Full Opinion

Case: 26-40145 Document: 38-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/18/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED No. 26-40145 November 18, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk Stephen A. Buesing, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Sergeant Unknown Layton; Captain Unknown Knox; Doctor Unknown Perkins; Jane or John Does, Transport Officers; Doctor Unknown Comeaux; Warden Unknown Ragsdale; Unknown Henslee, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:25-CV-277 ______________________________ Before Stewart, Richman, and Haynes, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: *1 Stephen A. Buesing seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Buesing’s motion constitutes a * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 1 JUDGE HAYNES “simply confirms in dismissal.” Case: 26-40145 Document: 38-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/18/2026 No. 26-40145 challenge to the district court’s certification that his appeal was not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). The inquiry into an IFP movant’s good faith is “limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).’” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). In a short brief, Buesing broadly argues that his complaint alleged he had broken his arm while in the custody of the defendants, who provided cursory treatment and allowed his arm to stay broken and hanging by the skin for months, which amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Additionally, he contends that severe pain that is inadequately treated or untreated can constitute a serious medical need. To the extent these arguments are liberally construed to renew his claims regarding delays in being transported to the hospital on December 30, 2024, there was no indication in Buesing’s allegations that the relevant defendants were subjectively aware of any substantial risk of further injury that would result from the few hours delay in admission to the emergency room for a broken arm. See Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002). To the extent his arguments are liberally construed to renew claims regarding his subsequent treatment until his surgery on February 7, 2025, his amended complaint indicates that he received continued treatment for the injury, and any disagreements with this treatment amount, at most, to negligence, which does not impose liability under § 1983. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). As Buesing does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his state law claims without prejudice, he has abandoned it. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). In light of the foregoing, Buesing has not raised a nonfrivolous issue; thus, his IFP motion is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as 2 Case: 26-40145 Document: 38-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/18/2026 No. 26-40145 frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; Howard, 707 F.2d at 220; 5th Cir. R. 42.2. The district court’s dismissal of Buesing’s complaint and our dismissal of this appeal each count as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 535-39 (2015). Buesing now has two strikes for purposes of § 1915(g). Buesing is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 3