United States v. Joyner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : v. : Criminal Action No.: 23-309 (RC) : SHAMELL NAQUAN JOYNER, : Re Document Nos.: 49, 52, 53, 54, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, Defendant. 103, 104, 105, 106 107, 108, 125 128, 143 MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE (ECF NO. 52); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES (ECF NOS. 53, 98); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE RULE 404(B) EVIDENCE (ECF NO. 49); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY (ECF NO. 99); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING PROPENSITY-BASED ARGUMENTS (ECF NO. 100); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING IN- COURT IDENTIFICATION (ECF NOS. 54, 101); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING TOOLMARK IDENTIFICATION (ECF NO. 102); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION BRIEF (ECF NO. 128); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING LAW ENFORCEMENT IDENTIFICATION (ECF NO. 103); GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING JAIL CALLS (ECF NO. 104); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS (ECF NO. 105); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER JERMONE MCCLINTON (ECF NO. 106); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING (ECF NO. 143); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING CERTAIN EXPERT TESTIMONY (ECF NO. 107); DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING LATE- NOTICED EXPERT TESTIMONY (ECF NO. 125); GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING DNA EVIDENCE (ECF NO. 108). I. INTRODUCTION Shamell Naquan Joyner is charged in twenty-eight counts of a Superseding Indictment with Hobbs Act robbery, carjacking, transportation of a stolen vehicle, brandishing or discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 27. A jury trial will begin in this case on June 29, 2026. In this opinion, the Court addresses over a dozen pretrial motions pending from the parties, including Mr. Joyner’s motion to suppress tangible evidence, the Government’s motion to introduce evidence of other crimes under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609, and various motions in limine filed by Mr. Joyner. The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on June 15, 2026. For the reasons below, the Court denies Mr. Joyner’s motion to suppress, grants in part and denies in part the Government’s motion to admit evidence of other crimes, and grants in part and denies in part Mr. Joyner’s motions in limine. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In a prior opinion, the Court recently denied Mr. Joyner’s motions to dismiss or sever certain counts of the Superseding Indictment. See United States v. Joyner, No. 23-cr-309, 2026 WL 1622706, at *1 (D.D.C. June 5, 2026). The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in detail in that ruling. In brief, Mr. Joyner is accused of committing ten armed robberies (“Armed Robberies 1–10”) and two armed carjackings (“Armed Carjackings 1–2) in a three- week period between April and May of 2023. See generally Superseding Indictment. As relevant to the present motions, some of the Government’s key evidence with respect to several of the offenses appears to be CCTV footage from targeted convenience stores depicting a masked robber. See Gov’t’s Mot. Admit Other Crimes Evid. Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and to Impeach Def. with Prior Convictions Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 609 (“Gov’t’s Mot.”) at 2– 18, ECF No. 53. The parties agree that the identity of the masked perpetrator is a central issue for trial. Thus, the Government proposes to offer a variety of evidence linking Mr. Joyner to the charged offenses, including photographs of Mr. Joyner’s prior possession of firearms, evidence of Mr. Joyner wearing the same clothing as the perpetrator on other occasions, and testimony from a firearm and toolmark expert opining that cartridge casings recovered from the scenes of 2 two of the robberies were fired from the same gun. Mr. Joyner’s present motions seek to exclude or limit much of this evidence. III. ANALYSIS The Court first addresses Mr. Joyner’s motion to suppress tangible evidence, which it denies. Next, the Court considers the Government’s motion to introduce evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609, which the Court grants in part and denies in part. Finally, the Court turns to Mr. Joyner’s motions in limine, which it grants in part and denies in part. A. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence (ECF No. 52) Mr. Joyner moves to suppress tangible evidence seized by law enforcement agents from inside his home, located at 413 Valley Avenue, SE, in Washington, D.C. See Def.’s Mot. Suppress Tangible Evid. (“Def.’s Mot. Suppress”), ECF No. 52. Metropolitan Police Department Detective Thomas O’Donnell applied for a warrant to search the Valley Avenue address on May 2, 2023. See id. at Ex. 1 (“Search Warrant”). As the affiant in the application, Detective O’Donnell summarized the facts of Armed Carjacking 1, Armed Robbery 2, and other crimes attributed to Mr. Joyner, including eyewitness accounts, surveillance footage, and a description of the specific articles of clothing worn by Mr. Joyner during the crimes and the items he is alleged to have stolen. Id. at 4–7. Detective O’Donnell affirmed that he had probable cause to believe that evidence related to these crimes was present inside the Valley Avenue address. Id. at 9. After reviewing the application, D.C. Superior Court Judge Zoe Bush issued a search warrant on May 2, 2023. Id. at 10. Later that day, the warrant was executed. According to the Government, “law enforcement agents seized clothing and shoes that were consistent with those worn by [Mr. Joyner] during several of the robberies as well as numerous identity and payment cards taken from employees during the course of the defendant’s armed carjacking and 3 robbery spree.” Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Suppress at 9–10, ECF No. 60. As set forth below, the Court finds that the search warrant at issue supports a finding of probable cause and therefore denies Mr. Joyner’s motion to suppress. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In seeking the issuance of a warrant, the government must submit “[a]n affidavit . . . provid[ing] the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). The task of the issuing magistrate is then “simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238. The duty of the reviewing court, meanwhile, “is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238–39 (citation modified). Although the Fourth Amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,” Supreme Court decisions “establish an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009)). This rule “is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, and therefore applies only where it results in appreciable deterrence.” Id. Nevertheless, under the “good faith exception” set forth in United States v. 4 Leon, if “an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,” evidence seized pursuant to such warrant is admissible even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated. 468 U.S. 897, 920–22 (1984). “[C]ourts determine the objective reasonableness of the police’s reliance on a warrant by considering ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the circumstances.’” Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 145). Suppression is not appropriate unless “the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. (citation modified). Mr. Joyner argues that the search warrant for the Valley Avenue address lacked probable cause because Detective O’Donnell’s affidavit failed to establish a nexus between that address and Mr. Joyner’s alleged criminal activity. See Def.’s Mot. Suppress at 5. The Court disagrees. Detective O’Donnell connected Mr. Joyner to the Valley Avenue address in two ways. First, according to Detective O’Donnell, on April 26, 2023, he and other detectives executed a search warrant on the Honda HR-V that Mr. Joyner allegedly stole during Armed Carjacking 1. Search Warrant at 8. Among other items, the detectives located a bank card in the name of Zaniyah Johnson. Id. A detective conducted a database query and found that Ms. Johnson had reported a domestic assault by Mr. Joyner inside the Valley Avenue address on April 7, 2023. Id. Second, also on April 26, 2023, Prince George’s County police officers responded to a report of a stolen vehicle in the area. Id. As a result of this call for service, Mr. Joyner was arrested and charged with unauthorized removal of a motor vehicle and related theft. 1 Id. As part of being released 1 The conduct for which Mr. Joyner was arrested on April 26, 2023, is not part of the Superseding Indictment. 5 from police custody for this arrest, Mr. Joyner provided a Prince George’s County Commissioner with a home address of 413 Valley Avenue, SE. 2 Id. at 9. Detective O’Donnell also sufficiently connected Mr. Joyner’s residence to his alleged criminal activity. “[P]robable cause requires not only a fair probability of criminal activity but also a nexus between that activity and the place to be searched.” United States v. Savoy, 889 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2012). In this case, no criminal activity was directly observed in the vicinity of the Valley Avenue address. Nevertheless, as the D.C. Circuit explained in United States v. Thomas, “observations of illegal activity outside of the home can provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for a suspect’s house . . . if there is a reasonable basis to infer from the nature of the illegal activity observed, that relevant evidence will be found in the residence.” 989 F.2d 1252, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Court agrees with the Government here that the facts presented in Detective O’Donnell’s affidavit would “warrant a man of reasonable caution” to believe that evidence of the crimes described therein would be found at the Valley Avenue address. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); Gov’t’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Suppress at 17–18. First, Detective O’Donnell described the clothing worn by Mr. Joyner during the alleged offenses. Search Warrant at 2–9. In Thomas, the D.C. Circuit found that there was probable cause to search a defendant’s residence for business records and the clothing that the defendant wore when he sold cocaine to an undercover officer, even though the affiant officer’s affidavit in support of the search warrant for the defendant’s house “offered no facts indicating that criminal 2 Mr. Joyner faults Detective O’Donnell for not performing an investigation to confirm that Mr. Joyner in fact lived at the Valley Avenue address. Def.’s Mot. Suppress at 6. However, the Court agrees with the Government that an independent investigation was not necessary given that Mr. Joyner himself provided that address as his residence to a Prince George’s County Commissioner mere days before the search warrant at issue was executed. 6 activity occurred at the house.” 989 F.2d at 1253–54. Like in Thomas, it was reasonable here for Judge Bush to conclude, based on Detective O’Donnell’s description of the specific articles of clothing worn by Mr. Joyner during the alleged offenses, that some of these articles would be found in Mr. Joyner’s residence. Second, Detective O’Donnell described the items allegedly stolen by Mr. Joyner, including specific quantities of cash, cigarettes, a cell phone, a wallet, and a credit card belonging to one of the victims. Search Warrant at 2–9. In United States v. Feliz, the First Circuit found that the facts presented in the affiant officer’s affidavit allowed a reasonable inference to be drawn as to the probable presence of incriminating evidence in the defendant’s apartment—including money he collected from illicit drug sales and records describing such transactions—even though no drug sales were described to have occurred at the apartment. 182 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 1999). The First Circuit explained that it was reasonable to infer that the defendant had stashed drug paraphernalia in a safe and accessible place, and because no other drug-dealing headquarters of his was identified, “[i]t followed that a likely place to seek to find incriminating items would be [his] residence.” Id. at 87–88. Here, too, it was reasonable for Judge Bush to suppose that Mr. Joyner kept the stolen items in his home. Because the Court has found that Detective O’Donnell’s affidavit amply supports a finding of probable cause, it could deny Mr. Joyner’s motion to suppress on that basis alone. But even if Judge Bush had erred in finding probable cause, Leon’s good faith exception would also require the Court to deny Mr. Joyner’s motion. In view of Detective O’Donnell’s extensive and detailed summary of Mr. Joyner’s alleged criminal activity in the affidavit, including the specific items Mr. Joyner is alleged to have stolen, no “reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal” based on the affidavit alone. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting 7 Herring, 555 U.S. at 145). The evidence recovered during the search of Mr. Joyner’s Valley Avenue residence can therefore be introduced at trial. B. Government’s Motion to Admit Evidence of Other Crimes (ECF Nos. 53, 98) In May of 2025, the Government provided Mr. Joyner notice (1) that it will seek to introduce evidence at trial of other crimes he has committed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (2) that if he testifies at trial, it will seek to impeach him with evidence of his prior convictions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609. See Gov’t’s Mot. Then, a few weeks ago, the Government filed a supplement informing Mr. Joyner of its intent to admit several other categories of evidence falling under Rule 404(b). See Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. Admit Other Crimes Evid. Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (“Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot.”), ECF No. 98. The Court addresses the Rule 404(b) and Rule 609 motions in turn. 3 1. Rule 404(b) Motion Pursuant to Rule 404(b), the Government asks the Court to admit (1) five photographs depicting firearms or Mr. Joyner holding firearms on occasions other than the charged offenses; (2) evidence of the clothing that Mr. Joyner was wearing when he was arrested on April 26, 2023, for another offense not charged in the instant case; and (3) evidence of a contemporaneous robbery of a 7-Eleven employee and a fraudulent transaction that occurred on the employee’s credit card. 4 Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at 1. For the reasons below, the Court denies the 3 Because the Government has provided notice of its intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence at trial, the Court denies Mr. Joyner’s motion for an order requiring the Government to do so. See Def.’s Mot. for Notice of Gov’t’s Intention to Use Rule 404(b) Evid. at Trial, ECF No. 49. 4 In its supplemental motion, the Government also provided notice of its intent to introduce evidence of all offenses currently charged in the Superseding Indictment if the Court granted Mr. Joyner’s previously pending motions to dismiss or sever various offenses. See Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at 18. Because the Government has now denied Mr. Joyner’s motion to dismiss and motion for severance, this issue is moot. 8 Government’s Rule 404(b) motion with respect to the five photographs depicting Mr. Joyner’s prior firearm use but grants the motion otherwise. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Despite being phrased in restrictive terms, Rule 404(b) “is actually one of ‘inclusion rather than exclusion.’” United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Evidence of a defendant’s other crimes is prohibited under the Rule only “if it is offered for the impermissible inference that a defendant is of bad character” and therefore prone to criminality. Id. But this evidence is admissible for any other purpose “so long as the evidence is not offered solely to prove character.” United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Courts undertake a two-step analysis to determine whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under Rule 404(b). The “threshold inquiry” is “whether the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character,” including any of the permissible purposes listed in Rule 404(b)(2). Id. at 1435 (citation modified). “If offered for such a proper purpose, the evidence is then subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility, the most important of which being the requirement of Rule 403 that the probative value of the evidence not be ‘substantially outweighed’ by its potential prejudice.” Id. (citation modified); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 9 danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). a. Evidence of Prior Firearm Possession First, the Government seeks to introduce five photographs demonstrating that Mr. Joyner possessed firearms on occasions other than the charged offenses as “evidence that he knowingly and intentionally possessed a firearm during the incidents that form the basis of the charged conduct.” Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at 3. These photos were recovered from the phone of Mr. Joyner’s relative, N.L., after the two individuals were arrested for conduct charged in the instant case on May 2, 2023. See Gov’t’s Mot. at 6, 27; Hr’g Tr. at 9:11–10:7. One of the photos, dated around April 20, 2023 (“April 20 Photo”), 5 shows Mr. Joyner inside of the Honda HR-V allegedly stolen in Armed Carjacking 1, holding a firearm in his left hand and a wad of cash in his right hand. Id. at 6 fig. 5. See Gov’t Ex. (“GX”) 1601A. The other four photos (“Two-Tone Gun Photos”) either depict Mr. Joyner holding a two-tone gun or, in one of the photos, simply a two-tone gun lying on the floor. Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at Exs. 1–4. Metadata for the Two-Tone Gun Photos suggests that these were taken in January of 2023. See GX-1601B–E. The Government contends that it wishes to offer the April 20 Photo and the Two-Tone Gun Photos for two alleged non-propensity purposes: (1) as evidence that Mr. Joyner’s possession of a firearm during the indicted robberies and carjackings was knowing; and (2) as evidence that he had ready access to firearms, and thus could commit these crimes. Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. Mot. at 1, ECF No. 63. For example, the Government explains that because “no witness will be able to testify that they saw [Mr. Joyner] in actual possession of [a] firearm” 5 Although the Government represents that the photograph was taken on April 20, its associated metadata suggests that it was captured on April 19, 2023. 10 during Armed Robberies 1 and 3, photos of Mr. Joyner holding a firearm at other times will make this fact more likely. Gov’t’s Mot. at 39. The Government also explains that to prove that Mr. Joyner brandished or discharged a firearm during the commission of Armed Robberies 1–10 and Armed Carjackings 1–2, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) or (iii), it needs to establish that he knowingly possessed a firearm. See Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. Mot. at 2–3; see also United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In order to convict defendants of using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), the government must prove: (1) that defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm, and (2) the use or carrying of the firearm occurred during and in relation to a crime of violence.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Government contends, evidence that Mr. Joyner possessed a gun on occasions other than the indicted robberies and carjackings can help it establish the required mens rea element of the charged § 924(c) offenses. 6 The Court finds, however, that photographs of Mr. Joyner’s firearm possession on such other occasions are not particularly probative of his knowledge regarding his alleged firearm use during the charged offenses. It is true, as the Government observes, that “in cases where a defendant is charged with unlawful possession of something, evidence that he possessed the same or similar things at other times is often quite relevant to his knowledge and intent with regard to the crime charged.” Cassell, 292 F.3d at 793 (quoting United States v. King, 254 F.3d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). However, the Government overlooks that this principle is 6 Mr. Joyner is also charged in two counts with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Superseding Indictment at 2–3, 14. However, the Government has not indicated that it seeks to introduce evidence of Mr. Joyner’s prior firearm possession to establish the mens rea element of the § 922(g)(1) charges. 11 generally confined to cases in which the defendant is charged with constructive possession. 7 See United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In the context of a weapon- possession case, Rule 404(b) evidence of intent is relevant to a theory of constructive possession, but not to a theory of actual possession.”). “The government can prove possession by showing that a defendant exercised either direct physical control over a thing (actual possession) or ‘dominion or control’ over the thing itself or the area in which it was found (constructive possession).” United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, the Government’s theory appears to be that Mr. Joyner exercised actual control over a firearm when he brandished or discharged it while committing Armed Robberies 1–10 and Armed Carjackings 1–2. See generally Superseding Indictment. But “[t]he D.C. Circuit has never held, as far as the Government notes or this Court is aware, that evidence of prior possession of a gun is probative of knowledge, absence of mistake, or any other non-propensity purpose to support an actual- possession theory in a gun case.” United States v. Burns, No. 24-cr-151, 2025 WL 1078781, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2025). 7 Indeed, although the Government is correct that courts routinely admit evidence of prior firearm possession to establish a defendant’s knowing possession of a firearm, the cases it cites in support of this proposition all involved constructive possession charges. See Hr’g Tr. at 12:14–16 (The Court: “Okay. And do you have an actual possession case that you think applies here?” The Government: “No, Your Honor, not off the bat, not with regards to actual possession.”). In Cassel, for example, the defendant was charged with constructive possession of firearms and ammunition found in his bedroom in his uncle’s house, which the defendant claimed belonged to his uncle. 292 F.3d at 793. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to admit evidence of the defendant’s prior gun possession to rebut this claim, finding that this evidence “was relevant to show [the defendant’s] knowledge of, and intent to possess, the firearms recovered from his room.” Id. at 792. Similarly, in United States v. Williams, also cited by the Government, the district court admitted images of the defendant previously holding a gun to prove knowledge and absence of mistake with respect to a firearm found inside the defendant’s backpack. 507 F. Supp. 3d 181, 191 (D.D.C. 2020). The district court agreed with the prosecution that these images “ma[d]e it more likely that [the defendant] knew of the firearm in his backpack.” Id. 12  Unlike for actual possession, “[i]t is settled law” in this Circuit and others that “prior firearm possession by a defendant is probative of his knowledge and intent to possess a weapon when the theory of prosecution is one of constructive possession.” United States v. Fields, No. 18-cr-267, 2019 WL 690347, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2019). This is intuitive. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “knowledge and intent are frequently at issue” in such cases, given that “[a] defendant will often deny any knowledge of a thing found in an area that is under his control (e.g., a residence, an automobile) or claim that it was placed there by accident or mistake.” Jones, 484 F.3d at 788. This scenario offers “a classic case for introducing prior instances of gun possession, since the government would otherwise find it extremely difficult to prove that the charged possession was knowing.” United States v. Garner, 396 F.3d 438, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). That is, evidence of prior firearm possession can help the prosecution show that the defendant “knew of, and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over,” a firearm recovered from an area under his control. Cassell, 292 F.3d at 792 (citation modified). In contrast, once the prosecution establishes actual possession by showing that a “defendant had a firearm under his immediate physical control, any contention that he did not know the nature of what he possessed is effectively precluded.” Jones, 484 F.3d at 788. And when the prosecution can make this showing, the value of Rule 404(b) evidence in proving knowledge or intent lessens significantly. The D.C. Circuit underscored this point in United States v. Linares. See 367 F.3d at 946–47. There, the evidence at trial established that Linares, while inside a car with two friends, got into an argument with a group of people standing outside of a nightclub that ended in “the firing of six shots from Linares’s car, and with Linares speeding away.” Id. at 943–44. One of the passengers in the car testified that she saw Linares shoot the 13 gun. Id. at 944. Furthermore, police officers pursued Linares and saw him holding the gun out of the car window before throwing it over a nearby fence. Id. Linares was charged with being a felon in possession of a handgun, and at trial, the district court admitted evidence of Linares’s prior firearm possession to prove intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake with respect to the discarded handgun. Id. at 945. The D.C. Circuit concluded this was error, however. Amid eyewitness testimony that Linares had physically possessed the gun before throwing it out of his car window, the D.C. Circuit rejected the idea that “Linares’s previous possession of a pistol ma[de] it any more likely that he knowingly possessed a gun this time.” Id. at 946. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “it is hard to see how Linares could possibly have possessed the gun unknowingly, i.e., without being aware that he possessed it or without realizing that the object in his hand was a gun.” Id. Similar to Linares, the Government here will present evidence that the perpetrator of the indicted robberies and carjackings actually used a firearm. See, e.g., Gov’t’s Mot. at 3 fig. 1 (surveillance footage from the store targeted during Armed Robbery 1 depicting the robber holding a gun), 9 fig. 7 (same for Armed Robbery 2), 14 fig. 11 (same for Armed Robbery 4), 18 fig. 13 (same for Armed Robbery 6). This is the case even for Armed Robberies 1 and 3. See, e.g., id. at 2–3, 9–11 (noting that surveillance footage from Armed Robbery 1 captured the perpetrator holding a gun and that cartridge casings were recovered from the scenes of Armed Robberies 1 and 3). If the Government can present non-Rule 404(b) evidence to the jury demonstrating that Mr. Joyner—assuming he is the perpetrator—brandished or discharged a gun during the indicted offenses, it has little need to show the jury five photographs of Mr. Joyner holding a gun on unrelated occasions to prove that his use of the gun during those offenses was knowing. By showing the jury these photographs, the Government would effectively be inviting 14 it to draw an impermissible propensity inference—that because Mr. Joyner possessed and had ready access to guns on other occasions, he is the sort of person who is likely to have used a gun while committing the indicted robberies and carjackings. The Government argues that Linares is distinguishable because here, the identity of the perpetrator of the offenses is at issue. See Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. Suppl. Mot. at 5, ECF No. 126. “Because the individual depicted in the surveillance footage is masked,” the Government contends, Mr. Joyner “may argue that he is not the person depicted in the surveillance footage.” Id. at 3. At the motions hearing, the Government thus suggested that if Mr. Joyner “can simply deny even being present, that, too, is grounds for allowing the introduction” of the photographs depicting his prior firearm use. Hr’g Tr. at 12:11–13. The Court does not follow this reasoning. Evidently, proof that Mr. Joyner has had guns in the past does not make it more likely that he is the masked robber simply because the masked robber also had a gun. 8 The photos will thus be of no use to the jury as it attempts to determine if the masked robber is, in fact, Mr. Joyner. Indeed, based on the surveillance footage—which clearly shows a masked robber wielding a gun—no reasonable jury could find that the robber (whoever he is) did not knowingly use a gun. It is not the robber’s knowledge of the gun that is at issue here; it is his identity. Still, the Court agrees with the Government that knowledge would be placed at issue if Mr. Joyner claims that he “lacked access to firearms and thus did not have an opportunity to commit armed robbery.” Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. Suppl. Mot. at 3. In that situation, evidence of 8 The photographs might have more relevance in this regard if the Government had sought to connect the firearms depicted therein to the ones used to commit the charged offenses. But the Government has not represented that it seeks to introduce the five photographs as proof that the firearms in the photographs are the same as those used in the charged offenses. The Court therefore need not address whether, under those circumstances, such photographs might otherwise be admissible under Rule 404(b). 15 Mr. Joyner’s uncharged firearm possession could come in pursuant to Rule 404(b) “not to show [his] propensity to possess firearms, but as ‘similar acts’ evidence to prove, inter alia, his access to firearms and thus his ‘knowledge’ or the ‘absence of [a] mistake or accident.’” United States v. Sepulveda, 420 F. Supp. 3d 153, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)). Such evidence becomes admissible once a defendant proffers a “lack of access” or “lack of possession” defense. Cf. id. (“To be sure, evidence of uncharged firearms is irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, if the defendant takes a position that completely removes his mental state . . . from dispute at trial.”). Thus, if Mr. Joyner testifies that he lacked ready access to firearms, evidence that he used a gun a few months before the charged offenses (Two-Tone Gun Photos) and in the middle of the offenses (April 20 Photo) would bear directly on this defense and could therefore be admitted as rebuttal evidence under Rule 404(b). Another court in this District recently reached a similar conclusion. In United States v. Fairnot, the defendant was charged with constructive possession of two firearms found in his car, and the prosecution moved to admit text messages from his phone discussing firearm sales to prove his knowledge and absence of mistake with respect to the recovered guns. No. 23-cr-24, 2025 WL 3534277, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2025). The district court admitted messages discussing the sale of a firearm of the same make and caliber as one of the recovered guns as intrinsic evidence of the charged offense, as the messages helped explain “how Fairnot might have come to possess such a weapon and constitute direct evidence . . . that Fairnot knowingly possessed the recovered [weapon].” Id. at *6. But the court declined to admit similar messages concerning an unrelated pistol, explaining that such messages “reveal[ed] little about Fairnot’s intent or absence of mistake in knowingly possessing” the recovered guns. Id. Still, the court went on to find that the latter messages would be relevant and admissible as rebuttal evidence if 16 the defendant “were to testify that he lacked familiarity with firearms in general,” as the messages “would speak directly to his acquaintance with firearms.” Id. The court therefore permitted the prosecution to offer these messages in rebuttal, but “only if Defendant . . . open[ed] the door by placing his knowledge of firearms at issue.” Id. Here, the Government anticipates that Mr. Joyner will raise a “lack of possession” defense at trial. See Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. Mot. at 2. It notes that at the time of the charged conduct, Mr. Joyner had prior felony convictions that precluded him from lawfully possessing firearms. Id. According to the Government, Mr. Joyner could therefore argue that he did not commit the offenses charged because he knew he was a felon who was not permitted to possess firearms and who therefore did not have access to firearms. Gov’t’s Reply in Supp. Suppl. Mot. at 5. On the current record, however, it is unclear to the Court whether Mr. Joyner will pursue this defense. Mr. Joyner has neglected to confirm this, and in his opposition brief, he emphasizes that he “has not opened the door to the admission of otherwise inadmissible firearm evidence.” Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at 7 (citation modified). The Court will therefore preclude the Government from moving to introduce photographs of Mr. Joyner’s prior firearm use until and unless Mr. Joyner raises a defense opening the door to this evidence. 9 Cf. United States v. Midyett, 603 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (barring the government from introducing Rule 404(b) evidence in its case-in-chief to rebut a lack-of-possession defense where it was unclear whether the defendant would pursue this defense at trial); United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Although the government is required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to prove defendant’s knowledge of the 9 If Mr. Joyner raises such a defense in opening statements or cross-examination of a Government witness, the Government is, of course, free to move to introduce these photographs during its case-in-chief. 17 firearm . . . prior bad acts are not admissible to prove defendant’s knowledge unless defendant places his mental state at issue or his knowledge of the firearm is not inferable from proof of possession itself.”). If Mr. Joyner raises such a defense, the Government is free to renew its motion to admit the photographs. At that point, the Court will consider whether any of the photos, although admissible under Rule 404(b), must nevertheless be excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. 10 b. Evidence of Clothing Worn During Arrest on April 26, 2023 Second, the Government also seeks to introduce evidence of the clothing Mr. Joyner wore during his April 26, 2023, arrest—for an offense not charged in the instant case—for the purpose of proving his identity as the perpetrator of Armed Carjacking 1 and Armed Robberies 2 and 3. 11 Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at 3–4. As explained above, although Rule 404(b) precludes the 10 Mr. Joyner suggests that the Two-Tone Gun Photos should not be admitted because the Government failed to “provide reasonable [written] notice” of its intent to introduce them. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3)(A); Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Suppl. Mot. at 3 n.1, ECF No. 122.