United States v. Cook

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________________ ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) v. ) Criminal No. 26-113 (PLF) ) GERALD COOK, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) OPINION Pending before the Court is Defendant Gerald Cook’s Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 31]. 1 Mr. Cook has been charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of D.C. Code § 22-402. See Indictment. In the early hours of November 1, 2025, officers recovered firearms and other evidence from a vehicle registered to Mr. Cook, parked in the 800 block of H Street Northeast. Mr. Cook has moved to suppress that evidence, arguing that the government’s warrantless seizure and search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment 1 The documents considered by the Court in connection with the pending motion include: Indictment [Dkt. No. 1]; Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 31]; United States’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence (“Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 32]; Mr. Cook’s Reply in Support of his Motion to Suppress (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 34]; Transcript of Motion Hearing dated September 17, 2026 (“9/17/26 Tr.”) [Dkt. No. 44]; United States’ Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence (“Gov’t Supp.”) [Dkt. No. 54]; Mr. Cook’s Response to the Government’s Supplement (“Supp. Opp.”) [Dkt. No. 57]; United States’ Supplemental Reply in Support of its Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (“Gov’t Supp. Reply” [Dkt. No. 61]; and Public Transcript of Motion Hearing dated September 25, 2026 (“9/25/26 Tr.”) [Dkt. No. 64]. to the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Mr. Cook’s motion to suppress. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The events at issue occurred over roughly three hours on the night of October 31, 2025, and into the early morning of November 1, 2025. Just after 11:30 p.m., Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer Abraham Hovsepian and his partner, Officer Carter Maffett, responded to a call near the 800 block of H Street Northeast. See 9/17/26 Tr. at 5:23-6:4; Def. Ex. 1/Gov’t Ex. 12 at 23:32:07 (Officer Hovsepian body-worn camera footage). 2 Officer Hovsepian’s body-worn camera was on when he arrived at the scene. See 9/17/26 Tr. at 6:5-6; Def. Ex. 1/Gov’t Ex. 12. Upon arrival, Officer Hovsepian and his partner spoke with a complaining witness, who alleged that she had been threatened by a man pointing two firearms at her a few minutes earlier, around 11:29 p.m. The complainant’s account of what happened is captured on Officer Hovsepian’s body-worn camera. See 9/17/26 Tr. at 6:7-8; Def. Ex. 1/Gov’t Ex. 12. As captured on body-worn camera footage, the complainant told Officer Hovsepian that she and the driver of a white vehicle were arguing over who was entitled to a parking space on the north side of H Street. Def. Ex. 1/Gov’t Ex. 12 at 23:31:20-23:31:22; see Opp. at 4, Fig. 2. 3 The complainant stayed in her vehicle, and the other driver got out of his and 2 Time references to video exhibits refer to the internal timestamps, which reflect the time of day or night when the video was captured. When a defense exhibit and a government exhibit capture the same footage with the same internal timestamp, both exhibits are cited. 3 The Court notes that “[i]t is well-settled that hearsay evidence may be considered in resolving a motion to suppress evidence.” United States v. Straker, 596 F. Supp. 2d 80, 84 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009). “Hearsay statements, like any other evidence, should be considered in light of 2 approached her. Def. Ex. 1/Gov’t Ex. 12 at 23:33:10-23:33:12. As the two argued while the other driver stood by the complainant’s vehicle, a bystander crossed from the other side of the street and inserted himself into the dispute, taking the side of the driver with the white vehicle. Id. at 23:33:23-23:33:33. According to the complainant, the bystander walked up to her vehicle and threatened to “flatten all four of [her] tires.” Id. at 23:33:33-23:33:40. The bystander then told the complainant, “I got something for you,” and he walked around the corner and out of her sight. Id. at 23:33:45-23:33:50. Moments later, according to the complainant, the bystander returned to the complainant’s vehicle and approached her with both arms raised and holding two firearms, which he pointed at her face. Id. at 23:33:51-23:33:59. The bystander also attempted to open the complainant’s vehicle door while threatening her. Id. at 23:34:00-23:34:02. The bystander then retreated and walked back around the same corner, and the complainant did not see him again. Id. at 23:34:15-23:34:22. The complainant described the bystander as a Black male with a caramel-brown complexion, scruffy beard, and long dreadlocks, wearing a blue hoodie. Id. at 23:33:23-23:33:29, 23:34:40-23:36:06. She emphasized that the bystander’s blue hoodie and dreadlocks stood out to her the most. Id. at 23:35:56-23:35:58. She described the bystander’s firearms as black and noted that one had a long bottom, which Officer Hovsepian suggested could be an extended magazine. Id. at 23:36:08-23:36:33. As also captured on body-worn camera footage, after taking the complainant’s statement, Officer Hovsepian relayed the statement and a description of the suspect over his radio. Def. Ex. 1/Gov’t Ex. 12 at 23:38:08-48; see 9/17/26 Tr. at 8:12-14. Moments later, around 11:41 p.m., Officer Hovsepian spoke on the phone with an individual listed in his phone their trustworthiness and reliability, and the Court has considered those factors here in relying upon the hearsay statements proffered in this matter.” Id. (citation omitted). 3 as “Ofc. Grant,” to whom he relayed the complainant’s statement, including that the suspect was “wearing a blue hoodie, which stands out.” Def. Ex. 1 at 23:41:27-23:43:06. Around 11:43 p.m., Officer Hovsepian received a phone call from Investigator Anthony Abreu with the Real Time Crime Center (“RTCC”). Id. at 23:45:17. 4 Officer Hovsepian recounted the complainant’s statement and the time and location of the incident to Investigator Abreu and, within a few minutes, Investigator Abreu located CCTV surveillance footage of the incident. Id. at 23:45:35- 23:52:05. Officer Hovsepian testified that during this phone call, Investigator Abreu told him— based on his review of the footage—that when the suspect left the complainant and the parking dispute for the first time, the suspect “went back to his car and towards the passenger side, and he was leaning in, reaching towards the glove compartment of the vehicle.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 16:16-18. Officer Hovsepian asked to be sent a clip of the surveillance footage, and the two ended their call around 11:54 p.m. Def. Ex. 1 at 23:54:02-23:54:37. After hanging up, Officer Hovsepian recounted to his partner that Investigator Abreu said, “I’m reviewing the camera footage, and I don’t ever see guns. I see some, like, motion, but I don’t see the guns in his hand.” Id. at 23:54:45-23:54:53. Less than ten minutes later, around 12:02 a.m., Investigator Abreu sent a clip of the CCTV footage depicting the incident to Officer Hovsepian and his partner. Def. Ex. 1 at 00:02:05-00:02:40; see Gov’t Ex. 13 (clip sent to the officers). The officers watched the clip, and Officer Hovsepian said to his partner, “I don’t see anything in his hands.” Def. Ex. 1 4 RTCC is a program that allows MPD and other agencies to access security cameras across Washington, DC. See 9/17/26 Tr. at 9:13-15; see also Press Release, Executive Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bowser and MPD Announce New Real-Time Crime Center (Dec. 7, 2023), https://perma.cc/6H7L-R9N2 (“The RTCC will serve as a new dedicated space that will be staffed 24/7 with local, regional, and federal law enforcement agencies to monitor and respond to criminal activities in real time.”). 4 at 00:02:25-00:02:27. After reviewing the CCTV clip, the officers told the complainant someone with MPD would be in touch within a few days, and the officers and the complainant parted ways around 12:06 a.m. Id. at 00:03:25-00:06:35. Just over an hour later, at approximately 1:11 a.m., MPD Officer Westley Grant and various other MPD and federal law enforcement officers saw a Range Rover SUV parked in the 800 block of H Street Northeast, which RTCC investigators had identified as the vehicle the suspect accessed when he disappeared around the corner during the incident. See Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:11:14-01:11:20, 01:12:03-01:12:10 (Officer Grant body-worn camera footage). Officer Grant testified that he learned the vehicle’s location from a phone conversation with Investigator Abreu. See 9/17/26 Tr. at 67:2-6. Moments after arriving on the scene, Officer Grant radioed to request that a canine unit be dispatched. Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:11:22- 01:11:44. Officer Grant then showed the other officers an email containing Flock camera photos of the suspect’s vehicle and the suspect wearing a multicolored jacket; Officer Grant testified that he received the email from Investigator Abreu at 1:04 a.m., around the time the two spoke on the phone. Id. at 01:12:03-01:12:17; see 9/17/26 Tr. at 62:1-4, 67:2-6; Def. Ex. 12/Gov’t Ex. 11 (email from Investigator Abreu). Officer Grant showed officers this email at various points before the search and explained that the suspect had been wearing a blue hoodie but had changed into the multicolored jacket. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:18:36-01:19:10. Around 1:13 a.m., Officer Grant radioed his supervisor, Lieutenant Jeremy Kniseley, and told him, “I got the car on lock.” Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:12:54-01:13:10. Officer Grant testified that at this point, if the suspect had walked up to the vehicle, “he was going to be stopped.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 89:16. Officer Grant then called Investigator Abreu and told him, “If you see this dude on camera, let me know, and just give me a call.” Def. 5 Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:14:45-01:15:00. Upon hanging up, Officer Grant told another officer that Investigator Abreu “said [the suspect] is in the club right now.” Id. at 01:15:02-01:15:09. Moments later, Lieutenant Kniseley arrived on the scene. See Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:15:22-01:15:30. Officer Grant immediately recounted to Lieutenant Kniseley: It was a dispute over a parking spot. He went to the car. Came back. Brandished two firearms with extended magazines. And then, like, brandished them, pointed them at the lady, said “Oh, I got something for you,” or whatever, and then, like, dipped where she couldn’t see. It was this car. RTCC saw it. And he said, “It looks like it’s in the glove box.” And the dude changed and went in the club. I called RTCC, and he said, “I’m watching the club, I’ll let you know when he comes out.” So he’s good for a stop. Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:15:25-01:16:08. During the suppression hearing, Officer Grant testified that this understanding of the incident came from “the RTCC and the previous reporting officers that we had phoned.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 90:17-19. He further explained, “I was in constant communication on and off through the whole event with the RTCC.” Id. at 87:18-19. In response to Officer Grant’s recitation of the facts known to him, Lieutenant Kniseley asked, “What’s our [probable cause]? Do we even need to run the dog? Did anyone see him with the gun?” Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:16:09-01:16:15. Officer Grant responded, “I think Abreu saw it. He said, ‘I think it’s in the glove box.’” Id. at 01:16:15-01:16:20. During the suppression hearing, Officer Grant testified, “Investigator Abreu told me he saw the individual around the area of the glove box. We know that from our training and experience that people that are carrying firearms, especially illicit firearms they can’t necessarily bring into an establishment that serves alcohol, they put them up in a glove box or, like, a center console.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 70:18-24. A few minutes later, Lieutenant Kniseley asked Officer Grant and the others, “Did we plain-view it pretty well?” Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:17:58-01:18:05. Officer Grant 6 responded that he had not, then looked briefly into the back seat of the vehicle and remarked, “I can’t even see in the back.” Id. at 01:18:00-01:18:11. During the suppression hearing, Officer Grant and Lieutenant Kniseley testified that the rear windows—those in the back seat and trunk—“were heavily tinted.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 68:16-17; 9/25/26 Tr. at 26:3-9. Body-worn camera footage shows the same. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14. After looking into the vehicle, Officer Grant showed Lieutenant Kniseley the photos that Investigator Abreu had emailed at 1:04 a.m. The lieutenant asked, “Is this what he’s wearing now after he changed?” Officer Grant responded, “Yeah. He had the blue hoodie and now he’s changed, I guess into this,” meaning the multicolored jacket. Id. at 01:18:13-01:18:30. Around 1:39 a.m., the canine unit that Officer Grant had requested about thirty minutes earlier arrived on scene. See Def. Ex. 7/Gov’t Ex. 15 (Officer Grant body-worn camera footage). The canine circled the vehicle twice and did not alert to the presence of firearms. Id. at 01:40:38-01:42:56. The canine and handler then left the scene without interacting further with the investigating officers. Id. at 01:42:56-01:43:16; see 9/17/26 Tr. at 112:22-113:4. Around 1:46 a.m., Officer Grant is seen on the phone with someone, ending the call just before 1:47 a.m. See Def. Ex. 8 at 01:46:49 (Lieutenant Kniseley body-worn camera footage). About a minute later, at 1:47:52 a.m., Officer Grant received another email from Investigator Abreu, this one containing screenshots of CCTV footage depicting the vehicle and the suspect, wearing a blue hoodie with long dreadlocks visible, walking to and from the vehicle around the time of the incident. See Gov’t Ex. 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). Officers began attempting to access the vehicle around 1:49 a.m., and succeeded around 1:52 a.m. See Def. Ex. 15/Gov’t Ex. 16 at 01:48:30-01:52:00 (Officer Grant body-worn camera footage). Once all four doors were open, officers began searching the vehicle and taking photos. 7 See id. at 01:52:00-01:53:30. At 1:55 a.m., Lieutenant Kniseley, who was searching the backseat area on the passenger side, pulled a blue hoodie down from the top of the backseat passenger- side headrest. See Def. Ex. 8/Gov’t Ex. 17 at 01:54:30-01:55:40. Then, noticing Officer Grant and others struggling to enter the glove box, Lieutenant Kniseley said, “We might have to pry it. So, he specifically saw him going into the glove box?” Id. at 01:55:40-01:55:48. Officer Grant responded, “Yeah.” Def. Ex. 15/Gov’t Ex. 16 at 01:55:47-01:55:56. Moments later, Officer Grant suggested calling Investigator Abreu, and he got the investigator on the phone at 1:56 a.m. See id. at 01:56:32-01:56:54; 9/17/26 Tr. at 79:13-15. Officer Grant then asked Investigator Abreu, “You said the glove box right? Ok yeah, we’re going to have to pry it. I just wanted to double-check that that’s the area where he was seen . . . if he’s focused on that area, then we’ll get it.” Def. Ex. 15/Gov’t Ex. 16 at 01:57:00-01:57:30. Lieutenant Kniseley then asked, “Which jacket do we need to take?” Def. Ex. 15/Gov’t Ex. 16 at 01:57:30-01:57:32. Officer Grant asked Investigator Abreu, “Which jacket? Can you describe the jacket to me again? It’s like a weird, it’s all blue, right?” Id. at 01:57:30-01:57:44. Officer Grant and Lieutenant Kniseley then pulled up a photo, and Officer Grant said, “Oh no, yeah, it’s this blue hoodie. Look. So, we got the blue hoodie.” Id. at 01:58:04-01:58:20. Returning his focus to the glove box, Officer Grant remarked to Investigator Abreu over the phone, “That would make sense of a sensible place to put it, right, if you can’t open it without the key.” Def. Ex. 15/Gov’t Ex. 16 at 01:58:20-01:58:30; see also 9/17/26 Tr. at 80:4-8. After hanging up with Investigator Abreu, Officer Grant told Lieutenant Kniseley of the glove box, “He said that is like the region he was in and focused on in the car.” Def. Ex. 15/Gov’t Ex. 16 at 01:58:38-01:58:41. Lieutenant Kniseley responded, “Ok, I guess let’s pry 8 it.” Id. at 01:58:48-01:58:51. At 2:00 a.m., the officers opened the glove box, revealing two black firearms, one with an extended magazine. See id. at 02:00:45-02:00:56; Gov’t Ex. 19. B. Procedural Background On May 20, 2026, the government obtained a federal indictment against Mr. Cook, charging him with two counts of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of D.C. Code § 22-402. See Indictment. On August 12, 2026, Mr. Cook moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the vehicle search that occurred on November 1, 2025. See Mot. The government opposed the motion on August 26, 2026, see Opp., and Mr. Cook replied on September 2, 2026, see Reply. The Court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on Mr. Cook’s motion, during which it heard testimony from Officers Hovsepian and Grant, Lieutenant Kniseley, and Defense Investigator Celia Sang. See Min. Entry dated Sep. 17, 2026; Min. Entry dated Sep. 25, 2026. At the Court’s request, the parties filed supplemental briefs. See Gov’t Supp.; Def. Supp.; Gov’t Supp. Reply. The Court then held oral argument on Mr. Cook’s motion on October 28, 2026. The motion is now thoroughly briefed and argued and is ripe for decision. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “Evidence obtained in violation of this guarantee is generally suppressed according to the ‘exclusionary rule.’” United States v. Darwah, Criminal No. 25-194 (LLA), 2026 WL 145612, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026) (quoting United States v. Weaver, 808 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Searches conducted without a judicially authorized warrant “are per se 9 unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). When police officers conduct a warrantless search, “the government carries the burden” of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. United States v. Darwah, 2026 WL 145612, at *5 (quoting United States v. Singleton, 759 F.2d 176, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (“[T]he general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on those seeking an exemption from the requirement to show the need for it.” (citation modified)). Relevant here, one exception to the warrant requirement is the “automobile exception,” which permits police to search a vehicle if it “is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” United States v. Williams, 773 F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity,” officers may search “any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. at 347; see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”). “The Supreme Court has described the task of evaluating probable cause as ‘a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances[,] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Probable cause “is an objective standard requiring an analysis of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to the officers at the time of the search.” United States v. 10 Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 91 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence have no place in the probable-cause decision.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2013) (citation modified). All the Supreme Court has “required is the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. at 244 (citation modified). III. DISCUSSION A. Officers Lawfully Seized Mr. Cook’s Vehicle Mr. Cook’s first argument is that law enforcement officers seized his vehicle without the requisite level of suspicion. See Mot. at 5-6; Supp. Opp. at 27-34. Personal property is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see also Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (holding that a seizure occurs “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied”). The “general rule” is “that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979). But “certain brief seizures of personal property for the purpose of conducting a limited investigation may be justified based on ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the [property] contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” United States v. Mickens, 810 F. Supp. 3d 75, 79 (D.D.C. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983)); see United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (applying the “reasonable and articulable suspicion” standard to the seizure of a person involving the partial blocking of a vehicle). To decide whether officers had reasonable 11 suspicion, courts examine the totality of the circumstances, considering only “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.” United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). Mr. Cook argues that MPD officers and federal agents seized his vehicle when they apprehended and surrounded it and then deployed a canine unit. See Mot. at 6. The government does not contend otherwise, and for good reason. “The D.C. Circuit has recognized, in the context of seizing a person, that ‘blocking a vehicle can be the kind of application of physical force that constitutes a seizure.’” United States v. Mickens, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 80 (quoting United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d at 1083). And “[c]ourts have applied the same principle to seizures of cars.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Harger, 313 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that the government seized a vehicle when officers blocked it in, thereby “intentionally terminat[ing] the vehicle’s freedom of movement”). Here, the body-worn camera evidence shows that several MPD officers and federal agents surrounded Mr. Cook’s vehicle beginning around 1:11 a.m., frequently walking up to and circling it. See Def. Exs. 3, 5-8, 13; Gov’t Exs. 14-18. Minutes later, Officer Grant told Lieutenant Kniseley that he had “the car on lock.” Def. Ex. 3/Gov’t Ex. 14 at 01:12:54-01:13:02. During the suppression hearing, Officer Grant testified that at that point, “if the suspect had walked up to the vehicle, [Officer Grant] would have stopped them before they could have gotten into the car.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 89:21-24. In other words, from essentially the moment Officer Grant arrived on the scene, “there is no question the officers would not have allowed [Mr. Cook] to take his car and leave.” United States v. Mickens, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 80. The officers’ actions thus constitute a “meaningful interference with [Mr. Cook’s] possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. at 61 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113). 12  For the officers’ seizure of the vehicle to comply with the Fourth Amendment, the officers must have had at least a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained “contraband or evidence of a crime.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 702. In opposing Mr. Cook’s suppression motion, the government skips reasonable suspicion altogether and argues instead that the facts known to the police satisfied the higher standard of probable cause. See Gov’t Supp. at 6. 5 According to the government, the officers’ probable cause was “based on the victim’s account of what happened to her and the corroborating surveillance footage that connected the defendant’s vehicle to the offense.” Id. The Court concludes that the government has carried its burden to show that the officers had probable cause to seize Mr. Cook’s vehicle. Law enforcement reasonably relied on the complainant’s account of the alleged assault. See Johnson v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d 539, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming a finding of probable cause premised on “a detailed victim statement identifying [the defendant] as the perpetrator”); Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th 828, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“‘[I]t is enough’ for probable cause ‘that the police officer . . . received his information from some person—normally the putative victim or an eye witness— who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam))). Just minutes after the incident, the complainant clearly and comprehensively reported it to officers on the scene. 5 Mr. Cook argues that the government “has conceded that it unlawfully seized the SUV” because it did not respond directly to Mr. Cook’s contention that the officers “lacked the necessary suspicion to seize the SUV when officers surrounded it.” Reply at 15. The Court disagrees. As the government points out, it responds directly to Mr. Cook’s seizure argument in its opposition, albeit briefly. See Opp. at 22. Moreover, the government has maintained that officers had probable cause to search the vehicle, see generally Opp.; Gov’t Supp.; Gov’t Supp. Reply, which the Court understands necessarily to encompass probable cause to seize the vehicle before searching it. See Gov’t Supp. at 6 n.4. 13 See Def. Ex. 1; Gov’t Ex. 12. She provided the officers with a detailed description of the suspect’s clothing and physical features—specifically, his long dreadlocks and blue hoodie—and the firearms that he allegedly brandished at her. See id. Within minutes, the officers had relayed this information to the RTCC, where an investigator reviewed surveillance footage from the area that corroborated the complainant’s account. The CCTV footage—which the Court has reviewed extensively—shows the suspect, wearing a blue hoodie with his long dreadlocks visible, crossing the street to insert himself into the parking dispute. See Gov’t Exs. 3, 11. Image 1: Still from Government Exhibit 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). The suspect is crossing the street walking toward the parking dispute. 14 Image 2: Still from Government Exhibit 3 (CCTV footage). The suspect is holding up his arm to oncoming traffic as he crosses the street. 15  The suspect can be seen standing near the complainant’s car for several seconds. See Gov’t Ex. 3. Image 3: Still from Government Exhibit 3 (CCTV Footage). The suspect is standing next to the driver of the white vehicle. 16  He then leaves the scene and walks to a vehicle parked around the corner. See Gov’t Ex. 3. Image 4: Still from Government Exhibit 3 (CCTV footage). The suspect is walking away from a parking dispute and toward a vehicle. 17  The video then shows the suspect opening the front vehicle’s passenger door, partially entering the front passenger seat for about fifteen seconds, stepping back out of the vehicle, and then walking back to the scene of the parking dispute. See Gov’t Exs. 4, 11. Image 5: Still from Government Exhibit 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). The suspect is leaning into the vehicle on the front passenger side. Image 6: Still from Government Exhibit 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). The suspect is walking away from the vehicle in the direction of the parking dispute. 18  The suspect then approaches the complainant’s front passenger window and can be seen raising at least one arm at her before attempting to open her passenger door. See Gov’t Exs. 5, 11, 13. See id. Image 7: Still from Government Exhibit 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). The suspect is standing by the front passenger-side door of the complainant’s vehicle. 19 Image 8: Still from Government Exhibit 13 (CCTV clip sent by Investigator Abreu to Officer Hovsepian). The suspect has at least one arm raised and pointed at the complainant. 20  The suspect then walks back to the vehicle around the corner as a city tow truck arrives on the scene. See Gov’t Exs. 5, 6. Image 9: Still from Government Exhibit 5 (CCTV footage). The suspect is walking away from the parking dispute. 21  The suspect goes into the driver’s seat of that vehicle for about thirty seconds. See Gov’t Exs. 6, 11. Image 10: Still from Government Exhibit 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). The suspect is entering the driver’s seat of the vehicle. 22  Then, the suspect exits the vehicle and walks around to the rear passenger side, where he takes off his blue hoodie, places it in the back seat of the vehicle, and changes into a multicolored jacket. See Gov’t Exs. 6, 11. Image 11: Still from Government Exhibit 6 (CCTV footage). The suspect (standing behind the light pole) is removing the blue hoodie. 23 Image 12: Still from Government Exhibit 11 (email from Investigator Abreu to Officer Grant). The suspect is wearing a multicolored jacket. Mr. Cook argues that “the CCTV footage does not corroborate the complaining witness[’s] statement” because she told the officers on the scene “that she was patiently waiting for a parking spot when another man initiated a parking dispute with her,” but the CCTV footage “shows that the alleged victim was the one to initiate the parking dispute.” Supp. Opp. at 27-28. The Court rejects this suggestion that the complainant’s account was not reliable. For one, the Court disagrees with Mr. Cook’s description of the CCTV footage as compared with the complainant’s statement. From the Court’s review, the parking dispute appears to have arisen exactly as the complainant described, or close to it. The video footage shows the complainant pulling up behind a white vehicle that appeared to be waiting for a parking space and pausing there for about ninety seconds. See Gov’t Ex. 3. A red vehicle parked in front of the white vehicle pulls out, and the complainant drives around the white car and pulls into the open space nose first. See id. The driver of the white vehicle then exits his vehicle and walks over to the complainant’s vehicle, and the argument ensues. See id. Regardless of whether the complainant was wrong about her entitlement to the parking spot, she did not initiate the dispute with the driver of the white vehicle. Nor did she mischaracterize how the dispute arose. The CCTV 24 footage matches her account of the moments before the dispute began, as conveyed to Officer Hovsepian and his partner. See Def. Ex. 1; Gov’t Ex. 12. More importantly, as described above, the CCTV footage confirms the complainant’s account of her interactions with the suspect and the suspect’s movements during the incident. Whether or not the complainant was waiting “patiently” for the parking space before the dispute arose does not change that fact. It would not be unreasonable for officers to have relied on the complainant’s otherwise corroborated statement about the alleged assault even had she misrepresented the circumstances leading up to the dispute. Mr. Cook’s more meaningful argument is that the CCTV footage does not corroborate the complainant’s statement that she was threatened with two guns because “the video does not ever show a firearm.” Supp. Opp. at 28. On this point, the Court agrees with Mr. Cook’s description of the surveillance footage. The government agrees as well. See Opp. at 19 (“Due to the distant positioning of the camera from the scene, it is not clear what is in the defendant’s hands, and his left arm is obscured from view.”). So, too, did the officers who reviewed the video on the night of the alleged incident. The evidence reveals that neither Investigator Abreu nor Officer Hovsepian observed firearms in the suspect’s hands while reviewing footage on the night of the incident. See Def. Ex. 1 at 23:54:45-23:54:53, 00:02:25- 00:02:27; 9/17/26 Tr. at 49:16-24; 93:6-7. Contrary to Mr. Cook’s suggestion, however, the CCTV footage does not establish that the suspect did not have firearms in his hands when he returned from around the corner and approached the complainant’s vehicle. Rather, the video’s poor quality makes it impossible to see what—if anything—the suspect was holding. The police therefore appropriately relied on the complainant’s eyewitness account that the suspect had two guns in his 25 hands when he approached her. The officers had every reason to believe her account, given that the surveillance footage corroborated it in all meaningful respects, including that the suspect can be seen raising at least one arm at the complainant. See Gov’t Ex. 13. As Officer Hovsepian testified, “[t]he grainy video can’t really show exactly what was in the hand, but it did match the timeline of what [the complainant] told me.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 12:13-14. To reiterate, officers were not required to have evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance, that weapons or other evidence would be found in Mr. Cook’s vehicle. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. at 243-44; see also United States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Probable cause is more than bare suspicion but is less than beyond a reasonable doubt and, indeed, is less than a preponderance of the evidence.”). The question is whether there was a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime would be recovered. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. at 244. Given the complainant’s detailed statement, corroborated by video evidence, the answer certainly is yes. See Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th at 840 (upholding a probable cause determination based on a complainant’s statement “that she had been assaulted,” which was “corroborated by her physical appearance and emotional state”). Mr. Cook briefly suggests that, even considering the statement and video evidence, officers should be faulted for not taking additional “investigatory steps” before seizing (and ultimately searching) the vehicle, such as approaching the suspect and “speak[ing] with him about the parking incident.” Mot. at 7. “Yet ‘[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.’” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 927 F.3d at 548 (quoting Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). In any event, the officers had a sensible reason for not wanting to enter into the nightclub where the 26 suspect was located at the relevant time. As Officer Grant put it: “[I]t was Halloween, and there [were] a lot of people in there, and there [wa]s the potential for an altercation, a public scene and jeopardizing public safety.” 9/17/26 Tr. at 68:3-5. Of course, Mr. Cook is correct that “probable cause under the Fourth Amendment concern[s] what officers who conduct a search and seizure knew at the time they conducted the search and seizure.” Supp. Opp. at 29 (emphasis modified); see United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he presence or absence of probable cause must be assessed on the basis of the facts known to the officer at the time he undertook the search.”). Accordingly, it would not matter what Officer Hovsepian or Investigator Abreu knew if the officers who seized and ultimately searched Mr. Cook’s vehicle did not have the same information. There is one caveat, however. Some circuits have held that the collective action doctrine—which posits that probable cause may be established based on the collective knowledge of multiple officers—permits