People v. Valenzuela CA1/1

Filed 10/28/26 P. v. Valenzuela CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A169644 v. ALFREDO VALENZUELA, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC053493B) Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Alfredo Valenzuela appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing. Valenzuela maintains (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting a coparticipant’s statement to the police and (2) insufficient evidence supports the court’s alternative findings that he aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill and that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life during a robbery or burglary. We affirm. All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 1 specified. 1  BACKGROUND Summary of Offense In ruling on the resentencing petition, the court summarized the facts as follows: “Petitioner Alfredo Valenzuela worked with Chico Hernandez, a narcotics trafficking [sic], and was related to Hernandez by marriage.[2] Hernandez had a dispute with one of his narcotics associates, Javier Vaca, and it escalated to Chico making threats against Vaca, specifically that he would bring people to finish Vaca. “[Valenzuela] traveled to the Bay Area to Vaca’s apartment in San Bruno with Hernandez and Raul Campos, who also worked with Hernandez and was [Valenzuela’s] friend and neighbor. They also traveled with Lazaro Perez who worked for and was close to Hernandez. [Valenzuela] described Lazaro as willing to do anything Hernandez asked of him. “Prior to making the trip, [Valenzuela] obtained two cell phones in someone else’s name. He kept one phone and gave the other to Campos. “The group took two cars to the Bay Area, a blue van that was registered in [Valenzuela’s] name, and a white Cadillac that belonged to Campos. “While driving to the Bay Area, the two phones were regularly in communication with one another and phones associated with the group also made calls to the apartment Vaca used in San Bruno. “Evidence established that the trip was to be a quick one and that the group planned to go up and back in the same day. 2 The evidence established that Valenzuela drove Chico Hernandez on two or three trips to the Bay Area and one to Chicago to deliver drugs or pick up money because Chico did not have a driver’s license. Raul Campos went on some of these trips. 2  “Once the group reached the Bay Area, the vehicle stopped at a Kmart parking lot. It was arranged that all of them would travel in the Cadillac to Vaca’s place. According to [Valenzuela], Hernandez did not want to take the van because Vaca knew the van and did not want to pay Hernandez, so Hernandez wanted to go charge them on surprise. Hernandez specifically stated to [Valenzuela], ‘Well, let’s go, you know, well, we’ll go, you know. He won’t know that it’s us. I’ll go charge him and he’ll pay me because he won’t have another choice not to pay me.’ “The group drove in the Cadillac to Vaca’s apartment in San Bruno and parked.[3] Hernandez said to [Valenzuela], ‘Come on, Fredo, let’s go,’ and [Valenzuela], Hernandez, Perez and Campos went up to the apartment where Vaca and the other victims were. They all entered the apartment and an argument took place. According to Campos, [Valenzuela] was inside the apartment and was looking for something at Hernandez’ direction. Eventually three of the victims, including Vaca, were zip tied and restrained at Hernandez’ direction. Hernandez then said to shoot them. After being directed to do so, [Valenzuela] turned up the stereo in the apartment and all the victims were shot. Evidence established that at least four guns were fired. In his statement to police, Campos admitted shooting one of the victims and also stated that Hernandez shot someone and that [Valenzuela] and another guy also shot one of the victims. “After shots were fired, the music was turned down and the group left the apartment. In his statement Campos said that [Valenzuela] was one of the last guys to leave the apartment. Additional evidence established that the entire incident took place between 4:30 to 4:45 p.m. and that Hernandez 3At trial, a DEA agent stated the apartment appeared to be a drug repackaging facility. 3 had a physical issue with one of his arms that prevented him from using more than one gun. Further evidence showed that the apartment where the events took place was rather small with the various rooms close together. “Following the incident at the apartment the group returned to the Kmart parking lot and separated, driving the van and the Cadillac back down to southern California. “The phones [Valenzuela] obtained were used during this time. Campos advised police he eventually threw his cell phone away, along with its chip, after [Valenzuela] told him to throw that chip away for me. “[Valenzuela], in his statement to police, initially denied being at the scene. He then said he was there, but in a hallway, not the apartment. In the same statement, he denied shooting anyone and said he did not have a gun. However, he told his cousin that the guy did not want to pay, and so Hernandez said to kill them, and Campos shot the victims. “[Valenzuela] described how the victims were shot and what they looked like after it happened. He told his girlfriend that he turned up the music in the apartment, and then shots were fired. “[Valenzuela] told police that he knew about a secret compartment in the van. When questioned by police about guns being taken out, he said, ‘That’s when, when I think they, like, they’re over there at Kmart when they are taking it out.’ “When asked by police what happened with the guns when they got back to the car, [Valenzuela] said, ‘They stashed them. Put them back inside the pockets, I guess.’ “The zip ties on the victims were from the same manufacturer and matched zip ties found in the trunk of the Cadillac. An additional zip tie was found in the apartment next to the cabinet where the stereo was located. 4  “[Valenzuela’s] and Campos’[s] statements [to the police] indicate that they were aware [of] the dangers of the drug trade, and according to Campos, even discussed the fact that Hernandez was likely to get them into bad things.” Jury Findings and Sentencing In 2004, a jury found Valenzuela guilty of four counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),4 one count of attempted robbery of an inhabited dwelling (§§ 664, 212.5, subd. (a), count 5), and one count of first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a), count 6). It further found true the special circumstances that the murders were committed during an attempted robbery or burglary and that multiple murders were committed. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3) & (17).) As to each of the counts, the jury further found true allegations that a principal had been armed with a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of the crimes. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Valenzuela was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole on each of the murder convictions. An additional two-year term was imposed on the attempted robbery conviction and a four-year term on the burglary conviction, both stayed pursuant to section 654. This Court affirmed the convictions in a 2007 unpublished opinion. (People v. Valenzuela (July 20, 2007, No. A111315) [nonpub. opn.].) Resentencing Petition In March 2022, Valenzuela filed a petition for resentencing, alleging he had been convicted of first degree felony murder and could not now be so convicted due to 2019 changes to the Penal Code. The prosecutor conceded 4 The victims included Javiar Vaca (count 1), Jose Munoz-Lopez (count 2), Emilio Flores (count 3), and Roberto Guerra (count 4). 5 Valenzuela had established a prima facie case but opposed granting the petition. Evidentiary Hearing An evidentiary hearing was held over several days. At the prosecution’s request, all the evidence that had been presented at trial, along with the trial transcript, was admitted without objection. In addition, Campos was called to the stand and exercised his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination (Campos’s own petition for resentencing was pending). After the court found Campos “unavailable,” Valenzuela’s attorney sought admission of several portions of Campos’s interview with the police as statements against interest pursuant to Evidence Code section 1230. The court admitted the statements on that basis. The prosecutor then sought to admit the remainder of Campos’s police interview, both as statements against interest and under the rule of completeness set forth in Evidence Code section 356. Defense counsel initially stated he had no objection but wanted some time to think about it. After being given time, counsel reiterated: “I have no objection to having it all come in. I don’t know that I agree that . . . the whole thing’s a statement against interest, but I don’t have any objection to the whole thing coming in.” The court admitted the full interview. However, it went on to explain: “[O]ne of the things the Court would be judging is credibility. So the Court would still be evaluating statements for credibility, but I think in terms of the necessary requirements to be met for reliability, I think it was sufficient to admit the statements for purposes of this, which is in fact a resentencing proceeding and not a trial.” After further argument, the court denied the resentencing petition, making a detailed ruling and finding the evidence established beyond a 6 reasonable doubt that Valenzuela, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted Hernandez and the other participants in the killings of the four victims and that he was also a major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Evidentiary Error Valenzuela maintains the trial court improperly admitted Campos’s entire police interview. Specifically, he asserts Campos’s statements were not reliable and should not have been admitted as statements against interest. Forfeiture Valenzuela failed, however, to object to admission of the full interview, let alone identify a specific evidentiary ground for making an objection. He therefore forfeited his claims of error. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880 [Generally, “a criminal defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal.”]; accord, People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 713–714 [in § 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, petitioner’s failure to object to court’s consideration of allegedly inadmissible evidence forfeited the claim].) There is no merit to Valenzuela’s contention that forfeiture does not apply because he has advanced a substantial evidence challenge to the court’s findings, a challenge based, at least in part, on the asserted unreliability of Campos’s statements to the police. While a substantial evidence challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal, a challenge to the admission of evidence may not. Indeed, Valenzuela cites no authority supporting his assertion that he can avoid forfeiture by advancing a substantial evidence challenge on appeal. To the contrary, in reviewing Valenzuela’s substantial 7 evidence challenge, we consider all the evidence properly before the trial court, including arguably inadmissible evidence as to which there was no objection. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 476 [“ ‘ “[I]t is settled law that incompetent testimony, such as hearsay or conclusion, if received without objection takes on the attributes of competent proof when considered upon the question of sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding.” ’ ”].) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Apparently anticipating forfeiture, Valenzuela makes a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On direct appeal, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will be sustained “only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [their] act or omission.” (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 (Fosselman).) “Whether to object to inadmissible evidence is a tactical decision; because trial counsel’s tactical decisions are accorded substantial deference [citations], failure to object seldom establishes counsel’s incompetence.” (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 621.) While Valenzuela broadly contends no competent attorney would have failed to object to a coparticipant’s hearsay statements to law enforcement incriminating their client, this conclusory assertion ignores the relative significance of exculpatory statements Campos made during the interview. Campos’s statements regarding Valenzuela’s possession of a gun were equivocal at best—Campos did not see the gun, and he claimed it was either Valenzuela or some other participant who shot one of the victims. In contrast, Campos was adamant when asked whether he or Valenzuela had any idea what they were getting into, exclaiming “Fuck no.” And Campos’s statements that Chico told Valenzuela to go look for “his shit” and that 8 Valenzuela was looking around for something suggested Valenzuela was not directly at the scene of the murders. In short, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that, on balance, the entirety of Campos’s interview was more helpful to Valenzuela than harmful. Valenzuela therefore has not carried his burden to affirmatively show that defense counsel acted with “no rational tactical purpose.” (Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 581.) Major Participant/Reckless Indifference Findings Additional Court Findings In denying resentencing, the trial court made the following specific findings in addition to the more general findings set forth above: “In the present case, the evidence established that Hernandez had the intent to kill Vaca and the other victims. He made several statements to support this that are in evidence and additional evidence establishes that he shot at least one of the guns and one of the victims. “Three of the victims were restrained with zip ties when Hernandez said to shoot them. Not long after this command, four guns were discharged in the apartment and all of the victims died as a result of gunshot wounds. “[Valenzuela], Hernandez’ family member and trusted employee[,] was present in the apartment when all of these events took place and was looking for things at the direction of Hernandez. He also turned up the music on the stereo prior to the shootings taking place. [Valenzuela] was clearly aware of Hernandez’ intent to kill. Circumstantial evidence, especially the fact that four guns were discharged as well as some of the information in [Valenzuela]’s and Campos’[s] statements support the conclusion that [Valenzuela] shared this intent, possessed a firearm and aided Hernandez and the other shooters in the killings. 9  “It would appear that this plan could not have been carried out in such a quick and complete manner, unless all of the participants were aware and participating in it. In a matter of minutes after [Valenzuela] and the others entered the apartment three victims were restrained and all four were shot dead. Music was turned up prior to the shooting to presumably drown out the sound of the gunfire, and then turned back down when the shooting was complete. “[Valenzuela] was one of the last to leave the apartment and was doing things at Hernandez’ direction while inside the apartment. He also knew that Hernandez’ plan was to charge Vaca and the others and to surprise them so Hernandez could do what he wanted. “One of the vehicles used was registered in [Valenzuela]’s name and he obtained cell phones that were used for communication by the perpetrators. “In addition, [Valenzuela]’s neighbor and close friend [(Campos)] owned the other vehicle involved in this incident where the zip ties were found. Moreover, [Valenzuela]’s statement described a blue van as having a secret compartment, and as stated earlier, he had expressed his thoughts that the guns might have been removed from there and then stashed after the shooting. “He also advised Campos to get rid of the chip for the cell phones he provided. This evidence, along with other evidence presented at the trial and the evidentiary hearing in this matter establishes beyond a reasonable doubt under Penal Code section 189(b)(2) [sic] that [Valenzuela], with the intent to kill, aided and abetted Hernandez and the other participants in the killings of the four victims. “The evidence previously discussed also establishes that [Valenzuela] was a major participant in the underlying felony. He was aware of 10 Hernandez’ intent to enter the apartment by surprise and take the money he believed was owed by whatever means necessary. “[Valenzuela] drove with the other perpetrators from southern California for the day and provided cell phones in someone else’s name that were used for communications while traveling as well as allowing one of the involved vehicles to be registered in his name. He entered and remained in the apartment, looking for things at Hernandez’ direction. Turned up the music to prevent detection, and based on circumstantial evidence was . . . in possession of a weapon. “The Court did not find [Valenzuela]’s statements that he did not know anyone had weapons, or that he did not possess a weapon to be credible. “The evidence further established that [Valenzuela] acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Valenzuela] willingly accompanied Hernandez to collect a drug debt using the element of surprise. “As discussed, the circumstantial evidence of Hernandez’ physical limitations and at least four guns were discharged supports the conclusion that [Valenzuela] knew weapons were going to be used during the offense and possessed one as well. “This conclusion is also supported by [Valenzuela]’s thoughts that were shared with police about the secret compartment in the van and that weapons may have been stashed there . . . after the shooting. “[Valenzuela] heard Hernandez say to shoot the victims after directing that they be tied up. [Valenzuela] was present during the entire incident and was one of the last perpetrators to leave the apartment. Although everything happened quickly, he never made any effort to leave the scene or minimize the risk of violence or danger to the victims. In fact, he remained well inside the apartment and turned the music up prior to the victims being shot. 11  “[Valenzuela]’s statement to police that if he made a statement to police that if he opens his mouth these son of a bitches are going to come for me. This, along with other evidence, including parts of his and Campos’[s] statements, showed that he was aware of how dangerous Hernandez and Lazaro were and that it was clear that the events in the apartment were going to be violent and would subsequently result in death. “Therefore, the evidence supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that under Penal Code section 189(e)(3) [Valenzuela] was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. “Based on those findings of the Court, including all of the evidence presented to me in this matter, the petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 for resentencing is denied.” Legal Framework and Standard of Review Generally, to be convicted of murder, a person must unlawfully kill another with malice, which can be either express or implied. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 188, subd. (a); In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 600.) “Malice is express when a defendant intends to kill and implied when a defendant consciously disregards danger to human life.” (In re Ferrell, at p. 600.) At the time Valenzuela was convicted of murder, however, a defendant’s malice could be imputed under the felony-murder rule if the victim was killed during the commission of a designated felony. (See People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [“[t]he felony-murder rule generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder”].) Effective 2019, “the Legislature amended the law of homicide, eliminating several theories of liability based on imputed malice.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 556; see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The amendments limited the scope of the felony-murder rule and the natural and 12 probable consequences doctrine “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) As a result, malice “may no longer be imputed to a defendant solely because the defendant participated in another crime.” (Patton, at p. 558; § 188.) A defendant seeking relief from a murder conviction under a theory disallowed by these amendments may petition the trial court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Under the statute, defendants can petition for relief in the court where they were sentenced if: (1) the complaint or information filed against them allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or related theories; (2) they were convicted of murder following a trial; and (3) they could not presently be convicted of murder “because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) The amendments to section 189 provide that murder liability cannot be imposed on persons convicted of felony murder unless they were the actual killer, an aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill, or a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).) In most cases where the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing, as was done here. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) When determining whether the evidence provides beyond a reasonable doubt whether a defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, resentencing courts 13 consider the factors discussed in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) and People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks). Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he ultimate question pertaining to being a major participant is “whether the defendant’s participation in ‘criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major.’ ” ’ (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611, citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) ‘Among the relevant factors in determining this question, [the California Supreme Court has] set forth the following: “What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inactions play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?” ’ (Clark, at p. 611.)” (People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1087 (Jones).) “As to whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, there is ‘ “significant[] overlap” ’ with the major participant analysis. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614–615.) Other factors relevant in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life include: ‘(1) Knowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons’; ‘(2) Physical presence at the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim’; ‘(3) Duration of the felony’; ‘(4) Defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of killing’; and ‘(5) Defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of violence during the felony.’ (Id. at pp. 618–623, some capitalization and italics omitted.)” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1087.) 14  “Reckless indifference to human life ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’ (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) As to its subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed’ and consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’ (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) As to its objective element, ‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) ‘ “Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of death’ ” satisfies the statutory requirement. [Citation.] Notably, “the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used” is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1087–1088.) In reviewing the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence, “we apply well-settled principles. ‘We “ ‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and 15 make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480.) Thus, an appellate court does not resolve credibility or evidentiary conflicts but defers to the trial court’s findings on these issues. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) “The same [substantial evidence] standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) “[B]ecause ‘[appellate courts] must begin with the presumption that the evidence . . . was sufficient,’ it is defendant, as the appellant, who ‘bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.’ ” (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1430, italics omitted; see People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 988 [appellant challenging the sufficiency of evidence “ ‘bears an enormous burden’ ”].) Reversal on substantial evidence grounds “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conclusion of the trier of fact].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) The Major Participant Finding Planning: With respect to Valenzuela’s role in planning, the trial court pointed out he allowed the blue van to be registered in his name, and he was aware it had a secret compartment from which he thought the guns might have been removed and later stashed. The other car used in connection with the crimes was owned by Campos, his close friend and neighbor, and zip ties 16 were found in it. Valenzuela also obtained two cell phones in someone else’s name that were used for communication by the perpetrators both before and after the attempted robbery and murders. And he drove from southern California to the Bay Area for the day, for the face-to-face with Vaca. As the court also observed: “[T]his plan could not have been carried out in such a quick and complete manner, unless all of the participants were aware and participating in it.” Thus, while there may be no direct evidence Valenzuela was involved in planning the crimes, a trier of fact could reasonably infer from the circumstantial evidence that he was. Weapons: As for Valenzuela’s role in using lethal weapons, the court again found circumstantial evidence established his involvement–especially the fact four guns were discharged, as well as information in Valenzuela’s and Campos’s statements to law enforcement. The court expressly found Valenzuela’s “statements that he did not know anyone had weapons, or that he did not possess a weapon” not credible, a conclusion we cannot disturb. Aware of Dangers: Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s conclusion Valenzuela was aware of the dangers involved in the surprise attack on Vaca by an armed posse of four led by Chico. The group took a single car for the final drive to Vaca’s apartment because Vaca might recognize the van and Chico wanted to “go charge them on surprise.” Hernandez specifically stated to Valenzuela, “ ‘He won’t know that it’s us. I’ll go charge him and he’ll pay me because he won’t have another choice not to pay me.’ ” (Italics added.) And Campos had previously told Valenzuela that Chico was “ ‘bad news’ ” and would “ ‘get [them] into big things’ ” like the “shit” that just happened. Present and No Attempt to Prevent: The evidence additionally establishes Valenzuela was present at the locale of the multiple murders (in 17 the small apartment) and did nothing to prevent them. Rather, he went about looking for Chico’s “shit” (i.e., drugs) at Chico’s request. Indeed, there was evidence he facilitated the killings by, at the least, possessing a gun. He also turned up the music, presumably, as the court commented, to drown out the sound of the gunfire to avoid detection.5 Actions After Murders: Finally, after the crimes were committed, Valenzuela told Campos to throw away the chip in Valenzuela’s cellphone. And Campos threw away both the cellphone and the chip. The Reckless Indifference Finding The evidence recited above also amply supports the trial court’s finding that Valenzuela acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801.) As the group of four armed men barged into Vaca’s small apartment and demanded money, while Valenzuela looked for Chico’s drugs, it is hard to imagine the peril to life could have been greater. Certainly, disregarding that risk was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a law-abiding person would observe. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) In other words, the risk the group’s actions presented was considerably more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any violent felony. Given all of the evidence discussed above, more than substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 5 Indeed, Valenzuela’s actions appear to have helped avoid detection. A neighbor testified he heard several people enter the apartment and arguing in Spanish. Thereafter, the rap music that was playing got louder, there was then six or seven popping sounds, thereafter the music was turned down, and he heard people running out of the apartment. Although the neighbor initially thought the sounds could have been gunfire, he decided it had been his imagination. 18 Valenzuela was a major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to human life.6 Valenzuela’s arguments to the contrary–that there was no reliable evidence he possessed or fired a gun, turned up the music before shots were fired, acted with the intention to facilitate the murders, or participated in the planning–misapprehend our standard of review. The trial court found otherwise on the basis of adequate evidentiary support and we do not judge credibility, reweigh the evidence, or draw reasonable inferences contrary to those drawn by the court. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying resentencing is affirmed. 6 Because we uphold the court’s denial of resentencing on this ground, we do not consider the propriety of the court’s alternative conclusion that Valenzuela, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killers. (See generally People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671.) 19  _________________________ Banke, J. We concur: _________________________ Humes, P. J. _________________________ Langhorne Wilson, J. A169644, People v. Valenzuela 20