Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-11148 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 1 of 3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-11148 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JABIN BETHEA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cr-00007-TRJ-CCB-1 ____________________ Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jabin Bethea appeals the 20-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of depriving an individual of consti- tutional rights while acting under color of state law, in violation of USCA11 Case: 26-11148 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 2 of 3 2 Opinion of the Court 26-11148 18 U.S.C. § 242. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred at sentencing when it applied a Sentencing Guidelines enhance- ment for obstruction of justice. He also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The government has moved to dismiss the appeal because Bethea’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver. The plea agreement said that Bethea “voluntarily and expressly waive[d] the right to appeal his conviction and sentence . . . on any ground.” Doc. 36-1 at 10–11. 1 The plea agreement provided exceptions to the waiver if: the district court imposed an “upward variance above the sentencing guideline range as calculated by the District Court,” Bethea claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, or the government appealed the sentence. Id. at 11. We enforce appeal waivers that a defendant made know- ingly and voluntarily, unless doing so “would result in a miscar- riage of justice.” Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713, 727 (2026); see United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating the knowing and voluntary requirement). A waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice when the sentence “is marred by the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” Hunter, 608 U.S. at 727. Here, after careful consideration, we conclude that the ap- peal waiver bars Bethea’s appeal of his sentence. The record, viewed as a whole, shows that he knowingly and voluntarily 1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries. USCA11 Case: 26-11148 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 3 of 3 26-11148 Opinion of the Court 3 waived his right to appeal his sentence. During the change-of-plea hearing, the district court specifically questioned Bethea about the waiver of his direct appeal rights, noting the exceptions that would allow him to appeal. The district court then confirmed that Bethea understood the appeal waiver. Furthermore, we see no indication that any of the excep- tions to the appeal waiver set forth in the plea agreement apply here. And nothing in the record before us indicates that enforcing the appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice. See id. Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss this ap- peal pursuant to the appeal waiver in the plea agreement is GRANTED.