imposed . . . or to
appeal the manner in which the sentence was imposed” “in
exchange for the undertakings made by the United States in this
plea agreement.” The waiver explained that Roberts could only
appeal his sentence if (1) “the sentence exceeds the maximum
permitted by statute,” (2) the sentence “is the result of an upward
departure and/or an upward variance from the advisory guideline
range that the Court establishes at sentencing,” or (3) the
government appeals the sentence. The plea agreement also stated
that Roberts’s sentence would ultimately be determined by the
district court, and any joint sentencing recommendation made by
the parties would not be binding on the court.
At a change-of-plea hearing, the district court engaged in a
full colloquy with Roberts, asking him many questions to
determine whether (1) he was competent to plead guilty and (2) he
understood the charges against him and the consequences of
pleading guilty. The district court also read the sentence appeal
waiver in the plea agreement to Roberts and confirmed that
Roberts understood and agreed to it. Roberts pled guilty to
Count 2, and the district court determined that Roberts’s plea and
his specific agreement to the appeal waiver were knowing and
voluntary.
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In a presentence investigation report, a probation officer
calculated that Roberts’s guidelines range was 135 to 168 months,
with a statutory range of 10 years to life. Roberts did not object to
the calculation of his guidelines range, either in writing or orally at
sentencing.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court
stated that it would hear from the government, Roberts’s counsel,
and Roberts himself if he wanted to make a statement. The
government recommended a below-guideline statutory-minimum
sentence of 120 months. The government stated that such a
sentence would be “sufficient enough” and would “not threaten a
dispar[ity]” according to the Judiciary Sentencing Information
online database. Roberts’s counsel also requested a 120-month
sentence.
With Roberts present, the district court then asked Roberts’s
counsel: “Does Mr. Roberts wish to make a statement?” Roberts’s
counsel responded, “No thank you, your Honor.” The district
court, however, did not address Roberts personally or say, “Mr.
Roberts, do you wish to make a statement?”
The district court ultimately sentenced Roberts to 140
months of imprisonment to be followed by 20 years of supervised
release. The district court stated that such a sentence was
warranted considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors because
(1) Roberts had been a correctional officer and (2) he victimized his
own cousin.
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Roberts did not object to the sentence. The district court
asked, “Now that the sentence has been pronounce[d], does the
defendant or his counsel object[] to the court’s findings of fact or
to the manner [in which] the sentence was pronounced?” Roberts’s
counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”
Roberts filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review ‘the validity of a sentence appeal waiver
de novo.’” United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
2008)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Arguments on Appeal
Roberts argues on appeal that (1) his sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to take
into account the risk of an unwarranted sentencing disparity with
similarly situated defendants, and (2) the district court plainly erred
by failing to ask him personally if he wanted to allocate at
sentencing. Moreover, Roberts contends that this appeal is not
barred by the sentence appeal waiver because (1) the waiver is
invalid since it contains the “illusory promise” that he could appeal
if his sentence was above the statutory maximum—which could
never happen because his statutory maximum for Count 2 was life
imprisonment—and (2) his waiver is unenforceable under the
“miscarriage of justice” exception that the Supreme Court
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described in Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). Roberts
does not contest that his merits arguments on appeal fall squarely
within the terms of the sentence appeal waiver.
The government argues that this appeal should be dismissed
as barred by the sentence appeal waiver because (1) Roberts
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, (2) Roberts’s
arguments on appeal fall within the terms of the waiver, (3) the
waiver is not premised on an illusory promise, and (4) none of
Roberts’s merits arguments on appeal satisfy the express
exceptions to the waiver or the “miscarriage of justice” exception
in Hunter. We agree with the government.
B. Analysis
First, the sentence appeal waiver is valid because Roberts
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it. United States v. Bascomb,
451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006) (“An appeal waiver is valid if a
defendant enters into it knowingly and voluntarily.”). At the
change-of-plea hearing, the district court (1) engaged in a
comprehensive colloquy with Roberts to ensure that he was
competent to plead guilty and understood the charges against him
and the plea agreement, and (2) specifically read the sentence
appeal waiver to Roberts and confirmed he understood it.
See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that, to enforce a sentence appeal waiver, “[t]he
government must show that either (1) the district court specifically
questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver
during the [plea] colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the
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record that the defendant otherwise understood the full
significance of the waiver”).
Second, the sentence appeal waiver is not premised on an
“illusory promise” that would render it unenforceable. See Pier 1
Cruise Experts v. Revelex Corp., 929 F.3d 1334, 1347 (11th Cir. 2019)
(explaining that, under Florida contract law, a contract is
unenforceable for lack of consideration if it is premised on an
illusory promise, i.e., a promise that “appears on its face to be so
insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all on the promisor”
(quoting Princeton Homes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th
Cir. 2010)); United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284
(11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]raditional contract principles generally apply
to plea agreements.”). For the plea agreement, the government
agreed to dismiss Counts 1 and 3 if, in exchange, Roberts pled guilty
to Count 2 and waived his right to appeal his sentence with three
exceptions. The dismissal of Count 1 saved Roberts from a 15-year
statutory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). That one of the three
exceptions to the sentence appeal waiver could never
occur—because Roberts could not possibly receive a sentence
above the statutory maximum of life imprisonment—does not
invalidate the general consideration underlying the waiver and the
plea agreement as a whole.
Lastly, Roberts’s claims of error on appeal do not satisfy the
“miscarriage of justice” exception to sentence appeal waivers that
the Supreme Court outlined in Hunter. See 608 U.S. at 717, 723-30
(holding “that an agreement not to appeal a sentence is
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unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of
justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of
egregious error that would bring the judicial system into
disrepute”). Roberts’s alleged substantive-reasonableness and
allocution errors are not the types of “egregious error[s] that would
bring the judicial system into disrepute.” Id. at 727. They are more
like “standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law” than the
“extreme cases” that the Supreme Court described as examples of
miscarriages of justice in Hunter. Id. at 727-28 (explaining that the
“miscarriage of justice” exception “sets a high bar” and should only
be applied “when the justice system’s basic integrity is at stake”).
We recognize that certain precedent indicates that a district
court plainly violates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(i)(4)(A)(ii) 1 when it “does not address the defendant personally
concerning the defendant’s desire to allocute but instead addresses
defendant’s counsel only.” See United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568,
583-86 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d
1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008)); 2 see also United States v. Machado, 886
1 Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) states: “Before imposing sentence, the court must . . .
address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or
present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). This means that the district court must ask
the question to the defendant personally (not his counsel). See United States v.
Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 583-86 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d
1070, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 2018).
2 In Perez, at sentencing the district court asked, “Will the defendant be
allocuting?” and immediately thereafter the defendant and his attorney
“conferred privately for an unspecified time period.” 661 F.3d at 584 (citation
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F.3d 1070, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 2018). 3 Perez and Machado involved
interpreters and are arguably distinguishable; however, they rely
largely on the more general principle that the court must address
the defendant personally under Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). See Perez, 661
F.3d at 583-86; Machado, 886 F.3d at 1086-87.
In any event, even if we were to assume arguendo that the
district court plainly violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii), such an error
under the facts here would not satisfy the “miscarriage of justice”
exception’s “hard-to-meet standard” under Hunter. See 608 U.S.
at 727-29. As the Supreme Court has elsewhere stated, in
considering whether this type of allocution error is “cognizable
under a writ of habeas corpus,” “The failure of a trial court to ask
a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to
say before sentence is imposed . . . is not a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor
an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
modified). The defendant’s counsel responded: “No, Your Honor. He doesn’t
wish to address the Court.” Id. All statements made by the court and counsel
were conveyed to the defendant through an interpreter. Id. This Court held
that the district court plainly violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) because it did not
personally ask the defendant if he wanted to allocute and “the record le[ft]
significant doubts as to the defendant’s knowledge of his right to allocute.” Id.
at 584-86.
3 In Machado, at sentencing the district court asked, “Does Mr. Machado wish
to make a statement at this time?” 886 F.3d at 1087. The defendant’s counsel
responded, “No, Your Honor,” and the court did not otherwise address the
defendant, who was communicating through an interpreter. Id. This Court
held that the district court plainly violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Id.
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procedure.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (emphasis
added).
Notably, at the sentencing hearing, with Roberts present,
(1) the district court said at the very beginning of the hearing that
it would hear from Roberts if he wanted to make a statement,
(2) the court asked Roberts’s counsel if Roberts wanted to make a
statement, (3) Roberts’s counsel said “[n]o” with Roberts by his
side, and (4) the court sentenced Roberts close to the bottom of his
guidelines range (a 140-month sentence with a guidelines range of
135 to 168 months). The district court’s alleged allocution error in
this case is not at all like (1) sentencing a defendant above the
statutory maximum, (2) sentencing a defendant based on an
unconstitutional factor like race, or (3) imposing a sentence
“without ‘some minimum of civilized procedure,’” each of which
the Supreme Court provided as non-exclusive examples of
miscarriages of justice in Hunter. Id. at 728 (quoting United States v.
Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192-93 (7th Cir. 2014)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this appeal is barred by Roberts’s
valid sentence appeal waiver. Accordingly, we GRANT the
government’s motion to dismiss and DISMISS this appeal based on
the sentence appeal waiver.