Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 1 of 10 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-14102 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TRE’ ANTHONY ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:25-cr-60042-RS-1 ____________________ Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Tre’ Anthony Roberts appeals his 140-month sentence for coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The government moves to dismiss this USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 2 of 10 2 Opinion of the Court 25-14102 appeal as barred by the sentence appeal waiver in Roberts’s plea agreement. After careful review, we grant the government’s motion and dismiss this appeal as barred by the sentence appeal waiver. I. BACKGROUND In July 2025, a grand jury charged Roberts in a superseding indictment with (1) attempted production of material involving sexual exploitation of a minor from August 2023 through October 2023, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Count 1); (2) coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity on September 15, 2023, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 2); and (3) a second § 2422(b) violation on October 22, 2023 (Count 3). Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Roberts pled guilty to Count 2 in exchange for the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3. As part of his guilty plea, Roberts admitted that in 2023 he engaged in “grooming behaviors” over text with his sixteen-year-old cousin by inducing her into engaging in sexual activity with him and requesting that she produce child pornography. In particular, on or about September 15, 2023, Roberts induced the victim into engaging in sexual activity with him via text message when he was sleeping over at her home. At that time, Roberts texted the victim if she would “rub one out for me,” and asked her if she was “[c]oming down or we going in the kitchen.” The victim responded, “[c]oming down,” and about twenty-eight USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 3 of 10 25-14102 Opinion of the Court 3 minutes later, Roberts texted the victim, “[s]ee how tired your hand/arm got that’s how we (men) be feeling.” The plea agreement contained, among other things, a sentence appeal waiver, which stated that Roberts agreed to “waive[] all rights . . . to appeal any sentence imposed . . . or to appeal the manner in which the sentence was imposed” “in exchange for the undertakings made by the United States in this plea agreement.” The waiver explained that Roberts could only appeal his sentence if (1) “the sentence exceeds the maximum permitted by statute,” (2) the sentence “is the result of an upward departure and/or an upward variance from the advisory guideline range that the Court establishes at sentencing,” or (3) the government appeals the sentence. The plea agreement also stated that Roberts’s sentence would ultimately be determined by the district court, and any joint sentencing recommendation made by the parties would not be binding on the court. At a change-of-plea hearing, the district court engaged in a full colloquy with Roberts, asking him many questions to determine whether (1) he was competent to plead guilty and (2) he understood the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty. The district court also read the sentence appeal waiver in the plea agreement to Roberts and confirmed that Roberts understood and agreed to it. Roberts pled guilty to Count 2, and the district court determined that Roberts’s plea and his specific agreement to the appeal waiver were knowing and voluntary. USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 4 of 10 4 Opinion of the Court 25-14102 In a presentence investigation report, a probation officer calculated that Roberts’s guidelines range was 135 to 168 months, with a statutory range of 10 years to life. Roberts did not object to the calculation of his guidelines range, either in writing or orally at sentencing. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it would hear from the government, Roberts’s counsel, and Roberts himself if he wanted to make a statement. The government recommended a below-guideline statutory-minimum sentence of 120 months. The government stated that such a sentence would be “sufficient enough” and would “not threaten a dispar[ity]” according to the Judiciary Sentencing Information online database. Roberts’s counsel also requested a 120-month sentence. With Roberts present, the district court then asked Roberts’s counsel: “Does Mr. Roberts wish to make a statement?” Roberts’s counsel responded, “No thank you, your Honor.” The district court, however, did not address Roberts personally or say, “Mr. Roberts, do you wish to make a statement?” The district court ultimately sentenced Roberts to 140 months of imprisonment to be followed by 20 years of supervised release. The district court stated that such a sentence was warranted considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors because (1) Roberts had been a correctional officer and (2) he victimized his own cousin. USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 5 of 10 25-14102 Opinion of the Court 5 Roberts did not object to the sentence. The district court asked, “Now that the sentence has been pronounce[d], does the defendant or his counsel object[] to the court’s findings of fact or to the manner [in which] the sentence was pronounced?” Roberts’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.” Roberts filed a timely notice of appeal. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review ‘the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.’” United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008)). III. DISCUSSION A. Arguments on Appeal Roberts argues on appeal that (1) his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to take into account the risk of an unwarranted sentencing disparity with similarly situated defendants, and (2) the district court plainly erred by failing to ask him personally if he wanted to allocate at sentencing. Moreover, Roberts contends that this appeal is not barred by the sentence appeal waiver because (1) the waiver is invalid since it contains the “illusory promise” that he could appeal if his sentence was above the statutory maximum—which could never happen because his statutory maximum for Count 2 was life imprisonment—and (2) his waiver is unenforceable under the “miscarriage of justice” exception that the Supreme Court USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 6 of 10 6 Opinion of the Court 25-14102 described in Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). Roberts does not contest that his merits arguments on appeal fall squarely within the terms of the sentence appeal waiver. The government argues that this appeal should be dismissed as barred by the sentence appeal waiver because (1) Roberts knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, (2) Roberts’s arguments on appeal fall within the terms of the waiver, (3) the waiver is not premised on an illusory promise, and (4) none of Roberts’s merits arguments on appeal satisfy the express exceptions to the waiver or the “miscarriage of justice” exception in Hunter. We agree with the government. B. Analysis First, the sentence appeal waiver is valid because Roberts knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it. United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006) (“An appeal waiver is valid if a defendant enters into it knowingly and voluntarily.”). At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court (1) engaged in a comprehensive colloquy with Roberts to ensure that he was competent to plead guilty and understood the charges against him and the plea agreement, and (2) specifically read the sentence appeal waiver to Roberts and confirmed he understood it. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that, to enforce a sentence appeal waiver, “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver during the [plea] colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 7 of 10 25-14102 Opinion of the Court 7 record that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver”). Second, the sentence appeal waiver is not premised on an “illusory promise” that would render it unenforceable. See Pier 1 Cruise Experts v. Revelex Corp., 929 F.3d 1334, 1347 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that, under Florida contract law, a contract is unenforceable for lack of consideration if it is premised on an illusory promise, i.e., a promise that “appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all on the promisor” (quoting Princeton Homes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2010)); United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]raditional contract principles generally apply to plea agreements.”). For the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss Counts 1 and 3 if, in exchange, Roberts pled guilty to Count 2 and waived his right to appeal his sentence with three exceptions. The dismissal of Count 1 saved Roberts from a 15-year statutory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). That one of the three exceptions to the sentence appeal waiver could never occur—because Roberts could not possibly receive a sentence above the statutory maximum of life imprisonment—does not invalidate the general consideration underlying the waiver and the plea agreement as a whole. Lastly, Roberts’s claims of error on appeal do not satisfy the “miscarriage of justice” exception to sentence appeal waivers that the Supreme Court outlined in Hunter. See 608 U.S. at 717, 723-30 (holding “that an agreement not to appeal a sentence is USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 8 of 10 8 Opinion of the Court 25-14102 unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute”). Roberts’s alleged substantive-reasonableness and allocution errors are not the types of “egregious error[s] that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” Id. at 727. They are more like “standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law” than the “extreme cases” that the Supreme Court described as examples of miscarriages of justice in Hunter. Id. at 727-28 (explaining that the “miscarriage of justice” exception “sets a high bar” and should only be applied “when the justice system’s basic integrity is at stake”). We recognize that certain precedent indicates that a district court plainly violates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) 1 when it “does not address the defendant personally concerning the defendant’s desire to allocute but instead addresses defendant’s counsel only.” See United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 583-86 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008)); 2 see also United States v. Machado, 886 1 Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) states: “Before imposing sentence, the court must . . . address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). This means that the district court must ask the question to the defendant personally (not his counsel). See United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 583-86 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 2018). 2 In Perez, at sentencing the district court asked, “Will the defendant be allocuting?” and immediately thereafter the defendant and his attorney “conferred privately for an unspecified time period.” 661 F.3d at 584 (citation USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 9 of 10 25-14102 Opinion of the Court 9 F.3d 1070, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 2018). 3 Perez and Machado involved interpreters and are arguably distinguishable; however, they rely largely on the more general principle that the court must address the defendant personally under Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). See Perez, 661 F.3d at 583-86; Machado, 886 F.3d at 1086-87. In any event, even if we were to assume arguendo that the district court plainly violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii), such an error under the facts here would not satisfy the “miscarriage of justice” exception’s “hard-to-meet standard” under Hunter. See 608 U.S. at 727-29. As the Supreme Court has elsewhere stated, in considering whether this type of allocution error is “cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus,” “The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed . . . is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair modified). The defendant’s counsel responded: “No, Your Honor. He doesn’t wish to address the Court.” Id. All statements made by the court and counsel were conveyed to the defendant through an interpreter. Id. This Court held that the district court plainly violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) because it did not personally ask the defendant if he wanted to allocute and “the record le[ft] significant doubts as to the defendant’s knowledge of his right to allocute.” Id. at 584-86. 3 In Machado, at sentencing the district court asked, “Does Mr. Machado wish to make a statement at this time?” 886 F.3d at 1087. The defendant’s counsel responded, “No, Your Honor,” and the court did not otherwise address the defendant, who was communicating through an interpreter. Id. This Court held that the district court plainly violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Id. USCA11 Case: 25-14102 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 Page: 10 of 10 10 Opinion of the Court 25-14102 procedure.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (emphasis added). Notably, at the sentencing hearing, with Roberts present, (1) the district court said at the very beginning of the hearing that it would hear from Roberts if he wanted to make a statement, (2) the court asked Roberts’s counsel if Roberts wanted to make a statement, (3) Roberts’s counsel said “[n]o” with Roberts by his side, and (4) the court sentenced Roberts close to the bottom of his guidelines range (a 140-month sentence with a guidelines range of 135 to 168 months). The district court’s alleged allocution error in this case is not at all like (1) sentencing a defendant above the statutory maximum, (2) sentencing a defendant based on an unconstitutional factor like race, or (3) imposing a sentence “without ‘some minimum of civilized procedure,’” each of which the Supreme Court provided as non-exclusive examples of miscarriages of justice in Hunter. Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192-93 (7th Cir. 2014)). IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, this appeal is barred by Roberts’s valid sentence appeal waiver. Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss and DISMISS this appeal based on the sentence appeal waiver.