Full Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 5, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 26-1099 (D.C. No. 1:25-CR-00291-NYW-1) JACOB DANIEL LICKERS, (D. Colo.) Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Jacob Daniel Lickers appeals a six-month prison sentence and reimposed life term of supervised release following the revocation of his supervised release. Lickers’s attorney moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that Lickers’s appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. After examining the Anders brief filed by Lickers’s attorney and the * appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 2 BACKGROUND In 2018, in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Lickers pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) and one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Lickers was sentenced to concurrent terms of 132 months in prison. He was also sentenced to a life term of supervised release to follow his time in custody. Lickers’s supervised release began in January 2025. In October 2025, jurisdiction over the supervised release was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado so Lickers could live with his mother. Soon after, United States Probation petitioned for an arrest warrant. 1 The petition’s single allegation was that Lickers had been unsuccessfully discharged from his counseling program for violating the terms of his supervised release. Lickers was taken into custody. United States Probation advised Lickers that if the petition’s allegation were proved, he would face a maximum prison sentence of two years. The United States Sentencing Guidelines provided an advisory range of four to ten months in prison. Lickers requested a sentence of credit for time served and reinstated supervision. The government requested that the court revoke 1 The petition is included as an attachment to the Anders brief but is not included in the record on appeal. But because the petition was filed in the district court, we take judicial notice of it. Su v. Ascent Constr., Inc., 104 F.4th 1240, 1243 n.1 (10th Cir. 2024). 2 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 3 Lickers’s supervised release, sentence him to six months in prison, and reimpose lifetime supervised release. Lickers was represented by counsel at the revocation hearing. The district court confirmed Lickers’s competency and that he had reviewed the petition with his attorney. The court advised Lickers of the rights he would waive if he admitted the petition’s allegation. And the court warned Lickers of the consequences of an admission: the Guidelines’ advisory range of four to ten months or a higher sentence as permitted by law. Lickers waived his rights, including his right to a full hearing on the petition. He admitted that he had been unsuccessfully discharged from the counseling program, and his attorney stipulated that a factual basis existed for that admission. The court accepted the admission. Before imposing a sentence, it heard Lickers’s attorney’s arguments about his educational and employment efforts, his engagement with treatment, and his family and community support. After hearing the government’s position, the court listened to Lickers’s allocution. The court then imposed a six-month sentence followed by lifetime supervised release. In reaching that determination, the court explained that it had considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(e) factors, relevant Guidelines policy statements, and other pertinent materials like the original presentence investigation report. And it acknowledged Lickers’s efforts to improve his circumstances, including through education and 3 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 4 treatment. Finally, the court explained the mandatory and special conditions of Lickers’s supervised release. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Anders, an attorney may ask to withdraw if a “conscientious examination” of an appeal shows that it is “wholly frivolous.” 386 U.S. at 744. To invoke Anders, the attorney must submit “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Id.; accord United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930 (10th Cir. 2005). The defendant may respond to the Anders brief. Calderon, 428 F.3d at 930. We must then fully examine the record to decide whether nonfrivolous issues remain. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An issue is frivolous if it is not “arguable on [its] merits.” Id. DISCUSSION I. Anders Brief and the Issues Identified In his docketing statement, Lickers challenges the “facts and allegations” underlying the violation of his supervised release. Docketing Statement at 5. The Anders brief identifies that challenge as the second of four issues. The other three issues are (1) whether the revocation hearing complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and whether Lickers’s admission was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; (2) whether the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable; and (3) whether the reimposed term of lifetime supervised release and its conditions were warranted. Neither Lickers nor the government responded to the Anders brief. So besides reviewing the entire 4 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 5 record, we will consider the four issues in the order in which Lickers’s attorney identifies them. 2 Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. II. Revocation Hearing and Lickers’s Admission The Anders brief first discusses Rule 32.1 and Lickers’s admission. Under Rule 32.1, a defendant is entitled to several protections in a hearing on the revocation of supervised release. These protections include written notice of the alleged violation; disclosure of the evidence against the defendant; an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence; and an opportunity to make a statement and present mitigating information. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E). “[T]he defendant has the implicit right to admit his guilt or to contest the alleged violation of the terms of his supervised release.” United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008). The Anders brief also identifies the potential issues of an attack on the 2 original judgment and sentence and an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim “[t]o the extent” Lickers may wish to contest those matters. Anders Br. at 17. Lickers’s docketing statement raises neither issue. Even if Lickers had raised them, both would be foreclosed. Lickers may not collaterally attack the original judgment or sentence, including the original imposition of supervised release, in an appeal challenging the revocation of his supervised release. United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1186 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006); see Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The exclusive remedy for testing the validity of a judgment and sentence, unless it is inadequate or ineffective, is that provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” (citation omitted)). Nor may Lickers raise an ineffectiveness claim here as to his attorney’s assistance during the revocation hearing. He can try making that challenge separately under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240–42 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 5 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 6 The record shows that Lickers’s revocation hearing complied with Rule 32.1(b). He learned of the evidence alleged in the petition and reviewed the petition. He appeared at the hearing with his attorney. He presented evidence of his rehabilitation efforts and community support. And he made a statement via his allocution. The district court found that Lickers was competent and that he admitted the allegation knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Lickers provides no reason for us to think otherwise. So any challenge to the nature of the revocation hearing would be frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. III. Challenging the Admitted Facts and Allegation The second issue identified in the Anders brief—and Lickers’s single challenge on appeal—concerns the “facts and allegations” underlying the revocation of his supervised release and sentence. Docketing Statement at 5. We review Lickers’s challenge for plain error because he admitted the violation of his supervised release and did not object to the revocation in the district court. United States v. Romero, 632 F. App’x 523, 524 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Fay, 547 F.3d at 1234). We discern no error. The petition alleged that Lickers’s violations included possessing a nude adult picture and sexually exploitative material, engaging in “high-risk sexual behavior,” and failing to be transparent with his treatment provider. Pet. for Warrant on Person Under Supervision at 1. Lickers admitted he had been unsuccessfully discharged from the counseling program 6 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 7 as a result of these violations, and his attorney stipulated to a factual basis. Lickers filed no objection to the factual basis detailed in the supervised-release violation report and summarized in the petition. In short, the record provides no lead for finding error. Lickers’s challenge to the facts and allegation underlying the revocation of his supervised release and his sentence is thus frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. IV. Revocation of Supervised Release and Reasonableness of the Sentence The third issue identified in the Anders brief is whether the six-month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. We usually review the issue of procedural reasonableness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2018). But where, as here, the defendant did not challenge the procedural reasonableness of the sentence in the district court, we look only for plain error. Id. In imposing a sentence following the revocation of supervised release, the district court must consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and applicable policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines. United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006). The court need not consider each § 3553(a) factor individually. Id. at 1189. Nor need it “recite any magic words” to show it considered the § 3553(a) factors and relevant Guidelines materials. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d at 1262 (citation omitted). But the court must state its reasons for the imposed sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). 7 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 8 We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under the abuse-of- discretion standard. Ortiz-Lazaro, 884 F.3d at 1265. An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court’s judgment is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 809 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “A sentence within the correctly calculated Guidelines range is presumed to be reasonable . . . .” United States v. Verdin- Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 898 (10th Cir. 2008). The defendant must rebut that presumption. Id. Beginning with procedural reasonableness, we see no error in the six- month sentence. Because both crimes Lickers was convicted of are Class C felonies, the district court could impose up to two years in prison for violating the terms of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). And the Guidelines advisory range was correctly calculated: four to ten months based on Lickers’s criminal-history category of II and a Grade C violation involving his supervised release. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025). At the revocation hearing, the district court said that it had considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and applied the pertinent § 3553(a) factors. And it more than adequately explained its reasons for Lickers’s six-month sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). As for substantive reasonableness, Lickers’s six-month sentence is presumptively reasonable because it falls within the advisory range. Verdin- Garcia, 516 F.3d at 898. Based on our review of the record, Lickers cannot 8 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 9 identify any issue to overcome that presumption, let alone show that the district court abused its discretion. So any challenge to the reasonableness of his six- month sentence would be frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. V. Lifetime Term of Supervised Release and Conditions The final issue identified in the Anders brief is Lickers’s reimposed lifetime term of supervised release and the accompanying conditions. Lickers’s convictions permit a minimum term of five years’ supervised release, up to life. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). We have said before that a lifetime term of supervised release is substantively reasonable for a defendant convicted of sex crimes like Lickers’s. See United States v. Young, 502 F. App’x 726, 729 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that lifetime supervised release for possession of child pornography was substantively reasonable and collecting cases from other circuits reaching the same conclusion); cf. United States v. Miller, 769 F. App’x 662, 663–64 (10th Cir. 2019) (reaching same conclusion about a defendant convicted of interstate distribution of child pornography). Finally, we consider the special conditions of supervised release and whether they present a nonfrivolous issue. The district court must state its reasons on the record for imposing special conditions. United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977, 982 (10th Cir. 2008). Special conditions may be imposed if they are reasonably related to the factors contained in § 3553(a), do not deprive the defendant of his liberty more than is reasonably necessary, and are consistent with certain Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 9 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 10 The district court first imposed conditions required under § 3583(d). The court then added special conditions. They include that Lickers (1) participate in substance-abuse testing and mental-health treatment; (2) not be around children under the age of eighteen except under the supervision of an adult approved by the probation officer; (3) have limited access to the internet; and (4) let the probation officer install software and hardware on Lickers’s internet devices to monitor his online activity. The court cited aspects of Lickers’s history and the nature of his offenses, concluding that the special conditions were reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors. And it found, under § 3583(d), that the conditions would not infringe Lickers’s liberty more than was necessary. Lickers did not object to the conditions during the revocation hearing. Based on our review of the record, we cannot quarrel with the district court’s conditions. See Hahn, 551 F.3d at 983. Any challenge to the life term of supervised release and its conditions would thus be frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 10 Appellate Case: 26-1099 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 11/05/2026 Page: 11 CONCLUSION After carefully reviewing the record and Lickers’s attorney’s Anders brief, we conclude that Lickers fails to present a nonfrivolous issue on appeal. We grant his attorney’s motion to withdraw and dismiss this appeal. Entered for the Court Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge 11