United States v. Norman Charles Rhodes
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-1842
JudgeJane Branstetter Stranch; Joan L. Larsen; Eric E. Murphy
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name:
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
│
Plaintiff-Appellee, │
> No. 25-1842
│
v. │
│
NORMAN CHARLES RHODES; JEANNIE KAREN PARKER- │
RHODES, aka Jeanie Karen Parker-Rhodes; JULY │
THIRTYFIRST, │
Defendants-Appellants. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:21-cv-12383—Jonathan J.C. Grey, District Judge.
Decided and Filed:
Before: STRANCH, LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Daniel Ginzburg, ABRAHAM & ROSE, P.L.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellants.
Richard L. Parker, Ellen Page DelSole, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. For decades, taxpayers have tried to evade taxes by structuring
their businesses using what they call a “pure trust organization” or “common-law trust.” For just
as long, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has looked through these schemes. This case offers
another example of this trend. Norman Rhodes created three “common-law trusts” to own two
businesses and a home. He and his businesses then stopped paying income taxes. After an audit,
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 2
the IRS issued Rhodes a tax assessment. When he still did not pay, the United States sued him.
The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding that Rhodes owed over
half a million dollars and ordering the sale of his home to pay this debt. Rhodes now claims that
the court should have held a trial. But any rational factfinder would conclude that Rhodes earned
the income produced by his businesses. And the purported entity that owned his home did not
qualify as a trust under Michigan law because it had no definite beneficiaries. We affirm.
I. Background
Rhodes founded a “graphic arts” company in 1980 that he named “Rhodes Graphics.”
Rhodes Dep., R.79-1, PageID 797. This Michigan company undertook “[t]ypesetting and
photography work,” and Rhodes acted as its “main salesman.” Id. He owned and operated
Rhodes Graphics for about six years. While winding down that business, he also bought “D&G
Sign Company.” Id. D&G sold “sign products,” such as billboards, and accompanying
“graphics” for these signs. Id. Rhodes performed a similar sales role for D&G. Id. Throughout
this time, the companies filed corporate tax returns, and Rhodes filed individual returns.
In the 1990s, Rhodes began to search for a different ownership structure for his
businesses. D&G’s operations (which included installing “heavy signs on buildings”) required
significant “liability insurance” because of the risk that a sign might fall and injure people or
property. Rhodes Decl., R.81-2, PageID 1431. So Rhodes wanted to insulate himself from
“personal liability” for any accident. Id., PageID 1432. While attending presentations by a man
named Brent Johnson, Rhodes discovered an ownership structure that he thought would offer this
insulation and allow him to avoid paying taxes.
Johnson marketed common-law trusts (what he called “pure trust organizations”) to
protect “assets from attachment by the IRS[.]” Website, R.79-3, PageID 965. According to
Johnson, these trusts allowed “an ordinary Citizen [to] protect his or her property from the
bureaucratic vultures inhabiting all levels of our government.” Article, R.79-4, PageID 966.
Johnson suggested (without support) that “the Internal Revenue Code” treated these trusts as
“exempt from the income tax,” but he added that they required parties “to divest [themselves] of
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 3
legal control while maintaining practical control of the assets in question.” Id., PageID 966–67.
Johnson marketed the trusts to his customers for a price of a couple thousand dollars.
Johnson explained that common-law trusts had a simple structure to help small
businesses. A businessowner could transfer ownership to the trust, become “the Holder of [a]
Beneficial Interest” in it, and hire a “Fiduciary Owner” or “trustee” to manage its assets. Article,
R.79-4, PageID 967. But the trust would retain the business owner “as General Manager” who
would continue to run the business. Id. The trust would also open a bank account that required
both the fiduciary owner and the general manager to sign checks. As Johnson explained,
businessowners who chose trusts would “not have legal control because [they] alone cannot
access funds” as general managers. Id. But their fiduciary owners also would lack “the ability to
access funds directly,” so the general managers could “maintain practical control.” Id. Johnson
thus opined that “if an IRS agent ever visits you at your work place, you can honestly tell him, ‘I
just work here, go talk to the owner.’” Id. After speaking with Johnson, Rhodes became
convinced that states could not regulate these trusts.
Rhodes created one trust each for two businesses and one property. First, he closed
D&G and started making and installing signs under the name “Signmaker,” an alleged common-
law trust. Rhodes Dep., R.79-1, PageID 799. Johnson served as Signmaker’s fiduciary owner,
and Rhodes served as its general manager. Id., PageID 799, 850. Rhodes ran Signmaker’s day-
to-day operations. It had no employees and hired “subcontractors” to install signs. Id.,
PageID 850–51. Rhodes oversaw the hiring and firing of these subcontractors and maintained
the trust’s books and records. Rhodes’s compensation for his services (his “main source of
income”) was listed “in the general manager’s contract” that he drafted with Johnson. Id.,
PageID 796, 852. He received this compensation by writing “checks” to himself from
Signmaker’s bank account. Id., PageID 852–54. While checks from this account required
Johnson’s signature, Rhodes could not recall a time when Johnson refused to sign.
Second, Rhodes closed Rhodes Graphics and started creating “artwork for printed
materials” using the name “Graphic Associates.” Id., PageID 799–800. Another alleged
“common law trust,” Graphic Associates had the same fiduciary owner (Johnson) and general
manager (Rhodes). It operated in the same way. Rhodes was its sole employee who ran its day-
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 4
to-day operations with the help of his wife, Jeannie Parker-Rhodes. For his services, Rhodes
received “checks” drawn on the Graphic Associates bank account in an amount that he set. Id.,
PageID 839–41, 844. Although Johnson acted as the “fiduciary owner,” he did “nothing” other
than co-sign the Graphic Associates checks. Id., PageID 840–41. And Johnson never second-
guessed the checks that Rhodes drafted.
Third, Rhodes and his wife had paid $150,000 for their home on Harsens Island,
Michigan, in 1992. Six years later, Rhodes transferred the home’s ownership to a common-law
trust that he named after a date of significance to him: “July Thirtyfirst.” He made this transfer
“to insulate” his home from “civil liability judgments from any court actions.” Id., PageID 820.
Rhodes again hired Johnson as July Thirtyfirst’s fiduciary owner.
Rhodes has not filed tax returns since 1997. He thus did not pay taxes on the income that
he admits he received from Signmaker and Graphic Associates. In his “opinion,” his income
never reached a level triggering the duty to file a return (although he did not research that level).
Id., PageID 855–56. The IRS also has no record of “Signmaker” or “Graphic Associates” ever
filing a tax return. Hoops Decl., R.79-14, PageID 1115.
Unfortunately for Rhodes, things did not work out as Johnson had promised him.
Rhodes’s failure to pay income taxes came to the IRS’s attention around 2008. The IRS
assigned Agent Nathaniel Reda to audit Rhodes for the tax years from 2003 to 2008. To add
insult to injury, this IRS investigation led Johnson allegedly to kick Rhodes out of his Harsens
Island home (but to allow Rhodes’s wife to remain there).
At first, Rhodes resisted the IRS investigation. Reda sent two letters to alert him of the
investigation and invite his voluntary participation. When Rhodes did not respond to either
letter, the IRS sent him a summons to appear. Yet he still failed to participate. The IRS thus
asked a district court to enforce the summons. Over Rhodes’s opposition, the court did so.
During his IRS appointment with Reda, though, Rhodes identified himself and then “plead[ed]
the Fifth [Amendment] to all [other] questions asked[.]” Reda Dep., R.79-16, PageID 1354. He
also did not produce any records.
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 5
Stymied by Rhodes, Reda obtained records associated with the “Signmaker” and
“Graphic Associates” bank accounts from Fifth Third Bank. These records showed checks
payable personally to Rhodes from these two accounts. They also showed checks that appeared
to cover Rhodes’s personal expenses—such as his utility bills, donations to a church, and a
payment to his veterinarian. Reda thus concluded that Rhodes owned the two bank accounts.
As a result, Reda treated the deposits into these two accounts from 2003 to 2008 as
Rhodes’s income. To determine his total income, Reda conducted the type of “bank deposits
analysis” that the IRS uses when taxpayers do not keep adequate records. This analysis adds up
the total amount of deposits into an account for the tax year at issue and then subtracts the
“known” non-revenue deposits. Under this method, Reda identified the net deposits into the
Signmaker account (and so Rhodes’s income) as $127,660.06, $74,600.10, $54,900.15,
$38,129.25, $51,992.47, and $31,519.85 for the tax years 2003 through 2008. This method also
showed that the Graphic Associates account had net deposits of $18,600.00, $15,085.00,
$54,215.00, $31,405.00, $10,185.00, and $6,225.00 for those tax years. Using these amounts,
Reda calculated Rhodes’s unpaid income taxes as $46,161.00, $28,404.00, $34,874.00,
$20,426.00, $17,465.00, and $8,851.00. With penalties and interest, Rhodes owed a total of
$641,669.67 as of October 2, 2024.
In 2021, the United States sued Rhodes to obtain a judgment on these liabilities (Count I)
and to enforce the tax liens placed on his Harsens Island home through a judicial sale (Count II).
The district court resolved this case in two orders. In its first order, the court granted partial
summary judgment to the United States. The court ruled for the United States on Count I,
finding that all income in the Signmaker and Graphic Associates bank accounts belonged to
Rhodes as a matter of law. But the court denied summary judgment on Count II. Although
finding that July Thirtyfirst did not qualify as a valid trust, the court reasoned that the true owner
of the Harsens Island home remained unclear and the United States had failed to give notice of
its tax lien.
Because the court’s first order found July Thirtyfirst invalid, the parties stipulated that the
United States was entitled to summary judgment on Count II and asked the court to enter a final
judgment. The court’s second order did so. See United States v. Rhodes, 2025 WL 2428437, at
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 6
*12 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2025). It held that Rhodes owed $558,352.96 in taxes and penalties
plus interest. The court also ordered the United States to sell the Harsens Island home and to
distribute the proceeds in a specific order. Rhodes appealed after the court denied his motion to
amend the judgment. See United States v. Rhodes, 2025 WL 2692039, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
25, 2025).
II. Jurisdiction
At the outset, the United States challenges our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. With a
few exceptions, Congress has given circuit courts jurisdiction only over the “final decisions of
the district courts[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision ‘ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 64
(2018) (quoting Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Operating Eng’rs &
Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 183 (2014)).
A large body of law has applied this final-judgment rule in this foreclosure context. On
the one hand, the Supreme Court has long held that a party may appeal from a judicial order
directing the “sale” of a property if the order settles “the rights of the parties” and leaves
“nothing” to do but undertake the “sale and pay out the proceeds.” R.R. Co. v. Swasey, 90 U.S.
405, 409 (1874); see Whiting v. Bank of the U. S., 38 U.S. 6, 15 (1839); Ray v. Law, 7 U.S. 179,
180 (1805); MSCI 2007-IQ16 Granville Retail, LLC v. UHA Corp., 660 F. App’x 459, 460 (6th
Cir. 2016); United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2015). Under this rule, a case
becomes final once a court orders the sale. See Whiting, 38 U.S. at 15. The party losing
possession of the property need not wait for the sale before appealing because of the “irreparable
mischief” that would arise if the party obtained a reversal only after the sale occurred. Id.; see
Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 203–04 (1848). The Court has followed this rule even when the
order of sale contemplated additional post-sale proceedings to determine the priorities of the
various creditors or to undertake an accounting. See First Nat’l Bank of Cleveland v. Shedd, 121
U.S. 74, 84–85 (1887); see also Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126–27 (1945).
On the other hand, preliminary decisions that do not order a sale and require more
judicial actions do not qualify as final. See Citibank, N. A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 7
333, 337–38 (5th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has held, for example, that a court did not
issue a final order when it decided that a property owner owed a debt but did not calculate the
debt’s amount or identify the property that the creditor could sell to satisfy it. See Swasey, 90
U.S. at 409–10; see also Grant v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins., 106 U.S. 429, 431–32 (1882).
Likewise, a court did not issue a final order when it concluded that a junior creditor still had a
valid interest in a property because the court had not identified the amounts the property owner
owed and had prohibited any creditor from selling the property without “further judicial action of
the court.” Burlington, Cedar Rapids & N. Ry. v. Simmons, 123 U.S. 52, 54 (1887); see Parsons
v. Robinson, 122 U.S. 112, 115–16 (1887); United States v. Allahyari, 99 F.4th 486, 493–95 (9th
Cir. 2024).
This case falls within the first group of cases, not the second. To start, the district court’s
judgment identified the precise amount of Rhodes’s debt to the United States: “$558,352.96”
plus interest. Am. Judgment, R.116, PageID 2138; see Citicorp Real Est., Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d
1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998). Next, the judgment contains what looks like a clear “decree of sale
absolutely and without reserve, which could be carried into execution at once[.]” Burlington,
123 U.S. at 55 (discussing Shedd, 121 U.S. at 84–85). It indicates that the United States “shall
sell the entire real property” on Harsens Island “at a judicial sale (including by a receiver if
requested by the United States), free and clear of all rights, titles, or interests of the parties,
including any rights of redemption.” Am. Judgment, R.116, PageID 2138 (emphasis added).
Lastly, the judgment even lists the various priorities of the proceeds from this sale. It instructs
that the proceeds should first go toward the expenses of the sale. Id. Then they should pay “any
real estate taxes due” to St. Clair County, Michigan. Id. Of the remainder, the United States
must pay 50% to Rhodes’s wife for her interest in the property. Id. It may keep the rest in
satisfaction of the tax debts. Id. By all accounts, then, this judgment appears to decide on “the
rights of the parties” and leave “nothing” to do but execute the “sale and pay out the proceeds.”
Swasey, 90 U.S. at 409.
The government has three rejoinders. It first argues that the district court has yet to issue
a “decree of sale.” Appellee’s Br. 31 (quoting Burlington, 123 U.S. at 56). We do not
understand this claim. The district court issued a final judgment ordering the government to sell
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 8
the Harsens Island property. So it has, in fact, issued such a decree. Indeed, the judgment looks
like the decree of sale in Shedd, which “ordered that the whole property be sold as an entirety, at
not less than $625,000” and added that the purchaser would own the property free “of the lien of
the mortgages, receiver’s certificates, costs, expenses, etc.” 121 U.S. at 84; see Burlington, 123
U.S. at 56.
The government next claims that this order of sale does not suffice because it did not
include “details” on how the government should execute the order and stated that the government
could request a receiver. Appellee’s Br. 33; see 26 U.S.C. § 7403(d). Yet the government does
not cite a single case (and we are aware of none) that requires a court to provide these
“execution” instructions before a judgment can become final. To the contrary, courts have
recognized an order of sale’s finality even when the government later filed a post-judgment
motion to appoint a receiver to execute the order of sale. See United States v. Gould, 2026 WL
2075559, at *2 (9th Cir. July 17, 2026); United States v. Byers, 133 F.4th 824, 829 n.2 (8th Cir.
2025). And judgments for a sum of money likewise do not contain these types of instructions.
But that does not render them nonfinal as long as they say “who is entitled to what from whom.”
Horn v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 898 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1990).
The government lastly points out that the order of sale has not “determined” the specific
amount of St. Clair County’s tax lien because it instructed only that this county lien must take
priority over the United States’ lien. Appellee’s Br. 33. As a result, a post-judgment dispute
might arise between the county and the United States over the sale’s proceeds. But this
uncertainty existed in Shedd as well. There, the order of sale left open “[a]ll disputes and
controversies between the” various mortgagees, including disputes over “the priority of the lien
of the said mortgages[.]” 121 U.S. at 84. Nevertheless, the judgment in Shedd was final because
of the conclusive order of sale. See Burlington, 123 U.S. at 55. And that fact distinguished the
Court’s decision in Parsons, which found that an order was not final partially because of ongoing
disputes over the priorities of various liens. 122 U.S. at 115. The Court reconciled Shedd and
Parsons on clear grounds: “in Shedd’s Case there was actually a decree of sale; in Parson’s Case
there was not.” Burlington, 123 U.S. at 56.
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 9
This key question (does an order of sale exist?) also distinguishes the other cases that the
government cites. See Allahyari, 99 F.4th at 491–95; United States v. Simons, 419 F. App’x 852,
855–56 (10th Cir. 2011). The district court in Allahyari made clear that it would enter a later
“order for judicial sale” after further briefing. 99 F.4th at 493. And the district court in Simons
“left unresolved the government’s ultimate request for relief seeking a forced sale of the
property.” 419 F. App’x at 856. Without an order of sale, both cases fell on Parsons’s non-final
side of the line. Yet here, as in Shedd, the district court awarded that final relief. We thus have
jurisdiction.
III. Merits
Rhodes raises two main arguments on the merits. Starting with Count I, he claims that
the district court committed several errors when holding him liable for the income in the
Signmaker and Graphic Associates bank accounts. Turning to Count II, he contends that the
court wrongly held that July Thirtyfirst was not a valid trust. At this summary-judgment stage,
we review both arguments de novo. See Davis v. Echo Valley Condo. Ass’n, 945 F.3d 483, 489
(6th Cir. 2019).
A. Count I: Income Tax Liabilities
Rhodes does not dispute the basic rules that apply when the IRS issues an “assessment”
to a taxpayer for “unpaid taxes.” United States v. Fior D’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 242 (2002).
He does not challenge the IRS’s claim that his failure to keep adequate records allows the IRS to
use any reliable “method” to determine his income. United States v. Walton, 909 F.2d 915, 918
(6th Cir. 1990) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 446(b)). Nor does Rhodes dispute that Reda’s method to
determine his income in this case—the “bank deposit method”—is reliable. Clayton v. Comm’r,
102 T.C. 632, 645 (1994); see Langille v. Comm’r, 447 F. App’x 130, 132 (11th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Ludwig, 897 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1990). And Rhodes does not dispute that
Reda’s use of this method triggered a “presumption” that the assessment correctly identified his
income (and unpaid taxes). Fior D’Italia, 536 U.S. at 242; see Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S.
507, 513–14 (1935); United States v. Rohner, 634 F. App’x 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2015); United
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 10
States v. Besase, 623 F.2d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 1980); Gasper v. Comm’r, 225 F.2d 284, 288 (6th
Cir. 1955).
Given this presumption, Rhodes bore an initial “burden” in this litigation “of producing
contrary evidence” that he did not receive the income that Reda’s assessment attributed to him.
Walton, 909 F.2d at 918. Under our caselaw, however, taxpayers face “much less of a burden”
when they must disprove the receipt of income (rather than prove the application of a deduction).
Besase, 623 F.2d at 465 (quoting Weir v. Comm’r, 283 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 1960)); see
United States v. Hammon, 277 F. App’x 560, 563 (6th Cir. 2008). To shift the burden of
persuasion to the government, Rhodes could do one of two things. He could assert a “reasonable
denial” of the receipt of the challenged income. Hammon, 277 F. App’x at 563; see Besase, 623
F.2d at 466. To be reasonable, though, Rhodes had to do more than make a “[v]ague” or
“general” claim that he did not receive the income attributed to him. Rohner, 634 F. App’x at
499 (quoting Hammon, 277 F. App’x at 563). So this test matches our general summary-
judgment rules: To shift the burden, Rhodes must present evidence from which “a rational trier
of fact” could rule in his favor. Viet v. Le, 951 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)). Alternatively, Rhodes could prove the assessment’s
allocation of income to him lacked even a “minimal evidentiary foundation” to prevent its
enforcement. Walton, 909 F.2d at 919.
Rhodes does not dispute that Reda’s assessment had a “minimal evidentiary foundation.”
Id. Rather, he claims that his declaration in opposition to the government’s summary-judgment
motion made a “reasonable denial” that he received the income produced by the Signmaker and
Graphic Associates businesses. Hammon, 277 F. App’x at 563. He is mistaken. At the outset,
Rhodes does not dispute that these two “business[es]” generated taxable “[g]ross income[.]” 26
U.S.C. § 61(a)(2). He instead claims that he should not have to pay taxes on this income because
he did not earn it. See Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 433–34 (2005). But if not him, who?
He does not argue that Signmaker and Graphic Associates should have paid because he says they
are not “distinct legal entit[ies]” as trusts. Appellant’s Br. 27 (quoting Americold Realty Tr. v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 383 (2016)). We thus may exclude these entities (or in
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 11
Rhodes’s nomenclature “fiduciary relationships”) from the inquiry. That fact leaves either
Johnson or Rhodes as the person who earned the income and owed the taxes.
For several reasons, no “rational trier of fact” could conclude that Johnson—rather than
Rhodes—earned the income that these businesses produced. Viet, 951 F.3d at 823 (citation
modified). Start with the background. Before meeting Johnson, Rhodes had been running both a
“graphic arts” business and a “signage” business. Rhodes Dep., R.79-1, PageID 797. He
ensured that these companies paid their taxes and that he filed individual returns on his income
from them. But he then met Johnson. Johnson marketed a common-law “trust” as “exempt from
the income tax” (without citation to the Internal Revenue Code). Article, R.79-4, PageID 966.
He also suggested that this trust structure allowed a businessowner to “maintain practical
control” of a business as its general manager even if a fiduciary owner had “legal” (or on-paper)
control. Id., PageID 967. And Rhodes chose this format for his signage business (Signmaker)
and graphic-arts business (Graphic Associates), appointing Johnson as the fiduciary owner and
himself as the general manager.
Next consider how these new “trust” businesses operated. Rhodes admits that he
continued to conduct the day-to-day operations just as he had done when the businesses were
companies. He also admits that he received personal income for his services by paying himself
money from the Signmaker and Graphic Associates accounts. Yet he paid no taxes on this
income and offered only a “[v]ague and general” excuse for this failure. Hammon, 277 F. App’x
at 563. We thus find it undisputed that he owed taxes on at least this part of the income from the
businesses.
What about the income that Rhodes left in the Signmaker and Graphic Associates
accounts and purportedly did not pay to himself? Here too, no “rational trier of fact” could
conclude that Johnson earned this income. Viet, 951 F.3d at 823 (citation modified). Johnson
neither benefitted from nor controlled the businesses or their bank accounts. As for any benefit,
no evidence exists that Johnson ever took a penny of Signmaker’s or Graphic Associates’
earnings. Rhodes also could not identify any checks from the accounts paid to Johnson. As for
any control, Rhodes could not offer a specific example of when Johnson refused to approve a
check. And while Rhodes claims that he received Johnson’s input for business decisions, these
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 12
“general allegations” would not permit any factfinder to conclude that Johnson earned the
income in light of the overwhelming evidence that Rhodes ran the businesses. Viet, 951 F.3d at
823 (citation modified).
In sum, every rational trier of fact would reach the same conclusion: that Rhodes created
these trusts (just as Johnson advertised) to avoid paying taxes on his earned business income.
But the tax laws do not permit a party to “attribute[]” via contract “the fruits” of a business “to a
different tree from that on which they grew.” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
Rhodes’s responses do not change things. He first criticizes the district court’s decision
to disregard his sworn declaration because he exercised his right to remain silent during the IRS
audit. True, the district court suggested that Rhodes’s decision to “invok[e] the Fifth
Amendment” during the IRS audit barred him from testifying about his businesses in this case
because the audit and the case qualified as the same proceeding. Rhodes, 2025 WL 2428437, at
*8; see Rhodes, 2025 WL 2692039, at *2. We have our doubts about this conclusion, especially
because Rhodes sat for a deposition and subjected himself to cross-examination during the case.
See In re Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th 176, 205 (6th Cir. 2022) (opinion of Griffin, J.); id. at 218
(Thapar, J., concurring). But we need not resolve this issue. The district court went on to
conclude that Rhodes failed to create a genuine issue of material fact even accepting his
declaration’s allegations. See Rhodes, 2025 WL 2428437, at *8. We affirm on that basis alone.
Rhodes next turns to 26 U.S.C. § 7491(a). This statute (which dates to 1998) says that
the IRS “shall have the burden of proof” on “any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the
liability of [a] taxpayer” if the “taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to” that issue.
26 U.S.C. § 7491(a); see Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3001(a), 112 Stat. 685, 726–27. And whether or not Rhodes’s
declaration makes a “reasonable denial,” Hammon, 277 F. App’x at 563, he says it at least
qualifies as “credible evidence” on the “issue” of who owns the income flowing into the
Signmaker and Graphic Associates bank accounts, 26 U.S.C. § 7491(a). Yet § 7491(a) applies
only if “the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this title and has cooperated with
reasonable requests by the [IRS] for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and
interviews[.]” Id. § 7491(a)(2)(B). Rhodes did none of these things. He thus cannot avail
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 13
himself of § 7491(a)’s burden-shifting rule even if he did produce “credible evidence.” Indeed,
one might take this conclusion one step farther: If taxpayers may not shift the burden of proof
under § 7491(a), why should they be able to do so under our preexisting “reasonable denial”
standard? Put another way, how should § 7491(a)’s codified language affect our prior judicially
created burden-shifting test? As in a prior case, we can save this question for another day
because Rhodes’s failure to satisfy that reasonable-denial test renders it unnecessary to decide.
See Rohner, 634 F. App’x at 499 n.4.
Rhodes also disputes Reda’s opinion that Rhodes wrote many checks from the Signmaker
and Graphic Associates bank accounts to pay personal expenses. Reda, for example, suggested
that Rhodes wrote the following personal checks from the accounts: a check to a veterinary
hospital for a family pet, checks to utility companies for the gas and electricity at his Harsens
Island home, checks to a local church for private religious donations, and checks to a health
insurer for personal medical expenses. According to Reda, these checks confirmed that the bank
accounts contained Rhodes’s income that he spent as he pleased.
In his declaration, Rhodes asserted that all these items qualified as valid business
expenses of Signmaker and Graphic Associates (seemingly in conflict with his claim that these
trusts were fiduciary relationships rather than legal entities). He, for example, alleged that the
veterinary care was for a “guard dog” that he kept at the “office space” for his businesses before
he began to operate them out of his home. Rhodes Decl., R.81-2, PageID 1434. And he said that
the businesses paid his home’s “utility bills” only after he started working from home. Id.,
PageID 1435. He also claimed that the checks he wrote to the local church were “small
charitable donations” from the businesses (rather than from himself). Id., PageID 1436. Lastly,
he asserted that he paid the health insurer “for group health insurance for Signmaker and Graphic
Associates workers.” Id.
One might wonder whether a factfinder would believe these claims. For example,
Rhodes testified that Graphic Associates had only one employee (himself) and that Signmaker
had only a contractor and subcontractors, not employees. Rhodes Dep., R.79-1, PageID 839,
850–51. So why would these businesses have “group health insurance” for “workers”? Rhodes
Decl., R.81-2, PageID 1436. That said, the district court found that Rhodes’s declaration
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 14
contained “plausible explanations” for the checks. Rhodes, 2025 WL 2428437, at *7. And we
may not “ignore” Rhodes’s declaration on summary judgment “simply because [he] might find it
difficult to convince a” factfinder. Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 404 (6th Cir. 2022).
But this conclusion does not change things. These explanations might suggest that
Rhodes could have lowered his taxable income (as compared to the amount in Reda’s
assessment) by taking deductions for business expenses. See 26 U.S.C. § 63(a). Yet Rhodes
concedes that he does not “challenge the quantum of the IRS’s assessment.” Reply Br. 9
(emphasis added). That is, he does not claim that he had taxable income that Reda’s bank
deposits method overestimated. Rather, Rhodes claims that he earned none of the taxable
income in the Signmaker and Graphic Associates bank accounts. We do not need to rely on any
of the specific checks to conclude that every “rational trier of fact” would reject this claim. Viet,
951 F.3d at 823 (citation modified).
* * *
The facts of this case are largely undisputed: Johnson convinced Rhodes that he could
avoid paying taxes by restructuring his businesses using common-law trusts. But Rhodes then
continued to operate his businesses in largely the same way (with the exception of occasionally
speaking with Johnson about the businesses and getting his co-signatures on checks). For nearly
100 years, however, the Supreme Court has held that taxpayers cannot “escape[]” tax obligations
through contractual arrangements. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115. Indeed, many courts have upheld
criminal convictions for similar schemes using purported common-law trusts or pure trust
organizations. See United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1220–21 (10th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Beam, 528 F. App’x 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422,
1430–31 (10th Cir. 1990). So Rhodes’s civil liability breaks no new ground.
B. Count II: Property Lien
Rhodes likewise does not dispute the legal rules that apply when the government tries to
collect unpaid taxes. Once the IRS issues an assessment, the “amount” that a taxpayer owes
becomes “a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to” the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6321; see id. § 6322. The government
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 15
may then sue to enforce the lien and request a sale of the property. See United States v. Davis,
815 F.3d 253, 257 (6th Cir. 2016); 26 U.S.C. § 7403. Courts must ask both a state-law question
and a federal-law question to resolve whether a tax lien has attached to specific real estate. State
law determines the interests that a taxpayer possesses in that land because § 6321 does not itself
create property rights. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002). But federal law
determines whether this state-law interest gives a taxpayer ownership of “property” or “rights to
property” and thus whether a lien may attach to the land under § 6321. See id. at 278–79.
The government invoked § 6321 in this suit. It sought an order of sale for Rhodes’s
Harsens Island home, claiming that Reda’s assessment created a lien on that home. But Rhodes
responded that he did not own the Harsens Island “property” and had no “rights to” it because he
had transferred the home to the July Thirtyfirst trust. 26 U.S.C. § 6321. The district court
disagreed, reasoning that July Thirtyfirst was not a valid trust. See Rhodes, 2025 WL 2428437,
at *10–11. If July Thirtyfirst were a nullity, Rhodes stipulated that he and his wife would still
own the home. Id. at *11. But he now challenges the district court’s ruling about this trust’s
validity.
Because § 6321 does not create property interests, we must turn to Michigan law to
decide whether Rhodes properly established (and transferred his home to) July Thirtyfirst. See
Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. To establish a trust under Michigan law, a “settlor” must satisfy five
requirements. Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.7402(1) (2026). The settlor must have the “capacity to
create a trust.” Id. § 700.7402(1)(a). The settlor must show an “intention to create” one. Id.
§ 700.7402(1)(b). The trust must have “a definite beneficiary” (or satisfy other conditions that
do not matter here). Id. § 700.7402(1)(c). The trustee must have “duties to perform.” Id.
§ 700.7402(1)(d). And a person cannot be both “sole trustee and sole beneficiary.” Id.
§ 700.7402(1)(e).
All agree that Johnson, in his capacity as the “fiduciary owner” of July Thirtyfirst, served
as its trustee. This case instead turns on the third requirement: Did July Thirtyfirst also have a
“definite beneficiary”? Id. § 700.7402(1)(c); see Helene S. Shapo et al., Bogert’s The Law of
Trusts and Trustees § 161, Westlaw (database updated May 2026). The articles creating this
trust used the phrase “Certificate holder” rather than beneficiary. Articles, R.79-11, PageID
No. 25-1842 USA v. Norman Rhodes, et al. Page 16
1044–45, 1049. And Rhodes and his wife were the first certificate holders. Rhodes Dep., R.79-
1, PageID 827. If certificate holders had the same substantive interests in the trust property that
beneficiaries must possess, Rhodes correctly notes that the “particular form of words” that he
used likely would not affect the trust’s validity. In re Est. of Matusinski, 2007 WL 1934791, at
*2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 3, 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Frost v. Frost, 131 N.W. 60, 61 (Mich.
1911)).
Still, Rhodes’s argument fails because the certificate holders lack the required interest.
Under the relevant definition of “beneficiary” in Michigan trust law, the person designated as
such must have “a present or future beneficial interest in [the] trust,” whether “vested or
contingent.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.7103(l)(i). Given this interest, “a fundamental feature of
a trust is the separation of legal and equitable title.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 942
F.3d 748, 750 (6th Cir. 2019). The t